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Abstract 
This thesis examines the operation of morally asymmetrical 
distinctions in the discourse produced in advance of the invasion of 
Iraq in March 2003. It does not set out to explain the invasion's 
occurrence, but, based upon the analysis of media texts, parliamentary 
debates, and political speeches, focuses upon aspects of the processes 
of justification and criticism preceding invasion. 
It blends together aspects of the work of Michel Foucault and 
Niklas Luhmann, with insights drawn from various approaches to the 
analysis of discourse and communication, in pursuit of an 
understanding of how the discursive space available to contributors to 
debate is restricted. It pays close attention to the closely related 
processes of `disclaiming' and `ontological gerrymandering' 
- 
interventions which are concerned with controlling what is, and is not, 
the case 
- 
particularly in terms of the way that they are orientated 
towards controlling how the person making them is to be observed. 
It is argued that the circulation of the illegitimacy of various 
positions puts some contributors at risk of being observed according to 
the more negative side of a morally asymmetrical distinction. It is 
argued that this creates `difficulty' for them, and incites their 
engagement in particular forms of discursive work in the attempt to 
avoid illegitimacy themselves. 
Close attention is paid to any observable regularities in the 
ways in which contributors attempted to avoid having their position 
associated with, amongst other things, `anti-Americanism', 
`appeasement', ` pacifism', `warmongering', or a `pro-Saddam' stance, 
all of which would threaten their legitimacy. 
A variety of techniques are identified, including the invocation 
of a contributor's history of positions (their `communicative career'), 
as well as their use of their allegedly less legitimate context-specific 
allies as a contrastive foil, at the expense of whom they claim their 
own legitimacy. 
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1. Introduction 
[T]he cognitive style of `What? ' questions must be changed to 
that of `How? ' questions. The unity of what is asked with a 
`What? ' question is always a product of the system that asks the 
question. It is therefore necessary to know first how it is that the 
question came to be asked. The system, whether a psychic or 
social one, asks how it asks about what is as it is. But even this 
statement is naturally nothing more than a communicative 
maneuver of redirecting communication. I don't know if I mean 
what I say. And if I knew, I would have to keep it to myself. 
(Luhmann, 2002: 183-4). 
Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always 
interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; 
there are things we know we know. We also know there are 
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things 
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns 
- 
the 
ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout 
the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter 
category that tend to be the difficult ones. 
(Rumsfeld, 2002). 
According to Zizek (2003: 9), the key omission from the above 
statement by Donald Rumsfeld is the possibility of `unknown knowns' 
- 
what we do not know that we know 
- 
which corresponds with the 
Freudian unconscious. Although psychoanalysis lies beyond the scope 
of this project, it is fair to ask how many people with access to the 
global news media were actually shocked in the sense of being 
surprised by the fact the bombing campaign known as `shock and 
awe' was launched by the `coalition of the willing' in March 2003. 
We knew it was going to happen even if we did not acknowledge that 
we knew it. 
Whilst the mass media arguably framed the `first' Gulf War in 
1991 as `an exciting narrative, as a nightly miniseries with dramatic 
conflict, action and adventure' (Kellner, 1995: 210), with the 
expansion of 24 hour news in the period between the two wars, it is 
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perhaps better to describe the coverage of the 2003 invasion as less a 
miniseries than a month long uninterrupted media marathon. 
Moreover, it was one with over a year's worth of advance publicity. 
The use of military force against Iraq had been a looming 
possibility for the preceding 18 months, despite ongoing diplomatic 
wrangling and the return to Iraq of the United Nations weapons 
inspectors. Despite the concerted efforts to prevent it, we all knew 
that it was going to happen, even those of us that wanted not to admit 
as much. 
Sociologically many dimensions of the conflict could be 
explored analytically, ranging from its historical connection to US 
foreign policy in general to the significance of communications 
technology such as the internet in the organisation of the world-wide 
anti-war protests in February 2003 (Alexander, 2004: 283). 
Thus far, a variety of accounts of, and explanations for, the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 have been forthcoming, including those 
criticising the official reasons advanced to justify it. These have 
ranged from Herman's (2004: 177) identification of three main 
`gambits' 
- 
demonisation of Saddam Hussein, claims regarding Iraq's 
possession of weapons of mass destruction threatening US Security, 
and the failed diplomacy and inspections - to Ali's (2002: 146) 
advance account of the official `apologetics' - Saddam Hussein's 
`insatiable' aggression, his stockpiling of `weapons of mass 
destruction', and his regime's `malignant ferocity'. Zizek's (2003: 1) 
account discusses the various arguments used, claiming that their 
inconsistency recalls Freud's `borrowed kettle' joke 
- 
the enunciation 
of inconsistent arguments serving to confirm the very thing that it 
endeavours to deny. 
This project aims to explore the discourse produced in the 
controversy surrounding the invasion, focussing upon the dynamics 
(or otherwise) of the openness or closure of the space available for 
debate, and the closely associated struggle for definition involved in 
justification and criticism. In particular, attention is directed to the 
circulation of morally asymmetrical distinctions and identifications, 
2 
and the `difficulty' that they can create for contributors to debate. 
Attention is directed to the sense in which the arguments made are 
morally loaded, and how they rely upon particular definitions of the 
situation for their efficacy. 
In the rest of this chapter I give preliminary consideration to 
questions relating to issues such as: the problem driving the thesis; its 
theoretical location; the analytic strategy adopted; the analytical foci; 
and the project's possible utility. Each of these strands is discussed 
under its own heading below. 
1.1. The Problem: Morality and Discourse 
1.1.1. Morality 
Issues relating to morality were a direct motivating factor for many of 
those authors credited with a key role in the establishment and 
development of sociology. However, it is not especially prominent in 
contemporary research. Few studies are explicitly framed in moral 
terms (although there are obvious theoretical exceptions 
- 
Bauman, 
1993; 1995; Smart, 1999; Fevre, 2002). 
This situation may be due in part to the decline in shared moral 
frameworks that has allegedly beset western capitalist societies 
(Maclntyre, 1985). In a temporal, spatial and cultural location where 
meta-narratives and certainties seem decreasingly popular, discussing 
`ethics' rather than `morality' sounds less harsh somehow, and being 
`ethically engaged' lacks many of the negative connotations of force 
and coercion associated with `moralising'. 
Despite an apparent aversion to explicitly discussing morality, 
there is nevertheless a widespread tendency to get involved, and 
sometimes preoccupied, with various conceptions of the `should'. A 
lot of research operates within a space in which the gap between what 
is the case and what (really) should be the case is all-important. Some 
sort of normative background is an unavoidable feature of all writing, 
but when it becomes the main focus of attention rather than how and 
why some situation came about it can often take on a rather moralising 
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tone (the source of Luhmann's frustration with much of the work of 
the Frankfurt School 
- 
see Luhmann, 2002: 187-93). 
1.1.2. Discourse 
Within most of the social `sciences' and their closely associated 
subjects there has been an ever-increasing interest in something often 
referred to as `discourse'. Its invocation is often extremely vague and 
various definitions are conflated under the term (Fairclough, 1992; 
Mills, 2001: 1). Whilst specific conceptions obviously have their own 
particular emphasis, in general they aim to articulate the significance 
of language as a constitutive phenomenon, and as a socially and 
psychologically organised practice. A variety of methods aimed at 
studying the significance of language are available, many of which can 
be drawn upon in an examination of the contemporary significance of 
the moral aspects of communication. 
When it comes to morality, controversy and conflict can be 
considered central issues (Black, 1998). Where the same values are 
not necessarily shared, they are often considered to be in competition, 
and such competition can in some cases colonise and divide entire 
political systems. 
There is also the possibility that different values are so 
divergent that they are based upon totally different logics such that no 
resolution between them is possible. The claims made by each are 
incommensurable with one another (Maclntyre, 1985; Lyotard, 1988), 
and to decide in favour of one rather than the other is to fundamentally 
reject the other's internal logic and do `violence' to it. Rather than 
entering debate at the point of deciding which of two competing values 
should win, a more interesting analytic question refers to whether or 
not it is possible to observe how it is that they conflict, and the ways in 
which they might nevertheless interact with one another. It is usually 
assumed that in order to disagree, two interlocutors have to agree on at 
least something, i. e., what it is they disagree about (Billig, 1996), but 
we can enquire more closely into the specific location of such 
(dis)agreement. 
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1.2. The Theoretical Location 
It is important to identify some of the theories with which I am 
engaging in dialogue, in order to explain how my project is embedded 
within sociology. In the interest of reflexivity I would first like to 
acknowledge a theoretical re-orientation that occurred whilst the 
project was underway. 
As originally conceived this project intended to explore similar 
themes, but with a rather different set of theoretical instruments, and a 
more normative orientation. It was going to engage directly with the 
literature on `risk' (Beck, 1992), and `reflexive modernization' 
(Giddens, 1991; Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994), with the 
argumentative forms observed being assessed in relation to a 
Habermasian notion of `discourse ethics' (Habermas, 1984a; 1984b; 
1990), or a softer sense of their democratic or anti-democratic 
implications. However, once underway, I moved away from pursuit of 
this possibility for several reasons. 
Firstly, as my theoretical and methodological position has 
progressed, I developed a degree of suspicion about the other 
theoretical and normative merits of this body of literature. In 
particular dissatisfaction with Beck's work regarding whether `risk' is 
to be treated ontologically or epistemologically (for critiques in this 
regard see Van Loon, 2000; Dean, 1999: 182; Lupton, 1999: 60; 
Cottle, 1998: 10; Alexander and Smith, 1996: 254-6). 
Secondly, based upon acceptance of critiques of Habermas 
regarding his implicit desire to reduce and overcome difference and 
multiplicity (Rasch, 2000a: 32; Falzon, 1998: 81; Rescher, 1993; also 
see Mouffe, 2000: 33,105; Torfing, 1999: 69), I became disenchanted 
with his normative framework. No matter how open the procedure 
adopted in its achievement, the requirement to end with a single voice 
is rather unattractive to me. This is one of the most obvious ways in 
which my personal normative assumptions and political preferences 
are influential. 
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Thirdly, and more pragmatically, I decided that analysis of the 
operation and significance of morality might be better pursued by 
being detached from an explicit set of normative concerns, and 
pursued from a very different starting point 
- 
people who could 
actually be viewed as the intellectual enemies of those with whom I 
began. I decided I did not want to be constantly involved in 
interrogating my materials for the degree to which they deviate from 
some ideal or other. 
In the most general terms, the project is rooted in a 
constructivist position, foregrounding the constitution and emergence 
of the social world, without necessitating an automatic denial of its 
`reality'. The two most central influences are systems theoretical 
sociologist Niklas Luhmann, and Michel Foucault, although the 
project also draws upon an eclectic blend of insights drawn from 
various approaches to the analysis of discourse and communication, as 
will become clear. 
I am not simply pursuing one theory as far is it can go, but I am 
drawing upon various divergent ones, often in order to clarify what it 
is that I am, and am not doing (or intending to do). The high degree of 
eclecticism could be considered too ambitious or as leading to 
incoherence. However, I would argue that this is not automatically the 
case. Drawing upon a variety of sources is enriching if it is done 
critically, and stops short of attempting a grand synthesis. Clarity 
about what I am drawing from where (and how and why) is obviously 
very important, and an integral part of the writing process, which 
cannot be adequately judged in advance. Just as the application of 
summarising labels is not sufficient to establish the validity of what 
has occurred, so too the absence of such labels should not 
automatically lead to research being rendered invalid. 
In particular I am interested in the significance of the 
admissibility (or otherwise) of particular arguments within an already 
defined discursive space, and more generally the constant negotiation 
and `policing' of the boundaries of that space through means that are 
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oriented towards issues of morality, in particular morally asymmetrical 
distinctions. 
Rather than being concerned with either the production of 
arguments, or their consumption, the focus is intended to be upon the 
issue of dispersion, or circulation 
- 
the space between the other two 
- 
with, of necessity, some overlap with them. Talk of circulation, or a 
system of dispersion obviously invokes Foucault (1972: 37), but this 
can also be connected up to Luhmann's theorisation of communication 
as a self-referential three-stage process (information, utterance, 
expectation of success) involving the unity of three selections (see 
Luhmann, 1995: 139-45). This will be elaborated further in the 
following chapter. For now, it is enough to note that my emphasis 
leads to a preoccupation not with truth and falsity, but with 
connectivity, with `possibility' and `difficulty'. There is a need for the 
analysis of the consequentiality of discourse, within the parameters of 
the controversy, which is arguably semi-autonomous from the question 
of truth/falsity of the statements or the validity of the arguments made 
within it. 
1.3. The Analytical Strategy 
The project considers the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in March 
2003, including aspects of the process of justification, in particular the 
circulation of negative, disqualifying, identifications and the difficulty 
they engender for contributors, as well as the forms of resistance 
adopted by those at risk of being associated with them. 
Whilst the project is theoretically informed it is also 
empirically driven. However, it is not simply about this specific 
context 
- 
the context is the stimulus, but not the only possible domain 
of application. Generalisation is of course something about which care 
is required, but there is no good reason to assume that the processes 
and difficulties discussed are limited to discussion of Iraq. 
The project is not aimed at producing a definitive account of 
the invasion of Iraq. A single project with such an aim would be either 
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natve or arrogant, and doomed to miserable failure. Doubtless, the 
issue of Iraq will keep many people going for a whole career! The 
main role of the context is to provide an anchor restricting the extent to 
which my floating away on a sea of self indulgence is possible. 
My project is admittedly rather ethnocentric to the extent that 
its focus is upon the UK, and to less an extent the US, and there are 
several areas of possible attention on the issue of Iraq with I am not 
engaging, all of which could be usefully analysed in detail. A far from 
exhaustive list includes 
- 
identifying a set of causal factors explaining 
why the war occurred; the conduct of the military action itself; the 
significance of oil in the world economy; the inattention to and 
exclusion of the voices of the Iraqi people within the justification and 
criticism preceding invasion; the development of the Stop the War 
Coalition as a social movement with an institutional legacy. In 
contrast to many other accounts of the context which are more 
obviously political or Critical in intent (see, for example, Kellner, 
1992: 7; Miller, 2004: 3; Edwards and Cromwell, 2004: 212) I will 
largely refrain from commenting upon the truth/falsity of the 
arguments made to justify or criticise the invasion. 
1.4. The Analytical Foci 
One key focus of the project is the existence of attempts at gaining 
advantage through the use of morality in argumentation. My use of 
`morality' is intended to be a critical and selective appropriation from 
Luhmann's use of it as the unity of the distinction good/bad or 
right/wrong (Luhmann, 1995). In particular I am interested in the 
formation of moral asymmetries 
- 
the attachment of the code of 
morality to other distinctions drawn in communication, specifically in 
the context of the public debate revolving around the invasion of Iraq. 
The project has an explicit orientation to morally loaded 
arguments 
- 
words, phrases and claims apparently embodying 
morality, the distinction good/bad or right/wrong, and associated 
implications of esteem/contempt. It is therefore intended as a second- 
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order analysis of the use of this distinction not as directly advocating 
particular versions of evaluation. Of course, one can always argue 
about the extent to which this is possible (or not) and my own set of 
normative assumptions is likely to occasionally intrude 
- 
it is 
impossible for them not to. However, a more interesting location for 
critique would perhaps be on the issue of the English languages 
confusion over evaluation in terms of the vagueness of `good' (and 
`right'). Valuation, and attention to issues of quality, can be a matter 
of morality, but also aesthetics, and also a technical assessment. When 
either of these words is used, how do we know that it is morality rather 
than artistic or technical goodness that is observed? This is obviously 
a very big question, which complicates the identification of 
communication about morality. As with anything else, it is a matter of 
interpretation, and no hard and fast rules exist. However, this lack of a 
clear separation is also analytically interesting, and the possibility of 
the conflation of the three forms of `goodness' or the colonisation of 
one by another is already present within sociological writings (for 
example, Bauman's work on `adiaphorisation' 
- 
Bauman, 1993; 1995) 
or Foucault's notion of an art of ethics (Foucault, 1985; 1986; 
O'Leary, 2002; Privitera, 1995). It will have to suffice for me to say 
that it is not simply the use of the words `good' or `right' that will alert 
my attention, implications of respect/disrespect, and esteem/contempt 
are also within my radar, and these would seem much less likely to be 
confused with conceptions of technical excellence, or beauty. 
The materials utilised within the analysis range from British 
national newspaper coverage to parliamentary debates, political 
speeches and literature produced by various relevant interest groups. 
These materials are approached via tools provided by a wide variety of 
methodological sources, including insights from amongst others 
critical discourse analysis, discursive psychology, and the American 
literature on `the construction of `social problems'. In keeping with 
what I have outlined so far, my focus will be upon regularities in 
processes of framing, and the policing of discursive boundaries; key 
words, formulaic phrases and notably recurrent rhetorical flourishes; 
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the negotiation of questions of legitimacy regarding the positions 
adopted; associated hedging, and disclaiming practices and other 
attempts at protecting speakers; and the sites of agreement between 
opponents 
- 
evidence of a degree of order within conflict. 
Greater detail regarding the analytical foci is provided in the 
subsequent Methodology chapter. One overarching, aim of the 
project is to attempt to assess the extent to which particular words, 
phrases and their implications can be said to mobilise moral 
asymmetries 
- 
creating `discursive difficulty' and inciting statements 
of particular types aimed at evading it. 
1.5. The Utility? 
It seems suitable to raise the question of the research's potential 
applications. The `findings' generated by the project can be argued to 
bear some relevance to the policy process, including how policy 
proposals could best be packaged. However, it is not my intention to 
be producing a guidebook for those who wish to improve how they 
`spin'! I am hoping that certain aspects might serve as a partial critical 
warning against accepting a narrowness of focus at an early stage of 
idea generation such that other potentially useful possibilities are ruled 
out before undergoing any consideration simply because they do not 
fit in with the emergent definition of what is central. 
Less instrumentally, it is hoped that it will contribute to an 
understanding of some aspects of how the articulation of moral 
argumentation operates in contemporary controversies. Obviously an 
understanding of the process involved in gaining advantage is 
something which would appeal to those wishing to do so, which 
potentially opens up certain ethical questions, including the possibility 
that the findings could be put to uses with which I may not be 
comfortable. More importantly, for me, is the possibility that those 
who are often disadvantaged, and their voices excluded by this process 
of advantage gaining, may find the project's arguments of some use in 
formulating modes of engagement with controversial issues in the 
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future 
-a rather Foucauldian sounding (and perhaps also pretentious) 
aim to `clear a space in which the formerly voiceless might begin to 
speak' (Moussa and Scapp, 1996: 89). 
1.6. The Chapters that Follow 
The rest of the main body of this thesis is split into three sections, 
subdivided into several chapters. The first section is made up of three 
chapters, concerned with the Theoretical Literature influencing the 
project, the more Empirical Literature concerned with the Iraq war, 
and an elaboration of the Methodological Approach adopted. It 
should be noted that there is considerable overlap between aspects of 
the theoretical and methodological chapters. They are highly 
interrelated with regard to the ways in which my subsequent 
observations are informed by the combined influences of the materials 
they discuss. 
The second section includes empirical chapters concerned with 
various dimensions of the public debate preceding and accompanying 
the war. The first three are concerned with the invocation and denial 
of links between Iraq and the War on Terror(ism), accusations 
regarding the influence of Anti-Americanism upon opposition to war, 
and claims that opponents of war were Pro-Saddam Apologists. I 
then explore the significance of references to Appeasement and 
Historical Analogies, as well as references to Pacifism, and 
Warmongering, as well as the importance attributed to Supporting 
the Troops. The final empirical chapter concerns some dimensions of 
the significance of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the public 
debate. 
The third section consists of a single Discussion chapter 
teasing out and linking together some issues emergent from the 
previous section, and noting possibilities that merit further exploration 
elsewhere. 
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2. Theoretical Literature 
This chapter explains the intellectual background to the thesis. It starts 
with some consideration of the significance of morality within 
sociology, including recent debates about `demoralization', and a 
critique of the conception of morality mobilised by Zygmunt Bauman. 
It then moves on to elucidate the dimensions of the work of Michel 
Foucault and Niklas Luhmann's work that I am appropriating (using 
and abusing), and the way on which I believe they can be combined 
productively. 
2.1. Morality in Sociology 
Attempting to discuss `morality' in a sociological or an everyday 
context can be a minefield because not only do people hold very 
strong opinions about it, they also lack a shared conception of what 
they mean by it. Like many other widely used words (power, 
structure, communication, poverty) the term mobilises very different 
connotations for various people, and this intensifies the possibility of 
interlocutors `talking past' one another. 
Nevertheless, broadly `moral' concerns have played a 
significant part in the foundation and development of sociology 
(Levine, 1995; Shilling and Mellor, 1998), and it seems relevant to 
acknowledge and discuss some ideas and debates of direct and indirect 
relevance to this project. 
2.1.1. Distinguishing Morality 
Morality can be the `other side' of a variety of distinctions drawn in 
discourse. It is often distinguished from the cognitive, and/or 
aesthetic, or in a more binary sense, from the amoral, immoral, or 
indeed from ethics. The particular distinctions drawn will of course 
relate to the context directly under consideration at any one time, but 
also to the specific way in which morality is conceived by those 
distinguishing it. For example, prescriptions regarding what is `right' 
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can be distinguished from evaluations of what is `good' (Barnsley, 
1972: 49), and ethics can be distinguished from an abstract moral code 
which works from above, and used to imply practices that `well up' 
from a specific group (Maffesoli, 1996: 15). Indeed `ethics' is often 
conceived as mobilising a less universalistic domain of application 
than morality 
-a realm of relative freedom concerned with what is 
good or bad for me rather than what is right or wrong for everyone 
(see Habermas, 1990; Poole, 1991: 135). Others claim that morality is 
not necessarily universal, but does require some form of 
generalisation, or at least impersonality such that it is taken to be 
equally binding upon oneself as others (Barnsley, 1972: 36,45). 
Despite this potential for confusion, many people advocate the 
need for a greater moral or ethical dimension within sociological 
practice (Tester, 1994: 4; Levine, 1995: 100; Smart, 1999: 130). 
However, when it comes to questions of morality, there is a strong 
tension between an approach which moralizes and one which engages 
in the thematization of morals (Luckmann, 1996: 82), respectively 
approximating the tension between prescriptive and analytic narratives 
identified by Smart (1999: 176). Are we motivated to evaluate or to 
understand processes of evaluation? 
As I have already implied, I am not entirely comfortable with 
starting from and being preoccupied with an `ought' and using it as the 
primary orientation of research. This is not meant to imply a naive, 
positivistic stance which denies the impact of my personal politics, and 
evaluative preferences. Instead it is more a suspicion about the ethics, 
and more importantly the efficiency and effectiveness, of `the 
sociologist as advocate' in a direct sense. I will return to this issue in 
my Methodology chapter. 
As ever, it is important to attend to the specific way that the 
term moral or morality is deployed in any account invoking it 
- 
the 
uses to which it is put often being a better guide to its meaning than an 
abstract definition. In the contemporary world one of the ways in 
which it is most commonly invoked is in relation to its alleged decline 
in importance. 
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2.1.2. Demoralization: The Moral in Decline? 
In social and cultural writing `the moral' has traditionally been closely 
aligned with the social in the sense of providing a type of `social glue' 
contributing to the integration and maintenance of social solidarity and 
relations of reciprocity (approximating the classic Durkheimian 
position on `organic solidarity' based upon the moral density resulting 
from the division of labour, see Durkheim, 1984; 201; Junge, 2001: 
107). 
According to Durkheim: 
We may say that what is moral is everything that is a source of solidarity, 
everything that forces man to take account of other people, to regulate his 
actions by something other than the promptings of his own egoism, and the 
more numerous and strong those ties are, the more solid is the morality. 
(Durkheim, 1984: 331). 
A variety of sources mobilizing various different conceptions of 
morality suggest that the glue previously holding us together has 
begun to dry out, or break down, and that this is an extremely negative 
development. 
One explanation of this general process of decline is that it is a 
logical corollary of the unfolding of modernity itself. As Poole (1991: 
Lx) puts it, modernity: `calls into existence certain conceptions of 
morality, but also destroys the grounds for taking them seriously'. It is 
self-undermining, putting even previously unquestioned truths and 
certainties under suspicion. 
Some contributions view this and the associated process of 
`demoralization' as a cause for intense concern. We are alleged to not 
only have less (in qualitative or quantitative terms) morality, or, more 
accurately, the lack of a shared moral language (Thompson and 
Sharma, 1998: 433), but relative to the other meaning commonly 
attributed to the term `demoralization' we also have less morale 
-a 
crisis of confidence (Fevre, 2000: 1). 
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Maclntyre (1985: 6) argues that the relationship between 
morality and the social order has changed in such a way that: `There 
seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our 
culture', due to the `the conceptual incommensurability of the rival 
arguments' (MacIntyre, 1985: 8; also see Holloway, 2000: 133). 
Instead of moral clarity, we have an allegedly problematic `linguistic 
melange' (Maclntyre, 1985: 233). 
Maclntyre (1985: 22) claims that the principle of emotivism 
- 
that all moral judgments are nothing more than expressed preferences 
- 
has widely penetrated western culture, something which has 
implications for the possibilities for meaningful dialogue, and the issue 
of persuasion: 
If the good and the right is what feels to me to be the good and the right, 
there is no necessary reason to imagine that you will share those feelings. 
And how could we possibly discuss our differences of opinion and how 
might we be able to come to some kind of agreement (even if it is only an 
agreement to differ)? We could not. Consequently our feelings of what is 
good and right will be totally individualized. 
(Tester, 2001: 58). 
If moral claims are nothing more than the expression of our feelings 
then, it supposedly follows that we can no longer distinguish between 
manipulative and non-manipulative relations, because, we: 
cannot genuinely appeal to impersonal criteria, for there are no impersonal 
criteria [... ] The sole reality of distinctively moral discourse is the attempt 
of one will to align the attitudes, feelings, preferences, and choices of 
another with its own. 
(Maclntyre, 1985: 24). 
Whilst there is an element of persuasion involved in deliberations over 
moral issues, according to Maclntyre's (1985: 71) view, there is also a 
sense in which any contributions are addressed to those who already 
agree. The extent to which his account reflects his having been 
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`seduced by the past' (Poole, 1991: 146) means that his account also 
suffers from this! 
One possibility is that a disagreement can be solved `externally 
to morality', or that moral decisions are somehow disguised as 
technical ones (Barnsley, 1972: 17). In a study of the BBC's 
Complaints Unit, Thompson and Sharma (1998): 435) point to the way 
in which complaints regarding taste and decency in programming are 
often resolved via the application of technical-rational criteria, thereby 
rendering the problem an administrative rather than straightforwardly 
moral one. Moral incommensurability is resolved via exiting the 
domain of morality! 
Holloway (2000: 34) utilises the metaphor of jazz in order to 
formulate a possible approach to the messiness of contemporary 
morality and the improvisation allegedly involved. He refuses to 
condemn the messiness out of hand, preferring to admit that there is a 
possibility that choices can be made between `opposing goods rather 
than between right and wrong' (Holloway, 2000: 93,114-5). 
Nevertheless, Holloway's (2000: 130) account appreciates the 
attraction of `absolute moral certainty', but instead of trying to 
eradicate the contradictions and complexities of moral disagreements 
with a final, definitive morality, argues that we should learn to live 
with them (Holloway, 2000: 93). An assertion of this type leaves itself 
open to the charge that it does not really provide any guide to action 
- 
how would it work? Also, it is likely to be viewed as advocating a 
celebration of uncertainty. 
One contribution to the debate on demoralization painting a 
dystopic picture comes from Himmelfarb (1995). For her, Victorian 
England was a place of moral certainty and that since then we have 
undergone a shift from virtues (which went unquestioned) to values 
(which are viewed as contingent choices) (Tester, 1997: 121). For 
Himmelfarb, this is the result of a reflection upon things that should 
have been left alone. The problems which she identifies are largely 
due to: `the thinking about that which ought to remain unthought' 
(Tester, 1997: 121). The implication of Himmelfarb's account, 
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according to Tester's characterisation, is that there is a point beyond 
which problematisation should not go, yet we have crossed that line. 
An interesting question concerns the extent to which this issue 
can be posed differently 
- 
when there are things being questioned, 
when controversy occurs, are there particular boundaries, which there 
is pressure not stray beyond? Are there socially defined limits to 
questioning with regard to morality? 
Tester's work differs from Himmelfarb's, and focuses upon the 
relationship between culture, morality and the media. He argues that 
the media have made it impossible not to know of the suffering of 
others 
- 
we have lost our `moral innocence' (Tester, 1997: 1) 
- 
and 
that we are `metaphysically guilty' because we have developed a blase 
attitude towards it (Tester, 1997: 151). More recently he has pursued 
such ideas in a roundabout critique of the thesis of `compassion 
fatigue' (Tester, 2001: 13) which addresses the question of how far we 
have stopped noticing or caring about the suffering and tragedy which 
we are confronted in the media every day. 
Whilst I would admit to agreeing with much of what Tester 
argues about things such as society's orientation to the suffering of 
others, his approach is, in relative terms, very much one of moralizing 
in Luckmann's sense. For example, he claims that the discipline 
known as 'cultural studies' precludes the possibility of moral 
evaluation, and therefore labels it `morally cretinous' (Tester, 1994: 
3), and my adoption of a degree of relativism perhaps means that I am 
a moral cretin! What is most important about Tester's contribution is 
that it is emblematic of many others in so far as it implies that `if only' 
everyone would listen to him them the world would be much better 
off. 
A more nuanced approach to demoralization comes from Fevre 
(2000: 22) who argues that the substance of what we now label 
morality is `hollow' because the mundane reasoning that he describes 
as `common sense' has seduced and colonised areas of social life in 
which `other ways of thinking used to reign' (Fevre, 2000: 72). As 
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such, moral decisions take on the `tone of consumption' (Fevre, 2000: 
9) 
-a very negative development in his view. 
Fevre constructs an ideal-typical, four cell table relating 
containing four different ways of sense-making and their 
`appropriateness' or `fitness for purpose' (Fevre, 2000: 20) to different 
domains of social life: 
Non-human Human 
Knowledge Science Commonsense 
Belief Religion Sentiment 
(Fevre, 2000: 141) 
Fevre's (2000: 117) thesis is not concerned with the breakdown of 
morality but with its replacement, and he argues that in the domain of 
belief, commonsense (mundane reason) has displaced sentiment 
(emotional thought) as the hegemonic form of sense-making. There is, 
therefore, no longer any point in asserting that we `believe' things. 
Instead, we are compelled to `know', since commonsense requires 
evidence of the senses rather than the emotions (Fevre, 2000: 79; 90) 
and will take nothing else seriously. This thesis argues that it is more 
the content than the form of morality that has changed 
- 
something we 
describe as morality persists, but the rationale upon which it was 
previously based has been superseded by another rationale, and Fevre 
is disturbed by this development because he views the new content as 
leading to a very inferior `sham morality' (Fevre, 2000: 226), which 
leaves `the facade of morality standing' (Fevre, 2000: 68-9). 
According to Fevre, this sham morality can be perceived by listening 
out for a particular level of `shrillness' (Fevre, 2000: 210) which 
accompanies it. 
Fevre's (2000: 160) ideal situation (in normative terms) is for 
us to `regain the ability to make sense in different ways', a possibility 
which he denies is either radical or conservative. Aside from the fact 
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that this displays a type of nostalgia that arguably overstates the merits 
of that which was allegedly in the past, what is most interesting about 
Fevre's account is the way in which he seems to apply a type of moral 
reasoning to the question of morality, and it is clearly the case that he 
views morality as good. In his account a `should' and an `is' are 
constantly feeding off one another. The fact that Fevre explicitly 
attributes wrongness to the particular means of deciding 
rightness/wrongness is interesting and although not particularly shrill, 
he asserts that morality is itself to be evaluated as good (or right), and 
should take specific forms. 
Another more indirect contribution to this debate, asserting the 
existence of a rather more subtle transformation is that of Furedi 
(2002). He enters with an acceptance of the argument that moral 
fragmentation has occurred 
- 
that there is no consensus on basic 
values and norms (Furedi, 2002: 68). However, he sees the 
development of a (negative) solution in the increasing prominence of 
risk and safety, such that they have replaced morality as a solution to 
the question of social cohesion (Furedi, 2002: 148). In particular 
Furedi claims that overtly moral discourse 
- 
the outright condemnation 
of people or practices 
- 
has become unfashionable (Furedi, 2002: 
148), and that the distinctions normal/abnormal and moral/immoral are 
being superseded by the calculus of risk 
-a health and safety morality 
based upon the distinction safe/unsafe (Furedi, 2002: 150-1). 
Luckmann (1996: 81) notes that explicit moralizing is a `risky 
intersubjective undertaking' 
- 
it risks undermining the possibility of 
communicative agreement by provoking dissensus. In a context in 
which there is supposedly an absence of a priori agreement upon 
fundamental values such a risk would appear to be fairly high, so we 
might indeed expect the process of moral evaluation to become less 
overt. However, accepting this possibility 
- 
the increasing subtlety 
- 
is not the same as accepting that the moral (right/wrong) distinction is 
absent. We are instead confronted with an extremely difficult question 
regarding the degree to which this is a significant disjuncture, or the 
continuation of the same phenomenon but packaged differently. 
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Fevre's claims that the type of sense-making involved in 
morality has shifted certainly seems more plausible than to suggest 
that morality is in decline. After all, distinctions between, or implying, 
right and wrong, good and bad, better or worse, clearly persist in 
contemporary societies, and no-one can completely avoid processes of 
valuation (O'Connor, 1993: 38). Evaluation may occur differently, 
upon a different basis, according to a different form of sense-making, 
but that requires investigation rather than nostalgia and lamentation. 
Writing long before these contemporary debates occurred, 
Barnsley (1972: 9) claimed that: `We draw distinctions between right 
and wrong, good and bad, all the time, without being cognizant of the 
criteria we are employing'. As will become clear, I am assuming that 
this is still the case 
- 
that moral asymmetries are mobilised and 
orientated towards in contemporary discourse 
- 
and as such I am 
following Luhmann in concentrating upon form rather than content. 
Before explaining this in more detail, I will discuss the contribution of 
the contemporary sociologist who has taken morality most seriously 
- 




2.1.3. Zygmunt Bauman and his Discontents 
For over more than a decade, Bauman has argued for a more 
`postmodern' understanding of morality and its relationship to 
uncertainty, characterised in the following way: 
1. humans are morally ambivalent 
2. moral phenomena are non-rational 
3. morality is riddled with irresolvable contradictions 
4. morality is not universalizable 
5. moral responsibility is the starting point, not the product 
of society 
-'being for the other' comes before `being with 
the other'. 
(adapted from Bauman, 1993: 10-13). 
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Bauman sees potential in the alleged growth of uncertainty since it 
provides: `the very soil in which the moral self takes root and grows' 
(Bauman, 1995: 287; also see Bauman, 1993: 80). Subverting more 
orthodox understandings, he rejects ethics as a set of codes to be 
followed, describing ethical systems as `arrogant' in their assumption 
that they can successfully sort between good and evil (Bauman, 1995: 
61). 
Bauman advocates a morality without foundations in which we 
are asked to embrace `the drama of choice' (Bauman, 1998: 13, 
original emphasis). He is rather dismissive of all attempts to achieve 
certainty regarding morality, labelling them `crutches' because they 
only succeed in the absence of questioning. Once inspected, each one 
is exposed as a manufactured certainty: `an unashamedly "made up" 
certainty' (Bauman, 2000: 21). Although he anticipates criticisms of 
this morality without foundations (Bauman, 1996: 58), he does not 
explain how, if certainty is now impossible, we can retain the 
conceptual possibility of an `authentic' certainty against which an 
inauthentic, made-up, variety can be contrasted. 
According to Bauman, the insecurity and anxiety associated 
with moral uncertainty make `guarantees of righteousness', an 
attractive option for some (Bauman, 1993: 56), particularly in terms of 
taking away, or removing the need for, the `agonies of choice' 
(Bauman, 1997: 184). However, to take such an option, and to evade 
the humbling uncertainties, is to exit the realm of morality altogether. 
It is fair to say that, in asserting such things, Bauman ignores the 
possibility that in order to be taken seriously morality has to deny that 
it is contingent and perspectival and has to claim the certainty implied 
by speaking in relation to `the facts' (Poole, 1991: 114-5). 
Another important aspect of Bauman's conception of morality, 
which has already been touched upon and is interesting particularly in 
relation to the discussion of Luhmann (see below), regards what it 
means `to be moral'. According to Bauman (1993: 1): "`To be moral" 
does not mean "to be good", but to exercise one's freedom of 
authorship as a choice between good and evil'. Moreover: `Being in a 
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moral situation means no more than a possibility of being good (or of 
being evil, for that matter)' (Bauman, 1998: 17). This is where the 
uncertainty is relevant, but it also has implications regarding the 
orthodox understanding of morality as `the good'. Instead, for 
Bauman it concerns both `the good' and `the bad', and the 
simultaneous possibilities thereof. 
Bauman's version of morality originates from a pre-social 
impulse, and is fundamentally about the importance of responsibility 
for the other, and, based upon his reading of the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas, also an acceptance of our responsibility for that responsibility 
(Bauman, 1998: 17). This involves an opening up of the self, but one 
which contains no expectation of reciprocity (Bauman, 1993: 48; 
1997: 62) 
- 
the contractual aspect often thought to characterise social 
relations is almost entirely absent. It therefore sets up, and embraces, 
a deliberately asymmetrical relation, and involves the deliberate 
abandonment of freedom (Bauman, 1993: 60). As such, being for is 
contrasted with the more symmetrical relationship implied by being 
with, which is non-moral (Bauman, 1993: 50). 
In a Durkheimian critique of Bauman, Shilling and Mellor 
(1998: 199) claim that his suspicion of abstract ethical systems is 
fundamentally derived from a methodological individualism, which 
sees collectivities as threatening to individual freedom. In stark 
contrast, Durkheim (1984: 184) claimed that `We cannot give 
ourselves over to other people, absolutely and utterly, without an 
abandonment of ourselves. ' Under such an understanding, with its 
completely different conception of the individual, being for the other 
in Bauman's sense is virtually impossible. 
The absence of attention to reciprocity has come in for notable 
criticism from Junge (2001), who asserts that, along with the sense in 
which morality rests on little more than a pre-social `impulse', it 
means that Bauman has actually failed to develop a sociology of 
morality (Junge, 2001: 110). According to Junge (2001: 114), without 
reciprocity morality becomes: `only the random outcome of 
aggregations of individual actions', and takes on an undue fragility. 
22 
There is something unimaginative about this as a criticism of 
methodological individualist theory, but Junge (2001: 110) does have 
an important point to make when emphasising the problematic way in 
which Bauman's account disregards `connectability'. Junge proposes 
that we add reciprocity, intersubjectivity and solidarity to Bauman's 
theory, which leads to a situation in which: `responsibility understood 
as a form of compassion is no longer conceived as a pre-social 
impulse, but as a social prerequisite of society also establishing 
reciprocity as a mutually binding glue in society' (Junge, 2001: 117). 
My `objection' to Bauman's account is not primarily related to 
the absence of reciprocity as a bad thing in normative terms (for 
society), but in more analytic terms (for sociology). My problem 
relates to the way that Bauman does or does not enable particular 
understandings of reciprocity, not one that worries about the 
implications of being for the other without regard to reciprocity in 
terms of it being better or worse for the continuance of (a particular) 
social order. 
Without a detailed theorisation of connectivity, it would seem 
questionable how much insight is to be gained from pursuing 
Bauman's version of morality with regard to how it would operate in 
practice 
- 
how it would work? In Bauman's defence he does make 
some references to the Schutzian notion of the `reciprocity of 
perspectives' and its importance for sustaining a sense of a shared and 
mutually intelligible social world (see Bauman, 1997: 9), however, we 
are still in the dark regarding the extent to which his morality does (or 
does not) already operate, and how it could do so without some 
version of reciprocity. 
Bauman's account therefore suffers from a similar difficulty to 
Habermas' notion of `discourse ethics'. We can perhaps imagine how 
the practice might work if fully realised, and we might (dependent 
upon political commitments) choose to view such a projected world as 
much better than this one, but how might we get there? If we attempt 
to `be for the other', or were to act as if reaching a consensus and the 
avoidance of systematic distortions of communication were orientated 
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to by all, we would probably very soon find out that we were seriously 
disadvantaged, because few others were acting upon the same basis. 
Of course, the selflessness that seems to be part of the idea of being for 
the other is probably intended as part of the virtue, but there is 
something about this that does not really sit well with a sociological 
understanding of the interrelatedness of human conduct 
- 
how are we 
to understand human actions sociologically if they are no longer 
thought to be directed towards the conduct of others? 
Of course the recognition of a right to bid for recognition 
involved in extending an `invitation to dialogue' (Bauman, 2001: 80) 
would seem highly laudable, since dialogue which `connects without 
enforcing uniformity' (Levine, 1995: 328) is widely thought of 
positively. However it would seem ill advised to make the extra step 
of moving in the direction of meeting someone halfway if they exhibit 
no intention of doing the same, since the mid-way point between you 
(perhaps the most likely location of any compromise) will then be 
closer to their starting point than yours! Similarly it would arguably 
seem disadvantageous, at least in a context involving competition of 
any kind, to open yourself to the `other', and be for them if they are 
unwilling to extend you the same courtesy. 
With regard to morality more broadly, as Weeks (1996: 152) 
puts it: `Moral pluralism can work only if individuals and groups are 
prepared to accept that a condition of freedom for their way of life is a 
tolerance of others'. Without that sort of reciprocity, or at least some 
understanding of how it does, or does not, work, things seem too 
intangible to be much use analytically, and seems like a recipe for the 
`triumph of the stubborn' (Rescher, 1993: 59). 
Rather than entering debate at the point of questioning whether 
Bauman has conceived of morality correctly or not, I propose to look 
at how particular evaluations are defended, reinvigorated, or 
undermined 
-a concern with the dynamics of their invocation or 
contestation. This, however, requires an understanding of the 
interrelatedness between discursive contributions, and therefore more 
of an understanding of connectivity than Bauman can provide. 
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2.2. Foucault and Luhmann 
While this project has been significantly influenced by the work of 
Michel Foucault and Niklas Luhmann, I recognise that there are 
various problems associated with their bodies of work. For example, 
Sibeon (2004: 6) accuses both of reification, with Foucault accused of 
reifying `discourse' and Luhmann reifying his notion of `autopoesis'. 
My appropriation of Luhmann in particular is somewhat 
`dangerous'. He is considered a relativist, if not a conservative, and 
his work `defies a pick-and-choose approach' (Blühdorn, 2000: 339). 
Nevertheless, his attention to the significance of distinctions, has been 
key to the development of my observational processes. 
Some have advanced injunctions against appropriating 
Foucault's work sociologically because it underestimates the `storage' 
of power (Sibeon, 2004: 70), allegedly tends towards an essentialist 
conception of power, and divorces discourse from both reality and 
subjectivity (Fox, 1998: 419). Nevertheless, I intend to make use of it, 
particularly in terms of its understanding of the interconnections 
between concepts and the ways in which people are understood as 
being incited into having particular relations with themselves. 
Whilst both theorists are anti-humanist in emphasis (indeed 
human beings are completely absent from Luhmann's theory), I do not 
believe that this makes it impossible to understand how their work 
might apply to people. I think that many of the criticisms and 
misunderstanding of their output result from the way that their anti- 
humanism makes it extremely difficult to understand how the ideas 
they articulate can be related to people's experiences. Hopefully this 
project, with its emphasis upon discursive `difficulty' might make a 
small indirect contribution to connecting some of their ideas to the 
way that people can understand some of their discursive experiences. 
As Potter (1996: 87) points out, the relationship between 
Foucault's conception of discourse and a specific piece of talk or 
writing is unclear, and the same could be said of Luhmann. Hopefully 
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the use to which I will put their work may help to clarify one way of 
conceiving of such a relationship. 
Despite the regular division of Foucault's work according to 
the alleged discontinuities in his relative emphasis, I believe there to 
be important interconnections and continuities which makes an 
appropriation of Foucault's work in general terms legitimate, and it is 
to his work that I turn initially. 
2.2.1. Foucault's Archaeology 
Much of Foucault's (1972) earliest work was preoccupied with an 
`archaeological' method, a means of understanding a particular 
domain of knowledge 
-a system of dispersion - and its circulation of 
objects, statements, concepts, strategies and functions 
- 
what he called 
a discursive formation. What we should study are the `mode of 
existence: the modifications and variations within any culture, of 
modes of circulation, valorization, attribution and appropriation' of 
discourse (Foucault, 1977a: 137), i. e., the way that a system of 
dispersion operates and changes. 
From this theoretical perspective, discourse is understood as 
autonomous from human beings in the sense that discursive events are: 
`independent of the intentions and temporality of the consciousness 
that was the vehicle for its appearance' (Bernauer, 1990: 106; 
Foucault, 1991a: 59). Rather than being the expression of the will of 
an individual, statements position subjects 
- 
it is through statements 
that subject positions can be assigned (Foucault, 1972: 91). 
According to Andersen (2003: 16) the central regulating 
difference within Foucault's archaeology is that between regularity 
and dispersion 
-a discursive formation being a set of statements 
dispersed with a degree of regularity. What matters is the existence of 
an underlying logic governing the possible relations between 
statements, functions, strategies, objects, subject positions and their 
degree of acceptability or legitimacy. As such, discourse `is not a 
place into which the subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differentiated 
subject-positions and subject functions' (Foucault, 1991a: 58). A 
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person does not speak; instead, by speaking a particular type of 
someone becomes available for observation. 
When it comes to a specific discursive formation, there is a 
series of questions to be asked in pursuit of understanding its sense of 
cohesive dispersion. Important questions concern the formation of: 
Objects (What is the object of knowledge? What are the social sites in 
which it emerges? Who is authorised to define it? ) Enunciative Modalities 
(Who can produce the knowledge of this object? From which institutional 
sites? What is the relationship between the producer of the knowledge and 
the object? Concepts (What are the logical and methodological rules? On 
what criteria are statements accepted or discarded? Which concepts are 
mobilised from other discursive formations? ) Strategies (Which 
overarching theories or themes are deployed? Which theories from other 
discursive formations do they articulate with? What functions does the 
discourse play in related fields of non-discursive practices? ) 
(Lopez, forthcoming; also see Rose, 1998: 174; O'Leary, 2002: 150). 
My analysis will not proceed via formally addressing such questions, 
partly because I am not directly assessing the `Iraq Crisis' as a 
discursive formation. Nevertheless, it will become clear that similar 
questions are important to what I am analysing, particularly those 
relating to the enunciative modalities and strategies at work in the 
material I analyse. How does articulation occur, and from what 
positions can legitimate contributions be made? 
2.2.2. The Limits of the Sayable 
One important implication of pursuing an archaeological method is 
that there are limits placed upon what can be said within any 
discursive formation 
- 
the limits of the sayable (Foucault, 1991a: 59), 
under which discourse `is constituted by the difference between what 
one could say correctly at one period (under the rules of grammar and 
logic) and what is actually said' (Foucault, 1991 a: 63). This difference 
is a central issue, and can arguably benefit from an encounter with 
Luhmann (see below). 
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Foucault's associated conception of the `order of discourse' has 
been appropriated by various others to account for the restriction or 
structuring of available meanings. For example, within critical 
discourse analysis it is regarded as the `social structuring of semiotic 
activity' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 58) which `limits the 
generative power of language by precluding certain connections' 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 151). 
The generative logic of a particular order of discourse limits 
what can be said, what connections can be made: 
an `order of discourse' creates its own disorder: by a string of rules, it 
establishes a profile of normality which functions as an exclusion 
mechanism and assumes the existence of a whole teratology of knowledge. 
Those who do not keep to these rules disqualify themselves. Their speech 
is neither true nor false because it is located outside `the true' 
(Visker, 1995: 113). 
Not only are there epistemological limitations upon the possible, but, I 
would argue, it makes sense to also acknowledge, limitations to do 
with valuation 
- 
ones that are not entirely excluded in the sense of 
being `impossible', but that are possible but unacceptable. 
Appreciation of such issues could be achieved by introducing a 
more sociologically or culturally sensitive dimension, or through 
connecting it to Kober's (1997) notion of `moral certainty' (see 
below). 
It is claimed that, to be accepted, to be considered credible, any 
statement `must be produced according to norms of legitimacy' 
(Butler, 1997: 151). Therefore every expression, every piece of 
discourse produced is `always already censured' (Butler, 1997: 134) as 
a condition of its intelligibility, and this occurs via application of a 
distinction between the permissible and impermissible (Butler, 1997: 
139). 
Given the proximity of Foucault's archaeology to the paradigm 
known as structuralism, and its associated anti-humanism, direct 
reference to people and human experience is almost completely absent 
28 
from much of Foucault's work. Language, therefore is seen as having 
a social life separate from individual people, which: 
exceeds the purview of the subject who speaks it' [... ] One cannot know in 
advance the meaning that the other will assign to one's utterance, what 
conflict of interpretation may well arise, and how best to adjudicate the 
difference 
(Butler, 1997: 87-8). 
If it is legitimate to deviate from the anti-humanism slightly and 
consider how people relate to this experientially, then this is best 
thought of as a form of `pressure' (May, 1995: 33) upon individuals 
regarding their conformity (in a non-repressive sense, of course) to 
external social practices of evaluation. 
2.2.3. Power, Governmentality and Risk 
An alternative, or rival, to the literature concerned with reflexive 
modernization, that also pays attention to the contemporary 
significance of `risk' has arisen out of the development of some of 
Foucault's later work on `governmentality' (Foucault, 1991a; 1991b; 
1991c). 
Developing themes from his genealogy of modem forms of 
power (power/knowledge), this body of work treats risk explicitly 
epistemologically, claiming that `the significance of risk lies not with 
risk itself but with what risk gets attached to' (Dean, 1999: 177). The 
significance of risk and uncertainty lie in their use as techniques of 
government 
-a means of disposing people to behave in particular 
ways, fostering particular forms of subjectivity to enable governing via 
the future (O'Malley, 2000: 460-1). For example, `what if...? ' 
arguments, can be used to give a moral quality to deliberation over a 
variety of practices regarding `safety', ranging from smoking, to the 
use of mobile phones, in pursuit of shaping conduct in particular ways. 
Consistent with his earlier work on the genealogy of modern 
forms of power/knowledge, and an understanding of power as a 
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productive phenomenon consisting of `action upon other actions' 
rather than upon people, Foucault (1983: 220; also see Foucault, 1978: 
92-102; Foucault, 1979: 194; Deleuze, 1999) advanced a version of 
government not observing domination, but a more productive process 
of `disposing things': 
With government it is a question not of imposing law on men, but of 
disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and 
even of using laws themselves as tactics 
- 
to arrange things in such a way 
that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be 
achieved 
(Foucault, 1991c: 95). 
Foucault saw such more subtle techniques as more efficient than more 
overt forms: 
A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true 
politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas; it 
is at the stable point of reason that he secures the end of the chain; this link 
is all the stronger in that we do not know of what it is made and we believe 
it to be our own work 
(Foucault, 1979: 102-3). 
It is fair to acknowledge that paragraphs such as this one are what 
make people assume that, despite the complexity of his analysis, all 
power/knowledge works in favour of the state (see Fox, 1998). 
Regardless, associated with such an understanding is Foucault's 
radical and controversial anti-humanist conception of the `self as a 
historically defined, and profoundly technological notion, as nothing 
more than the `the historical correlation of the technology built in our 
history' (Foucault, 1993: 222). The panoptic logic of `discipline' is a 
process of individualisation which circulates locations in a network of 
other relations (Foucault, 1979: 146,304), the trajectory of which is to 
reduce complexity 
- 
to make a multiplicity more manageable 
(Foucault, 1979: 219). 
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Accepting this general account of the way government 
operates, subsequent authors have focussed upon developing an 
`analytics of government' which could develop an understanding of 
the operation of the techniques through which it is pursued, 
establishing how we might relate to such techniques and their 
associated `regimes of practices' differently (see Dean, 1999: 36). 
It is argued consistently that one of the primary ways in which 
we are governed in these ways is by being produced as subjects of 
particular types, with specific ways or relating to our `selves'. Such 
possibilities, along with their strong relation to the contemporary 
importance that psychology has achieved due to its `generosity' (Rose, 
1999: 267; Rose, 1998: 87) have been explored by Rose (1998: 114): 
practices of management of individuality [... ] do not work principally or 
exclusively by repression or domination. Such practices also, and more 
characteristically, seek actively to produce subjects of a certain form, to 
mold, shape, and organize the psyche, to fabricate individuals with 
particular desires and aspirations 
As Butler (1997: 33) puts it in a distinct but related context, the effect 
of such interpellation is `not descriptive, but inaugurative'. Naming 
and processes of identification are not fixative, as much as the giving 
of `a certain possibility for social existence' (Butler, 1997: 2) 
- 
they 
primarily do not limit as much as bringing something about. 
Identification has become one of the primary means by which self- 
government is instigated and incited (Dean, 1999: 200), and issues 
surrounding this which relate to the importance of `ethics' are 
discussed below. 
Because they are derived from a Foucauldian conception of 
power, the production of selves, dispositions and practices involved in 
these conceptions of government are not criticised as constituting a 
`loss' of freedom. The issues are not to be studied as automatically 
undesirable or illegitimate: 
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To analyze the relations between `the self' nd power, then, is not a matter 
of lamenting the ways in which our autonomy is suppressed by the state, 
but of investigating the ways in which subjectivity has become an essential 
object, target, and resource for certain strategies, tactics, and procedures of 
regulation 
(Rose, 1998: 153). 
Aside from objections to the conception of the `self implied by such 
accounts, one significant criticism is that it does not attend sufficiently 
to the responses that people make to such techniques (Lupton, 1999: 
102). Given that Foucault claimed that power always implied 
resistance 
- 
indeed resistance was `internal' to it (Foucault, 1978: 96) 
- 
it is in some ways surprising that attention is not paid to the specific 
ways in which people might resist. Instead, there is arguably a 
willingness to leave things at the general level and not pursue this in 
depth. I am attempting to attend to this very failure by examining 
some of the ways that participants in public debate resist the ways in 
which they are identified, and the means through which they are asked 
to confront, examine and discuss themselves. 
2.2.4. Morality and the Art of Ethics 
An important dimension of the governmentality literature, and an issue 
that preoccupied Foucault's later work was the significance of ethics 
and their importance vis-ä-vis one's relations with oneself. 
In his studies of the emergence of sexuality as a discursive 
formation, Foucault made reference to processes of `moral 
subjectivation' which included the ways in which individuals are 
urged to constitute themselves in particular ways (Foucault, 1985: 29). 
He describes morality as a `prescriptive ensemble', but as also 
referring to: 
the real behaviour of individuals in relation to the rules and values that are 
recommended to them: the word thus designates the manner in which they 
comply more or less fully with a standard of conduct, the manner in which 
they obey or resist an interdiction or a presumption; the manner in which 
32 
they respect or disregard a set of values. In studying this aspect of 
morality, one must determine how and with what margins of variation or 
transgression individuals or groups conduct themselves in reference to a 
prescriptive system that is explicitly or implicitly operative in their culture, 
and of which they are more or less aware. 
(Foucault, 1985: 25-6). 
However, he also asserted that for the ancient Greeks moral reflection 
was much less related to codes of the permitted and prohibited than 
with `characterizing the type of attitude, of relationship with oneself 
that was required' (Foucault, 1985: 209). It was about a relation with 
oneself not with a code to be followed. 
The realm of ethics is construed as consisting of the: ` means by 
which individuals come to construe, decipher, act upon themselves in 
relation to the true and the false, the permitted and the forbidden, the 
desirable and the undesirable' (Rose, 1998: 153). According to Rose 
(1999: 245) the practices of the self associated with this can be 
organised into a 3-fold distinction, adapted from Foucault, which 
include: `moral codes' 
- 
which map a piece of ethical territory; 
`ethical scenarios' 
- 
the contexts in which such codes are 
administered; and `technologies of the self' the various models of 
self-examination used to accomplish the necessary transformations. 
In partial contrast, Dean (1999: 17) asserts four components: 
the governed ethical substance (ontology), the governing or ethical 
work (ascetics), the governable or ethical subject (deontology), and a 
telos (teleology) 
- 
making up processes of `self-government'. 
Regardless of the composition of each specific model of the 
elements in play, all these notions direct us to a particular logic that 
exerts productive pressures upon individuals' relations with 
themselves, making us: `evaluate ourselves according to the criteria 
provided for us by others' (Rose, 1999: 11). Conceptions of 
normality, or example, are evaluations with an accompanying telos 
- 
they contain `not only a judgement about what is desirable, but an 
injunction as to a goal to be achieved' (Rose, 1999: 133). One is not 
merely made aware of standards, but is incited to assess oneself in 
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relation to them and address any gap between them and oneself by 
working upon oneself to reduce its size. 
Despite Foucault's aversion to outlining normative principles, 
an approval of particular forms of self-relation allegedly present in 
ancient Greece permeates his work in this area, and makes 
comprehensible his preference for ethics over morality (in a manner 
completely opposite to Bauman's understanding of them). 
This establishes ethical relations with the self as approximately 
an almost artistic process 
- 
`an `aesthetics of existence' (O'Leary, 
2002: 173), or an `aesthetics of living' (May, 1995: 68), or an `ethics 
of passion' 
- 
an art of not being moral and not being governed 
(Robinson, 2003: 123). 
Although the trajectory of such possibilities implied in 
Foucault's work attracts the allegation that Foucault reduces all 
manifestations of culture to `problems of style' (Privitera, 1995: x), 
others see it as potentially preferential to our current conception of 
morality. 
For example, May (1995: 144-5) claims that there are 3 
`freedoms' to be gained by a shift towards an `aesthetics of living' 
- 
from a certain bondage to the moral, a freedom `for' (the self 
becoming a canvas upon which creation can occur) and the potential 
for community construction. The freedom this would entail is one 
entirely without guarantees: `We, like the artist, have no model to 
follow which will guarantee a good, or a beautiful, result. ' (O'Leary, 
2002: 132). 
Associated with this is an ethos, an imperative, to surpass the 
limitations imposed upon us from the outside: `it is a question of 
continually breaking the limits of the rigid object-like forms of 
subjectivity which are given to us by our culture 
- 
even when these 
forms are self-imposed' (O'Leary, 2002: 133). 
Whilst the governmentality literature attends to the ways in 
which we are encouraged to relate to ourselves in particular ways 
- 
the 
ways we are governed 
- 
this interpretation of Foucault's work on 
ethics is aimed at pursuing a greater ability to affect ourselves 
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(Robinson, 2003: 121) 
- 
the ability to transgress and change ourselves 
-a critical form of freedom including an ability to transgress the limits 
applying to you and become different (Patton, 2000: 85). 
2.2.5. Luhmann's Systems Theory 
Systems theorist Niklas Luhmann's conception of modernity is one of 
an evolutionary process which has unfolded via the functional 
differentiation of a variety of subsystems (law, politics, mass media, 
religion, art, economy etc) in order to facilitate the management of 
societal problems. These systems are arranged heterarchically 
- 
there 
is no top, no centre, no system with ultimate authority, and each such 
system reproduces itself recursively (via autopoesis) by operating on 
the basis of a specific code (legal/illegal, government/opposition, 
information/non-information transcendent/immanent, beautiful/ugly, 
payment/non-payment etc. ) which steers communication, and an 
associated programme implementing the code 
- 
giving the code 
content 
- 
although system codes rarely exist in a completely pure form 
(King and Thornhill, 2003: 25). 
Luhmann's theory is organised around a central distinction 
between a system and its more complex environment, and each system 
is operationally closed to the others and exists only in their 
environment. These systems are orthogonal, and do not interact with 
one another other than via the perturbations and irritations that they 
create via a type of structural coupling 
-a reciprocal irritation 
(Luhmann in Rasch, 2000a: 208). Each only `knows' the others via an 
internal construction of organized complexity. 
Luhmann's epistemology, known as radical constructivism or 
second-order cybernetics, draws heavily upon insights from biologists 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, and mathematician George 
Spencer Brown. It views communication as the operation of drawing 
a distinction 
-a cutting up of the world 
- 
which not only indicates one 
side but, from the point of view of a second order observer, also 
mobilises the other side of that distinction. 
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All communication proceeds via a synthesis of three selections 
- 
information, utterance and understanding (Luhmann, 1995: 137), and 
is also reliant upon a fourth selection - that of acceptance/rejection 
(Luhmann, 1995: 147) on the part of the `recipient' (also see Rasch, 
2000c: 25). However, in communication, what is at stake is not the 
transmission of something, but the drawing of a distinction - dividing 
the world up in some way 
- 
according to what is (claimed to be) the 
case, and what is not. Spencer Brown (1979) calls the unity of such a 
distinction a `form', and it can be represented as follows: 
Distinction 
mahne State Umar]'' Stale 
Form 
(Figure 1: ` The Form of Distinction, ' from Baecker, 2001: 69). 
Such a form refers to everything `contained' by a given distinction 
(Baecker, 1999: 3), and any observation `creates information by 
making such a distinction' (Rasch, 2000a: 52). In `indicating' 
(mobilising) one half, any observation, in effect, hides the other half 
- 
it becomes an unmarked space (Luhmann, 1998: 80), a `black box' 
which is only amenable to observation by another (second order) 
observer, who also creates his or her own blind-spot in making such an 
observation. 
2.2.6. Morality as a Code 
According to Luhmann, systems offer certainty by communicating 
only about their own communications and providing explanations for 
the disappointment of its expectations (King and Thornhill, 2003: 31) 
- 
treating its own communications as reality. For Luhmann, morality 
is a social system, with a particularly close relationship to uncertainty 
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in allowing people to act in spite of uncertainty (Luhmann, 1987: 94), 
yet it also possesses a uniquely negative potential. 
As a social system, morality has a rather strange status in the 
sense that it can operate as a bacterial infection, parasitic invader 
(Rasch, 2000a: 127), or virus which can attach itself to other social 
systems with very negative consequences. Luhmann views morality 
as a: `a symbolic generalization that reduces the reflexive complexity 
of doubly contingent ego/alter relations to expressions of esteem' 
(Luhmann, 1995: 236, original emphasis). Instead of having a stable 
substantial content, here we are concerned with morality as a form 
involving the application of a code good/bad, articulated through 
communication via the distinction right/wrong (Thyssen, 1992: 35), 
approval/disapproval (Rasch, 2000b: 91), praise/blame (Luhmann, 
1995: 82), or esteem/contempt (Luhmann, 1995: 156). 
It is a code operating according to the unity of the distinction 
good/bad: 
The moral is [... J a specific distinction, a form with two sides: good and 
bad, or taking internal commitments into account, good and evil. Such a 
positive/negative opposition can never be reduced to a unity, except in the 
form of the paradox. Moralists, and indeed Durkheim himself, would have 
to assume that the distinction of good and bad is a good distinction [... ] 
This is certainly not a logical conclusion and somebody with experience of 
living under totalitarian regimes [which Luhmann did] might well prefer to 
see the distinction of good and bad as a bad distinction. 
(Luhmann, 1996: 30-1). 
In the interests of autopoesis, it is important that whilst one side of the 
distinction may be preferred, both sides of the distinction can be 
applied in an act of observation. The scope of the code's application is 
`virtualized' (Luhmann, 1993a: 76) with respect to both possibilities, 
and morality, as the unity of the two, can exist only if the possibility of 
the oscillation between them is kept open (Luhmann, 2002: 49). As 
such, there are no phenomena which are essentially `moral', instead, 
their moral status comes from the drawing of a contingent distinction 
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between good/bad. Whilst as the above quotation suggests, moralists 
would view the good/bad distinction as intrinsically good itself (also 
see Luhmann, 2002: 39), Luhmann is much more ambivalent about it 
- 
it is highly productive, but potentially dangerous. 
Such an orientation opens up many possibilities for criticism 
beyond the regular assertion that Luhmann is a relativist (which he 
deliberately and unashamedly was) or a conservative (more 
debateable) 
- 
that Luhmann's theory is amoral (or even immoral), or 
that this virtualization of morality is itself dangerous. 
2.2.7. The Role of Ethics 
Luhmann's rejection of entrenched moral positions leads him to see a 
particular (defensive) function for ethics, which is to: `warn off 
morality' (Luhmann, 1987: 94). Ethics assumes the role of a second 
order morality which subjects morality to its own code (Rasch, 2000a: 
149), and works to prevent the good/bad distinctions which are drawn 
from automatically remaining good/bad the next time the distinction is 
drawn. As such, ethics becomes a protection against moralizing aimed 
at keeping open the possibility that it is wrong (also see Thyssen, 
1992: 37). 
According to Luhmann's theory, it is particularly important that 
the code good/bad is not able to attach itself isomorphically or 
congruently to the steering code of any other social system, leading to 
that system's paralysis, and disappearance (Rasch, 2000b: 91, also see 
Luhmann, 2002: 124) 
- 
and therefore de-differentiation. As such, for 
Luhmann, `good' should attach itself to the distinction each code 
embodies (Luhmann, 2002: 92), and therefore the prevention of each 
systems' disappearance. Neither half of a distinction is always good, 
but the continued availability of both sides is. Therefore, for 
Luhmann, the key role for ethics, is to keep morality in check by 
responding to all moralizing with the question: `Why are you 
distinguishing in this way and not in another? ' (Luhmann, 2000: 120). 
Thyssen (1992: 37) broadly takes up Luhmann's view of the 
role of ethics as `insist[ing] on the limits of morals'. He then takes a 
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somewhat Habermasian turn in advocating that ethics be viewed as a 
procedure 
- 
the ethical process (Thyssen, 1992: 41) 
- 
which should 
exhibit a stable form, albeit with an unstable content, aimed at 
achieving a consensus (Thyssen, 1992: 42). Thyssen (1992: 38-9) sees 
a need for formal, abstract, shared rules, which can foster mutual 
expectations, not in relation to what constitutes morality, but instead in 
terms of the process by which decisions about morality are made. This 
resonates with the general consensus on acceptability that is necessary 
to the functioning of a truly radical pluralism (Weeks, 1996: 64). Here 
we are faced with a second order morality which would concern itself 
with the goodness and badness of the distinction right/wrong broadly 
in line with Luhmann's approach, but without guarantees. 
Of particular interest to my project are Thyssen's brief 
discussions of controversies between groups with different moralities, 
and the lack of any compelling criteria of justification: 
In a conflict between subcultures, no one subculture can force another to 
subscribe to its morals without violating the principle of tolerance and the 
right of each group to choose its identity [... ] each subculture insists on 
being different and will refuse a neutral court of appeal 
(Thyssen, 1992: 38). 
The possibility of the lack of mutually accepted grounds evokes 
themes present within a variety of other work some of which I have 
already mentioned (Maclntyre, 1985; Weeks, 1996, Lyotard, 1988; 
Rasch, 2000a). 
Whether or not we wish to accept all the particularities of 
Luhmann's theory, if we accept that distinctions are something of 
general social relevance, and that the distinction good/bad is a 
particularly significant code, we can perhaps see how the recurrent 
application of one of its sides to a particular putative phenomenon can 
stabilise somewhat. In the case of `good' this may eventually lead to it 
gaining a status beyond question, and in the case of `bad' place it in a 
such a position that attempting to label it `good' may seem almost 
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nonsensical. Truths (moral or otherwise) can become sacred objects 
(Edwards et al., 1995: 40), and, as such, take on an additional `moral' 
character 
-a sense of goodness/badness regarding their acceptance or 
rejection 
-a type of doubling of their goodness. 
A status can be achieved whereby they become practically 
`beyond question' if one wishes to remain intelligible. For Fevre, this 
would be the case with respect to `commonsense' attaining a 
hegemonic position as a basis for a distorted form of morality. Whilst 
Fevre terms this `demoralization', Luhmann, would see this rather 
differently as merely a change in the `criteria of allocation' (Luhmann, 
1996: 31) but not a change in the persistence of morality (the code) 
itself. Indeed, unlike Fevre and others, he is more concerned with 
morality being too influential rather than not influential enough. 
Whilst Luhmann's concern about morality's potential for 
paralysing other social systems contains an admission that the social 
world is potentially quite fragile, he also sees little possibility of any 
of our most persistent distinctions disappearing. For example: 
[D]espite all the turbulences eroding tradition there is no serious likelihood 
of normality 
- 
that is to say, the distinction between normal and deviant 
- 
disappearing or of us having to lose our habit of observing society in terms 
of this distinction because it has ceased to be useful 
(Luhmann, 1993a: viii). 
In this regard, Luhmann observes a very important place for the mass 
media, particularly in terms of its `maintenance and reproduction' 
(Luhmann, 2000: 31). However, he stresses that this does not mean 
that the media deterministically fix moral principles. Rather: `It is 
only the code of morality which is reproduced, in other words the 
difference of good and bad, or evil, behaviour' (Luhmann, 2000: 31, 
original emphasis). The most obvious way in which the code 
undergoes a rejuvenation, is in relation to the `scandals' (usually 
related to finances or sexuality) which are such a prominent part of 
much media coverage (Luhmann, 2000: 80). 
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It is not simply that: `In the spectacle of public condemnation 
of the abnormal, the potency and pervasiveness of normality is 
reactivated [... ] the self-judgement of each of us against its standards 
is mobilized' (Rose, 1999: 208). Rather, the disapproval helps to 
reconstitute the unity of the code, and contribute to its perpetuation - 
the code is reproduced as a distinction that can be drawn again. 
More generally it is not simply the application of the code 
good/bad that involves the attribution of approval/disapproval, but also 
the communicative process, and here we perhaps have another way of 
thinking about the moral aspects of intelligibility. According to Rasch 
(2000a: 93-4) Luhmann also asserts that: `the moral code [... ] has the 
additional function of inhibiting or "suggesting away" [... ] the 
freedom it produces by coding approval or disapproval of the 
consequences of communication'. An utterance apparently contains 
an approval/disapproval regarding whether or not what is 
communicated should be taken on board, and accepted as valid. 
Luhmann (1995: 235) also notes the way in which the operation 
of morality can provoke conflicts, and subsequently impede their 
resolution. In this respect Luhmann's ideas link with Luckmann's 
(1996) account of the risk of dissensus accompanying moral 
communication, particularly in terms of the polarisations that can 
develop: 
[T]he moral colouring of communications is also risky, because it leads to 
a rapid fixation of positions, to intolerance, and to conflict. A 
communication presents itself as being moral, if it suggests or explicitly 
states that self-esteem, or the esteem accorded to others relies upon the 
fulfilment of certain conditions. He [sic] who communicates morally in 
this manner implies that he cannot respect others, if they do not adhere to 
the communicated conditions; and he also puts his own self-esteem in 
jeopardy, he binds himself to the communicated morality and makes it 
more difficult for himself to revise his opinion in retrospect. 
(Luhmann, 1987: 92). 
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Put more simply, morality: `works to promote conflict by clearly 
indicating that one's position lies on the side of right and by the 
subjecting the opposing side to public rejection' (Luhmann, 1995: 
392). Hence moralistic approaches mobilise a `tendency to treat other 
people as enemies' (Black, 1998: 144). 
According to the interpretation of Rasch (2000b), based upon 
his understanding of Schmitt (1996), herein lies another danger, 
specifically in relation to politics: 
If one lives by a fundamental `is/ought' distinction, bemoaning the way 
things are and promulgating a utopic vision of the way things ought to be 
[... ] then one will be tempted to coordinate this distinction with the 
political distinction, condemning those who oppose one's own `ought' as 
representing not a politically different position but rather the morally 
indefensible status quo. In this way the political will transform itself into 
[a] type of moral Armageddon [... ] and only one side can win such a final 
battle. 
(Rasch, 2000b: 163; also see Luhmann, 2000: 80). 
Use of language such as `Armageddon' may be hyperbolic, but the 
idea that positions can be fixed in such a way that common ground is 
unavailable might cause concern amongst those wanting to avoid 
violent forms of conflict. For those advocating dialogic relations, the 
good/bad distinction (morality) is perhaps often not a `good' 
distinction to use! 
2.2.8. Moral Certainty and Moral Asymmetry 
If we are in the territory of definitions of a situation obtaining a moral 
character, then we are not only potentially in the realm of Goffman 
(1959: 220) but also a variety of other approaches that may help with 
an understanding of some form of `definitional persistence', in 
particular some associated with Garfinkel's (1967) ethnomethodology. 
A variety of approaches have been developed under 
Garfinkel's influence, developing an understanding of intelligibility 
and the need for individuals to account for themselves as a morally 
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and normatively significant phenomenon (Jayyusi, 1991). The 
reconsidered approach known as membership categorisation analysis, 
in particular, has focussed upon the importance of moral categorisation 
and moral accountability (Housley 2002: 6), and has even made 
tentative steps to connect its observations about the way that people 
manage perceived `moral discrepancies' in their conduct to 
Luhmann's theories (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2003: paragraph 6.1). In 
particular such approaches tend to understand there to be a very close 
connection between processes of description and appraisal (Jayyusi, 
1991: 233). 
In an article drawing heavily upon Wittgenstein, Kober (1997) 
discusses what he calls epistemic and moral certainties. Whilst not 
easily distinguishable in practice (Kober, 1997: 373) in relative terms, 
the epistemic are concerned with the way that `reality' is viewed, 
whilst the moral revolve around the evaluation of human actions 
(Kober, 1997: 378; on a similar issue see Barnsley, 1972: 47). 
According to Kober (1997: 365): 
Epistemic and moral certainties [are] constitutive rules of language games, 
such that they are unjustifiable, undeniable and serving as obliging 
standards of truth, goodness and rationality for members of a community 
engaging in the respective practices. 
Within a specific language game particular rules and norms come into 
being and become constitutive of that game, taking on a determinant 
role within it: 
Constitutive moral norms, i. e., moral certainties, of a moral language game 
M are not justifiable within M; instead they determine what counts as 
morally right or wrong (as good or evil) within M or what will be 
considered morally admissible or forbidden by members of a community 
being engaged in M. 
(Kober, 1997: 374). 
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Moreover this has strongly exclusionary implications: `Those who do 
not obey the moral norms of a moral language game M either do not 
practise M or will be excluded from it for being considered 
incompetent' (Kober, 1997: 375) 
- 
something obviously similar in 
implication to the `order of discourse'. There are requirements before 
something can be `inside'. 
Again we are back to questions of intelligibility, and the 
dynamics (or otherwise) of the lack of availability of particular 
discursive locations or subject positions from which to speak. This 
does not necessitate that we view the discursive contributions made by 
an individual as determined, but does involve a recognition that within 
a particular practice, some potential arguments are more `difficult' to 
make than others, not least because of the availability of sanctions in 
relation to the `morality of intelligibility' 
- 
the limits of the sayable. 
If we are interested in the dynamics of putting things beyond 
question, or making things more difficult to question, particularly in 
relation to morality, then I would argue that it makes sense to think 
about `moral certainty', and to do so in a dual sense. According to this 
formulation moral certainty does not just refer to conviction, or 
certainty about the goodness/badness of a particular attitude or practice 
- 
that I believe that X or Y is wrong, and no argumentation will 
convince me otherwise. It would also make a slightly creative use of 
the legal meaning of the term. In a legal context, possession of moral 
certainty refers to the belief that something is beyond reasonable doubt 
- 
it is the criteria required for a jury to convict. As such it may make 
sense to invoke `moral certainty' in reference to the definition of a 
situation as a matter of conviction, and involving the idea that, in 
relation to an established definition some ideas, statements and subject 
positions are beyond the bounds of reason. It is possible that a person 
has moral certainty about the goodness of the `protection of children', 
the badness of Saddam Hussein, or the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction inside Iraq, but it is also possible that it can become 
beyond reasonable doubt that these are at stake in a particular context. 
If such definitions become a matter of moral certainty, and attempting 
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to engage in dialogue with them on any other grounds might be rather 
unproductive. It is possible to be excluded entirely and rendered 
illegitimate and unintelligible that way, or rendered illegitimate whilst 
being included, according to the logic of a moral asymmetry inside an 
order of discourse, or language game 
- 
not unintelligible, but 
intelligible as illegitimate. 
In order to bring this issue into slightly better focus I will now 
clarify the sense in which I am attempting to link Luhmann and 
Foucault together. 
2.2.9. Marking Space and the Repressive Presence 
Despite Luhmann's rejection of Foucault's work (See Harrison, 1995: 
76), it is possible to see an affinity between aspects of their projects. 
Rempel (1996: 83) makes an attempt to connect the two by 
adding Foucault's version of power/knowledge into Luhmann's 
systems theory, attempting to make Luhmann less one-dimensional by 
conceptualising systems as combining forms of power/knowledge. 
While he may have a point that system codes can be usefully viewed 
as `the glue that binds power and knowledge together' (Rempel, 1996: 
81), establishing a `constraining principle of inclusion and exclusion', 
his implicit criticisms that Luhmann reduces multiple types of 
knowledge to a single one within each system is not entirely valid. It 
ignores Luhmann's recognition that communications can be more 
subtle than manifesting themselves directly in the form of a system's 
code 
- 
indeed it may be relatively rare to see them manifested that 
directly. 
Andersen (2003: 12) notes a connection between the two in 
terms of a similarity between the `enunciative function' in Foucault's 
archaeological work 
- 
the difference between actuality and possibility 
(Bernauer, 1990: 91) 
- 
and Luhmann's version of `meaning' 
(Andersen, 2003: 12). If we accept Andersen's version of meaning, of 
possibility, as: `a horizon that lines up with actualisation 
- 
something 
appears and thereby excludes other possibilities' (Andersen, 2003: 73), 
then the connection is clear. 
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More generally Pottage (1998: 3) notes Luhmann's affinities 
with Foucault (and Deleuze) in terms of their mutual interests in 
`emergence' ahead of `substance' and the ways in which `structures, 
processes and theories [... J produce themselves out of their own 
contingency' (Pottage, 1998: 3; see Foucault, 1977b: 148-9). Pottage 
also claims that Luhmann could be considered to be Foucault's 
`disclosing agent' (Pottage, 1998: 5) helping to make his work more 
specific, and there is a very particular sense in which I am in 
agreement with this. 
In his discussion of Foucault's conception of power, and in an 
attempt to settle, or at least reconfigure, the question of whether power 
primarily produces or represses, Deleuze (1999: 29) claims that: 
`Power "produces reality" before it represses. ' To this we can respond 
by questioning whether it is necessary to decide which comes first 
- 
production or repression. Surely their virtual simultaneity is also a 
possibility, and it is in this area that the `disclosing agent' metaphor is 
most appropriate. If it is the case that `one phrase denies the existence 
of others, forbidding, contradicting or repressing them to such an 
extent that each phrase remains pregnant with everything left unsaid' 
(Deleuze, 1999: 2, emphasis added), then we can use Luhmann to 
make this slightly more specific. A statement is not pregnant with 
everything that is left unsaid, instead, it is pregnant with a specific 
thing that is left unsaid 
- 
the other side of a specific distinction or 
form, instead of which it is produced. While it may also be reliant 
upon other `unsaid' things, the thing that is specifically unsaid has a 
different status to all those others which exist in the background. 
According to this, we can say that any particular example of the logic 
of the panopticon (assuming that it is successful) neither one-sidedly 
represses nor produces anything. Instead it produces particular types 
of compliant bodies specifically instead of specific unruly or non- 
compliant ones, and many other potential dimensions of those bodies 
are ignored completely. 
In more Luhmannesque terms, when something is `produced', 
it `emerges' because of the drawing of a distinction, and something 
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else (the distinction's other side) is always in some sense repressed. 
All observations automatically involve a blind spot 
- 
what is 
simultaneously not seen/indicated/produced 
- 
as well as the space that 
is marked. Not only are all other possibilities absent, but also 
something specific 
- 
the unmarked space, the other half of the 
particular distinction 
- 
and some kind of governing, influencing, 
guiding, or shepherding potential is associated with such a process. 
In Luhmann, there is a clear importance attached to what we 
might like to call an `already'. Communications have to build upon 
and attach themselves to previous communications 
- 
that is the 
prerequisite for `autopoesis'. Whilst I do not want to invoke all of 
this, and although prepared to acknowledge the utility of aspects of 
Luhmann's theoretical instruments more generally, I am not sure that 
it is necessary to automatically invoke them in relation to every 
observable distinction. 
The notion of an `already' is also present in Foucault, 
specifically in reference to the relationship between manifest discourse 
and an `already-said, which according to Foucault is simultaneously 
also a `never-said': 
[E]verything that is formulated in discourse was already articulated in that 
semi-silence that precedes it, which continues to run obstinately beneath it, 
but which it covers and silences. The manifest discourse, therefore, is 
really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and 
this `not-said' is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said. 
(Foucault, 1972: 25). 
This repressive presence can be understood, and made even more 
specific by relating it to Luhmann's `marked' and unmarked spaces. 
The quotation actually implies that Foucault was aware of the 
possibility of this more two-dimensional understanding, and it seems 
to me that accepting such a two-dimensional version of meaning 
production is a step on from the rather tiresome concern over whether 
power either produces or represses (or which comes first), and allows 




virtual simultaneity. When people exhibit a sense of attachment to a 
particular definition of the situation, when they talk about something 
being the case, this understanding will allow perception of not only all 
the other possibilities that are excluded, but the specific thing that is 
excluded 
- 
the sense in which it is X rather than Y specifically that is 
the case. When such an attachment to one definition instead of 
another specific one is observable, it will be useful to think of it as a 
moral asymmetry, a difference that makes a difference in Bateson's 
(2000: 459) sense, but one that does so in an obviously moral (and 
probably strategic) sense. Such an asymmetry is in some sense 
internal to a specific order of discourse, a specific language game, a 
specific form, and the illegitimacy of any position in relation to it is 
one inside it rather than outside. It also relies upon distinctions being 
drawn between two things, one of which is `preferred' morally. It 
does not necessarily require, however, that they are a clear dualism or 
`disciplinary twins' in Connolly's (1983: 236-7) sense, although some 
may be relatively similar. 
As already mentioned, the illegitimacy that can result is not an 
illegitimacy due to unintelligibility, but an illegitimacy due to being 
understood in a specific negatively valued way. One can be 
illegitimate by being unintelligible 
- 
outside a language game, a form 
or order of discourse 
- 
or by being intelligible in specific ways, 
according to particular moral asymmetries inside a discursive space. 
This is where the possible experiential dimension comes in. If 
we assume that a discursive space (however you wish to understand it 
- 
as a discursive formation, a social system, a language game, an order 
of discourse) operates with a high degree of closure according to a 
limited range of morally asymmetric distinctions, and people are to 
some degree aware of this, then they are going to be aware of and 
subject to particular `demands' made of them when they are engaged 
in discursive practices. Depending upon the way in which the 
discursive space has been set up, they will potentially be faced with 
specific forms of discursive difficulty. 
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In order to be a legitimate contributor to a specific space one 
has to first ensure that one can be understood as being inside it. 
Assuming that that can be successfully achieved, there is the 
possibility that one will nevertheless be understood as illegitimate 
`inside' it 
- 
according to the devalued half of one of the distinctions in 
operation. In order to address the risk of being understood in a 
morally and strategically disadvantageous way, particular practices or 
statements may be required, and pressure placed upon an individual to 
produce them, something requiring that they relate to themselves in 
particular ways. 
I will elaborate on the relevance to this understanding of moral 
asymmetry of the interrelated concepts of `disclaiming' (Hewitt and 
Stokes, 1975) and `ontological gerrymandering' (Woolgar and 
Pawluch, 1985; Potter, 1996) in my Methodology chapter. Before 
getting to that, I will discuss some of the sociologically relevant 
literature engaging with aspects of the `Iraq Crisis'. 
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3. Empirical Literature Review: War in/on Iraq 
3.1. Introduction 
Central to this project are the problems people confront when arguing, 
and similar problems are faced when writing a PhD thesis. Given the 
highly controversial nature of the `Iraq crisis', it is no surprise that 
much of the literature concerned with it is aimed directly at 
transforming the context itself. Many contributions are explicitly 
normative in approach 
- 
directly concerned with what should be the 
case 
- 
and my problem lies in establishing the boundary between the 
academic literature and the empirical materials deserving different 
forms of analysis. 
Do I insist upon a clear separation, formulating criteria upon 
which to base the sorting process, thereby allowing greater credence to 
those allocated to the literature category and allowing its contents to 
elude my potentially deconstructive gaze? Alternatively, I could assert 
that there is no significant difference between the two types of 
material, in which case the status of a literature review is brought into 
question. 
This problem is exacerbated by the proximity of my account to 
the events themselves, meaning that most accounts of the 2003 war 
have thus far been produced by people `inside' the context 
- 
journalistic `eye-witnesses' (Simpson, 2003; Omar, 2004), and 
politicians defending their own role in events (Cook, 2003; Short, 
2004) or are driven directly by a vision of what should have happened. 
My chosen means of dealing with this `problem' of separating 
the empirical and literature components is most certainly not to claim 
that I have solved it satisfactorily. Instead, when it comes to those 
contributions concerned with the events of 2002 onwards I have tried 
to distinguish between those making contributions `about' the 
controversy, and those doing so `within' it in a way loosely 
approximating Luhmann's distinction between first and second order 
observation. Nevertheless I freely admit that the distinction is less 
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than clear, since I am a contingent observer too. The materials could 
have been organised differently, and material drawn from some 
sources appear in this chapter and in relevant subsequent ones. 
3.2. Gulf War I and the Aftermath 
Any attempt at making sense of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 is 
doomed to ahistoricism if it neglects to give some consideration to the 
`first' Gulf War in 1991, the conclusion and aftermath of which 
created many of the conditions of possibility of the action 12 years 
later. 
Although it is not my intention to engage in a detailed 
comparison of the two events, it is still necessary to probe the 
literature about it for any relevant insights. I will not be providing any 
great detail on the events that took place (a summary timetable of 
some of the many key events can be found in the Appendix), since the 
details are still a matter of intense controversy. What matters more 
here are those dimensions and themes present in accounts of the 
conflict which are most sociologically pertinent. Rather than dividing 
up the literature according to time, I prefer a more thematic approach 
which will largely involve discussion of both wars against Iraq 
together. Nevertheless, a few remarks focussing upon the first Gulf 
war and its aftermath are necessary. 
The `first' Gulf War (1991) has been understood in various 
ways, many considering it to represent something significantly new 
culturally. The presence of 24 hours news (CNN) demonstrated that 
we now inhabit a world in which mediation is of central importance in 
shaping human socio-cultural experiences in the West (Kellner, 1992). 
Not only were these changes purported to have occurred in relation to 
the news media specifically, but also in relation to morality and 
military technology (Askoy and Robbins, 1992) in terms of its 
emphasis upon `hygiene' (Melling, 1995: 80; Kellner, 1992: 157), 
time and speed (Virilio, 2002), and the definition of war itself 
(Baudrillard, 1995). Moreover, it is seen as a key event in the 
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reconfiguration of global politics following the fall of Communism 
and the end of the Cold War (Huntington, 1998: 251). 
Schulte-Sasse and Schulte-Sasse (1991: 67-8) distinguish five 
locations for the analysis and critique of the 1991 war: 
Long-term US power politics including military intervention in the third 
world; Inconsistencies in the official `moral' legitimation of war; 
Disinformation campaigns; Long-term historical modernization processes 
in the Middle East; `the importance of aestheticized experiences of 
collective unity and superiority for the cultural reproduction of U. S. 
society and of war as a means of simulating a unified body politic. 
They characterise prevailing accounts as deficient due to an over- 
emphasis upon questions of power and propaganda to the detriment of 
cultural and ideological understandings: `analysis of hegemonic power 
strategies and disinformation can become counterproductive if it fails 
to consider means by which current societies reproduce themselves 
culturally and ideologically' (Schulte-Sasse and Schulte-Sasse, 1991: 
68). Their point is arguably valid in relation to the more recent 
conflict since most accounts thus far are (perhaps understandably) 
preoccupied with the allocation of the responsibility for how events 
unfolded, to the detriment of a more holistic understanding of how it 
was that things occurred in the ways that they did. 
A variety of accounts exist of several dimensions of the build- 
up to the `first' war, with others focussing upon the aftermath, 
especially the sense in which it did not resolve the issues at stake 
satisfactorily. 
Virilio (2002: 137) claims that the war resulted in a 
`transpolitical paradox': 
he who was defeated (Saddam Hussein) did not lose the war, since he 
remains in power and retains his potential for harm. The war of zero 
casualties (or nearly, on the side of allies) was therefore also a war of zero 
political victory [... ] 
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Whilst there was no doubt about the coalition's victory militarily, 
politically there was minimal change with Saddam Hussein retaining 
power despite uprisings in the south. Many accounts of the aftermath 
are critical on this point, arguing that the question of what was to come 
next was ignored or forgotten by the Bush government (Aburish, 
2001: 307) 
- 
an accusation again made against his son's 
administration in 2003. 
The UN resolutions passed in the war's aftermath, instituting 
the sanctions regime and the UNSCOM process inspecting Iraq's 
disarmament, were in many ways, according to Rai (2002: 182), an 
`offer designed to be refused. ' However, they were accepted as part of 
the ceasefire agreement, although it turned out that this acceptance did 
not necessarily mean that the Iraqi government intended to comply 
completely (Aburish, 2001: 316). Indeed, it is widely accepted that 
Iraq implemented a formulaic means of dealing with the inspections 
process, a pattern of `Iraqi denials, followed by partial disclosure, 
followed by further investigation by the UN inspectors, leading to 
further Iraqi admissions' (Cockburn and Cockburn, 2002: 107). Such 
cynicism was an important theme in the controversy over the 
inspections process in 2002-3, and one reason advanced for the belief 
that Iraq would never fully comply. 
Cynicism is something of which those in favour of the 
resolutions have also been accused. For example, Rai (2002: 177) 
claims that aspects of UNSCR 678 in particular `add up to a set of 
goalposts that can be moved indefinitely'. A high degree of flexibility 
of application appears to exist in the interpretations made of the 
resolutions, such that they could be `selectively re-invoked (or 
ignored) at will by America, and it now seems likely that this is 
precisely what may continue to happen indefinitely' (Merrin, 1994: 
450). Ignored on and off for 11 years, the resolutions were re-invoked 
in 2002-3 to justify invasion and occupation of Iraq. 
A high degree of asymmetry has existed in terms of the 
flexibility of interpretation allowed to the various parties. Whilst 
flexibility was afforded the US, Iraq was not allowed to object, or 
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deviate from the minutiae of what was required of it without being 
held morally accountable. 
According to Richard Butler, head of UNSCOM in 1998 when 
the inspectors faced increased resistance to their activities, leading to 
what was know as `Operation Desert Fox', Iraqi officials: 
`increasingly deflected attention from their lack of cooperation in the 
disarmament process by using language that the diplomatic 
community would value: "sovereignty", "security", "dignity". ' 
(Butler, 2000: 169). In the same account, Butler also expresses 
disapproval of Kofi Annan's attempts to undertake a `comprehensive 
review' of the inspections process in late 1998, particularly on the 
grounds that it implied: `a kind of moral equivalence between 
UNSCOM and Iraq' (Butler, 2000: 191; also see Trevan, 1999: 367) - 
any such symmetry was inappropriate. 
The most comprehensive account of the discursive aspects of 
the process leading up to Operation Desert Fox - the four day US/UK 
bombing campaign in December 1998 
- 
is Richardson (2004). Within 
a wider study of the representation of Islam within the UK broadsheet 
press he constructs the argument that underlying the coverage of the 
`crisis' in 1998 was a: "`Discourse of Military Intervention", in which 
the lexical, syntactic, semantic and structural choices in the texts are 
functional to their pragmatic role: justifying bombing Iraq and 
"removing" Saddam Hussein' (Richardson, 2004: 189). 
Richardson analysed journalistic contributions to show the way 
in which relationships were set up between various elements within 
the context, and expectations fostered regarding what should happen. 
For example, he looks at the way in which the Iraqi perception of the 
crisis was often portrayed as determinant 
- 
amounting to the 
implication that if only they understand `we' are serious about action 
then they would act in the way `we' desire (Richardson, 2004: 166). 
Moreover, he notes that coverage of the build up to Operation Desert 
Fox concentrated upon 'Saddam's defiance of international law', 
implying that his agency was paramount, and also leading to a 
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situation in which `something needs to be done' (Richardson, 2004: 
156-7). 
The propositional logic of the argument for military action in 
that case can be represented in diagrammatic form: 
Tyne Saddamilasseinis Defying 
International Law 
Mairand Saddamis a Bad Man Iniernatimal Law 
Slmuldbe Uplield 
jn a$on Something Needs tobe Done 
Coi fusion We Should Internere 
Pres"em"ns We are P'hys ically Able We are Morally 
to Intervene Able to Irdervene 
Milßary S aphis tication `Just C anus e' 
(Figure 1: ` The Discursive Strategy in the Broadsheet Reporting of Iraq', from 
Richardson, 2004: 156). 
The significance of this `discourse of military intervention', and the 
fact that the assumption that military action was appropriate permeated 
so much of the coverage, clearly makes such ideas applicable to the 
more recent controversy. According to Richardson, also present were 
a limited range of strategies contesting those dominant ones, which 
tended to focus on three main points: that Britain and the US were 
inconsistent in that they were not proposing to attack all countries 
breaking international law, the questioning of the accuracy of military 
technology, and arguing against the whole basis for military 
intervention, as well as the expression of a preference for non-violent 
approaches (Richardson, 2004: 178-181). 
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Whilst there is much to admire about the sophistication of 
Richardson's account, one slightly frustrating thing from my 
perspective is the confidence that he displays regarding what `really' 
was the case. For example, Richardson professes to know whether or 
not the action that took place was legal or not: 
Although the relevant Security Council Resolutions did not 
- 
and do not 
- 
authorise military attacks on Iraq, the Americans argued throughout the 
crisis that the decision for military aggression could be made without 
further recourse to the Security Council. 
(Richardson, 2004: 159, original emphasis). 
There is nothing wrong with taking this position, but asserting it as if it 
were a matter of certainty is problematic. There is no consensus (not 
even loosely) on what the various Security Council Resolutions 
applying to Iraq do and do not do, something which has been an ever- 
present source of controversy. It would almost be better to completely 
bracket the question of what the Resolutions are supposed to do, and 
leave to one-side the question of any gap between what should and 
does happen. A much better way of thinking about the issue is not 
deciding whether or not something really should have been allowed to 
happen, but: how was it able to do despite so many people asserting 
that it should not have done so? 
Whilst the 1998 controversy, and war of 1991 set the scene for 
the 2003 invasion an important issue framing the context for the 
invasion is the ` war on terrorism', a discursive formation which merits 
some consideration. 
3.3. The War on Terrorism' 
A variety of accounts of the so-called war on terror(ism) (WoT) have 
been produced since it was launched, emanating from a multitude of 
disciplinary sources. 
Two main interrelated themes can be identified in the accounts 
that exist 
- 
the alleged vagueness of reference of the phrase WoT in 
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terms of the definitions of `terrorism' and `war', and the apparent 
moral difficulty involved in criticising it. 
3.3.1. Vagueness 
One way that the WoT has been thus far understood and criticised in 
scholarly discussions is its general vagueness, and suspicion about 
clarity is often present in attempts at undermining the whole process. 
In his eyewitness account of the events of 9-11, the now 
Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams claimed that: `As soon as 
it was decided that the September atrocity was an act of war and that a 
`war on terrorism' was to be undertaken, clarity disappeared' 
(Williams, 2002: 37-8). He also claimed that it was unclear what 
would count as `victory' within it (Williams, 2002: 32; also see 
Bauman, 2002: 86). 
Chomsky, who has clear political reasons for objecting to the 
very idea of a WoT, puts his objections as follows: 
To call it a 'war against terrorism', however is simply more propaganda, 
unless the `war' really does target terrorism. But that is plainly not 
contemplated because Western powers could never abide by their own 
official definitions of the term, as in the U. S. Code or Army manuals. To 
do so would at once reveal that the U. S. is a leading terrorist state as are its 
clients. 
(Chomsky, 2001: 16). 
This is interesting for its identification of the two locations blamed for 
the lack of clarity 
- 
the definitions of both war and terrorism. He 
ironises both its status as a war, and the selective definition of 
terrorism involved. 
3.3.2. Problems with `War' 
Various contributors have described the use of the term `war' in the 
WoT as problematic, including Habermas (in Borradori, 2003: 34), 
who claimed that the frame was normatively and pragmatically a 
`mistake'. Others are less generous describing it as `dreadfully 
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misconceived' (Short, 2004: 267), or observe sinister motivations 
behind the classification 
- 
that it was `propaganda', or `doublespeak': 
The idea of a `war on terrorism' is itself a form of doublespeak. It reflects 
a now-pervasive habit of using war as a metaphor for all sorts of things 
that are not really wars at all [... ] 
Usually, the people who launch metaphorical wars realize at the outset that 
victory, as understood in real wars, will never happen [... ] 
Instead, what usually happens is that these wars develop permanent 
bureaucracies that drain resources and issue periodic exhortations to the 
public as a way of compensating for the fact that victory is nowhere in 
sight. 
(Rampton and Stauber, 2003: 128). 
Arguably, there is another dimension to the coming together of the 
terms war and terrorism, hinted at by Zulaika and Douglass (1996) in 
an account exploring terrorism's relationship to `taboo' years before 
the events of 9-11. They claim that terrorism is often portrayed as 
`war' in order to achieve acceptance of particular forms of 
counteraction: `By casting terrorism in the guise of warfare, these 
unruly elements can be converted into the work of a full-fledged army 
against which an organized counteraction can be mounted' (Zulaika 
and Douglass, 1996: 82-3; also see Fuller, 2001: paragraph 1.11). 
Since any interaction with terrorists is a taboo-violation 
(Zulaika and Douglass, 1996: x), violence is the only option. If 
terrorism and war are so very closely associated, having a `war' on 
`terrorism' is almost semiotically excessive, a doubling or repetition of 
meaning 
-a doublespeak, but not in the Orwellian sense meant by 
Rampton and Stauber. 
3.3.3. Problems with `Terrorism' 
The definition of `terrorism' in circulation in the WoT has also been 
criticised, with Chomsky drawing a distinction between literal and 
`propagandistic' uses of the term: 
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[A]longside the literal meaning of the term [... ]: the term `terrorism' is 
used to refer to terrorist acts committed by enemies against us or our allies. 
This propagandistic use is virtually universal. Everyone `condemns 
terrorism' in this sense of the term. Even the Nazis harshly condemned 
terrorism and carried out what they called "counter-terrorism" against the 
terrorist partisans. 
(Chomsky, 2001: 90). 
Put more succinctly: `Everyone condemns terrorism, but we have to 
ask what they mean' (Chomsky, 2001: 91). 
Derrida (in Borradori, 2003: 102) meanwhile asserted the need 
for care in relation to both the terms `terrorism' and `international 
terrorism'. The vagueness of the referent leaves it open to abuse in the 
form of `opportunistic' appropriations (Derrida in Borradori, 2003: 
103-4). Moreover, arguably: `the most powerful and destructive 
appropriation of terrorism is precisely its use as a self-evident concept 
by all the parties involved' (Borradori, 2003: 153). The danger is that 
everyone can think they are talking about the same thing, using the 
word in the same way, when actually very different conceptions are at 
work, leading to people appearing to accept the definitions of their 
opponents. 
In this same interview Derrida spoke at length about the 
significance of the imposition of terminology: 
The dominant power is the one that manages to impose and, thus, to 
legitimate, indeed to legalize (for it is always a question of law) on a 
national or world stage, the terminology and thus the interpretation that 
best suits it in a given situation. 
(Derrida in Borradori, 2003: 105). 
It has certainly come about that the vast majority of people, even those 
critical of the definition, understand the contemporary world situation 
somehow in relation to the `war against terror(ism)' 
- 
accepting the 
reality of it as a process underway, something with particular reductive 
implications. The question of whether this has been `imposed' 
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somehow is a separate question from whether such widespread 
acceptance has occurred. 
It is perhaps helpful to view the definition of the WoT at work 
as a definition of no definition 
- 
the absence facilitating a high degree 




Some Things One Must, or Must not, Say 
According to Derrida, the discourse associated with 9-11 actually calls 
for talk: 
Not only is it impossible not to speak on this subject, but you feel or are 
made to feel that it is actually forbidden, that you do not have the right, to 
begin speaking of anything, especially in public, without ceding to this 
obligation, without making an always somewhat blind reference to this 
date 
(in Borradori, 2003: 87; original emphasis). 
There was a form of moral pressure to acknowledge and speak about 
9-11, an incitement to express horror at its occurrence. The closely 
associated imperative to not say certain things was also observed by 
various sources. 
As Crockatt puts it: 
The war against terrorism separates the sheep from the goats: `Those not 
with us are against us, ' said President Bush. There is no comfortable 
middle ground. Indeed, it is arguably harder to find middle ground in the 
war against terrorism than it was in the war against communism. 
(Crockatt, 2003: 163). 
The absence of a middle ground available reflects the significance of 
the filtering capacity achieved by the for/against distinction, and 
makes it difficult to say certain things without negative consequences 
(feedback). 2iiek (2002: 33), among others had pointed out that in 
relation to 9-11: `every explanation which evokes social circumstances 
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is dismissed as covert justification of terror'. All attempts at 
understanding or explaining the events get conflated with justification, 
and therefore also the marginalisation of those engaging in them (see 
Johnson, 2002: 223). 
2i2ek (2002: 144) understands this as an `ideologico-political 
blackmail', claiming that its greatest catastrophe was Europe being 
drawn in by it, strengthening US hegemony. Whilst strongly resonant, 
the notion of `ideologico-political blackmail' suffers from being a little 
too obviously critical 
- 
`blackmail' leaves little doubt about the 
morality of any evaluation made 
- 
and the intensity of 2izek's 
hyperbole is exactly the sort of thing that appears to play into the 
hands of those attempting to marginalise dissent. To them he is saying 
that American deaths are less important than making sure the US is not 
hegemonic, a proposition that they would find it easy to deride. 
Other critical contributors tended to be more careful about 
attempting to protect themselves from such marginalisation: 
One can condemn unconditionally certain acts of terrorism (whether state 
or not) without having to ignore the situation that might have brought them 
about or even legitimated them [... ] 
One can thus condemn unconditionally, as I do here, the attack of 
September 11 without having to ignore the real or alleged conditions that 
made it possible. 
(Derrida in Borradori, 2003: 106-7; original emphasis). 
Here Derrida claims that explanation and justification are separate, and 
even emphasises his condemnation of 9-11 with italicisation. Such 
careful talk has been a very important part of the discourse of those 
criticising events since 9-11, and is one of the central themes of this 
thesis. An index of how far such moral problematisation had spread is 
that even Baudrillard (2002: 24), certainly not someone known for 
making concessions, tried not to appear unconcerned with the deaths 
of 9-11. 
The intensity with which specific positions have been rendered 
morally problematic within the WoT is helped by the way that 
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`terrorism' viewed as unambiguously bad, as `the hidden universal 
equivalent of all social evils' (Zizek, 2002: 111), or the `ultimate 
bogeyman, the perfect taboo' (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996: 189). 
Terrorists appear inhuman, and those appearing to speak on their 
behalf are dehumanised to the extent that the subject positions from 
which they could speak are marginalised, and potentially important 
distinctions obliterated (also see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996: 98). 
It is very important to try to understand the operation of this 
logic with respect to the invasion of Iraq, and the role it played in 
shaping many of the contributions made to the public debate. One 
likely site for its circulation is the mass media. 
3.4. The Role of the Media 
Various accounts produced in the wake of the `first' Gulf War in 1991 
have asserted the important role of the mass media in the conflict - 
both in the build-up and coverage of the war itself. Emergent from 
this literature is a concern with the media's influence upon events, 
including criticism of its role in relation to both conflicts. Much of 
this criticism has revolved around two interrelated issues - the 
relationship between the military and the press, and whether or not the 
press acted as `cheerleaders' for war (Kellner, 1992: 1), circulating 
`propaganda'. 
3.4.1. The Media's Relation to the Nation? 
One issue raised recurrently is the question of whether something 
approximating a process of censorship occurred in both conflicts. 
According to Rai (2002: 189), in 2002 during the build-up to invasion: 
Crucial pieces of information, with great bearing on the major decisions 
being made by Government, appeared in the British broadsheets 
- 
fleetingly. The information was effectively suppressed, almost as if a 
Government censor had indicated the boundaries of the acceptable and 
journalists had halted at this border. There is no such Government censor. 
There is, however, a real problem of freedom of expression and of freedom 
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of thought in Britain and in the United States, two of the freest societies 
ever to have existed. 
Accusations of `censorship', like those of `propaganda' are clearly 
aimed at undermining the legitimacy of specific practices 
- 
in this case 
the exclusion rather than inclusion of particular information. Rai does 
not assert that a formal process of government censorship was at work, 
but implies that informal but nevertheless clear boundaries of 
acceptability were operating to influence the information in 
circulation. 
Similarly, invoking the relevance of the previous conflict, 
Rampton and Stauber (2003: 185) claim that during Operation Desert 
Storm: `Overt censorship played a relatively minor role in shaping the 
content of reports from the field. Far more important was the way 
embedding encouraged reporters to identify with the soldiers they 
were covering. ' 
The importance attributed to this `embedding' in coverage of 
the subsequent conflict both in academic commentaries and public 
discourse is difficult to overstate 
- 
most sources view it as a key 
development in war coverage, making the embedded journalist reliant 
upon and sympathetic towards the military 
- 
indeed directly dependent 
upon them for their safety (Simpson, 2003: 350). 
This leads to the suspicion that the relationship of embedding 
has been expanded deliberately because of this. As Lewis et al. (2004: 
11) put it: `public relations strategies in the Pentagon are partly based 
on the recognition that influencing coverage involves controlling the 
context in which journalists report, rather than more direct forms of 
interference. ' In some ways, embedding is therefore viewed as a 
means to `manage' the media without overt interference being 
necessary. 
The embeddedness of journalists also has an epistemological 
relevance, changing our relationship to `reality', such that the coverage 
it produces seems more immediate, and more `real': 
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Embeddedness [... ] constitutes a language that signifies the real [... ] It 
offers a form of indexical compensation [... ] The reality of representation 
is substituted for the representation of reality. That is, `authenticity' arises 
less from the authenticity of reality per se than the authenticity of the 
means by which reality is portrayed. 
(Crandall, 2003: no pagination). 
In their account, based upon the analysis of 1534 television news 
reports from the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Sky News, a survey based 
on a representative sample of 1002 people within Britain and 
interviews with 37 `key' actors in broadcast coverage, Lewis et al. 
(2004) noted the expansion of the coverage drawn from embedded 
reporters, including the way they supplanted reporters based in 
military briefing centres as the major source of news, as well as the 
implications of this to questions of partiality: 
The MoD [... ] felt that they were aware of the identifiable pro- or anti-war 
stances of various journalists throughout. The US media, on the other 
hand, seem to have been enlisted much earlier and more thoroughly to the 
`patriotic mission' of embedding. 
(Lewis et al., 2004: 21). 
This is particularly interesting, given the importance attributed to 
patriotism. This was an important theme noted in accounts of the 
preceding Gulf War, both in terms of the justifications made (Billig, 
1995), and particularly in terms of how a process of scrutiny and 
surveillance, operated upon the coverage of war: `Many politicians 
and organizations scrutinized the media for possible traces of 
defeatism, breaches of security, or "understanding of the enemy"' 
(Luostarinen, 1992: 133). In 1991, the UK's Jeremy Bowen, and the 
US's Peter Arnett suffered from such inspection and were portrayed as 
propagandists for Hussein and as traitors to their respective countries 
(Aburish, 2001: 306; Norris, 1991: 271; Hackett, 1993: 6). 
An explanation for such filtration processes, which does not 
require the existence of an active conspiracy, concerns the role of 
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national cultural templates. Hackett (1993: 10) focuses upon 
American local press coverage of events in the First Gulf War, 
showing how dissent was marginalised as the product of `fringe 
people'. He claims the hostility to dissent prevalent in the media 
suggests that: `the peace movement was running against a cultural 
template by which Americans interpret the experience of war' 
(Hackett and Zhao, 1994: 533). This American `master narrative' of 
war, is as follows: 
The story begins with a villain who gratuitously, indefensibly and without 
provocation attacks an innocent victim, thereby challenging the moral 
order of which the US is the Center. The US is reluctant to resort to war, 
and tries to persuade the transgressor to be nice, to return to the paths of 
righteousness. But the villain may be inherently evil and monstrous, so 
that the use of reason is out of the question. Then the US may be 
compelled to take on the role of hero, and swoop down and destroy the 
enemy, skilfully and surgically employing the technological superiority of 
American weapons, and then go home again. Unlike lesser countries, the 
American motive in going to war is not self-aggrandizement or revenge, as 
it might be in a conflict between equals; rather the motive is punishment of 
evil, meted out from above, just as God may punish sinners, and parents, 
their children. So motivated, the American people overcome their initial 
reluctance to go to war, and unite to support the action, even at the cost of 
making sacrifices and undergoing difficulties, because it is just and moral 
to do so. In that struggle against unmitigated evil, the only acceptable 
outcome is the untrammelled triumph of good, and the unconditional 
surrender of evil. The demon is exorcised, the moral order restored, and 
the troops, as instruments of that order, go home to victory parades. 
(Hackett, 1993: 49-50). 
The resonance of this account with the events subsequent to 9-11, the 
invasion of Afghanistan, and the rhetoric of the WoT goes some way 
to supporting its validity. Specifically, in the case of the first Gulf 
War, the template was alleged to filter coverage in a variety of ways: 
Assuming that news coverage of the Gulf confrontation was indeed 
scripted according to the master narrative, what patterns of emphasis and 
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exclusion would we expect? We would expect coverage to emphasize US 
efforts during the crisis to find a peaceful solution without allowing evil to 
be rewarded; evidence of Iraqi aggression, atrocities and evil; the 
preparedness of US troops and the efficiency and precision of their 
weapons. Conversely, information contradicting the master narrative 
would tend to be filtered out, if not by journalists, then by their audiences, 
whose sense of patriotism would be outraged: previous US support for 
Saddam Hussein; the notions that the Bush Administration might have 
been `shopping for a war', and/or had given Iraq a `green light' to invade, 
and/or had snubbed Iraqi overtures to settle the crisis peacefully; the 
tarnished human rights record of the victim, Kuwait, and especially of 
some US allies (Syria, Turkey) in the crusade against Iraq; the possibility 
that Kuwait was not a blameless victim, that Iraq had plausible historical 
claims and economic grievances; US violations of international law, as 
alleged by Ramsay Clark's war crimes tribunal; the imprecision of many 
US weapons, only a minority of which were `smart'; Iraqi civilian 
casualties; US motives for intervention in the Middle East apart from 
reversing aggression. 
(Hackett and Zhao, 1994: 536-7). 
The implication of accepting this analysis is that the explanation of the 
exclusions and inclusions involved in the processes of criticism and 
justification requires an appreciation of culturally embedded narratives 
rather than crude assertions of dominance. 
Hackett (1993: 41) points to the difficulties that the template 
caused for dissenters, requiring them to spend: `much of their access 
[to the media] simply defending their own legitimacy, asserting their 
patriotism, their social normality, their right to speak' (Hackett, 1993: 
41), i. e., making `defensive claims to legitimacy' rather than directly 
stating their case against war. 
Whilst emerging from a very different theoretical and 
methodological location, there are parallels here with Smith's (1991) 
Durkheimian cultural understanding of the Falklands war 
- 
not least in 
the implicit understanding of the workings of something 
approximating a sacred/profane distinction. 
According to Smith, the Falklands war was `caused' by a series 
of cultural differentiations between Britain and Argentina on the 
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sacred/profane distinction. In Britain, sacred values such as the 
morality, democracy, freedom and rationality of Britain were asserted 
and contrasted with the profanity of Argentina 
- 
its alleged 
immorality, dictatorship, lack of freedom and irrationality (Smith, 
1991: 117) in such a way as to justify war and enabling it to regenerate 
British collective moral sentiments. In relation to war more generally, 
Smith claims that: 
[T]he maintenance of the cultural motivations for war, as with any 
successful ritual, crucially depends upon the work of practitioners in 
maintaining a sacred: profane code. They must do two things for a war to 
become a ritual. Firstly, a cultural code embodying the sacred: profane 
distinction must be at the center of discourse. Secondly, `war' events must 
be accounted for as acceptable products of the code. In the first step the 
choice of code is accountable to events, and in the second, events are 
accountable to the codes produced by the coding. If the sacred: profane 
code is shown to be the incorrect yardstick for evaluating events, or if 
events are held to contradict the code, the generative force of the 
sacred: profane distinction is lost, and the ritual motivations for fighting 
will evaporate (though of course instrumental motivations may remain). In 
consequence, much of the parole in the war can be seen, speaking 
ethnomethodologically, as accounting activity aimed at maintaining (or 
destroying) the ritual status. 
(Smith, 1991: 108; original emphasis). 
Smith's Durkheimian cultural approach was explicitly designed as a 
corrective to more common economic and geo-political explanations 
for war, and it may be interesting to consider the types of coding 
necessary to facilitate the coalitions' invasion of Iraq. Whether or not 
we can accept that particular coding `causes' war directly is a slightly 
different matter. 
3.4.2. Circulating Truth, Lies or Propaganda? 
The other major area in which the role of the media has undergone 
scrutiny is the truth status of the stories it circulated. 
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I have already mentioned accusations about `propaganda' in 
the context of the `war on terrorism' (Chomsky, 2001: 16), and the 
propaganda angle, focussing on the media's role in `manufacturing' a 
context for particular action to take place, has been prominent in 
contributions from strong critics of the wars, unsurprisingly given its 
negative (profane) implications (Smith, 1991: 130). 
Particularly in relation to the first conflict, another set of 
interconnected, but distinct, notions with a rather more `postmodern' 
twist were promulgated, i. e., that it was not the truth or reality of the 
events themselves that were at stake, but something rather different - 
not simply that an illegitimate `bias', which implies that a more 
`objective' account is possible (Anderson, 2003: paragraph 1.14) - 
was at work. 
According to his consistently pessimistic perspective, Virilio 
(2002: 22) claims that the first Gulf war shows us that it is: 
useless to investigate what still distinguishes `news' from `propaganda'; 




disinformation never being a lie, but the excess of contradictory news, 
hypernews [... ] 
Everything is true in the offensive of direct broadcasting, `true' in the 
instrumental sense of the term, that is to say, operationally and 
immediately efficacious. 
As an alternative, Virilio (2002: 67) posits the importance, instead, of 
`disinformation by excess information [... ], jamming, a saturation of 
meaning' (original emphasis), therefore echoing Baudrillard's (1995: 
76) claims that the: `threshold of mental tolerance for information' 
was deliberately crossed. 
Notwithstanding the extremely vicious criticisms of 
Baudrillard's account of the non-existence of Gulf War One as an 
`unjust non war' (Merrin, 1994: 451) because of its alleged complicity 
with the loss of moral nerve which reduced the success of anti-war 
conviction (Norris, 1992: 27), anyone attempting to keep up with the 
news coverage of the more recent conflict, would have to admit that by 
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any standards the threshold of mental tolerance was certainly 
exceeded. There was an excess of information about the event, 
making clarity intensely problematic to achieve. 
3.5. Representations of Saddam Hussein 
Although the personalisation of events involving Iraq has often been 
criticised (Aburish, 2001: 305; Ritter in Rivers Pitt, 2002: 67), a key 
component in both conflicts was the representation of Saddam 
Hussein, particularly in the Western media. 
It is argued that an important part of the justification of the Gulf 
War in 1991 was a process of media `demonization' (Corcoran, 1992: 
108; Kellner, 1995: 207) which involved circulation of the idea that no 
negotiation and therefore no diplomatic solution to Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait was possible. This is supported by Aburish (2001: 295), in his 
biography of Hussein: `everything was aimed at creating the image of 
a monster with whom one could not negotiate. ' By the end of that 
war, Hussein had `ceased to be a person and had become an 
institutionalized monstrosity' (Aburish, 2001: 315). 
There are, of course, many who would see such a situation as 
entirely appropriate. However, what is perhaps most interesting about 
this situation from my point of view, is that this was also observed as a 
`change' 
- 
if he had to undergo demonization, then he was not 
considered sufficiently demonic before, so discursive work was 
required. 
According to Chomsky (2001: 65) the treatment afforded 
Saddam Hussein illustrates the way in which people are `transferred 
from favored friends and allies to the category of "terrorists" because 
they disobeyed U. S. orders'. Chomsky's treatment is a little trite, but 
successfully identifies the sense in which the movement from friend to 
enemy, across the distinction that constitutes the `political' (Schmitt, 
1996; Mouffe, 1993) is something that occurs regularly within US 
foreign policy. 
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In a more subtle analysis, looking at political cartoons and 
caricatures of `the enemy', Link (1991a) notes how this transformation 
undergone by Saddam Hussein was initially rather problematic for 
those covering it. Because of Iraq's secularism, and the previous 
favour afforded Hussein in the West: `in the first period after 
Saddam's invasion of Kuwait the press suffered from something like 
an "enemy image" crisis: no immediately identifiable Saddam 
stereotypes existed' (Link, 1991a: 46). There was a dearth of ready- 
made negative representations of Hussein, so work was required to 
construct one. According to Link the usual `irrational madman' or 
`lunatic' form of portrayal often favoured by the West (with which it 
can contrast its reason and soberness) could not be sustained because 
of the very slow escalation of events: 
when a situation escalates more slowly it is more difficult to sustain the 
image of an `enemy' lacking subject status. After a while it could not be 
denied that Saddam Hussein maneuvered (for example, with the hostages) 
or `played poker'. The moment such gambler symbols appeared on the 
scene, the enemy had been conceded subject status. 
(Link, 1991 a: 48). 
Engaging in manoeuvring, and playing poker are considered the 
actions of a calculating and rational actor not a madman, so any such 
representations could not be easily sustained. Link's narrative 
captures some of the complexities of the way Saddam Hussein's 
character has been represented 
- 
the co-presence of accusations of 
irrational madness and shrewd calculation 
- 
which were also present 
in the more recent justificatory process. 
Many contributions about the representation of Saddam 
Hussein involved attempts at policing the way that he has been 
understood. One such contribution comes from psychologist Jerrold 
Post who rose to prominence throughout the build-up to war as an 
`expert' who had studied the psychology of Saddam Hussein, and 
other political leaders. 
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Post (2003: 340-4) made a series of claims about Saddam 
Hussein's psychology, describing aspects of his personality such as his 
`revolutionary pragmatism and ideological flexibility', his alleged 
paranoia, his `messianic ambition' and his `malignant narcissism'. 
None of this sounds very healthy, but Post is acutely concerned to 
dismiss claims that Hussein was suffering from a psychotic disorder, 
claiming that there was `no evidence' for such an accusation (Post, 
2003: 342). In fact, he stresses that such `pejorative diagnosis is not 
only inaccurate but also dangerous. Consigning Saddam to the realm 
of madness can mislead decision makers into believing he is 
unpredictable when in fact he is not' (Post, 2003: 335). Furthermore, 
he suggests that there was a potential self-fulfilling prophecy in the 
`coalition's' approach such that the political calculator would be 
replaced by a much less rational actor because of their actions: 
when Saddam is backed into a corner, his customary prudence and 
judgment are apt to falter [... ] The persistent calls for regime change may 
well be moving him into that dangerous `back against the wall' posture 
[... ] Moreover, with his back to the wall it is probable that he would 
attempt to use chemical/biological weapons against Israel and against U. S. 
armed forces in the region. 
(Post, 2003: 365). 
Thankfully this last piece of the prediction did not come to pass, but 
the central implication of this is that the coalition's actions were self- 
defeating if their aim was to produce a diplomatic (i. e. non-military) 
solution to the developing conflict, since they were likely to render 
Hussein much less rational. 
From my point of view, in the more recent conflict, leading up 
to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the most interesting thing is the 
consequentiality of those representations for those against a military 
`solution'. How is the badness of Saddam Hussein mobilised to make 
the lives of those against war more `difficult'? 
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3.6. The Importance of Various Histories 
3.6.1. Saddam Hussein's History with the West 
An important component in the representation of Saddam Hussein and 
his enemy status is his history of having a close relationship with the 
West. In particular this has been a theme identified by critics of the 
action in 2003 
- 
characterising the US government's portrayal of him 
as hypocritical (Sardar and Davies, 2004: 242). For example, 
Rampton and Stauber (2003: 21) accuse the US press and politicians in 
particular of having displayed `astonishing historical amnesia' about 
the US's relationship with Iraq throughout the 1980s, claiming that: 
back when Saddam actually started gassing people, his government was 
considered `legitimate', and Iran's attempt to achieve what the current 
Bush administration has called `regime change' was `inconsistent with the 
accepted norms of behaviour', according to the US State department. 
Aburish (2001: 354) also condemns the US and UK governments for 
their attempts to ignore their complicity in Saddam Hussein's crimes. 
In particular he derides the fact that the use of chemical weapons in 
Halabja, which had been ignored by the US administration, was 
subsequently turned into the `rallying cry' that Saddam Hussein had 
used chemical weapons `against his own people' (Aburish, 2001: 295) 
-a phrase which was commonly invoked in describing his `badness' 
throughout the more recent controversy. 
The history of some of the personnel involved in making the 
case for war was also noted by some of those in favour of military 
action. For example, in his biography of Saddam Hussein, Coughlin 
(2002: 213-4) notes the irony of Donald Rumsfeld's role in the build- 
up to war given his key part in the Reagan administration's decision to 
bring Iraq out of diplomatic isolation in the early 1980s (also see 
Kampfher, 2004: 229). Such previous closeness, cynical or otherwise, 
brought about the necessity of the discursive work required to confer 
upon Saddam Hussein a satisfactory `enemy image' which could help 
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justify military action in 1991 (Link, 1991; Schulte-Sasse and Schulte- 
Sasse, 1991: 90). 
Throughout the literature on both conflicts, there is a 
widespread consensus identifying a specific historical theme as key in 
representations of Saddam Hussein - the drawing of historical 
analogies between him and Adolf Hitler. 
3.6.2. Saddam Hussein as `Another Hitler' 
Within accounts of the character and methods of Saddam Hussein 
there is often considerable time spent describing similarities with other 
dictators, particularly those associated with the Second World War. 
Connections between Hussein and Stalin are common, with 
Iraq under Hussein often described as a `vicious neo-Stalinist tyranny' 
(Record and Terrill, 2004: 41), even by those opposing his violent 
overthrow. Hussein is often referred to as idolising (Shawcross, 2004: 
19), or being influenced by Stalin (Simpson, 2003: 367-8; Coughlin, 
2002: 47; Darwish and Alexander, 1991: 216), and as possessing an 
impressive library of Stalin's writings (Aburish, 2001: 13,79). 
Much more prominent has been the question of a link between 
Hussein and Adolf Hitler, an accusation regularly advanced in 1990- 
91 by George Bush Senior (Freedman and Karsh, 1994: 219). It is 
possible to consider contributions mentioning a Saddam-as-Hitler 
logic as falling into two groups 
- 
those claiming a connection, and 
those claiming that others claim a connection. Very often, it is unclear 
into which group a contribution falls, but there is an important 
difference between saying `Saddam Hussein is another Hitler' and 
saying that `many people have claimed that "Saddam Hussein is 
another Hitler". ' 
Most scholarship that observes the connection made with Hitler 
broadly fall into the second group, describing the significance of the 
accusations rather than making them themselves, and some accounts 
of various aspects of Iraq's recent role in the world mention the 
Saddam-as-Hitler logic in passing (Przybylowicz and JanMohamed, 
1991: 11; Kellner, 1992: 63; Said, 1993: 357; Shlaim, 1995: 96; 
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Walsh, 1995: 13; Scheer, Scheer and Chaudry, 2003: 48), whereas 
others explore its significance in more detail. 
Aburish (2001: 288) claims that this logic partly comes from a 
British attitude which became a `national trademark since the failure to 
appease Hitler in the 1930s'. Aburish agrees with Ali (2002: 143) that 
the analogy with Hitler arose subsequent to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990, but Ali takes a more intense critical stance, trying to 
undermine the connection by claiming that: `Ever since the Second 
World War the name of Hitler and his philosophy has been recklessly 
invoked to drum up public support for Western wars' (Ali, 2002: 284). 
According to this, the use of Hitler analogies is something of which we 
should automatically be suspicious. 
A different form of problematisation is used by Virilio (2002: 
19; original emphasis) who claimed that: "`Saddam Hussein is Hitler" 
seems to me weak, even optimistic, as the risks associated with the 
Middle East in 1990 are ultimately incomparable with those of Europe 
in the 1940s. ' At the time of the first Gulf War, Virilio implies that 
the Middle East was actually more dangerous than Europe in the 1940s 
-a statement which now arguably sounds rather prophetic. 
Link (1991b) also attempts to understand such historical 
analogies more generally, via the use of the Saddam=Hitler formula: 
In principle one can distinguish two types of historical analogies. One 
kind of analogy is based on structural and functional factors, as in 
comparison of different countries according to their level of 
industrialization. Though this kind of comparison can yield valuable 
insights, it is always complex and requires the collection of voluminous 
data. Rarely, if ever, are structural analogies, such as those between 
Hitler's expansionary empire and today's Iraq, discussed in the media. If 
they were, the shortcomings of the Hitler-Saddam analogy would quickly 
become apparent: Hitler's great German empire was not a nation at the 
threshold of modernity; Hitler did not have to buy his poison gas for 
Auschwitz in foreign countries, etc. The second type of analogy, favored 
by the media, depends instead on parallels in patterns of interaction, on 
`characters' and collective symbols. While the power of Saddam's Iraq 
fails in a structural comparison with Hitler's imperial German empire, one 
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can apply the interactional pattern of a police-man toward a criminal to 
both Hitler and Saddam. 
(Link, 1991b: 61). 
In the relevant empirical chapter I will examine some contributions 
attempting to utilise or defeat the analogy by comparing the two 
contexts, but what is most interesting about Link's understanding is 
that in stressing the interactional pattern of policing associated with 
the analogy he appreciates that its moral force and consequentiality are 
not necessarily directly entwined with its `truth' status. He also 
identifies the significance of the way that the analogy, as a definition 
of the situation, fosters a preference, for a particular type of activity 
- 
has a specific teleology associated with it. 
3.6.3. Another Vietnam? 
Connections have often been made between Iraq and the Vietnam War 
(1961-75) by those campaigning against military action, in particular 
in America where it has especially powerful cultural resonances. 
The consequences of that period of American history are 
reflected in the prominence given to the Vietnam War within US 
cultural and social memory (Misztal, 2003b: 11; Simons, 1998: 8), and 
the extent to which it caused a `national identity crisis' (Hackett and 
Zhao, 1994: 535) and has served as a `constraint that has counselled 
caution' (Roper, 1995: 40) since. Indeed, this crisis spawned what is 
known as `Vietnam syndrome' (Kellner, 1992: 385-6; Merrin, 1994: 
453; Freedman and Karsh, 1994: 441; Rampton and Stauber, 2003: 
182). This `scar' on the collective mind of America fostered a 
constant need to `exorcise' the war's ghost (Mariscal, 1991: 97; Said, 
1992: 393; Walsh, 1995: 1; Massumi, 1998: 49; Simons, 1998: 21, 
333), contributing the purchase of Reagan's `back again' rhetoric 
during his time as President (Baudrillard, 1989: 108). During 1991 
this `exorcism' took the form of the constant denial of similarities 
between the wars: 
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The denial of any similarity between the wars, however, became more than 
a rhetorical move by public figures 
- 
it transfixed the U. S. popular 
imagination and became an indispensable element in many representations 
of the Persian Gulf War. 
(Kendrick, 1994: 130-1). 
From a critical perspective, Rowe (1991: 137) claims that despite the 
presence of such rhetoric of denial, there were important reasons to 
explore the historical parallels between the wars. Of course, most 
important is the extent to which so doing mobilises the very negative 
associations of Vietnam, something advantageous to those strongly 
against the war. 
In 2003, the Vietnam analogy was mobilised in public 
discourse and literature increasingly following the cessation of the 
main hostilities, where the resultant situation was described by Scheer, 
Scheer and Chaudry (2003: 112) as `an increasingly Vietnam-like 
scenario'. They stressed the important connotations of a particular key 
word in relation to the Vietnam analogy, the word in question being 
`the dreaded Q-word "quagmire"' (Scheer, Scheer and Chaudry, 2003: 
128,163; also see Rowe, 1991: 121). 
The prominence of the Vietnam analogy moved Record and 
Terrill (2004) to engage in a detailed scholarly comparison of two 
contexts. Some of their assertions will make an appearance in a 
relevant empirical chapter, but their general conclusion is summed up 
as follows: 
The differences between Iraq and Vietnam outnumber the similarities, 
especially the strategic and military dimensions, but two aspects of the 
political context may contain pertinent lessons or warnings 
- 
attempting to 
build a state in an alien culture, and sustaining domestic political support in 
a protracted war against an irregular enemy. 
(Record and Terrill, 2004: vii, 3,55). 
Some of those explicitly against the conflict also focussed on 
differences between the two contexts, for example: 
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The siege of Iraq is not another war in Vietnam. Its target, scale and 
means are all lesser. But there is another difference too. This time, Britain 
is not just lending diplomatic and ideological support to American 
barbarities, it is actively participating in them as a military confederate. 
The record of Old Labour, shameful as it was, is little beside the odium of 
its successor. 
(Ali, 2002: 153). 
Here the differences (as well as some similarities) are mobilised to 
portray the Iraq conflict as `worse' than Vietnam in the sense that, this 
time British involvement would be more active and therefore more 
`odious'. 
3.7. Anti Americanism 
As the only remaining `superpower' America's place in the world is 
highly significant and a person, organisation or state's relationship to 
America can be highly consequential in various ways, and this was an 
important theme running through the debates over Iraq, both within the 
literature and within the discourse internal to the context. This is 
particularly the case when it comes to the accusation of something 
called `anti-Americanism' as a motivation for a position against war. 
In his work on `banal nationalism' 
- 
the ordinariness of the 
influence of the nation 
- 
Billig (1995: 153) points out that, in 
American professional wrestling, `Americanness' is a `semantic sign 
of goodness itself'. The positive value attributed to `America' as an 
idea is not restricted to the wrestling ring, and of course, this is not 
entirely an accident. Some dimensions of the positivity of 
`Americanism' are the product of fairly deliberate state intervention 
throughout the period 1914-24 
- 
the `Americanization campaign' 
(Ricento, 2003). Ricento points out a variety of discursive strategies 
and techniques pursued during this campaign, including `Constructive 
strategies' (including justification, unification and avoidance of 
differences); `Strategies of transformation'; and `Strategies of 
perpetuation' (including strategies of avoidance of change) (Ricento, 
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2003: 617) all of which were aimed at constructed a unified vision of 
what it was to be American, associated with which was a specific 
narrative of national identity (Ricento, 2003: 631). 
In his account of the impact of Vietnam upon American 
culture, Martin (1993: 27) discusses Andrew Ross's writing on the 
Cold War, including the that way that an official distinction between 
inside and outside was established via the `American/un-American' 
distinction, through the anti-Communist `purges' of the McCarthyite 
era (Hofstadter, 1996). Particular activities were allocated to each side 
of the distinction delimiting legitimate variations from appropriately 
American behaviour. 
According to Crockatt (2003) the `quasi-theological' notion of 
the `un-American' is closely associated with that of anti-Americanism: 
To be un-American is to deviate from some accepted notion of 
Americanism; it is a form of heresy. There is a close relationship between 
un-Americanism and anti-Americanism, the distinction between them 
being that the former is generally applied to Americans while the latter 
generally, though not exclusively, refers to non-Americans. What ties 
them is the peculiarly intense expression of nationalism known as 
Americanism. 
(Crockatt, 2003: 50). 
Contributions discussing anti-Americanism vary somewhat in the 
meanings attributed to the term, and particularly with regard to the 
inclusiveness of their definitions. Some contributions reserve it for a 
rather restricted scope, limiting its application to those who profess a 
desire to destroy America and have no qualms about murdering its 
citizens (i. e., `al Qaeda'). Others utilise a less restricted definition 
including many or all expressions of criticism of America's culture, its 
government and policies. 
From a firmly anti-war position, consistent with his position on 
the previous conflict (see Kellner, 1992; 1995), Kellner (2004: 147) 
acknowledges that `anti-Americanism is on the rise throughout the 
world. ' His definition refers to extremely negative manifestations of 
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attitudes towards America, claiming that these are often exacerbated 
by George W. Bush himself. In contrast, Shawcross (2004: 181) 
writes of a dangerous and yet, according to him, familiar `hate- 
America-first view of the world' (also see Kirkpatrick, 1984: 23). He 
associates this with `the Left', but also claims that it is contagious and 
`seeping into the population at large' (Shawcross, 2004: 91). 
From a position critical of the invasion, Rampton and Stauber 
(2003: 198) locate the apparent expansion of anti-Americanism in its 
alleged success as a `formula to win ratings' in the Muslim and Arab 
world. Moreover, they view it as an equivalent ('equal and opposite') 
strategy to the `hyper-patriotism' used within America. In identifying 
the primary location of anti-Americanism as the `Muslim and Arab 
world', they utilise a relatively exclusive definition and engage in a 
process of distancing 
- 
denying its application to Western critics such 
as themselves. It is important to understand that, as critics of the 
invasion, and U. S. foreign policy more generally, they are the type of 
people often accused of being in thrall to anti-Americanism. 
In his thoughtful contribution, Crockatt (2003) discusses the 
way in which the London Review of Books became a site of 
controversy after 9-11 by publishing material interpreted as saying that 
America `deserved it', and asks whether or not there is `some sort of 
elective affinity between liberal intellectuals and anti-Americanism? ' 
(Crockatt, 2003: 41). In discussing the association, he mentions the 
`condescension' and attitudes of superiority often presumed to 
underlie anti-Americanism (Crockatt, 2003: 42), something of which 
Marshland (1985: 24) accuses sociologists more generally as part of 
their allegedly generalised and systematic `reflex anti-Americanism'! 
Furthermore, Marshland's contribution demonstrates that, just as 
aspects of `Americanism' have a history, so does the use of the term 
anti-Americanism. It would be absurdly ignorant to view it as a new 
weapon in the available political armoury 
- 
it was articulated 
throughout the Cold war, and directed in particular at members of 
CND and left-wing critics of American foreign policy (including 
sociologists). 
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Hebdige (1988: 52-8) notes that some degree of antipathy to 
aspects of America and the spread of its influence have united across 
time such diverse people as Matthew Arnold, Aldous Huxley, George 
Orwell and Richard Hoggart. More recent accounts from American 
critics popular in the UK have noted the history of articulation and 
application of `anti-Americanism' has not been historically confined to 
one political perspective. According to Eric Schlosser: 
It used to be that we would take shit from grumpy old Tories who hated 
rock music and viewed Americans as being just slightly above Australians 
on the social evolutionary scale. There was also no shortage of leftwing 
Laborites who saw Americans as a personal embodiment of racism and 
neo-colonialism and mindless consumerism. 
(The Guardian: G2,29/10/03: 5). 
As part of her Friedenspreis acceptance speech at the 2003 Frankfurt 
book fair, Susan Sontag also discussed the relationship between 
Europe and the US: 
It should also be remembered that, historically, the most virulent anti- 
American rhetoric ever heard in Europe 
- 
consisting essentially in the 
charge that Americans are barbarians 
- 
came not from the so-called left but 
from the extreme Right. 
(The Guardian: Saturday Review, 18/10/03: 4-6). 
In the context of the cold war, Haseler (1986) distinguished four types 
of anti-Americanism 
- 
primitive, functional, communist, and 
ideological, and in their more recent account Sardar and Davies (2002: 
195-203) discuss four main sets of reasons for people's objections to 
the USA 
- 
existential, cosmological, ontological and definitional ones. 
Hostility to America stems from the fact that economically and 
otherwise, America has made it too difficult for others to exist, it has 
acquired a god-like role as the `prime cause' of most things in the 
world, it possesses a circular ontological logic about its own goodness 
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(reflected in the American/un-American distinction), and has become 
the singularly most successful defining power in the world. 
Personally I am highly suspicious of the term's analytical 
utility as referring to specific `objects', both due to its vagueness, and 
the strategies governing its articulation. As Christopher Hitchens, 
himself strongly in favour of the invasion of Iraq, points out: `In most 
obvious ways, the term "anti-American" is as meaningless or absurd as 
the accusation "un-American" used to be. It is both too precise and at 
the same time too vague' (Hitchens, 2003: 29). 
It is a moot point whether or not complete precision is ever 
possible, but suspicion about the vagueness seems a more appropriate 
response than embracing it in the way that Crockatt does. He is 
comfortable with a breadth of application that views anti-Americanism 
as something that assumes: `many forms and has many different roots. 
It is more useful to think of it as a family of related attitudes rather 
than as a single entity' (Crockatt, 2003: 44). Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges that it is: 
a contested concept whose range of reference is wide and shifting. Though 
at the extreme there may be little ambiguity about what constitutes anti- 
Americanism, in the muddier middle ground, its meaning is a matter of 
perception and point of view. On occasions, the term is used as a political 
weapon to discredit an opponent rather than anything approaching a 
neutral term of analysis. 
(Crockatt, 2003: 46; also see Haseler, 1986: 57). 
When utilised as a weapon it implies `an element or irrationalism and 
resistance to facts that may run counter to prejudices' (Crockatt, 2003: 
43), and is therefore interdiscursively connected to other `-isms'. 
I have continually invoked Crockatt's analysis, because of both 
its subtlety and its descriptive strengths, but there is a clear tension 
between his acknowledgment of the political and strategic uses made 
of it as an accusation, and his apparent acceptance of an extremely 
broad definition. The combination of strategic use with breadth of 
definition raises the question of whether it would be better to attend to 
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the operation of the notion of anti-Americanism, where and when it is 
utilised, rather than accept its a priori validity. 
3.8. Supporting the Troops 
The circulation of the idea of anti-Americanism relies to some degree 
on the `nation' as something one can be for or against. Another 
dimension of the literature involving some similar issues is the 
observed importance attributed to `supporting the troops' 
- 
being 





to express support for the troops 
is observed within a variety of approaches. For example, Smith (1991: 
129) notes Margaret Thatcher's claims during the Falklands War that 
the BBC and the media had a duty to: `support "our boys"'. 
Some contributions assert the existence of a generalised 
reflexive tendency for the media to support military action, losing their 
critical faculties: `When the guns are firing, even if in only one 
direction, the media close ranks and become a cheering section for the 
home team' (Chomsky, 1992: 54; Freeman, 2004: 65), with media 
coverage of war, and its regular references to `our boys', and their 
`angelic sacrifice' (Massumi, 1998: 42) assisting the promotion and 
justification of war (Richardson, 2004: 155; also see Kellner, 1992: 
235-6). 
It is not only the media who are subject to pressures regarding 
the need to support the troops. In the `first' Gulf War, according to 
Hackett and Zhao (1994: 528-9; also see Hackett, 1993: 46) the 
pressure manifested itself in anti-war protesters seeking legitimacy for 
their dissent by defensively stressing their patriotism and being forced 
to spend their access to the media claiming that despite being against 
the war, they supported the troops. The strategy was not always 
successful, since, as Rowe (1991: 127, original emphasis) puts it: `The 
elementary distinction between "support" for human beings and 
"opposition" to combat activities was considered too intellectual in a 
time when only emotion made sense'. 
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Beck (2002: 45) notes the fact that critics of the policies 
pursued in the WoT have been `chided as unpatriotic', and in relation 
to the war in 2003, specifically, Anderson (2003: paragraph 1.21) 
notes how according to opinion polls public support for the war 
significantly increased with its outbreak, claiming that this was due to 
people rallying around the troops. According to Scheer, Scheer and 
Chaudry, 2003: 83), in the US, once the war was `over' and the 
occupation underway: `The media and the Democrats were still too 
nervous to question the purpose of our being in Iraq, lest they be 
shamed for "not supporting our troops. ". ' Such pressures led some to 
coin rather reductive phrases such as `Patriotism Police' (Rampton and 
Stauber, 2003: 166) or `Pentagon Correctness' (Solomon, 2004: 162) 
to make sense of such processes. 
In his exploration of the `banal' manifestations of nationalism, 
Billig (1995: 2) claims that the first Gulf War: `indicates the speed 
with which Western publics can be mobilized for flag-waving warfare 
in the name of nationhood', as well as demonstrating how nations 
portrayed as opposing `us' can undergo transformation into `enemies 
of international morality' (Billig, 1995: 92). Billig (1995: 105-9) also 
describes the significance of `national deixis' 
- 
the rhetorical pointing 
involved in talking about `us' and `them' in national terms. This 
process is clearly of interest in relation to references to `our' troops. If 
they are `our' boys, belonging to `us', then the `we' that is envisioned 
is a national `we', with the `nation' conceived in familial terms. 
In their account, Rampton and Stauber quote Hermann 
Goering's testimony at the Nuremberg trials in 1946 as advocating use 
of a similar logic: 
the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is 
easy. All you have to do is tell them they are under being attacked and 
denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to 
danger. 
(Rampton and Stauber, 2003: 137; also see Zilek, 2003: 1). 
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Invoking a logic utilised by Nazis 
- 
associating the actions of the US 
administration with those of Nazi Germany - is clearly part of their 
wider strategy of delegitmating the invasion, but is particularly 
insightful in relation to its diagnosis of the significance of establishing 
a sense of national unity. Indeed, using similar logic, Richard Sennett 
has questioned the extent to which a form of `sofft fascism' requiring 
liberals to prove their patriotism, might be at work in America (The 
Guardian: Saturday Review, 23/10/04: 34-5). 
As I have already mentioned, Smith (1991: 113) uses a 




through which societies recharge their moral 
sentiments. In partial contrast, and in the context of the first Gulf War, 
other accounts view the sense of national (as distinct from societal) 
unity as a process of aestheticization: 
a society that uses representations of war as a means of unifying the body 
politic in an imaginary fashion needs an elaborate network of signs 
representing Oneness and Otherness 
- 
including a sophisticated economy 
distributing these signs and institutionalized practices that guarantee a 
rapturous public consumption of such signs. 
(Schulte-Sasse and Schulte-Sasse, 1991: 72). 
They claim that processes associated with such unity generation are 
fundamentally not rational or argumentative, but about desire. 
Regardless of the logic from which it emanates, the importance 
of the incitement of national unity and support of the troops are 
important phenomena requiring detailed consideration. Without direct 
consideration of the public debates, its relevance in 2003 is strongly 
implied by Time Magazine's (29/12/03-5/1/04) decision to make the 
US soldier its `Person of the Year'. 
3.9. The Marginalisation of Protest 
3.9.1. Marginalisation 
As I have already intimated, it seems that in relation to the WoT a 
degree of hostility impinges upon those who may wish to advance 
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particular arguments, and accounts of anti-war protest identify various 
processes through which it is marginalised, making protest an 
unattractive option, and limiting its successes, as well as contributing 
to a formal appearance of `unity on the homefront' (Kendrick, 1994: 
143). As Hackett (1993: 24) puts it: 
One line of attack emphasized a nationalistic version of responsibility: 
protesters should take more care not to comfort the enemy or undermine 
the morale of US troops in the Gulf by showing a country divided. 
Another argument sought to place protesters on the moral defensive (and at 
the same time endorse American militarism) by arguing that their freedom 
to protest was being preserved by the very people and actions they were 
protesting against. 
When protest was not passed over completely (Massumi, 1998: 43), 
such marginalisation involves dismissive references to `professional 
agitators' (Hackett, 1993: 30), or the coding of protest as conducted by 
an irrational `unruly mob' in which their arguments are ignored and 
only their loud sloganeering given prominence (Kellner, 1992: 79; 
Kellner, 1995: 209), both reliant upon a `journalistic paradigm for 
social protests' which `gravitates toward individuals exhibiting the 
most extreme appearance and behaviours' (McLeod and Hertog, 1992: 
260). 
Hackett (1993) focussed upon grassroots protest rather than 
elite discourse, examining US local news coverage, to identify three 
frames in the media coverage of anti-war protest: the `enemy within' 
- 
portraying protesters as a hostile internal threat 
- 
the `marginal oddity' 
- 
minimising their significance by focussing upon their quantitative 
and qualitative deviance 
- 
and the `legitimate controversy' 
- 
recognising that opposition to war could be legitimate. He argues that 
in local press coverage of anti-war protests, the pervasiveness of the 
enemy within frame required that: 
even writers who did not accept it felt compelled to address it through 
appropriate qualifications, disavowals and distinctions. Some editorials 
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distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate protest, between 
`rowdies' or vandals, and enlightened objectors who are `honestly 
motivated. ' 
(Hackett, 1993: 24). 
The prevalence of such disavowals resulted in the formation and 
articulation of a `hierarchy of dissent' - an idea echoing Becker's 
(1970: 207) `hierarchy of credibility' 
- 
in which some forms were 
privileged by the antiwar movement and the media (Hackett, 1993: 39; 
also see Hackett and Zhao, 1994: 525). For strategic and normative 
reasons concessions were made to the hostile discursive climate. 
Many of those producing accounts against the more recent 
invasion exhibit awareness of similar hostility, and deploy similar 
discursive techniques to combat them. In particular, they have 
questioned the `extreme' portrayals of anti-war protest and accusation 
of their `professional' agitation by stressing the breadth and diversity 
of opposition to war 
For example, the leaders of the Stop the War Coalition 
described their movement as including `the widest possible cross- 
section of organisations and individuals' (German and Murray, 2003: 
4; also see Rai, 2002: xiii-xvi and Yaqoob, 2003: 25). In his account, 
Cook (2003: 298) noted the breadth and `ordinariness' of most of the 
people he saw taking part in the large protest marches in London 
(15/2/03): 
I recognised many of them as the kind of people who would have marched 
with me against cruise missiles twenty years ago 
- 
young people with 
bright woollen scarves and clumsy mittens to keep out the biting cold. But 
most of them were different. They were ordinary people in their everyday 
clothes, from every walk of life and every age group in Britain. 
Such claims are similar to many of the arguments made more directly 
within the public debate in pursuit of legitimacy, possessing a de- 
marginalising imperative 
- 
amounting to the claim that dissent is not 
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limited to politically `extreme' individuals: if many, very different, 
people are against war then they should not be easily dismissed. 
3.9.2. Friends, Enemies and Differentiations 
Kellner (2002: 153) directly connects George W. Bush's logic of `with 
us or against us' with Schmitt's (1996) work on `the political', 
arguably wishing to delegitimate Bush's logic via association with a 
Nazi sympathiser. Dillon (2002: 75) also invokes Schmitt arguing that 
rather than being an existential difference the distinction is better 
understood in strategic terms 
- 
implying that in the WoT the 
distinction is mobilised producing particular strategic effects. 
The issue of enmity more generally is constantly raised in 
relation to war, as are various binary distinctions. As Richardson puts 
it: 
One approach during war time is to reduce options and possibilities to an 
`either/or' position [... ] This creates a situation in which the only people 
referred to or quoted in the news are arguing either for or against war 
-a 
debate which presupposes `We' have the right to be making such 
decisions. 
(Richardson, 2004: 155-6). 
Accounts of 1991 in particular often point to the significance of binary 
logic noting the presence of `dualistic structures organized around 
concepts of black and white, friend and foe' (Link, 1991a: 38), as well 
as the way in which the `effort to give the war and the anti-war some 
of the complexity they deserve also runs afoul of the in-and-out, 
choose-your-team, quick-fix, which-side-are-you-on mentality' 
(Gitlin, 1992: 45). The distinction friend/enemy exerts a steering 
influence upon contributions to debate, allegedly impeding sufficiently 
complex understandings of what is at stake. 
In an article exploring the way that the events of 9-11 can be 
used as a teaching tool, Canaan notes how she: 
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used the lecture on structuralism to critique Bush's oft-quoted statement 
shortly after September 11a' that `you are either with us or against us'. I 
suggested that this statement divided the world into a binary opposition in 
which all are located in one camp, `ours' or the other, `theirs'. This 
effectively lumped into the latter group anyone who might have any 
objection to any aspect of the war 
- 
and thus equated those who opposed 
the war to those terrorists who instigated its initiation. 
(Canaan, 2002: paragraph 5.19). 
As well linking Bush's enunciations to structuralism, versions of `us' 
and `them' can also be usefully explored using membership 
categorization analysis, especially in terms of the way that they form 
part of a wider `dialogic network' with those of other world leaders 
such as Tony Blair, as well as Osama bin Laden (see Leudar, Marsland 
and Nekvapil, 2004), 
Nevertheless, regardless of the approach adopted, it is possible 
to observe problems that may result from the application of the 
distinction, particularly for those preferring to be understood as neither 
friend nor enemy: 
On a world scale, the decision by the US administration 
-I say 
administration rather than people because one must acknowledge the 
bravery of those Americans who dare speak out against their government's 
policy 
- 
to characterize the aftermath in terms of a war between `us' 
- 
freedom and democracy, liberal capitalism, the good guys 
- 
and `them' 
terrorists, despots, evil, the bad guys 
- 
which has no place for anything in 
between or neutral, and in which the USA will determine who the terrorists 
are, has forced states everywhere to make quick calculations of gains and 
losses in choosing sides. The opinion of dissenters and of those who 
refuse such options and what underlies them, has been marginalized or 
ridiculed as old left or naive, unable to come to terms with contemporary 
reality. 
(Venn, 2002: 122-3). 
Separating the US administration and the American people, is a 
common move in criticism of the US, but, importantly, Venn identifies 
the problems that can result from the attempted refusal to be 
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interpellated into the friend/enemy, for/against distinction 
- 
including 
the possibility that those refusing the choice are exiting contemporary 
reality. This creates difficulties for those wishing to dissent, relating 
to how, and where they are to locate themselves in the available 
discursive space. 
3.9.3. To What Do (or Should) Protesters Object? 
The possibility that those refusing the for/against distinction are 
exiting reality might actually appeal to some, not least Baudrillard 
(1994: 63, original emphasis), who in his account of the First Gulf 
(non) War claimed that `The question is not whether one is for or 
against war, but whether one is for or against the reality of war. ' 
Accordingly: `To be for or against the war is idiotic if the question of 
the very probability of this war, its credibility or degree of reality has 
not been raised even for a moment' (Baudrillard, 1995: 67). Virilio 
(2002: 4) put the need to refuse the reality of war's representation in 
more moralistic terms: `[W]e must not only be conscientious objectors 
but also objectors to the objectivity of its representation. We must not 
believe our eyes. ' For Virilio it is not enough to object to the war, but 
we `must' also object to the way it is represented, whereas for 
Baudrillard an interrogation of the credibility of its occurrence should 
come before any position for or against it. 
As interesting as these imperatives might be, neither approach 
would seem likely to have widespread appeal given that those refusing 
the choice between being for or against war are easily portrayed as a 
`marginal oddity' or worse. Although he has certainly found a 
devoted constituency, Baudrillard is commonly marginalised within 
sociology and cultural studies, and it is fair to say that by invoking him 
as much as I have I am taking him more seriously than most people 
would feel comfortable with. Nevertheless his contribution raises 
some important and interesting issues about the ways of relating to the 
events that took place, and the obstacles to positioning oneself in novel 
ways in relation to them. 
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The steering pressure exerted by the for/against distinction can 
elide what the opposing sides may have in common, something 
interestingly noted by Misztal, specifically their shared relationship to 
a `discourse of human rights': 
The same discourse of human rights was also used by supporters of the 
military action against the Iraqi war as they saw the war as being necessary 
to eliminate local and regional human rights abuses. The logic of each 
choice, the first between human rights and war (meaning here abuse of 
human rights) and the second choice between human rights (meaning here 
war) and tyranny (meaning here abuse of human rights) suggests that there 
is only one right option. To put it differently, it means there is no 
alternative to human rights language [... ] 
While politics as it is practised forces us to make either/or choices (e. g. are 
you for or against war? ), the issue can not be reduced to `are you in favour 
of human rights or not? ' The self-congratulatory nature of human rights 
language can be criticized not only for its emptiness, defensiveness or 
victimology, but also for not encouraging us to face many ambiguities and 
difficulties of weighing claims that cannot be judged without a detailed 
knowledge. Our task as academics should be to show that the choice is 
`not that simple', that we all can benefit from the strengthening of our 
negative capability [... ] 
(Misztal, 2003a: paragraph 1.7-1.8). 
According to this, whilst supporters of, and protesters against, military 
action obviously differed in their orientations to war, they shared an 
orientation towards human rights as important 
- 
even though human 
rights had a different significance in each of their `choices'. Misztal 
claims that in a situation where politics forces people to make either/or 
choices the role of the academic should be to show that the available 
-- - 
options are `not that simple', i. e., to advocate appreciation of a greater 
degree of complexity. As will become clear, many direct 
contributions to the public debate arguably engaged in advocating this 
greater complexity, but nevertheless were also bound together with 
their opponents in various ways. 
According to his work on the Falklands crisis Smith explains 
this in the following way: 
90 
The proponents and opponents of the conflict, although divided at the level 
of parole, were united at the level of langue. It is thus entirely probable 
that the opponents of the war, having engaged in ritual protest and 
discussion around the central symbols, derived an equally deep 
commitment to the same moral fabric of society as the proponents! 
(Smith, 1991: 127). 
People speaking in opposition to one another are nevertheless bound 
into a relationship with their opponents 
- 
sharing things on another 
level than their `for' or `against' orientation. For Smith what is shared 
lies on a deeper level than their `for' or 'against' orientation, reliant 
upon a shared semiotic core 
-a `sacred centre' (Smith, 1991: 122). 
Rather than assuming that this agreement occurs on a `deeper' 
level, is it not also possible that the various binaries Smith utilises are 
better thought of as semi-autonomous distinctions, and therefore that 
opponents can be in agreement and disagreement on the basis of 
different distinctions 
- 
in agreement about the importance of 
supporting the troops, or the reality of the war's occurrence, but in 
disagreement on its morality or legality? Determining the precise 
location of any such agreement of course requires detailed 
consideration of the contributions made to the public debate, and 
before attempting that I need to explain how I have approached such 
contributions. 
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4. Methodology Chapter 
4.1. Introduction 
As already noted, the methodological approach adopted here is 
eclectic, something which merits discussion, and makes a clear 
methodological exposition simultaneously more difficult, and 
extremely important. When you set out not implementing a set of 
already-existing procedures, it is important to try to be as clear as 
possible about what was done, and why. 
In this project, the methodology has been assembled from 
diverse sources, blending them together in various ways, and the 
intellectual journey involved in such a process cannot be described 
simply by naming the form(s) of transport used. 
In this chapter I aim to articulate how it is that the many 
approaches influencing mine can come together coherently: what do 
they have in common that speaks to me? Whilst it provides discussion 
of most elements expected of a methodology chapter 
-a map of the 
contours of the materials analysed, and justification thereof 
- 
this 
chapter will also attempt to articulate some more contingent aspects of 
the blending process. 
It is therefore an exercise in self-positioning 
- 
clarifying and 
justifying the subsequent inclusion of references to disparate bodies of 
work, and I will be engaging in many of the practices that I observe in 
the context with which this research is concerned, another fact 
meriting discussion. 
In pursuit of approaches that can help to characterise 
(re)constitutive processes, and also satisfactorily get to grips with 
issues such as constraint, I have cast my net quite widely. In the 
course of this particular, long-term fishing expedition I have come to 
appreciate the strengths and of course weaknesses of a variety of 
methodological approaches. 
My approach blends together insights from a variety of 
methodologies, but does so via the insights they can provide in relation 
92 
to my wider analytical strategy. The methodologies include: critical 
discourse analysis, the constructionist approach to social problems, 
discursive rhetorical social psychology, and other more loosely 
defined `discourse analytic' work. It should be noted, that these 
`bodies' are rather ill-defined, existing as interdiscursive clusters of 
ideas, and networks of authors, rather than as hermetically sealed 
entities, and there is considerable overlap and cross-pollination 
between several of them. 
References to each are included because of the role that they 
have played in the development of my analytic strategy. I am not 
attempting a synthesis of these approaches as much as making use of 
them, and the types of issues to which they attend 
- 
primarily social 
processes of constitution. Notwithstanding any mutual antagonisms, 
the elective affinities and tensions between them allows the generation 
of different types of knowledge than that obtained by utilising just one. 
The rest of this chapter is structured thematically. It is divided 
into sections each of which relates to some important dimension of the 
project, either in terms of the types of `phenomena' described, or in 
terms of the questions they raise, and problems posed. Within my 
discussion of each of the themes, references to the various bodies of 
work appear where appropriate, and I rely on a limited range of `key' 
texts which have played an important role in the gestation of my own 
work. Whilst some of the contents are clearly related back to the 
earlier theoretical chapter, they are more applied in the sense that they 
describe issues that are more directly implicated in the processes of 
observation utilised in analysing the materials presented in the 
empirical chapters that follow. 
4.2. Materials for Analysis 
The materials analysed are primarily in the form of documents or 
texts. They include more than 15,000 newspaper articles collected 
between 12/9/01 and 31/1/05 
- 
both reports and opinion pieces 
- 
the 
proceedings of relevant parliamentary debates 
- 
ten studied in detail 
- 
93 
and other texts generated throughout the controversy, including those 
produced by various interested parties. The public nature of all these 
materials means that others can obtain them for the purposes of 
criticising my interpretations 
- 
and it lessens the need for me to 
consider ethical issues regarding informed consent (Silverman, 2000: 
201). 
The newspaper articles were acquired as the controversy 
unfolded and relevant articles gleaned and an archive constructed over 
time. Since the issue of Iraq has been high on the public agenda since 
12th September 2001, and persists at the time of writing (February 
2005), this required a high degree of organisation. No claim is made 
to the archive being statistically `representative' of the coverage. 
Since my interest in their content is not directly statistical 
-I am not 
using them as a `sample' from which to make statistically inferential 
generalisations about the overall population 
- 
this is not overly 
problematic. The point was not to collect materials which could allow 
construction of a summary map of the debate overall, but to make it 
possible for the regularity of particular issues or practices to be 
identified. 
As my regular paper, The Guardian was obtained consistently 
throughout the process of collection, whilst consumption of other 
newspapers fluctuated. All the British national dailies were obtained 
when `defining moments', such as parliamentary votes publication of 
reports and protest marches, occurred. When this was not possible, 
gaps were filled via relevant websites where available. Particular 
effort was made to obtain materials whose content received 
widespread discussion in other media. The only paper systematically 
omitted from the archive was The Daily Star, primarily due to its 
minimal `hard' news content. 
With reference to parliament, at an early stage, the decision 
was made to deal with copies of Hansard rather than with videos or 
audiotapes of parliamentary activity. This was based on the 
impracticalities of trying to obtain these other types of material, and 
the logistics of transcribing and analysing them. I recognise that 
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Hansard is `cleaned up' in the sense that messy and dialogic 
dimensions of speech such as overlap, speed, tone, volume are 
omitted, and that the debates in the UK parliament are highly 
formalized rather than conversational in format. However, since I am 
not trying to do a form of analysis that requires that these features be 
preserved this is not overly problematic. 
The other resources included campaign materials produced by 
groups such as the Stop the War Coalition, and political speeches 
made by relevant members of the US and UK governments 
- 
most of 
which were available online, albeit also in `cleaned up' form. 
These empirical materials were used in a manner consistent 
with Lynch's `post-analytic ethnomethodology', in so far as they were 
utilised as: `a spur to the imagination rather than as proof of 
hypotheses' (Lynch, 1993: 116). I have not attempted to produce a 
definitive account of the controversy, but have explored particular 
regularities, and their context-dependent significance. The project is 
therefore an exercise in the exploration of this material rather than 
searching for an explanation for the controversy's existence, aimed at 
achieving a nuanced understanding of some of the themes recurring in 
some contributions to the public debate. 
In keeping with this, the analyses in following chapters 
proceed through `rhetorical induction' (Edmondson, 1984), whereby 
selected examples are described and analysed in detail, and advanced 
as indicating other more general and regular processes. Obviously a 
high degree of selectivity ('cherry-picking') is involved with regard to 
such examples, and trust required on the part of the reader regarding 
the existence of other such cherries. In stark contrast to other similar 
studies, for example, Hackett's (1993; also see Hackett and Zhao, 
1994) study of US local news coverage of peace protests in the first 
Gulf War, every care is taken to include information allowing any 
inquisitive or distrustful reader to directly locate all examples for 
themselves. 
This inductive process is broadly in line with the procedures 
involved in critical discourse analysis (CDA), in particular 
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Fairclough's (1992: 37) `textually oriented' form. I proceed via a 
synthesis of description, interpretation and explanation (see 
Fairclough, 1989: 109). In my analyses, an example is provided, 
which is not to be viewed entirely in isolation, its context specific 
significance in terms of what it `means' and what it `does' are 
characterised, and a possible reason for it occurring when and where it 
does is then provided, woven into a wider narrative about the 
regularity of other similar, and different, practices. 
Whilst I accept that it is important to try to be clear with my 
writing, I am also sensitive to the degree to which controlling its 
meaning is not possible (see below). If we feel the need to formulate a 
gold standard for all research, then the best such standard available is 
probably the question: `have the researchers demonstrated successfully 
why we should believe them? ' (Silverman, 1993: 25). It seems to me 
that this is not something that can simply be answered in advance of 
reading a specific analysis. Regardless of the specific methods 
utilised, what surely matters more is the richness of the analyses 
conducted, and how well a piece of research can be connected up with 
other materials beyond those used to generate it. As such, questions 
regarding the specifics of why I have done what I have done when I 
have done it are an integral part of the analyses themselves, so answers 
to such questions should be apparent in and through the analyses in the 
following chapters. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to engage in some advance 
characterisation, including the specific `phenomena' towards which 
my attention is directed. 
4.3. Analytical Foci 
The subsequent discussion leads me to settle upon directing my 
attention towards the importance of the interconnected issues outlined 
below. Rather than build up to a glorious conclusion, I have decided 
to state these at an early stage so as to focus my discussion early on 
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and hopefully enable the reader to appreciate their interrelatedness as 
my discussions unfold. 
The list should be sufficient to demonstrate that, whilst I am 
attempting to develop an analytic sensitivity towards the operation of 
moral asymmetries, I am not simply reducing all analysis to their 
description. Instead they are but one route into analysis. 
My analytical foci include: 
  
Formulaic phrases and recurrent rhetorical flourishes 
  
Meaning and connectivity 
- 
intertextuality, and other discursive 
resources drawn upon, or mobilised in debate 
  
Framing processes, and attempts at delimiting the terms of a 
debate, and other boundary work 
  
The negotiation of questions of legitimacy regarding the 
positions adopted 
  
Hedging, disclaiming and other attempts at protecting speakers' 
identities, as well as what they indicate about the constraints 
within which speakers are operating (or perceiving themselves 
to be) 
  
The action orientation of utterances 
- 
what they are attempting 
to do 
" The sites of agreement between opponents, and their degree of 
mobility 
  
Techniques of problematisation 
- 
evidence of the refusal to 
accept the contributions of one's opponents 
My recurrent readings of the materials collected were conducted with 
a view to exploring the presence (and absence) and local specificity of 
these themes. 
4.4. An Analytical Strategy, Not a Method? 
Andersen (2003: xiii) distinguishes between a method and an 
analytical strategy claiming that a `method' implies that an object is 
observed, leading to the production of what is considered true 
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knowledge, which requires creation (and following) of rules and 
procedures so as to ensure that this can take place. In contrast, an 
analytical strategy shifts attention to a `second order' at which 
observations are observed (and recognised as observations), something 
which involves the (analytical) de-ontologisation of the social world 
(also see Luhmann, 1990: 67). What is important is not the 
implementation of a set of procedures, but questions about what 
strategies enable the generation of critically different forms of 
knowledge than those already existing. 
According to Andersen's approach, the most important issue 
becomes: 
what possibilities for observation unfold when the concern is no longer 
given objects but, instead, the question of how problems, individuals, 
interests 
- 
all kinds of social identities 
- 
come into existence as and within 
communication 
(Andersen, 2003: xv). 
As much as considering what types of arguments are used, I am also 
trying to explore my own possibilities for observation and 
argumentation. In keeping with this, my general approach is best 
characterised as `constructivist', with an emphasis upon processes of 
discursive work involved in the emergence and constitution of 
particular social `phenomena'. Language is therefore not viewed only 
as a system of symbolic representation, but also as something used to 
accomplish things 
- 
specific utterances have an `action' orientation' 
(Potter, 1996: 108), and are therefore seen as performative (Lash, 
2002: 216; Marks, 1998: 105). 
As someone interested in language, it would seem appropriate 
to reflect briefly upon my own use of it, something problematic in the 
same way as all other forms of self-reference. Obviously I am writing, 
which has an action orientation (in this specific case, the attempt to 
generate and circulate knowledge in order to persuade specific readers 
to award a particular qualification). The words used, and the concepts 
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invoked are important for the `understanding' engendered in a reader, 
yet I am unable to directly control the possibility of readings going 
beyond my intentions (Lopez, 2003: 144). There is no apparent 
solution to this, assuming that it is a problem. Clearly it would be to 
my advantage to make what I am saying as clear as possible. 
However, attempting to determine precisely what someone may take 
from what follows is obviously impossible too. The best way of 
engaging with this on my part is perhaps to try to anticipate some of 
the more likely `misunderstandings' of what I am doing and 
incorporate clarifications that will forestall them into what I write. 
In this regard, I should clarify one aspect of the approach that I 
am adopting, which is often misunderstood 
- 
the question of my 
`constructivism'. 
4.5. Constructivism and a `Two Front War' 
In his sympathetic assessment of Luhmann's work, Rasch (2000a: 74) 
describes how constructivism often finds itself embroiled in a `two 
front war' against both realism and idealism. It is accused of paying 
either too much or too little attention to `reality'. In a manner 
analogous to the apparent fate of the British New Labour Party, by 
trying to be both and yet neither of two available alternatives, it has 
often made two sets of enemies, and ultimately pleasing no-one. 
According to Rasch (2000a: 82-3) this problem is addressed by a 
constant oscillation between idealism and realism, which has a 
particular logic to it. 
In order to forestall the automatic attraction of similar 
criticisms to myself, it will perhaps be useful to try to clarify some of 
the issues (misunderstandings) that lead towards this controversy, by 
considering what it is that Luhmann's epistemology considers `real'. 
Despite Luhmann's claim that discussions of `realism' are 
potentially endless, and highly unproductive (Luhmann, 2002: 64) his 
theory invokes the term `real' but has something slightly different in 
view than its usual `referent'. According to Hayles (in Rasch, 2000a: 
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190), what systems theory directs us to is not the world, as such, but 
our relations or interactions with it. What we can know about is our 
interaction with the thing we call the world 
- 
how we make sense of it, 
and what we do in order to deal with the fact that we cannot know it in 
isolation from ourselves. 
In keeping with this I have decided to try to avoid direct 
reference to stable psycho-social features among the people whose 
discursive contributions I am studying which may attract the criticism 
associated with Discursive Psychology of viewing people as a one- 
dimensional or disembodied `homo rhetoricus' (Hammersley, 2003: 
763). However, consistent with my appropriation of Luhmann in 
particular, I do not claim to be directly studying people at all, so the 
criticism is not strictly relevant. I am studying the relationship 
between communicators, and other communication, something which 
might be assisted by having a neatly fleshed out conception of the 
human being, but does not strictly require one. 
When it comes to the study of communications, the `reality' 
being addressed is not the reality behind a claim or communication 
- 
the truth of what is claimed, or the materiality of what is referred to by 
it 
- 
but the reality of the communication itself having occurred, and 
the connective possibilities it enables. This is similar to the 
Foucauldian sense in which the materiality of a statement is located in 
its `capacity to be repeated' (Bernauer, 1990: 106). 
According to Lash (2002: 111) it is this understanding that 
`communication is the fabric of the real' that is Luhmann's great 
strength. In his work on the mass media as a social system, Luhmann 
(2000: 3) states that: `It makes good sense [... ] to regard the real 
reality of the mass media as the communications which go on within 
and through them. ' If we can extrapolate from this a little, what 
becomes important is not any `referential' relationship between a 
communication and an `object', but the significance of the 
communication itself. Whether or not this is precisely the 
`materialism of the incorporeal' that Foucault (1981: 69; also see 
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Foucault, 1977c: 169) advanced is unclear, but it does connect with 
Foucault's assertions about `the statement' which: 
is linked [... ] to a `referential' that is made up not of things, facts, 
`realities', or `beings', but of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the 
objects that are named, designated, or described within it, and for the 
relations that are affirmed or denied in it. 
(Foucault, 1972: 91). 
It is therefore concerned with what Foucault calls `spaces of 
differentiation' (Foucault, 1972: 92) and not direct relations (or not) 
with some postulated material reality. 
Take, for example, an assertion of the form `I am not a 
structuralist' (something which Foucault and Luhmann both repeatedly 
denied 
- 
see Luhmann, 1995: 278-82; Foucault, 1993: 202,1991a: 
72). What would be focused upon is (primarily) not the veracity of the 
claim 
- 
whether the speaker (really) `is' a structuralist 
- 
but the reality 
of it having been said, its context specific significance in terms of what 
subsequent connections it makes possible. According to my approach 
instead of `is it true? ' we would ask `to what it was produced as a 
response? ' What is it about the space in which it occurred that 
`required' it? To what did it connect? Moreover, how did it 
(re)position elements within that space: where was it designed to lead? 
Here we are in the realms of what Luhmann terms `second- 
order observation' 
- 
the observation of observations (Luhmann, 1998). 
It should be clarified that such observation does not claim superiority: 
`Neither any exception to the general conditions of observation nor 
any "higher" or "better" knowledge is claimed for second-order 
observation' (Luhmann, 2002: 65). It does not overcome the blindness 
that is automatically involved in all observation, but makes it apparent 
(Roberts, 1999: 38), and renders everything contingent (Luhmann, 
1993b: 769). 
There are strong resonances between second-order observation 
and Derrida's deconstruction (Luhmann, 1993b: 766), in so far as both 
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can be used to take apart, or undermine, the assumption of a stable 
relationship between presence and absence (on affinities with Derrida 
particularly in mutual opposition to Habermas and Gadamer, see 
Harrison, 1995: 88; Rasch, 2000a: 55; also see Teubner, 2001). 
Personally, I would not feel uncomfortable being described as 
a deconstructionist, since part of what I am doing problematises 
presumed distinctions. However, what I am doing has not emerged 
directly from an encounter with Derrida. 
Some of the criticism regarding the issue of `reality' emerges 
from a regular conflation of this `contingency' with `arbitrariness', or 
a refusal to acknowledge a distinction between the two (Rasch, 2000a: 
78). To label something `contingent' is to advance the claim that it 
could have been otherwise, which is not the same as saying that it was 
arbitrary, or could have been absolutely any way. In saying that 
something could have been otherwise, one is also accepting that it was 
not otherwise, i. e., that it `really' occurred and had some associated 
effect(s). 
This type of emphasis 
- 
asking questions about the what, how 
and why 
- 
rather than the truth or reality of claims means that the 
approach implied resonates with the `strict constructionist' approach to 
social problems which attempts to focus upon claims and their 
`articulation' rather than upon the `ontology of the described' (Ibarra 
and Kitsuse, 1993: 44). Whilst such a `strict' approach is difficult to 
sustain consistently (see Best, 1993; 1995 for sophisticated but hostile 
critiques), it is questionable that difficulty automatically equals 
illegitimacy. 
Ibarra and Kitsuse's approach is developed in reaction to a 
critique of the constructionist position, made by Woolgar and Pawluch 
(1985) in coining the term `ontological gerrymandering'. They argue 
that there is something problematic (and epistemologically 
inconsistent, see Best, 1993: 114) about researchers who are willing to 
observe the constructed `nature' of claims made by those contributing 
to the discourse around a social problem under study, noting the 
contingencies and interests at stake, but exhibit an unwillingness to 
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accept that their own claims can be subjected to the same form of 
ironisation (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985: 216; also see Potter, 1996: 
183-4). So when a constructionist researcher, after analysing the 
constitutive work of a set of claimants, provides their own evidence 
for what `really' is, or should be, the case - whether or not something 
should or should not be considered a problem - they are lapsing into a 
non-reflexive realism or `objectivism'. 
Ibarra and Kitsuse (1993) make an attempt to reformulate and 
re-orientate the constructionist project in response to this critique. For 
them, what is important is the `condition-category' rather than the 
`condition' as something real or unreal. They are not directly 
interested in the referential aspects of claims (Ibarra and Kitsuse, 
1993: 30), but in a manner similar to Luhmann, more the autonomous 
reality of claims themselves. The location of their gaze is different, 
and arguably a little more difficult to understand. 
In this regard, Woolgar and Pawluch's (1985) critique, and the 
concept of ontological gerrymandering, can be put to work. Attending 
to contributors' attempted manipulation of what is and what is not the 
case is surely one way to probe the significance of the distinctions they 
draw, and the observations they make whilst making arguments. 
Indeed, Potter (1996: 184-5,200) argues that `ontological 
gerrymandering' can be used to refer to any case where a specific 
argumentative terrain is selected from several options. In keeping with 
my remarks on the `repressive presence' in the previous chapter, I 
think that attending to such issues as claims about what is and is not 
the case will be an extremely productive way of thinking about the 
proximal processes of inclusion and exclusion involved in restricting 
the space within which a particular debate occurs, as well as the way 
in which morally asymmetric distinctions are negotiated and evaded. 
Despite his own protestations about it being unnecessary for 
Conversation Analysis (CA) to engage in dialogue with 
poststructuralism (Schegloff, 1997; 1998; Wetherell, 1998), 
Schegloff's (1998: 514) `why that now? ' question is resonant with 
such a focus. Of course, for Schegloff it is only relevant to the analyst 
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if observably relevant as a problem to the member. To some degree I 
am taking this on board, and the main way in which my approach is 
influenced by CA is the importance of discipline in this respect 
- 
attending to the issues with which I am concerned as primarily 
relevant to the people involved. 
Whether you are making claims, or making claims about the 
claims of others, you will of course end up talking about reality in 
some sense 
- 
just as even Derrida has to end up making assertions 
about presence 
- 
there seems little possibility of escape because our 
hegemonic communicative practices are realist. Therefore, despite my 
stated emphasis, and the fact that some form of purity is neither 
possible nor desirable, I will inevitably be open to criticisms as 
inconsistent when making assertions about what is going on in a given 
instance. This problem arguably raises some wider questions about 
the extent to which word limits exert a coercive realist effect upon 
writing processes, but I have no space to go into that here! Suffice to 
say, I am entirely comfortable with my observations being open to a 
degree of ironisation. 
4.6. Locating (Dis)agreement 
One obvious question to ask about any controversial situation is what 
is the disagreement about 
- 
what is the source of controversy? 
Another, perhaps less obvious question, concerns the position of the 
disagreement 
- 
where it is located? Within what `dimension' of the 
discursive space is it located? 
According to Gadamer (1975), even when there is 
disagreement, there must also be some agreement against which it can 
gain its significance, even if it is only agreement regarding what the 
disagreement is about! There is, of course, no good reason to assume 
that this location will be relatively stable. As a debate unfolds, the 
point(s) of disagreement may shift about based upon who says what to 
whom. 
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In the founding text of rhetorical psychology, Billig (1996: 55) 
views the argumentative process as extremely dynamic, with the 
constant potential for the `point of disagreement' to shift: 
Once an argument starts, words which have been used non-controversially 
can suddenly find themselves in the forefront of controversy, as the 
momentum of the argument pushes the disagreement into hitherto 
unsuspected areas 
For Billig, rhetoric is fundamentally about persuasion, specifically 
processes of justification and criticism (Billig, 1996: 117), although 
since their successful achievement cannot be assumed, the 
argumentative process is largely about a `search for the last word' 
(Billig, 1996: 138). 
Since much politics take the form of struggling over 
`appropriate descriptions of events' (Patton, 2000: 28) or attempts at 
narrowing the definition of a given situation to one that is favourable 
(Manning, 1985: 26), it is important to consider the dynamics of how 
things are closed down as a strategy pursuing `victory' in an argument. 
What is involved prior to any moment of closure? How might any 
such closing, work? How does a debate unfold (or indeed, fold up)? 
Billig sees argumentation as (potentially) infinitely open 
- 
something of a swirling, whirling contest in which `each argues that 
the other's justifications are unjustifiable' (Billig, 1996: 131). Whilst 
infinite problematisation may be theoretically possible, forms of 
problematisation seem to stop or stabilise eventually, and therefore, 
what surely becomes interesting is the specific place that it stops, and 
the manner in which it does so. 
In his interpretation of the Thatcher government's success in 
achieving office and re-orientating the British political spectrum, Hay 
(1996) focuses upon its successful framing of a discursive context to 
its advantage 
- 
primarily around the `winter of discontent' as a crisis 
requiring radical intervention. A meta-narrative to this effect was 
constituted over time, facilitating Thatcherism's success by exerting an 
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organising influence over the events which subsequently occurred so 
that they would fit in with it. He claims that it was not press 
indoctrination that was at stake, but: `the ability to frame the 
discursive context within which political subjectivities are constituted, 
reinforced and re-constituted' (Hay, 1996: 261). 
According to this account, the space with which we are 
concerned, the `agreement' involved is not a single point, but an area 
of `containment' (or in Foucauldian terms, dispersion), a terrain with a 
degree of variability, and with borders which are policed. 
The possibility of some sort of limiting or squeezing of space 
is also a theme present in other work on Thatcherism (Phillips, 1996; 
1998), which explores how its success was due to the widespread 
circulation and penetration of its `key words and formulaic phrases' 
within. Phillips cites examples such as `choice' and `value for 
money', and argues that they operated to `encourage interpretation 
within a certain range of meanings' (Phillips, 1998: 855, original 
emphasis). 
According to Fowler, from whom Phillips draws the concept, 
formulaic phrases are stylistic templates serving three roles: 
First, formulaic patterning is cohesive in effect: recurrent patterns provide 
a set of stylistic `templates', homogenizing the discourse. [... T]heir 
widespread dispersal through the language of all of the newspapers, 
provides a 'cue' to readers to recognize all of this as the same discourse. 
Second, formulaic phrase patterns are generative. They are an important 
mechanism in facilitating the generation of new instances of `it' in the 
discourse [... ] 
[Thirdly] they have a levelling or equating effect, causing different matters 
to be perceived as instances of the same thing. 
(Fowler, 1991: 173-4, original emphasis). 
In a rhetorical spirit, we can perhaps summarise these roles or 
functions more alliteratively as recognition, (re)constitution, and 
reduction, all of which seem consistent with a squeezing, closing and 
connecting process. 
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Interestingly, Phillips' account notes the extent to which 
Thatcherism's opponents shared such words and phrases, thereby 
serving to naturalise them (Phillips, 1996: 229) as `commonsense'. In 
particular she identifies the way in which the Labour Party shared a 
common frame of reference (Phillips, 1996: 212), often challenging 
the words and phrases `within the terms of Thatcherist discourse and 
[were] therefore not a challenge to the discourse itself. ' (Phillips, 
1996: 224, original emphasis; also see Fairclough, 2000: 10, on the 
`not only.. 
. 
but also' logic of New Labour's discourse). 
Accordingly, it seems that there is the potential to legitimate 
your opponents' claims by engaging with them in particular ways 
- 
making their part in the controversy seem legitimate (Billig, 1996: 
252). Billig uses the example of holocaust denial and how trying to 
argue with those who deny its occurrence as if they were open to 
persuasion can make them seem reasonable in ways they do not 
deserve, and can therefore be a self-defeating strategy. If we follow 
such ideas through, then it seems possible that you can accidentally 
legitimate the arguments of your opponents by engaging with them in 
particular ways which fail to problematise the way in which you are 
(dis)agreeing with them (also see Smith, 1994). This directs attention 
towards issues such as whether or not opponents might be using the 
same words in different ways. In order to communicate, they do not 
necessarily have to achieve intersubjectivity in the sense of a union of 
consciousness, so it is possible for them to, metaphorically, share 
signifiers without sharing signifieds. Opponents can use the same 
words, without necessarily referring to the same things with them, yet 
may `assume' that they are talking about the same things (Rescher, 
1993: 141), and this is something to which I need to be sensitive when 
examining the spaces in which agreement and disagreement occur. 
4.7. Creating `Difficulty' 
It is worth recapping that for Luhmann ` communication' occurs via 
the synthesis of three selections 
- 
information, utterance and 
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(mis)understanding (Luhmann, 2002: 157), such that differential 
interpretation of the same word by people does not bring 
communication to a halt (Esposito, 1999: 98). Communication is 
`experienced as successful' when the three selections form a unity to 
which `further communication can connect' (Luhmann, 1995: 243). 
That is what makes autopoesis possible. Misunderstanding is not 
precluded, since communication does not rely on transmission, or on a 
successful union of consciousnesses. 
According to my appropriation, it is not the autopoesis of a 
given system that is at stake as much as the actualisation of connective 
possibility, and the interconnection of particular chains of 
communication, along with the question of the degree to which a 
discursive space is closed via the application of moral asymmetrical 
distinctions. 
As should be clear so far, I am adopting a conception of 
communication that includes the possibility that a particular 
communication or observation can be rejected by its `receiver'. 
Communication involves a selection on the part of its `recipient' 
(Rasch, 2000a: 148), and therefore does not automatically receive 
what Austin (1975: 117) calls `uptake'. Clearly this avoids me 
assuming a particular determinist version of a communication's 
`impact'. Whilst Luhmann's version keeps the possibility of rejection 
open, and therefore a conception of direct `control' is absent from 
what I am trying to conceptualise, this does not mean that some from 
of coercion, seduction or shepherding is also absent. 
Based upon a variety of sources, I have come to a position on 
what I wish to term `difficulty' 
- 
the stuff of the `moral certainty' 
- 
which is meant to connote a non-deterministic, but normative (in the 
ethnomethodological sense of moral accountability, see Garfinkel, 
1967; Heritage, 1984) conception of social influence. 
In her overview of the constructionist approach to social 
problems, arguing for the centrality of morality in claims-making, 
Loseke (1999: 11,49) constructs an ideal-typical model for the 
`perfect claim'. She argues that it is possible for claimants to construct 
108 
an `indisputable morality' (Loseke, 1999: 59), such that disputation 
becomes extremely difficult 
- 
if you try to argue with it, try to 
disagree, then you risk placing yourself beyond the boundaries of 
legitimate debate. One obvious example is the commonly asserted 
`need' to `protect' the `innocence' of children which informs and 
constrains much contemporary debate. If we view morality as about 
the construction of `preferred emotional orientations' (Loseke, 1993: 
211), then we can begin to appreciate the demands that can be made of 
people in a controversial situation, including the risk of any 
contribution they make being disqualified. 
Loseke (1993: 207) also usefully directs attention to the 
importance of understanding `people production' as a `rhetorical 
practice' which seems integral to much claims-making, as well as the 
way in which it becomes morally loaded with regard to the worthiness 
of particular productions (of people) vis-a-vis sympathy or 
condemnation (Loseke, 1993: 209). Whilst she does not invoke 
Foucault, one can see how such ideas could be connected up with his 
in terms of inclusion/exclusion and in terms of the production of 
`types' of person as based upon the `will to knowledge' (see Foucault, 
1978; 1979), and with other differentiations between the worthy and 
unworthy, and the resultant moral asymmetries. One thing that 
becomes important here is the allocation of `worthiness' vis-a-vis the 
right to a hearing, and the right to dispute. Who can legitimately 
contribute arguments, or make legitimate claims, and through what 
process is that established? What are the parameters of legitimate 
debate, and how do they operate? Does a distinction between 
reasonable and unreasonable represent the boundary of the permissible 
(see Mouffe, 2000: 24)? 
In an article bemoaning the arguments that realists make to 
delegitimate those of a more relativist persuasion, Edwards et al. 




which work to create difficulty for those wanting to disagree. They 
point to the arguments which realists deploy against relativism, 




banging a fist on a table, or asking relativists to deny that 
people have `really' been killed in wars - create `difficult' rhetorical 
situations for those wishing to disagree, requiring their engagement in 
often lengthy rhetorical work, and allowing their responses to be 
dismissed as long-winded, or as red-herrings. Such `undeniability' can 
be connected to Loseke's `indisputable morality', serving to make 
demands upon those subjected to them 
- 
it becomes risky and difficult 
to disagree in the face of the moral community which is seemingly 
invoked. Those considering dissent are asked: would you really want 
to be standing alone outside it? Such a situation would seem to be a 
context specific and practical form of interpellation (Hay, 1996: 264), 
a pushing and pulling, and a shepherding of people into specific 
(restricted, and probably negatively valued) subject positions if they 
refuse to agree on certain propositions. It can become `difficult' not to 
express agreement (see Pomerantz, 1984; Potter, 1996) of at least a 
minimal kind. 
Writing about the importance of metaphors in theoretical 
writing, Lopez (2003: 15) discusses the existence of `discursive 
exigencies' 
- 
the `tensions, incompatibilities and desiderata' involved. 
This resonates with my theoretical chapter, including my discussions 
of moral certainty and moral asymmetry. Certain connections are not 
possible for epistemic reasons, but we can also potentially identify the 
existence of constraints upon enunciations in all contexts, not 
necessarily due to the absence of epistemic connective possibilities 
within a particular discursive formation, but also those with a more 
normative content 
- 
related to the mobilisation of various moral 
asymmetries 
- 
which can be more locally invoked so as to render 
particular potential contributions more difficult. 
In relation to such issues, it is important also to acknowledge 
what is encouraged (Billig, 1996: 264) as well as what is made 
difficult, or is discouraged within a particular social situation. 
Thinking about the simultaneity of `encouragement' and 
`discouragement' may be one further way of thinking about the 
possible connections between Luhmann and Foucault on the respective 
110 
question of observation and power as constitutive or productive (and 
simultaneously also repressive) 
- 
of inciting particular productions 
rather than specific others. 
We can arguably look for the wider discursive context, and 
how it constrains or impinges upon actors (epistemically, and morally 
or normatively) in their interventions which explicitly thematise it, and 
attempt to negotiate ways out of it and open up the available discursive 
space, and avoid negative evaluation. Again, we are back to the issue 
of ontological gerrymandering, viewed as an intervention in the order 
of discourse, as an attempt to control or police its boundaries, i. e., 
trying to maintain the prevalent forms of encouragement and 
discouragement. Alternatively, it could be trying to shift, move or 
change the specific order of discourse, or alter the logic of the wider 
discursive formation (or space) so as to change the dynamics of 
encouragement/discouragement, and make particular enunciations 
more or less difficult. One possible means of this occurring is by 
contributors regularly characterising their allies or opponents in some 
way or other, or claiming that their contributions should or should not 
be understood in particular ways, for example, by claiming or 
disclaiming particular identities. 
4.8. Disclaiming, Reflexivity and Being Unexpected 
Whilst conducting some empirical analyses of the context of Section 
28's failed repeal in the year 2000 (Burridge, 2001, Burridge, 2004), 1 
observed the recurrence of particular rhetorical techniques involving 
speakers denying homophobia. This led me to the literature utilising 
the concept of disclaiming, specifically in van Dijk's CDA and Billig's 
more `rhetorical' approach. 
van Dijk employs references to disclaiming and denial in the 
context of the justifications utilised in defence of discrimination 
against ethnic minorities. He summarises it neatly as the ` introduction 
for a but' (van Dijk, 1992: 110), as in `I am not racist but... ', and 
views it as a reflection of transformations in the ways in which 
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prejudice is expressed and discrimination legitimated (also see van 
Dijk, 1991; 1998; Billig, 1996). Whilst appreciating the sophistication 
of van Dijk's analyses, and having a considerable political sympathy 
for what he is doing, there are two senses in which I want to deal with 
disclaiming differently. 
Firstly, I would like to employ the concept in a less uni- 
directional sense 
- 
looking at the contrastive power of `but' in 
negotiating difficult arguments on both sides of a given argument. 
Secondly, I am not sure that it is necessary to view its use as 
automatically reflecting a transformation. Of course, my position on 
this is also necessitated by my desire to avoid judging the veracity of 
claims made. For van Dijk, the move towards disclaiming represents a 
change in the superstructure of a base consisting of much the `same 
old' prejudice. From the approach that I am adopting, that base is not 
of primary importance, if it is knowable at all. 
My wish to use a somewhat `depoliticised' version of 
disclaiming leads me back to its originators (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975) 
as well as more recent related developments (Potter, 1996; Antaki and 
Wetherell, 1999). This recognises that words such as `but' are often 
utilised in face-saving activity which is socially and informationally 
cooperative (Schiffrin, 1987: 160), and orientated towards some form 
of consensus, without assuming that such activity is somehow 
illegitimate. 
Hewitt and Stokes' (1975: 3) define a disclaimer as: `a verbal 
device employed to ward off and defeat in advance doubts and 
negative typification which may result from intended conduct. ' They 
deductively differentiate five types 
- 
hedging, credentialing, sin 
licences, cognitive disclaimers and appeals for the suspension of 
judgment 
- 
and argue that such techniques attempt to avoid potential 
negative identity typification, and therefore orientate towards 
perceived cultural constraints (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975: 11). 
Potter's (1996) interpretation operates along similar lines, and 
is related to what he calls the ` dilemma of stake'. He recognises that 
social actors themselves often seek explanations at the level of 
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interests, and therefore: 
[A]nything that a person [... ] says or does may be discounted as a product 
of stake or interest. The referencing of such a stake is one principal way of 
discounting the significance of an action, or reworking its nature. 
(Potter, 1996: 110) 
Stake is a potential problem for a speaker, and a potential resource for 
those who wish to undermine what they are saying (Potter, 1996: 114). 
This means that speakers may be encouraged to avoid particular 
attributions of stake 
- 
and thereby avoid their arguments being 
rendered illegitimate. What therefore becomes important are the 
`practices through which stake is established and discounted' (Potter, 
1996: 114). 
According to Antaki and Wetherell (1999: 11) there are other 
more generic rhetorical techniques which use a `but' to `fireproof 
what a speaker is saying, including the `concession'. They identify a 
three-part structure 
- 
proposition, concession, reprise 
- 
which speakers 
use in making a `show' of conceding a point in order to make their 
contribution less open to rebuttal. As an imaginary example, someone 
might say the following: `I do not like Talcott Parson's work. He was 
obviously a very clever man. But his books are unreadable'. The 
assertion that he was `obviously a very clever man' is a concession in 
that it pulls back from the original proposition, and displays the 
absence of a systematic `anti-Parsons' stake. Antaki and Wetherell's 
(1999: 24) argue that such techniques can be, but are not exclusively, 
political in a direct sense. 
None of this is to deny the value of van Dijk's analyses, nor to 
rule out the `political' dimension of disclaiming, just to recognise that 
the associated issues can be viewed as more generic, and something 
that is often present (and recurrent) in the contributions of people on 
both sides of any argument, not just the one with whom I might 
disagree. As a careful reader will have noticed, it is also present in my 
arguments 
-I have just engaged in it here! 
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Such techniques are potentially useful to people in various 
different contexts as a means of resisting particular typifications, 
categorisations, and identifications, or forms of observation and 
recognition 
-a means of crossing from one distinction to another, or 
from one side to another in the attempt to avoid a moral asymmetry. It 
is this more generic context-specific significance that is of interest to 
me, as well as the arguably ubiquitous importance of `who' and `what' 
you are as you speak (see Wetherell, 1998: 394 on the occasioned and 
situated nature of subject positions). How does this phenomenon take 
on particular significance associated with the context in which it 
occurs? If it can be generally characterised as a form of reflexivity, 
and an orientation to, and problematisation of, expectations, to what is 
it particularly produced as a response? Again we are in the realms of 
the question: `why that now? ' 
4.9. `Criticism' and the Role of the Researcher 
With respect to my own role, there are perhaps two main issues which 
merit discussion, the interrelated issues of `reality' and `relativism'. 
Potter (1996: 230-2) identifies three types of critique 
- 
the 
practical, critical and reflexive 
- 
all of which are legitimate, but which 
have productive tensions between them. The approach I am adopting 
is most akin to the third of these, which `moves in a more postmodern 
direction' (Potter, 1996: 231), and recognises that its products are also 
socially constituted, and open to ironisation. 
The critical approach, which I am distancing myself from, 
without denying its legitimacy, is `Critical' in the Frankfurt school 
sense, and is explicitly motivated by a conception of liberation, and 
evaluates social arrangements in terms of their deviation from an 
explicitly formulated (utopian) normative base which envisions how 
the world would (should) work more fairly. 
This is an issue used as a criticism of CDA in Schegloff's 
(1997; 1999a; 1999b) critiques. Schegloff (1999b: 577) identifies a 
tendency within CDA which suggests that its authors `know basically 
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how the world works', and according to Potter (1996: 224) CDA treats 
the researcher's understanding of reality as factuality as 
unproblematic, something which again resonates with the notion of 
`ontological gerrymandering' (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985). 
Schegloff also criticises the approach as involving less 
discipline than CA, and as enabling `self-indulgence' on the part of the 
researcher (see Schegloff, 1999b: 579). However, his unwillingness to 
name names on this, and the fact that the first analytic move in 
Fairclough's formulation of CDA is description, undermines his 
accusations somewhat. Nevertheless a sense of not getting carried 
away on the froth of my own political opinions is an important 
element of what I am trying to do, and is certainly more of a potential 
in more explicitly politically-directed work. 
Whilst I undeniably have normative assumptions, and a vision 
of how the world could be better, which obviously impacts upon my 
observations, invoking it as a direct point of comparison with the 
materials I am analysing is far from my primary goal. It is clear that I 
am also refusing to choose between science and politics in the way 
that the choice is often posed. I am engaging in a piece of 
theoretically informed but empirically orientated research, which fits 
into neither category. I am writing, and therefore involved in 
producing `theoretical effects' (Lopez, 2003: 147), but these are not 
simply located within the respective controversies, but are also about 
controversy, morality and discourse more generally. Largely due to 
my having bought into the `anti-representationalism' attributed to 
those authors usually described as `poststructuralist' (see May, 1995) 
my primary aim is not to persuade the reader to take a particular 
position on the invasion of Iraq. Instead I am trying to encourage 
them to think about the significance of some of the processes through 
which the controversy unfolded. 
Perhaps the most important thing about the stance I am taking 
is that both sides in each argument (including those with whom I 
agree) undergo a degree of ironisation. From the position I am taking, 
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I am quite willing to admit the contingencies involved in arguments 
with which I agree (in this case those protesting against the war). 
These issues also raise the question of relativism, for which 
there is no satisfactory answer. I agree with (Edwards et al., 1995: 33) 
that attempting to take a relativistic stance is not somehow `morally 
bankrupt' and that it is important to engage in `decoupling the implied 
equivalence between relativism and lack of political commitment' 
(Potter, 1996: 7). Clearly absolute relativism is actually impossible, 
and my orientation is probably better characterised as a form of radical 
pluralism, but this does not mean that I should automatically give vent 
to all my political anger, or that I should be worrying about the 
`purity' of my `science'. 
Despite being sensitive to the sense in which knowledge, 
meaning, descriptions, observations are political in the sense that they 
can not be ideologically neutral, and that no reading is `innocent' 
(Lopez, 2003: 149; Rasch, 2000c: 22), I do not accept that this 
automatically means that I should embrace the identity of the activist 
as Alvarez (2001) advocates. 
In describing a conflict, I am in one sense automatically 
participating in it (Rasch, 2000: 116) by attaching myself to it. 
However, it is possible for someone to write in such a way as to not 
automatically alienate those of a different political persuasion in 
advance of them engaging directly with the content of what they have 
written. To embrace activism, would imply that I was giving up on the 
possibility of communicating with political `enemies', and that I was 
importing a good versus evil schema into the whole enterprise (and 
observing exclusively according to the code `morality' in Luhmann's 
sense). I would hope that a more `constructive' constructivist position 
was possible, whereby I am not so partisan as to be only preaching to 
the converted. 
These issues also raise questions about the extent to which I 
can claim to be any different from those whose contributions I am 
studying. This is particularly pertinent since, I have been engaging in 
many of the practices in which I will subsequently claim contributors 
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to the public debate around the `Iraq Crisis' are engaged, in order to 
position myself, and avoid negative typification - clearly engaging in 
disclaiming in Hewitt and Stokes' (1975) sense. In trying to justify 
what I am doing, and attempting to create a space for a contribution 
that is neither consciously `merely scientific' nor `merely political', I 
am arguably demonstrating my similarities with those studied. 
According to Fairclough (1989: 141) there are a lot of 
similarities between what analysts and participants do, and this is 
particularly likely to be the case in qualitative work. However, I am 
engaging in a practice which aims to consider more than just one side 
in an argument (Jenkins, 1996: 12), and my enunciations emerge from 
a very different context -a different discursive formation - that of 
sociology (see Woodiwiss, 2001) that has its own conventions and 
makes particular demands upon me - encouraging and discouraging 
particular practices. 
Despite these differences, I am not asking for some special 
exemption for myself, nor for my enunciations, and from the point of 
view of any observer my observations are open to ironisation in 
various ways. Hopefully the care taken to be clear about the `how' 
and `why' of my assertions as well as the `what', and the manner in 
which my work is focussed upon the materials analysed, will mean 
that as few people as possible will feel motivated to engage in such 
ironisation! 
Whilst it would be pretentious to claim that this thesis is an 
`experience book' in Foucault's (1991d: 25-42) sense, it certainly 
represents a theoretically informed account of my intellectual 
experience of the processes and events leading up to and surrounding 
the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, as communicated in the material I 
analysed. In the chapters that follow I describe some of the 
regularities observable in the discourse produced in relation to the 
invasion, starting with the claimed relevance (or irrelevance) of Iraq to 
the more general `War on Terror(ism)'. 
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5. Links to the War on Terror(ism) 
We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against 
another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge 
or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe 
haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a 
decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists. 
(Bush, 2001). 
The military action against Iraq (beginning March 2003) emerged 
from a discursive space shaped by the events of September 11`h 2001 
(henceforth 9-11), and the ensuing so-called `war on terror(ism)' 
(henceforth WoT). 
Analytically I am not directly interested in resolving whether 
or not the invasion was `really' part of the war on terror(ism), but the 
way in which connections between Iraq the WoT are made or denied 
in arguments made for and against the invasion's legitimacy. This 
chapter examines some of the ways that connections were made 
between the two issues (if indeed they are viewed as separate), and 
whether any regularities are observable in the ways that any 
relationship is configured in contributions aimed at legitimating or 
undermining the case made for invading Iraq. 
In keeping with the rest of my analyses, my approach views 
assertions of belonging, as involving normative implications regarding 
how subsequent observations should proceed. Often statements about 
what is the case also imply what should be the case. They aspire to 
organise subsequent contributions and map the parameters of 
legitimate dissent 
-a morality of recognition asserting that this is the 
case, and you should agree (if you do not do so already). 
5.1. WVoT as a Formulaic Phrase 
Arguably the phrase `war on terror(ism)' is `formulaic' in the sense 
espoused by Fowler (1991) and Phillips (1996,1998), the main 
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functions of which I have summarised alliteratively as recognition, 
(re)constitution, and reduction. The success that `war on terror(ism)' 
has achieved as a definition of the current world situation implies that 
it has operated along these lines. When the phrase is stated, we all 
supposedly know what is at stake 
- 
it is recognised and reconstituted, 
and the complexity of events reduced. This is highly consequential, 
since as Fuller (2001: paragraph 1.11) points out the classification of 
the world situation post 9-11 has strong implications for `identifying 
the jurisdiction for resolving the conflict'. If the situation is 
understood as a `war' then this will foster particular expectations about 
what follows. 
In this regard, I need to do a little disclaiming of my own. I am 
continually invoking the phrase `war on terrorism', and reducing it 
further to `WoT' (so too `9-11'). Given my orientation to complexity, 
I am aware that this may invite accusations of performative 
contradiction. However, I hope that the reader will forgive this in the 
interests of economy of words, and now that I have mentioned it, will 
be immunised against any sinister ideological implications! 
5.2. Invasion of Iraq was Legitimate Because Part of the 
WoT 
One set of interconnected claims made in support of invading Iraq 
would deny the distinction between what I have already referred to as 
`two' contexts. For these contributions, Iraq is part of the WoT, and 
this is the source of its legitimacy. 
On the logic of the infamous with/against `us' distinction, Iraq 
is allocated to the `against' category, and is therefore to be treated in 
the same way as al Qaeda. As Lord Howell of Guildford 
[Conservative] put it: `[F]rom the US perspective, Iraq and terrorism 
are the same issue and the moral case is the same 
- 
that against 
unspeakable evil' (Hansard, 2002e: 867). 
Much of the justificatory talk in advance of the invasion 
involved assertions regarding the Iraqi government's support for 
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terrorism, and the potential for it giving `weapons of mass destruction' 
to international terrorist groups. For example, in his speech to 
parliament following the publication of the government's dossier on 
Iraq's WMD Tony Blair stated that: `[T]here is no doubt [... ] that 
certain forms of terrorism in the middle east are supported by Iraq' 
(Hansard, 2002b: 19). 
The phrase `There is no doubt' is clearly both descriptive and 
prescriptive. It was very common in arguments in favour of war, 
along with the closely related `There can be no doubt'. The constancy 
with which Saddam Hussein and Iraq were linked with terrorism, 
either as willing to engage in it, or provide it assistance 
- 
served as one 
way in which a connection was made with the WoT. The `risk' of him 
assisting al Qaeda was raised quite regularly. Given that he had 
obtained and used WMDs in the past, and the work of UN weapons 
inspectors, who were supposed to verify Iraq's disarmament after the 
Gulf war of 1991, was `incomplete', there was allegedly the possibility 
that at some future date he might decide to cooperate with al Qaeda, 
supplying them with any such weapons that remained. 
The US Vice President Dick Cheney spoke of this scenario as a 
`potential marriage' (Philip Webster and Damian Whitworth, The 
Times, 12/3/02: 1). Whilst this admits some uncertainty 
-a potential 
not necessarily coming to pass 
- 
the risk of not intervening to prevent 
such a marriage was portrayed as so great that preventative military 
action was the only sensible risk-averse course of action. Absolute 
certainty was not required because of the extent of the negative 
consequences envisaged 
-a using the spectre of terrible consequences 
to advocate war. As George Bush (2002b) put it: `[W]e cannot wait 
for the final proof 
- 
the smoking gun 
- 
that could come in the form of 
a mushroom cloud'. 
There was, however, a way to achieve a guarantee, according 
to Colin Powell: 
[[Jn this post-September 11`x' world, getting those weapons out of his hands 
is the only way to guarantee that he won't use them again, or he won't 
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make common cause and pass them on through his terrorist connections for 
use practically anywhere in the world. 
(Powell, 2003b). 
The logic runs as follows: `We' do not know for certain that it will 
happen, but we can be certain of it not happening if we act decisively 
to ensure it is impossible. 
This position was captured quite nicely by the recurrent phrase 
`inaction is not an option' (or variations on it) (see for examples Julian 
Borger et al., The Guardian, 12/3/02: 1; Ben Roberts, Daily Mirror, 
9/9/02: 5) 
- 
another phrase aiming at reduction of the available 
legitimate options. 
The `potential marriage' also meant that Iraq and the WoT 
could not be ` divorced': 
There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass 
destruction [... ] In focusing on Iraq, we should not forget the wider war on 
terrorism. We will not be able to rest on our laurels if we are successful in 
Iraq. As many noble Lords have said, we cannot stress too strongly the 
fact that Iraq cannot be divorced from the threat of international terrorism. 
(Lord Inge [Crossbench], Hansard, 2002c: 949-50). 
Such connections (potential or otherwise), made war on Iraq a part of 
the WoT; not necessarily equating to the whole thing, but, according to 
George W. Bush, a part nevertheless: 
We're at war. Iraq is a part of the war on terror. It is not the war on terror; 
it is a theater in the war on terror. And it's essential we win this battle in 
the war on terror. By winning this battle, it will make other victories more 
certain in the war against the terrorists. 
(Bush, 2004a). 
Other contributions stressed that not only was Iraq part of the WoT, it 
was central to it. For example, according to US Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, Paul Wolfowitz: `The war on terror and disarming Saddam 
Hussein are not merely related; disarming Iraq is a crucial part of 
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winning the war on terror' (The Independent, 30/1/02: 19). What is 
important is that the issues are not separate but related, they are the 
same 
- 
one is a crucial part of the other. Later in the same article, 
Wolfowitz goes into some detail about the reasons for this 
- 
the 
`potential for catastrophe', something that `must' be avoided 
- 
the 
coming together of terrorists and WMD. 
Many contributions in favour of the invasion of Iraq, also 
stressed this centrality long after George W. Bush declared that `major 
combat operations' were over. Iraq has been variously described as 
`the front line in the war on terror' (Con Coughlin, The Sunday 
Telegraph, 24/8/03: 22), `the principal theatre of the global war 
against terrorism' (Editorial, The Daily Telegraph, 6/9/03: 27), `the 
central front in the war on terror' (Bush, 2004b) or the `crucible' in 
which the conflict with international terrorism is to be fought (Blair, 
2004c). Little attention was paid, by any of these contributors to the 
possibility that this might actually be a self-fulfilling consequence of 
the invasion. 
The question of the directness of the conflict's emergence 
played a very important role in the debate, and sometimes posed a 
problem for those advocating war on Iraq. The speed and eagerness of 
response was arguably something that was considered as relevant 
evidence for how reasonable and legitimate the conflict was. 
As early as October 2001, it was noticed, by some of those 
who would later oppose the invasion that the possibility of invading 
Iraq was creeping onto the agenda (Editorial, The Guardian, 10/10/01: 
23). In his up-close-and-personal study of the Bush administration 
after 9-11, Woodward (2002: 49) claims that Donald Rumsfeld 
(supported by Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz) raised the possibility 
that: `they could take advantage of the opportunity offered by the 
terrorist attacks to go after Saddam immediately' within a week of the 
attacks on the twin towers and Pentagon, and that Wolfowitz saw Iraq 
as more `doable' than Afghanistan (Woodward, 2002: 83). In his 
following book on Iraq, Woodward (2004: 178) claims that Tony Blair 
committed British troops on 7/9/02, despite Bush giving him several 
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chances to keep British troops out of the action, also claiming that war 
was on the agenda even before the Bush administration took office, 
and citing 21/11/01 as a key date in terms of the drafting of plans 
(whereas Kampfher, 2004: 230 claims it was April 2002). 
These types of `revelation' can be problematic for the 
legitimacy of invasion 
- 
implying an irrational eagerness. Such 
potential problems, related to eagerness, arguably influence the degree 
to which some of those arguing in favour sought to reduce or minimise 
any direct relationship between the WoT and Iraq. 
5.3. War on Iraq was Legitimate Because Not Simply Part 
of the JVoT 
In contrast to those contributions arguing that invading Iraq was 
directly part of the WoT, others argued that it was legitimate because it 
was not. In fact, it was precisely because it had a history independent 
of 9-11, that war was justified. 
As Gieryn (1999: 58) points out in his account of the boundary 
work involved in distinguishing science as a legitimate domain of 
cultural activity, the co-presence of apparently contradictory 
arguments is not necessarily a cause for criticism (although 2izek, 
2003 uses it as such). It is perhaps better understood as flexible 
discursive activity, occasioned in response to distinct rhetorical 
threats. 
Undoubtedly such positioning in this case was incited by the 
need to avoid war being observed as a knee-jerk reaction to 9-11: the 
rhetorical threat being the accusation that it represented a reflexive 
`lashing out'. This incitement produced, in part, claims such as that 
made by, Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean [Labour]: `[T]he issue 
of Iraq stands by itself: we would be debating it irrespective of what 
happened last year' (Hansard, 2002c: 871). 
The types of evidence drawn upon within such claims include 
events occurring before 9-11, asserting that Iraq was `on the agenda' 
long before. For example, in an interview as part of the BBC2 `s 
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Hotline to the President programme shown in early September 2002, 
in which Tony Blair famously agreed that Britain would be willing to 
pay a `blood price' (a reference to debates between Robert McNamara 
and Harold Wilson during Vietnam the war), Sir Christopher Meyer, 
the British Ambassador to Washington, claimed that when Blair and 
Bush met for the first time in February 2001 Iraq was the very first 
item on their agenda (Andy McSmith et al., The Daily Telegraph, 
619/02: 4; Paul Waugh, The Independent, 6/9/02: 6). 
The sense in which the issue is `not new' was emphasised 
elsewhere: 
Iraq has been a central theme of Bush policymaking from well before he 
took office [... ] 
[E]ven if September 11 had not happened, he would still be using this 
middle phase of his first term to confront his blood foe over weapons of 
mass destruction. 
(Roland Watson, The Times, 16/8/02: 20). 
Here Watson claims that the conflict has been `long in the making', 
and that the need for action is not simply a reaction to 9-11. Instead, in 
his evidence to the US Senate Armed Services Committee (9/7/03), 
Donald Rumsfeld claimed that it was the result of a change that 9-11 
made to the administration's perception of an already existing threat: 
The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new 
evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because 
we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our 
experience on September 11`h. On that day, we saw thousands of innocent 
men, women and children killed by terrorists, and that experience changed 
our appreciation of our vulnerability and the risks the U. S. faces from 
terrorist states and terrorist networks armed with powerful weapons. 
(Rumsfeld, 2003b). 
Rumsfeld stresses that Iraq was a longer term problem, and that 9-11 
caused a re-evaluation of American interpretations of its seriousness. 
Along with other contributions such as Paul Wolfowitz's admission 
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that WMD were not really central but were settled on as a public 
justification for `bureaucratic reasons' (in Tanenhaus, 2003: 145), it is 
also exactly the type of enunciation that has problematic implications 
for the legitimacy of the invasion, allowing those opponents of war to 
claim that the invasion of Iraq was not really anything to do with the 
previously stated reasons to do with Iraq itself. 
In his personal account of the UN inspections process, Hans 
Blix, for example, claimed that: `[I]t's clear that the U. S. 
determination to take on Iraq was not triggered by anything Iraq did, 
but by the wounds inflicted by al Qaeda' (Blix, 2004: 169), a version 
of events echoed in the Butler report (2004: 70) - that 9-11 had 
changed the `calculus of threat'. If the invasion of Iraq was not really 
about Iraq then, for opponents to war, its legitimacy is highly 
questionable. 
5.4. The War on Iraq was Illegitimate 
Despite the absence of neatness in anti-war arguments, relating to the 
relevance of the WoT, some of the ways in which they configured the 
relationship between WoT and Iraq are interesting, and some 
regularities are observable in the material I collected and analysed. 
One of the main arguments used against the invasion was that it 
would have negative consequences because it would be observed as a 
war on Islam. For example, former Labour cabinet member, Frank 
Dobson argued that: `Military action against Iraq will be a principal 
recruiting sergeant for terrorism, and al-Qaeda will be delighted if the 
United States and Britain go to war' (Hansard, 2003a: 311-2). 
Invasion of Iraq would cause problems for the WoT, actually 
increasing the problem of terrorism 
- 
acting as a `recruiting sergeant' 
- 
constituting a type of deviance amplification. This would be self- 
defeating in terms of making `victory' within the WoT more difficult, 
and making it more difficult to bring terrorists to justice (also see Scott 
Ritter, The Guardian, 19/10/01: 24; ISC, 2003: 34). Put more 
sarcastically after the invasion had taken place: `Sure, there might not 
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have been any terrorists in Iraq before, but they are now. Bush's claim 
about Iraq as a hotbed of terrorism has turned into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy' (Scheer, Scheer and Chaudry, 2003: 168). 
A similar contribution came from Liberal Democrat leader, 
Charles Kennedy on the eve of the war: 
Although I have never been persuaded of a causal link between the Iraq- 
regime, al-Qaeda and 11 September, I believe the impact of war in these 
circumstances is bound to weaken the international coalition against 
terrorism itself, and not least in the Muslim world. The big fear that many 
of us have is that the action will simply breed further generations of suicide 
bombers. 
(Hansard, 2003d: 786). 
Kennedy denies a link between 9-11 and the Iraqi regime, and notes 
the likely consequences of war in terms of terrorist recruitment. 
Moreover, he identifies another self-defeating consequence 
-a 
weakening of the `international coalition against terrorism'. The 
possibility that war would leading to fragmentation of the valorised 
`coalition', or waste worldwide sympathy, was a prominent feature of 
much anti-war argument (George Galloway, The Guardian, 20/11/01: 
Judy Dempsey, Financial Times, 30/11/01: 9; Richard Dawkins, The 
Guardian: G2,9/4/04: 9). 
Many arguments implied that focussing upon Iraq was a 





and should have remained separate. This `distraction' 
argument was constant throughout the account of former White House 
`terrorism czar' Richard Clarke (2004), but also made elsewhere: 
Al-Qaeda is the real foe, not Saddam [... ] 
There is nothing wrong with continuing to put massive pressure on 
Saddam and working with the United Nations to get weapons inspectors 
back into Iraq. 
But the greatest effort must be reserved for the greatest threat. And that 
comes from Al-Qaeda. 
(Editorial, Daily Mirror, 16/10/02: 6). 
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This statement about the primacy of the threat posed by al Qaeda, and 
the implication that Iraq is a distraction, is combined with a disclaimer 
- 
that the Mirror nevertheless does not want do nothing about Saddam 
Hussein. This implies a perception that within the prevalent climate, 
without such `clarification', an accusation that they wanted to do 
nothing about Saddam Hussein might be forthcoming. The 
significance of such protective measures will be pursued in greater 
detail in subsequent chapters. 
Another important set of arguments against invasion of Iraq 
made the accusation that the events of 9-11 were being used to 
legitimate a war conceived in advance. According to Keane (2003: 
39), forcibly removing Saddam Hussein was mentioned as a priority 
by Bush in a BBC interview in 1999, a year before he was elected. 
Relatively soon after 9-11, suspicions were expressed that a 
situation was being created in which invasion of Iraq would be a 
legitimate and logical next step 
-a `softening up process' (Jackie 
Ashley, The Guardian, 27/2/02: 20; also see Andrew Murray, The 
Guardian, 16/11/01: 21; Scott Ritter, Daily Mirror, 2/8/02: 4). 
Some observed the: 
unconcealed desire of the conservative Hawks, led in the Bush 
administration by Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to use 
the crisis as an opportunity to get rid of Saddam Hussein once and for all. 
(Rupert Cornwell, The Independent, 10/10/01: 6). 
Such alleged `opportunism' is likely to be denied by those accused of 
it, despite the claims made by Woodward (2002) that war with Iraq 
was discussed by prominent members of the Bush administration in 
the days immediately following 9-11. Such revelations are counted as 
evidence of it having been conceived well in advance, as are other 
claims made by former members of the administration. Former 
member of the US treasury, Paul O'Neill, who was fired in December 
2002, subsequently claimed that removing Saddam Hussein was 
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`Topic A' after Bush's inauguration and that discussions regarding an 
occupation of Iraq were underway in January and February of 2001, 
well in advance of the events of 9-11 (CBS, 2004; also see Woodward, 
2004: 9). He is supported by former White House `terrorism czar' 
Richard Clarke's assertions that Bush wanted to find (the) evidence 
that Iraq was responsible for 9-11, as distinct from wanting to find out 
if there were any such evidence (in Borger, 2004; also see Clarke, 
2004) 
- 
consistent with accusations about the operation of a `faith- 
based' intelligence attitude (Greg Thielmann [former US State 
Department weapons expert] in Singer, 2004: 100; also see Kampfner, 
2004: 347). 
Attempts to use a perceived longstanding eagerness to justify 
war against Iraq to undermine the case for war, is arguably reliant 
upon a morally asymmetrical distinction between reasons and excuses. 
This difference makes a big difference in terms of legitimacy 
- 
one 
responsive to events, the other preconceived and therefore less 
legitimate. 
5.5. War' as a Metaphor 
In viewing the phrase 'WoT' as a formulaic phrase 
- 
in which several 
words are fused tightly together producing a single unit 
-I have been 
primarily dealing with it not as a `war' on terrorism but as a `war on 
terrorism'. Nevertheless, in trying to understand the prevalent public 
understandings of the Iraq conflict's relationship to the WoT, it seems 
necessary to consider the significance of the metaphor `war'. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the appropriateness of the war 
metaphor is taken for granted by those with an affirmative orientation 
towards those activities subsumed under it. It tends to be brought into 
question only by those critical of the policies pursued under its 
umbrella. 
Journalist Jonathan Steele, problematised `war's' legitimacy 
whilst discussing some of its metaphorical properties: 
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[T]he `war' on terror should have remained what it initially was, a 
metaphor like the `war' on drugs. But instead of being harmless linguistic 
exaggeration to describe a broad campaign encompassing a range of 
political, economic and police countermeasures, it was narrowed down to 
real war and nothing else. 
(The Guardian, 22/11/03: 23). 
It is arguably naive of Steele to expect a political motif like `war on 
terror' to remain just a metaphor. The metaphor was always likely to 
`demand' something that looked like a war, with a clearly defined and 
locatable enemy. The alternative label, `campaign against terrorism' 
(see The Independent newspaper between October and November 
2001) never caught on as a sound-bite. This difference may have 
made a big difference in Bateson's (2000: 459) sense, possibly 
facilitating contentment with the political, economic and police-style 
countermeasures that Steele was hoping for. As differences go, it may 
have made more of a difference than that between a `War in Iraq' and 
a `War on Iraq' which was viewed as important by some (Kellner, 
2004: 149; Bodi, 2004: 244). However, the `campaign' motif was 
unable to frame the debate over the earlier action in Afghanistan, and 
had no presence in the debate preceding invasion of Iraq. 
It seems that in the available stock of foreign policy-related 
tropes, war is very much at the front of the shelf upon which they are 
stored, making it unlikely to lose its hegemonic position as a major 
tool of international `problem-solving'. 
Another issue identified by those resisting the drive towards 
war with Iraq, was the importance of the failure to locate Osama bin 
Laden: `With Osama bin Laden not caught, an alternative villain-in- 
chief is essential' (Editorial, The Independent, 28/8/02: 12). Since bin 
Laden could not be displayed as evidence of the success of WoT, a 
process of transference took place replacing him with Saddam 
Hussein. In contrast to bin Laden, Hussein could be located more 
easily since he was head of a state, not a rhizomatic organisation 
without definite location. 
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Others have criticised the notion of the WoT in more general 
terms, rendering suspicious its plasticity of application, and the 
question of what states have tried to `get away with' in its name. One 
such diagnostic example in a media context comes from Naomi Klein: 
The spectre of terrorism 
- 
real and exaggerated 
- 
has become a shield of 
impunity, protecting governments around the world from scrutiny for their 
human rights abuses [... ] 
The War on Terror was never really a war in the traditional sense. It is, 
instead, a kind of brand, a idea that can be easily franchised by any 
government in the market for an all-purpose opposition cleanser [... ] 
WoTTM can be used on any liberation or opposition movement [... ] 
As with all wars on terror, terrorism isn't really the target; it was the 
excuse to wage the real war: on people who dared to dissent. 
(The Guardian, 28/8/03: 25). 
In the British (and American) context, because of the need for some 
semblance of liberal democratic values, marginalisation of dissent 
takes a rather more subtle form than in some of the locations Klein 
might have in mind. In the chapters that follow I discuss some of the 
processes through which dissent was marginalised, including the 
problems contributors had to address in pursuit of legitimacy in the 
public debate preceding invasion of Iraq. The first of these concerns 
the accusation that those against the invasion were guilty of `anti- 
Americanism'. 
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6. The Spectre of Anti Americanism 
I am not suggesting incidentally that the Guardian is anti- 
American, but I do honestly believe people should think 
carefully. Some of the rhetoric that I hear used about America is 
actually more savage than some of the rhetoric you hear used 
about Saddam and the Iraqi regime. Now come on, let's get a 
sense of perspective here. America is our ally, America is a 
country we have been together with over the past 100 years, 
stood together with in important times. 
(Blair, 2003) 
The point is so obvious that it has to be mentioned: it is perfectly 
possible to profoundly disagree with something, indeed to 
believe that rap music or racial prejudice or any other `hateful' 
item should not exist or be tolerated, to genuinely loathe and 
detest it, and still be capable of peaceful co-existence in a world 
in which it exists. The glib way in which genuine political 
differences are consigned to hatred, and criticisms of American 
actions and policy become anti-Americanism or `un-American 
activities', is a recipe for ending debate, not for making sense of 
mutual differences. 
(Sardar and Davies, 2002: 55) 
Of the many morally-loaded accusations circulating in debate 
preceding invasion of Iraq, the accusation of `anti-Americanism' was 
one of the most recurrent, despite claims that it had experienced a 
'demise' as a method of undermining criticism of US foreign policy 
(sec Nilger, 2004: 24). 
Broadly, the accusation is that the influence of `anti- 
Americanism' renders problematic a contributor's position within the 
legitimate space available for the debate over invasion. To be anti- 
American, is to possess a stake 
- 
an irrational prejudice against 
America 
- 
that disqualifies contributions that the possessor might 
make. 
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6.1. Opposition to JVar is `Anti An: erican' 
A straightforward example of this process of accusation comes from 
the then proprietor of The Daily Telegraph, Lord Black who claimed 
that: `Underlying most complaints against American policy towards 
Iraq is simple anti-Americanism' (The Daily Telegraph, 14/2/03: 28). 
This description is clearly negative in intent, and such assertions seem 
to be aimed in two directions. Firstly, towards any present and future 
complaints against American policy 
- 
having already positioned their 
source as illegitimate 
- 
and secondly, to retrospectively undermine any 
arguments already made. 
The influence of anti-Americanism is commonly deemed 
worthy of contempt, and often packaged via extreme case formulations 
regarding apparently `absurd' positions that those affected by anti- 
Americanism take in contexts where orientations towards America are 
considered relevant. 
When it became clear that military action was imminent, Alice 
Thomson gcneralised that: `[T]hc question of whether to go to war 
with Iraq has been routinely addressed with an infantile anti-American 
rant' (The Daily Telegraph, 7/2/03: 27), a negative characterisation 
also related to a wider strategy of delegitimation via ascribing 
irrationality to those with whom the contributor disagrees. Whilst 
childhood is something that is celebrated in British culture, the 
description of adults as `infantile' is clearly a negative reference to 
irrationality, and therefore illegitimacy, as is the term ` rant'. 
Similarly, speaking in a parliamentary debate over the British 
Government's now infamous dossier on Iraq's WMD, Lord 
Strathclyde [Conservative] said: 
Perhaps I may also express my horror at the growing visceral anti- 
Americanism that we sec today [... ] there can be no moral equivalence 
between the United States of America and an Iraq led by Saddam Hussein 
(Ilansard, 2002c: 864). 
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As `visceral', anti-Americanism is a bodily phenomenon, rather than 
cognitive and rational, and Strathclyde also implies that his opponents 
illegitimately portray the USA and Iraq as of equal value. Another 
example raising the issue of moral equivalence, but including more 
layers of extremely negative description, comes from Andrew 
Sullivan: 
This is not to say that there are no good reasons to criticise American 
foreign policy [... J But the anti-Americanism I'm speaking of is not of this 
kind. lt's designed to demonise the United States, to portray it as almost 
morally equivalent to the Islamist terrorism it is trying to hold back. 
In fact, this anti-Americanism, which embraces the far left and elements of 
the far right, rarely proposes anything positive. And as it recites its 
mantras of contempt, and summons every American failing of the past 50 
years without ever crediting America's successes, it marinates in its own 
resentment. It teeters on the edge of anti-semitism. 
In its hatred of the United States it is close to finding excuses for the 
barbarity of Saddam Bussein, the cruelty of the Taliban or the malevolence 
of Al-Qaeda [... j 
Even now, America has gone painstakingly down a UN route to achieve its 
goals. These are the facts. But to the new cult of anti-Americanism, facts 
don't matter. 
(The Sunday Times, 19/1/03: 21). 
This alleged anti-Americanism is negative in many ways. It is close to 
anti-Semitism; it hates America, and finds excuses for terrorism, and 
'barbarity'. It 'marinates in its own resentment' and 'recites its 
mantras of contempt'. Perhaps the least violently negative accusation, 
but perhaps the most interesting, is that it is not open to 'the facts' 
which implies that this 'anti-Americanism' is closed to, and therefore 
lies outside the bounds of, reason. 
These contributions all articulate disrespect for, and attempt to 
undermine the legitimacy of, utterances allegedly emerging from anti- 
Anmcricanism's influence. The regular but relatively indirect 
circulation of similar accusations of anti-Americanism creates 
problems for those wishing to oppose war 
- 
their contributions were at 
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risk of being seen as anti-American and therefore illegitimate, and few 
are actively going to want to embrace such a characterisation. That 
said I am aware of a very small number of contributions directly 
affirming their own anti-Americanism. For example, author Margaret 
Drabblc, wrote the following shortly after the `war' was declared over 
by Gcorgc W. Bush: 
My anti-Americanism has become almost uncontrollable. It has possessed 
me. like a disease. It rises up in my throat like acid reflux, that fashionable 
American sickness. I now loathe the United States and what it has done to 
Iraq and the rest of the helpless world. I can hardly bear to see the faces of 
Bush and Rumsfcld, or to watch their posturing body language, or hear 
their self-satisfied and incoherent platitudes. 
(The Daily Telegraph, 8/5/03: 22). 
This is, however, extremely rare. From the contributions of most 
others opposing war, it seems that the widespread circulation of the 
relevance of anti-Americanism has implications for what they say and 
how they say it 
- 
leading to them engaging in particular forms of 
discursive work in an attempt to avoid it. The possibility of their 
contributions being marginalised as the product of anti-Americanism 
impinges upon them (acting upon their actions, and affecting the 
conduct of their conduct) requiring them to take steps to try and avoid 
such an attribution, indicating their recognition that anti-Americanism 
was part of the apparatus through which others could make sense of 
their arguments. 
6.2. Disclahning and Displaying Your Credentials 
Resistance to the applicability of anti-Americanism is often pursued 
via contributors disclaiming the influence of anti-Americanism upon 
their contributions, or attempting to provide evidence to the contrary. 
The most obvious approach is outright denial 
-a technique 
adopted by Baroness Turner of Camden [Labour]: `Those who feel as I 
do 
" and thcrc arc many of us - are often derided as being anti- 
American. We arc not' (llansard, 2002c: 1001). Alternatively, some 
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chose to try and protect particular arguments - asserting their 
autonomy from anti-Americanism. For example, the Liberal 
Democrat Defence Spokesman, Menzies Campbell, adopted this 
technique: `[I]t is neither anti-American to question the policies of the 
Bush Administration nor unpatriotic to question those of our own 
Government' (Hansard, 2002b: 43). Similarly, writing in the 
aftermath of war, Robin Cook claimed that: `To question the degree of 
Britain's complicity with a Bush administration is not to be anti- 
American' (The Guardian, 17/4/03: 26). Much more recently, and 
more generally, Mike Marqusse also claimed that: 
A disbelief in the prerogatives or the beneficence of the American empire 
is not anti-American. Nor is it anti-American to be alarmed by features of 
US political culture, an alarm shared by many millions of Americans. 
(The Guardian, 4/11/04: 25). 
These three contributions can all be viewed as attempts at 
problematising the relationship between specific positions and `anti- 
Americanism' 
- 
trying to undo existing or potential links regarding 
what would count as evidence for the influence of anti-Americanism. 
All three are examples of `ontological gerrymandering' aimed at 
rescuing activity such as the questioning of policy from being 
absorbed into those other unspecified activities likely to be described 
as anti-American. 
The notion of evidence is an important component in other 
techniques of disclaiming, which is far from surprising, since such 
`credentialing' was one of the major techniques identified by Hewitt 
and Stokes (1975). What are more interesting than the presence of the 
technique itself, are the particular types of evidence that are advanced 
as indicating the absence of anti-Americanism. 
One technique used is to point to a longstanding support for 
America, or its policies, a technique used by Chris Patten, a high- 
profile critic of the US' developing policy towards Iraq, who described 
himself as a `lifelong Atlanticist' (in Peter Riddell, The Times, 
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19/11/02: 16) and as an `Americaphile' (in Jonathan Freedland, The 
Guardian, 9/2/02: 8). However, there were no guarantees in relation 
to this, and as Jurgen Habermas points out, subsequent to 9-11: `Even 
those who hold an unquestionable record, as I do among my American 
friends, needed to be cautious with regard to criticism' (in Borradori, 
2003: 26, original emphasis). 
Often this involves pointing to a history of behaviour advanced 
as fitting a template of pro-Americanism with which a current position 
can be contrasted. The argument thus runs as follows: I have a history 
of support for America, but on this specific issue I am taking a 
different view, but this cannot be rendered illegitimate as emergent 
from a stake because of my more longstanding position. The 
contrastive use of evidence of a longstanding orientation could be 
usefully characterised as a reliant upon a `communicative career' -a 
public history of communications consistent with that other view. 
This contrastive approach was adopted by the late Lord Jenkins 
of Hillhead [Liberal Democrat]: `I have long been a natural pro- 
American [... ] I raise these issues not with a desire to be negative [... ] 
but because I believe that there is an urgent need for clarity on them' 
(Mansard, 2002c: 893-4). Similar stress upon longstanding pro- 
American credentials is present in other contributions: 
I am disturbed by the fact that I cannot support the American position on 
this matter. I have always attached huge importance to the relationship 
with the United States. I have long-standing and close relations with that 
country. I am bound to say, however, that I believe it to be wrong on this 
matter. 
(Douglass Hogg [Conservative], Hansard, 2003a: 317). 
The regret claimed regarding Hogg's disagreement with US policy, 
again is again a self-protection device, which also stresses that it is out 
of the ordinary 
-a violation of expectations, given his communicative 
career. 
A slightly curious example comes from Sir Peter Tapsell 
[Conservative]: 
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I have been a lifelong admirer and friend of the United States. I have often 
regretted that I was not born an American. I would love to have been a US 
federal Senator. If I had been, with my seniority, I would be chairman of 
the top committee there. I have been there innumerable times since, from 
Oxford, I debated there with 50 American Universities. I was in New 
York on the morning of 11 September last year, and I was there only a 
fortnight ago attending the Business Advisory Council of the United 
Nations of which I am a member. 
Clearly I am not remotely anti-American, but the fact is that America has 
grossly mishandled the Palestine problem for many years, and is beginning 
to drag Britain into a very dangerous situation. 
(Hansard, 2002d: 80). 
Tapsell claims that he wishes that he had been born an American, and 
also states his denial in more direct terms `Clearly I am not 
remotely... '. The forms of evidence he uses to indicate the absence of 
anti-Americanism include his having been there often for a variety of 
reasons. This, along with the fact that he was there on 114' September 
2001, is supposed to protect him from accusations of anti- 
Americanism when he later criticises the US. 
A similar structure is present in a contribution from Labour MP 
Tam Dalyell: 
I am not anti-American. I was a member of the executive of the British- 
American parliamentary group. I share at one remove four times over a 
grandmother with Harry S Truman, and I hope to attend the celebrations in 
Missouri in May to mark the anniversary of his birthday. 
(The Guardian, 27/3/03: 25). 
This does not seem to be far from the adapted cliche `some of my best 
friends are American'? In this case the evidence used is an indirect 
link via a family tree, and the desire to go to an anniversary (birthday) 
celebration, as well as membership of a pro-American organisation. 
Similar familial connections are mobilised by Lord Richard 
[Labour]: 
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One of my children is now an American citizen; my granddaughter is an 
American citizen; another of my children lives in Philadelphia; and for 
seven-and-a-half years I myself lived in that country. I hope that at least I 
have been able to establish the credentials. 
However, it is a fact that we now have in the United States probably the 
most right-wing Administration since the end of the Second World War. I 
think we have associated ourselves too closely with that Administration. 
(Hansard, 2003e: 162). 
As is commonly the case, the disclaiming involves use of a contrastive 
conjunction (`however') between the credentialing and criticism. 
Elsewhere, Lord Morgan [Labour] claimed that he could not be 
anti-American because: ` I taught American history in universities for 
30 years and greatly enjoyed it. ' (Hansard, 2003b: 331). It is unclear, 
however, whether or not his enjoyment of the subject is determinant or 
whether simply having taught it should be considered sufficient! 
6.3. Separating the Government and People 
A slightly different contribution comes from the academic Richard 
Dawkins, attempting to invert the presumed relationship between 
positions: 
Tony Blair's restless shifting of his justification for war undermines 
conviction, for standard `lady doth protest too much' reasons [... ] 
Those of us opposed to the war are sometimes accused of anti- 
Americanism. I am vigorously pro-American, which is one reason I am 
anti-Bush. They didn't elect him, and they deserve better. 
(The Independent, 1/3/03: 23). 
Here, a dislike for George W. Bush is affirmed, and claimed as 
reflecting a pro-American stance 
- 
contrary to the apparently assumed 
relationship in the discourse of anti-Americanism. The accusation of 
anti-Americanism is turned back upon those who normally wield it 
- 
if Dawkins is pro-American because anti-Bush, then those speaking in 
Bush's favour are the real anti-Americans. Unfortunately from 
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Dawkins' point of view this logic never really caught on! 
Nevertheless, the discursive separation between the people of America 
or the nation itself, and its government or policy, which is implicit in 
Dawkins' contribution, was very evident elsewhere, including a 
Guardian/ICM poll taken shortly before the 2004 US Presidential 
elections (Alan Travis, The Guardian, 15/10/04: 4). 
During the build-up to war, an Editorial in the Daily Mirror 
drew that very distinction: 
The Daily Mirror is not, as we've stressed many times, anti-American. 
That would be an absurd view of a great superpower which values the 
principles of democracy and freedom so highly. 
But we are increasingly anti-Bush. And with good reason. 
(Daily Mirror, 17/9/02: 6, original emphasis). 
This distinction was particularly evident in November 2003, in the 
war's aftermath, in the build-up to George W. Bush's controversial 
visit to the UK. For example, according to Paul Routledge: `Anti- 
Americanism is wrong, because it is futile and muddle-headed to bear 
ill will against an entire people. The focus of our hostility must be the 
American government' (Daily Mirror, 14/11/03: 6). 
It should be noted that this particular distinction, between the 
nation or its people, and its government or policy has become quite 
widely recognised as a technique utilised in the denial of anti- 
Americanism (Crockatt, 2003: 44), so there may be a degree of 
entropy relating to its successful use - similar to the way in which the 
fine distinctions drawn in the denial of other prejudices may be 
reflexively reduced in effectiveness over time. 
6.4. Reversal 
- 
Well You are `anti-French' 
Another less evident technique, which peaked in use immediately 
before the invasion was launched, is the reversal of the accusation that 
prejudice is involved. When the US and UK governments abolished 
their pursuit of a second UN resolution to justify the use of military 
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action, blaming French intransigence - the threat of an `unreasonable 
veto' 
- 
some critics claimed that this was scapegoating based upon 
anti-French prejudice, rendering the opposing accusations of anti- 
Americanism as themselves based upon a kind of unfairness: 
When rational argument fails, we find a scapegoat. Who better than the 
traditional enemy, the French? The language that has been used in the 
debate against the French verges on xenophobia. Yet any criticism of the 
Bush regime is pounced on as anti-American. 
(John McDonnell [Labour], Hansard, 2003d: 877). 
In this context, we also see the only example, other than that of 
Margaret Drabble (above) that I have encountered of someone 
affirming anti-Americanism: `I know I am being anti-American, but 
other Members have had a good bash at the French this evening, and I 
am going to have a go at the Americans' (Ronnie Campbell [Labour], 
Mansard, 2003d: 862). Those accusing the opposition to war of anti- 
Americanism are accused of hypocrisy since they are not averse to 
mobilising or relying upon prejudice in their own arguments. 
Unfairness, irrationality and illegitimacy are claimed to apply equally 
to them. 
6.5. Differentiating Oneself as Immune 
Many other contributors conceded that anti-Americanism was 
prevalent and influential, but denied that it applied to them and the 
majority of other dissenters: 
No one can deny that anti-Americanism has increased and is increasing 
- 
or that it ought to be diminished, and would be if the US followed different 
policies. But this is not the whole or the true picture. Mainstream opinion 
is perfectly capable of drawing a distinction between America and its 
leadership. Mainstream opinion can also handle both the visit of the head 
of state of a historic ally on the one hand, and the legitimacy of a peaceful 
protest against his policies on the other. 
(Editorial, The Guardian, 15/11/03: 25). 
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This claims membership of a majority constituency in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms ('mainstream'). It admits that anti- 
Americanism is present and claims that it is on the increase, and relies 
upon its presence elsewhere in order to distinguish itself as more 
reasonable. 
It would seem logical that such distinctions are drawn in order 
to avoid the possibility of guilt-by-association - there is a need to 
clarify that even though those making the distinction are on the same 
`side' as those more obviously guilt of anti-Americanism, they are not 
infected by the same apparently unreasonable and illegitimate 
perspective. If anti-Americanism is conceived as a disease, then they 
claim immunity to it. 
When they distance themselves from particular positions, those 
who are more willing (or able) to provide evidence disclaiming the 
influence of anti-Americanism are arguably also repositioning those to 
whom the label would stick more easily. The person who is `pro- 
American but anti-war' claims legitimacy partly at the expense of 
those who are `anti-American and anti-war', simultaneously 
contributing to the exclusionary power of the description even as they 
try to avoid it themselves. 
As well as overlapping with Hackett's (1993: 39) notion of a 
`hierarchy of dissent' (also see Hackett and Zhao, 1994: 525) by 
implying that some reasons for dissent are `better' than others, this 
also resonates with Smith's (1994: 204-16) distinction between the 
`good homosexual' and the `dangerous queer', drawn in the context of 
Section 28's passage in 1988. In Smith's account this is a distinction 
that is set up by a `dominant discourse' (Thatcherism), promising 
inclusion to one half of the distinction at expense of the other. In this 
context, the moral asymmetry seems to arise in part as a by-product of 
the strategies used by those people resisting the imposition of a 
`dominant' narrative, whose self-protection may serve to further 
marginalise people who are their context-specific allies 
- 
people upon 
whose existence they are reliant in attempting to generate their own 
claimed status as more legitimate. 
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This situation arguably illustrates the difficulty of finding a 
`way out' of the relevance of accusations of anti-Americanism once 
they are put into wide circulation 
- 
people formulate ways of `escape' 
which may tend to work at the expense of others, and help to sustain 
and reinforce the relevance of the accusation at the same time as they 
deny its applicability to them. 
6.6. Vagueness and the Absent Anti-American? 
Because of the nebulous way in which accusations and implications of 
anti-Americanism seem to circulate, one could be forgiven for viewing 
it as a ghostly presence 
-a spectre - haunting the debate, and 
intruding where it does not belong. Indeed, this is a metaphor utilised 
by Haseler (1986: 8). 
The nebulous character begs a question regarding whether 
individual people are the source of it, or the sites for its dispersal. It 
does tend to be the case that the term `anti-American' is used more as 
an adjective than as a noun 
- 
as it is in most of the examples here. 
Particular arguments made by those speaking against war, are 
potentially `anti-American', rather than it being specific individuals 
who are described as such. The figure of the clearly defined individual 
`anti-American' is almost absent from the debate. However, it is fair 
to assume that those least likely to achieve success in denying its 
influence upon them are likely to be people viewed as not having a 
communicative career fitting a template of pro-Americanism. It might 
be fairly easy to come up with a list of possible candidates using this 
logic, and one might speculate that George Galloway would fit the bill 
according to those who see value in utilising the description. Indeed, 
his name is recurrent when it comes to those people who are strongly 
associated with a package of other claims regarding illegitimate 
identities and characteristics, as will hopefully become clear in 
subsequent sections. 
The vagueness associated with the process of accusation 
actually exacerbates the difficulties faced by those potentially 
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described as anti-Americanism. If you can not be quite sure what will 
count as anti-Americanism, it is not really possible to formulate or 
implement fail-safe techniques for its avoidance. Hence things are 
rather messy, and success not guaranteed. 
Under the stark binary distinction apparently driving the so- 
called `war on terror(ism)' those who are at risk of being made sense 
of as anti-American are also at risk of being seen as pro-Saddam (the 
two often being reduced to one another) 
- 
you are with us or against 
us. It is to those accusations relating to a `pro-Saddam' orientation, 
and the modes of resistance adopted, that I now turn. 
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7. Pro-Saddam Apologists 
Why do those on the left feel that in order to oppose a war 
against Iraq it is necessary to rehabilitate Saddam Hussein? 
(Rod Liddle, The Guardian: G2,14/8/02: 5). 
[T]here is an almost wilful reluctance on the part of many anti- 
war people to engage with what kind of man Saddam is. 
(David Aaronovitch, The Independent, 30/8/02: 14). 
When you look back at the common sense and progressiveness 
of arguments against American intervention in Vietnam. Chile 
and the like, you can't help but be struck by the sheer befuddled 
babyishness of the pro-Saddam apologists. 
(Julie Burchill, The Guardian: Weekend, 1/2/03: 5). 
It is revealing that, where our parents during Vietnam were 
actually for something 
- 
`Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh! ', they chanted 
- 
we have no positive agenda. ('Sad-Sad-Sad-Dam! ' isn't terribly 
appealing. ) All of the proposals are negative. Stop the War. 
Don't Attack Iraq. Stop. Don't. No. When you ask the 
protesters for a positive agenda - their actual alternative solution 
for the people of Iraq 
- 
they mumble something about stopping 
nastiness. 
(Johann Had, The Independent: Review, 7/3/03: 4). 
As already noted, one theme preoccupying public and academic 
debates about Iraq's recent history has been the representation and 
evaluation of Saddam Hussein. Another implication of the `you are 
with us or against us' distinction is that it crudely polarises positions 
into for/against sides, not only in terms of a contributor's relationship 
to America, but also their relationship to Iraq and Saddam Hussein in 
particular. As such, those against war - the anti-Americans - are also 
`apologists' for Saddam: if not against Hussein, they must be for him. 
They are therefore at risk of being viewed as positively disposed 
towards Saddam Hussein, and beyond the legitimate boundaries of 
debate. 
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Accusations of this sort were particularly observable in the 
press coverage during the build up to invasion launched in 2003. 
Indeed, as can be seen from the four quotations above, even those 
ostensibly on the `left' in British politics appropriated this logic. 
Given the negative implications of being viewed as an 
`apologist', those arguing against war, were required to engage in 
another form of discursive work - disclaiming a positive orientation 
towards Saddam Hussein. Within the materials analysed, there are 
many examples of this practice, apparently aimed at creating or 
defending space for opposition to the war that will not automatically 
be categorised as `pro-Saddam'. As has previously been noted, such 
contributions can be viewed as ontological gerrymandering aimed at 
altering the order of discourse - making alterations regarding what is 
to be taken as evidence for a particular attribution. 
Before going on to look at some of the examples of people 
attempting to avoid being observed as apologists for Saddam Hussein, 
I will first give some examples of accusations made against 'pro- 
Saddam apologists'. 
7.1. `Pro-Saddam' Accusations 
Before the prospect of an invasion of Iraq became the centre of the 
British media's attention, Christopher Hitchens wrote the following 
about the war in Afghanistan: 
[Als a charter supporter of CND I can remember a time when the peace 
movement was not an auxiliary to dictators and aggressors in trouble. 
Looking at some of the mind-rotting tripe that comes my way from much 
of today's left, I get the impression that they go to bed saying: `what have I 
done for Saddam Hussein or good old Slobodan or the Taliban today? ' 
(The Guardian: G2,14/11/01: 5). 
Obviously, this is far from a positive assessment, but more 
importantly, Hitchens makes a quasi-nostalgic assertion which argues 
that, in contrast to the past, the contemporary peace movement, are 
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now auxiliaries (or in Lenin's terminology `useful idiots') of dictators. 
It is almost irrelevant whether or not the consequences of their actions 
are deliberate or accidental; they are still viewed as illegitimate. 
Hitchens is also careful to establish his credentials for 
legitimately pronouncing on this 
- 
he has no stake requiring criticism 
of the peace movement since he is a `charter supporter of CND'. 
Commenting on the world-wide anti-war marches and 
demonstrations in February 2003, Hitchens made similar accusations: 
the demonstrations I attended or witnessed in London, Washington, San 
Francisco and elsewhere were actually organized by people who do not 
think that Saddam Hussein is a bad guy at all. They were in fact organized 
by groups who either openly like Saddam, and Milosevic, and Mugabe, 
and Kim Jong-Il, or by those who think that Osama bin Laden represents a 
Muslim cry for help. 
(Hitchens, 2003: 10, original emphasis). 
More crude examples of accusation were available in newspaper 
coverage of the Fire Brigade's Union's industrial action prior to the 
war, with claims that their actions meant that Union Chiefs were 
'Saddam's Stooges' (The Sun, 14/11/02: 1; also see The Sunday Times, 
16/3/03: 2, for similar accusations by a Conservative MP). 
Another more subtle manifestation of such accusation, 
appropriating the for/against logic, comes from John Wilkinson 
[Conservative], speaking in the House of Commons: `Saddam Hussein 
knows that those who are not against him are for him' (Hansard, 
2003a: 308). Earlier in the same debate, George Foulkes [Labour Co- 
op] had made a similar comment about the implications of protesting 
against war: 
I saw the marches that some of my colleagues took part in. They were 
reported with joy and glee on Iraqi television and they gave great succour 
to the dictator. I saw no placards on those marches saying, `Saddam must 
goy 
(Hansard, 2003a: 292). 
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Giving `succour' to Saddam Hussein would seem unlikely to be 
considered an attractive option. Not only would this mean being in 
favour of him, it would also be having an effect that was advantageous 
to him. In making him feel better about himself, and less likely to 
comply with the UN inspections, it would also be increasing the 
likelihood of war. There is therefore a type of guilt-by-association 
effect underway which identifies particular actions as endowed with 
meaning and consequences which most people would wish to avoid, 
thereby creating an obstacle for those wanting to resist the drive to war 
in that their actions may be understood in disadvantageous ways. 
In some cases, their actions were indeed understood in such 
ways. For example, several months after the end of `main combat 
operations', journalist James Meek quoted a returning Iraqi exile 
Mazzin al-Khazragi talking about the pre-war protest marches: 
I was asked by somebody to go on an anti-war demonstration and I 
refused. I said that if the placards said `No to war, down with Saddam' I 
would go, but I never saw anything on those placards against Saddam. 
(The Guardian: G2,7/8/03: 4). 
Admittedly, this is only one example, and from a secondary source, 
but it implies that the anti-war campaigners, despite their sophisticated 
construction of a diverse coalition, made a public relations error in 
failing to stress clearly enough that they were both against the war and 
against Saddam Hussein. 
If you do not clarify your position, then this leaves open the 
possibility that it will be characterised for you by others. There is 
therefore a kind of demand circulating for contributors to display their 
position, or deny disadvantageous understandings thereof. 
7.2. Saddain Hussein is Evil, But... 
There are countless examples, in the materials analysed, of people 
speaking or writing against the war and negotiating the obstacle of 
147 
potentially being seen as `pro-Saddam', thereby indicating that they 
recognised the importance of avoiding it. For example: 
It is important to re-emphasise that those of us who are opposed to war in 
this House and across our nation are not friends of Saddam Hussein. We 
were against him when he invaded Iran, we opposed him when he invaded 
Kuwait and we spoke out against him when he used chemical weapons 
against his own people. Unfortunately, the UK and US Governments 
supported and armed him in the 1980s [... ] The American Administration 
is extremely well informed about Iraq's weaponry. As The Scotsman 
pointed out last Friday, Donald Rumsfeld probably still has the receipts. 
(Mohammad Sarwar [Labour], Hansard, 2003a: 341). 
Sarwar invokes a claimed consistency of position as evidence against 
him and those with his position being friends of Saddam Hussein, and 
alleges inconsistency on the part of those advocating war. Their 
position on Saddam Hussein is alleged to have changed considerably 
over time 
- 
their communicative career has involved more `careering 
about' than his. Although this emanates from an apparently defensive 
contribution it also amounts to a claim to high ground in terms of 
legitimacy 
- 
we (those against war) have been consistently against 
him, whereas you (those for war) have not. In addition, his 
disclaiming is something that has been said before ('re-emphasise'), 
implying that disclaiming once is insufficient. 
As the build-up to war intensified, journalist Don Mackay 
quoted Simon Weston, a widely admired Falklands war veteran 
regarding his position on the prospect of war: 
Make no mistake, I'm no friend of Saddam. He's an evil despot and has to 
be removed. But if the US, Britain and their allies do not remove him with 
lawful world authority then we are making a big mistake. 
(Daily Mirror, 22/1/03: 4). 
This quotation, assuming its accuracy, is an almost perfect example of 
a concession in Antaki and Wetherell's (1999) sense 
-a three part 
statement in which the second part pulls back from the first somewhat 
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- 
making a concession, before the third carries on with the theme of 
the first. In common with so many of the other contributions I have 
examined, it includes the use of a `but' in contrasting claimed and 
disclaimed orientations. Moreover, he is clearly drawing a distinction 
between morality and law, and implying that the legality or not of the 
war is more important than moral evaluation of Hussein. 
It is fair to say that Weston is the sort of person whose 
contributions were highly valued in the debate - as a former soldier his 
opposition to war can be portrayed as somewhat unexpected, serving 
to problematise simplistic understandings of the polarisations involved 
in establishing who is on which side. 
In pursuing an increased level of complexity, claiming the 
absence of an incompatibility between the two parts of a disclaimer is 
central. For example, from Liberal Democrat leader, Charles 
Kennedy: 
We all accept the world would be safer without Saddam's baleful 
dictatorship. But I see no contradiction between abhorrence of his 
leadership and the profound anxiety many in this country feel about the 
way in which the Americans 
- 
with Tony Blair's support 
- 
propose to 
launch an invasion. 
(The Observer, 26/1/03: 18). 
The most important part of the `ontological gerrymandering' here, the 
most strategically important thing that needs to be recognised as being 
the case, is that there is `no contradiction', no incompatibility between 
these two different observations or evaluations, i. e., you can oppose 
war on other grounds than the moral evaluation of Saddam Hussein, 
and it is not necessary to rehabilitate him. 
It is important to realise that the negative talk about Saddam 
Hussein in which those against war engaged as part of their 
disclaiming, put them in partial agreement with their opponents. 
However, while the badness of Saddam Hussein is a matter of almost 
universal consensus, the relevance of his badness is certainly not. It 
may be the complexity of this claimed irrelevance, with simultaneous 
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contempt for Saddam, is the major impediment to mutual 
understanding. The `contortions' required by those attempting to 
articulate such complexity can, to their opponents, seem disingenuous. 
In pursuit of a position of `safety' with respect to the accusation 
of being an apologist for or friend of Saddam Hussein, some 
contributors again made use of others apparently on the same `side' as 
them as a kind of contrastive foil, as they did on the issue of anti- 
Americanism. For example, in criticising the content of a television 
appearance made by Tony Blair, an Editorial in The Guardian 
newspaper observed that: 
To say that opponents of the war believed that `Saddam was a reasonably 
benign influence' is an unworthy insinuation [... ] There may be a small 
minority of people who opposed the war who are apologists for Saddam. 
Some of them may also think that we do not need to worry about terrorism. 
None of this, though, applies to the overwhelming majority of opponents 
of the Iraq war, and certainly does not apply in any way to this newspaper 
(The Guardian, 29/9/03: 19). 
It is the possibility of identifying some `small minority' of apologists 
that allows others to portray themselves as more reasonable in 
contrast. Arguably, it is difficult to see how making use of others, and 
amplifying their deviance and further marginalising them is more 
worthy than Blair's `insinuation' which is criticised, since it relies 
upon the application of similar morally asymmetrical distinctions, in 
this case a distinction between a legitimate and illegitimate basis for 
resisting a drive to war. 
It is interesting to note that the folding involved does not 
necessarily stop with the disclaiming of problematic identities. 
Although much more rare, there are various examples of people 
identifying disclaiming itself as illegitimate. For example, Liberal 
Democrat Peer, Lord Mackie of Benshie said: 
One cannot ignore history. People say, `I know he's a bad man, but-', but 
they must take account of that. Firmness might well have led Saddam to 
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accept the Saudi offer of shelter. I am afraid that the marches which took 
place world-wide and the attitudes of a number of politicians of vision 
have strengthened his resolve to hang on [... ] 
I do not want a war, but firm opposition to this evil man, situated in a very 
dangerous position, will do more to avert a war than anything else. 
(Hansard, 2003b: 348). 
This is similar to the reflexive logic of Lord Alli [Labour] about the 
denial of homophobia in the context of the proposed repeal of Section 
28: 
I say to my friends and colleagues that to begin a speech with kind words 
such as `I am not prejudiced', or, `I accept the rights of gay people but', or, 
`I will do anything to stop the bullying of gay young men and women', and 
then to oppose the repeal of section 28, cannot remove the responsibility 
for the legacy of hate. 
(Hansard, 2000: 425-6; also see Burridge, 2004). 
Disclaiming is itself implicitly portrayed as illegitimate in both of 
these contributions, and Lord Mackie's statement also appropriates the 
logic of some other more obviously pro-war arguments in arguing that 
the best course of action if you want to avoid war, is actually to act as 
if you want one! 
It is important to recognise that access to successful 
disclaiming is not equally distributed 
- 
there are different degrees of 
difficulty involved depending on a variety of factors, but particularly 
including the question of how your actions and communications have 
been previously understood, i. e., what I have already called a 
`communicative career'. In the context of Iraq, and on the question of 
attitudes to Saddam Hussein, there were particular individuals around 
whom accusations circulated consistently, despite repeated denials, or 
clarification, of their position. Below I discuss some of the difficulties 
encountered by two such individuals 
- 
George Galloway and Scott 
Ritter 
- 
and consider some of the reasons for the problems each faced. 
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7.3. George Galloway 
One of the people about whom the `pro-Saddam' accusation has most 
often been made is the former Labour MP George Galloway. 
Although he is not the only person affected by this process, in the 
discourse of those in favour of war, he quite closely approximates the 
`ideal type' (in Weber's sense) of the pro-Saddam apologist. He was 
eventually thrown out of the Labour Party over his position on the war, 
specifically over statements which were interpreted as suggesting that 
British soldiers should disobey their orders. 
Galloway has a very longstanding record (communicative 
career) of criticising the US/UK policy towards Iraq, particularly their 
approach to the UN sanctions regime, and has been so vocal as to have 
acquired the nickname `the honourable member for Baghdad Central' 
well in advance of the build-up to invasion in late 2002 and early 
2003. 
More than a year in advance of the military action, in a debate 
at Westminster Hall, there was a very high profile accusation made by 
Ben Bradshaw [Labour] about Galloway's relationship with Saddam 
Hussein. Bradshaw said: 
Some of the good points that he [Galloway] made on the middle east peace 
process would, I believe, carry more credibility if he had not made a career 
of being not just an apologist, but a mouthpiece, for the Iraqi regime over 
many years 
(Hansard, 2002a: 88WH). 
Galloway replied by calling him a `liar', which constitutes 
`unparliamentary language' in the UK Parliament, and both were 
subsequently made to publicly apologise for the exchange. 
In addition to the accusation Bradshaw made, and its reference 
to the issue of credibility, his contribution is particularly interesting 
because it draws another distinction 
- 
between an `apologist', which is 
obviously illegitimate, and a `mouthpiece', which is even worse. He 
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implies that Galloway does not simply apologise for Saddam Hussein, 
but actually speaks on Hussein's behalf. 
Galloway faced constant contempt from a variety of sources in 
the build-up to the war, particularly from The Sun newspaper which 
variously described him as `the voice of Saddam' (Trevor Kavanagh, 
The Sun, 27/2/03: 2), again implying that he spoke for Saddam 
Hussein directly, `treacherous' and a `slimy Saddam supporter' 
(Trevor Kavanagh, The Sun, 1/4/03: 9) as well as a `lickspittle lackey 
of dictators' (The Sun Says, The Sun, 1/4/03: 8). 
Commenting upon Galloway's second trip to Iraq in September 
2002, Stephen Pollard wrote that: 
his mission in life: to show us that Saddam is human [... J 
George Galloway stands in a long and dishonourable line of willing dupes. 
Similar fools have told us that Hitler had a lovely smile, Milosevic 
supported his local football team and Mengistu adored his children. So 
what? They were dangerous, evil men, however comforting the quality of 
their handshake. 
(The Times, 18/9/02: 20). 
More specific, and more sinister, allegations were forthcoming once 
the invasion was underway, based upon documents allegedly found in 
the looted office of Iraq's foreign minister by a reporter working for 
The Daily Telegraph (David Blair, 22/4/03: 1; 23/4/03: 1; 24/4/03: 1) 
which suggested that Galloway was receiving payments from Iraq and 
had been profiting from illegal oil sales in violation of the UN's oil- 
for-food programme. Galloway described the accusations as `black 
propaganda', and launched libel actions against the paper. He 
eventually received £150,000 in compensation after a successful libel 
action against the Telegraph in December 2004, and earlier received 
£50,000 damages from the Boston-based Christian Science Monitor 
after it made similar accusations (Jamie Wilson, The Guardian, 
20/3/04: 5). 
Galloway was also under a microscope when it emerged that 
his name was on a list, presented to a sub-committee of the US 
Congress, of individuals and organisations suspected of oil-related 
deals during the sanctions regime (David Rennie, The Daily 
Telegraph, 22/4/04: 4; Trevor Kavanagh, The Sun, 23/4/04: 9). 
Galloway's response to these accusations was as follows: 
I was not the only one on their list: one of the Pope's secretaries, the 
former French interior minister Charles Pasqua (the country's most 
astringent mainstream critics of the US), a string of top UN officials, 
Indonesia's president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Vladimir Putin, Russia's 
Communist party and the ANC 
-a kind of `axis of evil' of opponents of 
sanctions and the war 
- 
are all miraculously named in documents saved 
from the flames as swimming in oil at the expense of starving children. 
(The Guardian, 24/4/04: 22). 
The `convenience' of these allegations is utilised by Galloway to 
render them suspicious, and this `well they would say that about me' 
logic permeates much of his resistance to the way he has been 
understood. The other main technique was to point to his `anti- 
Saddam record' (Galloway, 2004: 47), and his history of campaigning 
against Saddam Hussein, and like other contributions, also attempting 
to invoke the inconsistency of his opponents: 
I was pleased to be able to say, while under attack as an apologist for 
Saddam Hussein, that I used to be outside the Iraqi embassy in London 
demonstrating for democracy and human rights while British businessmen 
and ministers were inside selling guns and gas. 
(Galloway, 2004: 39). 
Unfortunately for Galloway, there existed many apparent tensions 
between the types of evidence available for assessing his position. 
The often-repeated video footage of him in Saddam Hussein's 
presence in 1994, apparently saluting his `indefatigability', arguably 
undid any credibility he may have accrued for twenty odd years of 
campaign work. As with Tony Benn's arguably ill-advised interview 
with Hussein shortly before the invasion began, the availability within 
his communicative career of the appearance of him taking Saddam 
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Hussein seriously is unlikely to make him any more persuasive a 
contributor. It is arguably the case that, in some ways, he acted in 
such a way as to appear to be exactly who his opponents said he was, 
thereby confirming his illegitimacy in their eyes. 
7.4. Scott Ritter 
When Mr Ritter appears on television, he is now routinely asked 
whether he considers himself a traitor [... ] He has been 
described as `misguided', `disloyal', and as `an apologist for and 
defender of Saddam Hussein'. Some commentators have 
compared Mr Ritter's defiant defence of Iraq to the propaganda 
broadcasts for Japan famously made by American citizen Iva 
Ikuko Toguri during the Second World War. Mr Ritter himself 
prefers the example of Daniel Ellsberg, the defence department 
official who leaked Pentagon papers during the Vietnam War, in 
an attempt to discredit the military campaign. 
(Julian Coman, The Sunday Telegraph, 15/9/02: 29). 
The case of former UNSCOM weapons inspector Scott Ritter is 
slightly different, given that he has been widely observed as changing 
his position on Iraq and its alleged WMD. 
As a result of his opposition to the Bush administration's 
policies, Ritter experienced a `smear campaign', including allegations 
of child endangerment (David Teather, The Guardian, 24/1/03: 4), and 
also attracted accusations of treachery. In common with Galloway, he 
was accused of giving Iraq a `propaganda coup' when he spoke to the 
Iraqi parliament on the 8`h September 2002 (Michael Theodoulou, The 
Tinges, 9/9/02: 11). This was significantly different from the 
propaganda coup he had previously given the Iraqi regime when, as 
`the UN weapons inspector most detested by Baghdad' (Cockburn and 
Cockburn, 2002: xxvii), he was portrayed as the `ugly American' 
because of his confrontational style (Butler, 2000: 198). 
Ritter's situation illustrates the ambivalent status of the 
`convert' within controversy. To the group joined, the change is 
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welcome, and can be utilised as evidence of the persuasiveness of their 
case 
- 
someone's mind has been changed by their arguments (see 
Hofstadter, 1996: 35). The relative strength with which such an 
individual can be shown to have held their previous view can then be 
used to indicate how powerful those arguments are. In Ritter's case, 
his position on the 2003 invasion can be portrayed as a significant 
change, and because of his previously observed hawkish and 
confrontational position. 
When a `conversion' takes place and someone leaves one side 
in a controversy, charges of treachery are often made by the `side' 
losing their former `member'. Or, in less directly moral terms, the 
convert can be accused of inconsistency, or their motivation for 
changing position impugned. 
One way of attempting to resist such accusations of 
inconsistency is to deny that any radical change has actually taken 
place. Ritter himself often claimed that he had been consistent in his 
approach (David Rose, The Observer, 15/9/02: 19), and others have 
taken his side on this issue: 
Some in the media have portrayed Ritter, a tough-guy U. S. marine, as a 
crank 
- 
apparently because he `switched sides' and became an outspoken 
critic of the Bush propaganda campaign on Iraq. In fact, a close reading of 
his books shows Ritter's position had not flipped, but rather had evolved. 
(Scheer, Scheer and Chaudry, 2003: 75). 
On this account, Ritter is not a convert 
- 
that is too dramatic a 
description. His position has ` evolved', implying that it has not been a 
discontinuous process, but a relatively slow, `reasonable', `rational', 
one. 
Ritter also raises some other questions about the notion of 
speaking in `difficult' circumstances, where dissent may be 
unwelcome, and one way of thinking about this issue is Foucault's 
(2001: 11) discussion of the ancient Greek notions of `parrhesia', 




who speaks the truth'. This highly valued role consists of having the 
courage to say the things that a leader does not necessarily want to 
hear, and involves the speaker confronting a significant risk in 
speaking. The `truth' that is told has a strong moral quality, and a 
relationship to duty, derived from the risk involved and the courage 
therefore required. According to Foucault (2001: 15): `The fact that a 
speaker says something dangerous - different from what the majority 
believes 
- 
is a strong indication that he is a parrhesiastes' (also see 
O'Leary, 2002: 148). 
I do not contend that the label accurately describes Ritter, and 
Foucault (2001: 83) points out that the elitism involved in the notion 
of parrhesia precludes its existence in a democracy (which is how the 
UK and US are usually classified). It could be argued that 
democracies are at their least democratic in a war-related situation, so 
it may be that the notion of parrhesia is nevertheless relevant. 
Regardless, there is something about the way in which Ritter and 
others have described his contributions, which connects with the 
courageous heroism and sacrifice implied by the notion of parrhesia, 
as well as an appeal to freedom of speech (and therefore the US 
Constitution's First Amendment). 
Below are two quotations from a book in which he was 
involved: 
I feel that what I bring to the table is absolutely essential to this debate. 
That's why I speak out 
- 
to bring insights to bear which might not 
otherwise be heard. Rather than being a traitor, I think that my speaking 
out is the most patriotic thing I can do right now. The biggest service I can 
do for my country is to facilitate a wider debate and dialogue on the 
direction regarding Iraq [... ] 
My speaking out has everything to do with empowering democracy, and 
absolutely nothing to do with treason or betraying my country 
(Scott Ritter in Rivers Pitt, 2002: 70-1). 
Mr Ritter is a patriot, a man with an astounding record of service to his 
country. He is a card-carrying Republican who voted for Bush in the 2000 
election. Far more than any of the men who now push for the war on Iraq 
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in Washington D. C., Mr Ritter is a man who has seen the situation 
firsthand. 
(Rivers Pitt, 2002: 8). 
These extracts combine an appeal to courage and risk, with a stress 
also placed upon displaying patriotism. Moreover, there is an appeal 
to the unexpected 
- 
Ritter is a `card-carrying Republican' (also see 
- 
Scott Ritter, The Guardian, 7/10/02: 17). If such a person is against 
war, he must surely have good reasons. The discursive strategy 
implies that because he is going against what would be expected given 
his preceding communicative career, and because he is displaying 
courage by speaking despite attendant risks, his position now is to be 
taken more seriously. 
7.5. The Irrelevance of Morality? 
Throughout the build-up to the invasion of Iraq, and in the months 
since, the disclaiming of those against war with regard to a positive 
orientation towards Saddam Hussein has constituted a partial 
agreement with their opponents in terms of the moral evaluation of 
Saddam Hussein. Although there is a `but' following their own 
condemnation of him, they were still engaging in the debate on the 
grounds of morality 
- 
morality is made relevant even if only 
temporarily, until the `but' is said. 
Since the badness of Saddam Hussein was an important 
component in the justifications used as part of their opponent's 
arguments for war, there is a risk of those against war seeming to 
partially accept aspects of their opponents' case for it. However, their 
claims questioning the relevance of the moral evaluation of Saddam 
Hussein 
- 
their disputation that it should be central 
- 
creates the risk of 
their position being dismissed as overly complex sophistry. 
Although the relevance of Saddam Hussein's badness appears 
to be the location of the conflict, it is the attempt at breaking away 
from a widespread consensus about this that creates some of the 
problems faced by those against war 
- 
if you accept the badness of 
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Saddam then how can you be defending him? It must be that you are 
only saying so to avoid condemnation for it. Things come full circle 
when, because of this, people have to stress his evil even more 
strongly. 
The widespread negative description of Saddam Hussein is 
strongly related to another important theme within the whole debate 
- 
the alleged connections of the pre-war situation with World War Two, 
including the restatement of a theme from 1990-1 
- 
that the badness of 
Saddam Hussein was sufficient to make him `another Hitler'. 
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8. Appeasement and Historical Analogies 
There are glib and sometimes foolish comparisons with the 
1930s. I am not suggesting for a moment that anyone here is an 
appeaser or does not share our revulsion at the regime of 
Saddam. However, there is one relevant point of analogy. It is 
that, with history, we know what happened. We can look back 
and say, `There's the time; that was the moment; that's when we 
should have acted. ' However, the point is that it was not clear at 
the time 
- 
not at that moment. In fact, at that time, many people 
thought such a fear fanciful, or worse, that it was put forward in 
bad faith by warmongers. 
(Tony Blair, Hansard, 2003d: 767). 
Another prominent accusation directed at those arguing against war 
was that they wanted to engage in `appeasement', something which is 
clearly negative in our `moral vocabulary' (Walzer, 2000: 68), and 
connects to another recurrent theme in the public debate 
- 
the 
invocation of analogies with previous wars. 
Foster (1999: 25) notes how historical and cultural narratives 
from World War Two (henceforth WWII) in particular have often 
been appropriated in the telling of subsequent wars because: ` the past 
exists as an accomplished presence in public understanding'. My 
concern is not with evaluating the `accuracy' of the analogies drawn, 
but more with the connective possibilities they open up 
- 
what 
valuations and connections they make possible, as well as the 
particular problems created for some contributors. 
According to many arguments in favour of war, the Iraq `crisis' 
was to be understood as analogous to Europe in the 1930s 
- 
it was 
WWII again. As I noted in the review of literature, as in the 1991 
conflict, Saddam Hussein was cast as Adolf Hitler, and those arguing 
against war were equivalent to those advocating appeasement of 
Hitler's expansionist agenda. Rarely, Saddam Hussein was even 
implied to be worse than Hitler. In his biography of the former Iraqi 
President, Couglin (2002: 211) wrote of the Nazi's development of the 
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chemical nerve agent Tabun, also possessed and used by Iraq: 
`Although Tabun had been developed by the Nazis, Hitler himself had 
refrained from using it on the battlefield. Saddam, clearly, had no 
such qualms. ' In addition to this portrayal of Hussein as Hitler, Tony 
Blair and George W. Bush (controversially) were occasionally cast in 
the role of Churchill. 
Just as the cultural expansion of the Holocaust as an evil event 
has allowed its moral criteria to be applied in other less specific ways 
(Alexander, 2002), the same can be said for WWII and various 
concepts and personnel associated with it. Given contemporary 
understandings of the way that historical events unfolded, the 
persuasive force of the analogy is located in a series of asserted 
equivalences: Saddam = Hitler = evil; opponent of war = appeaser = 
wrong in the 1930s = wrong now (and, importantly, should know 
better). Such logic made it possible for supporters of war to claim 
that: 
the refusal of key European countries to stand up to the threat of Saddam 
Hussein in 2003 showed that it was still capable of failing the test that it 
flunked in 1936, when it should have threatened force. 
(Shawcross, 2004: 75). 
Not only has appeasement failed in the past, it is also argued to be 
systematically misguided and self-defeating (Kirkpatrick, 1984: 19-20) 
since it merely delays the inevitable, ultimately leading to a more 
difficult conflict as with Hitler (Record, 2002: 137,147). As Richard 
Perle, former Chairman of the US Defense Policy Board, put it in 
relation to Iraq: `A pre-emptive strike against Hitler at the time of 
Munich would have meant an immediate war, as opposed to the one 
that came later. Later was much worse' (The Daily Telegraph, 9/8/02: 
22). 
In fairness, it should be noted that a few arguments in favour of 
war discursively appropriating the 1930s nevertheless denied that this 
meant Hussein was Hitler and that those against war were appeasers 
- 
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for example, Pollack's (2002: xv-xvi, 423) impassioned but relatively 
thoughtful contribution 
In general, Hitler analogies are often contested both on the 
grounds of their validity, and the motivation for them having been 
made. The case against them is summed up by philosopher Peter 
Singer who asserts that the logic of many of the pro-war arguments 
was `remember Munich, not Vietnam', claiming that: 
the comparison between Hitler and Saddam Hussein in 2003 is misleading, 
in various ways. First, Hitler was the leader of a major world power; 
Saddam was not. (Iraq was much weaker in 2003 than it had been when it 
invaded Kuwait in 1991, for sanctions and forced disarmament had 
prevented it from replacing much of the military equipment it lost during 
the Gulf War, or modernizing its armed forces. ) Second, Hitler was on an 
expansionist path; since 1991, Saddam had been constrained to such an 
extent that he was unable to control even those areas of his own state in 
which Kurds had effectively established an autonomous region. Third, at 
Munich, Hitler made claims to part of the territory of an independent state, 
Czechoslovakia, which strenuously resisted those claims. Britain and 
France should have stood by Czechoslovakia, and, if Hitler had invaded it, 
declared war on Germany. That obviously, would have been in full 
compliance with international law. The situation in 1991, when Saddam 
invaded Kuwait, had certain parallels to Hitler's claims on Czechoslovakia, 
but by 2003 there was no parallel at all. 
(Singer, 2004: 19). 
Despite such denials, there are many examples of connections made 
between Iraq and the WWII in discourse through the build-up to war. 
One example, which is often not recognised as such, is the infamous 
phrase `the Axis of Evil' (originally axis of hatred in an earlier draft 
- 
see Frum, 2003: 238; Woodward, 2004: 86-7) deployed by George W. 
Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address 
-a phrase evoking the 
`axis powers' Germany, Italy and Japan (Woodward, 2004: 92), 
implying that a sinister relationship existed between the named 
countries 
- 
Iran, Iraq and North Korea. 
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In the public debate there were many other contributions 
appropriating aspects of history in various ways, as well as contesting 
such appropriations. There are also examples of analogies unable to 
attain the level of success of WWII. I will go on to briefly discuss two 
of these after dealing in greater detail with the question of 
appeasement and WWII. 
8.1. Accusations of Appeasement 
There are many examples of people invoking `appeasement' and 
accusing their opponents of pursuing it. As early as January 2002 it 
was claimed that: `The ghost of appeasement in the 1930s looms over 
the present confrontation with Saddam' (Editorial, The Sunday 
Telegraph, 22/1/02: 14). Asserting that a ghost `looms' is not the 
same as accusing people of engaging in appeasement, but if we 
assume that it should have `remained dead' then it is clear that its 
ghostly presence is not welcomed. 
Many of the accusations proceed in this rather nebulous 
manner 
- 
vague statements about appeasement's presence, without 
clarity about who is accused, or how appeasement is defined. 
Speaking directly in relation to the section of Tony Blair's eve 
of war speech reproduced at the start of this chapter, former leader of 
the Conservative Party, William Hague made use of such vagueness: 
`The Prime Minister said that analogies with the 30s can be taken too 
far, and of course they can, yet in some of the opposition to the 
Government's stance there is a hint of appeasement' (Hansard, 2003d: 
791). Hague starts by agreeing with Blair regarding the way in which 
analogies can be `taken too far', but then uses the contrastive 
conjunction `yet' to deviate from Blair's argument and claim the 
presence of a `hint' of appeasement. Again it is not specified who is 
`guilty' of engaging in it. 
An example of more direct accusation, although again not 
identifying particular individuals, which also invokes `appeasement', 
comes from Julian Lewis [Conservative]: 
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It must be said that many of the very same people who are arguing against 
action now were arguing against it then. Those who said, in advance of the 
action that was eventually taken against the Hitlerite regime, that no action 
was justified get a bad press, because they are now regarded as having no 
reasonable arguments. Let me assure you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that if we 
could revisit the debates that took place in this House in the 1930s, we 
would hear arguments for appeasement just as sophisticated as those put 
forward today. Those arguments were wrong then, and they are wrong 
now. It will be a grave mistake if people think that the cause of peace is 
served by always avoiding conflict. Sometimes the only way to bring 
peace is to face up to the need for conflict, and this is one of those 
occasions. 
(Hansard, 2003a: 333). 
Many arguments against war are portrayed as having been heard 
before 
- 
in the 1930s. Indeed, not only are the arguments the same, so 
too are the types of people making them. For Lewis, these people are 
unreasonable and their arguments wrong, since they are equivalent to 
those made against war with Hitler, the makers of which are now 
regarded as `having no reasonable arguments'. At the end of this 
extract, Lewis includes a rather Orwellian-sounding `to get peace we 
sometimes need to go to war' argument. 
Although direct reference to specific individuals as appeasers 
was relatively rare, there were examples observing the `types' of 
people likely to engage in it 
- 
`the very same' types implied but not 
named by Lewis: 
Appeasement is certainly in the air and has taken possession of a large 
number of British opinion makers 
- 
perhaps a third of the Labour Party, all 
the Anglican bishops and even some generals and diplomats. 
(John Keegan, The Daily Telegraph, 28/1/03: 20). 
Whilst I am not explicitly interested in furnishing definitions myself, it 
seems fair to consider the question of what counts as appeasement. By 
looking at the processes of accusation, its defining qualities are 
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unclear. As I have already stated, such accusations tend to proceed 
rather vaguely. Suffice to say, the analogy with the 1930s is used in 
an attempt to delegitimate the arguments made against war. 
There are contributions to the public debate describing specific 
activities as constituting appeasement, although many of these are 
fairly extreme. For example, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan 
region in Sulaymaniyah, Barham Salih wrote that: `Inspections are a 
form of appeasement' (The Observer, 16/3/03: 19). If we assume the 




Earlier on in the process, in his address to the United Nations 
General Assembly (12/9/02) George W. Bush actually challenged the 
UN to ensure that it did not suffer the same fate as its predecessor, the 
League of Nations: `We created the United Nations Security Council, 
so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more 
than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes' (Bush, 2002a). 
The importance of this challenge was taken up by those positively 
disposed to war against Iraq (for example, Trevor Kavanagh, The Sun, 
13/9/02: 9), and the perceived unwillingness of the UN to act strongly 
connected to the failure of League of Nations and a parallel with 
WWII and appeasement drawn yet again. 
Another example comes from the Reverend Ian Paisley 
[Democratic Unionist Party], who made the following claims: 
Diplomacy cannot stop a tyrant. We can try to buy off terrorists, but they 
will not be bought off. As Churchill said, if we appease them they will 
come back for more: it only feeds their appetite [... ] 
I am sad at heart that in Northern Ireland we have reaped the dark harvest 
of attempting to appease terrorism. 
(Hansard, 2003d: 861-2). 
Given his own place in the context of Northern Ireland, which he 
invokes, he has specific concerns regarding the issues of terrorism and 
diplomacy. The implication of the first sentence, is that all diplomacy 
constitutes appeasement when dealing with a `tyrant', and the extreme 
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`badness' of Saddam Hussein therefore means that diplomacy is 
automatically self-defeating. 
A more fruitful location to probe the forms of evidence taken to 
constitute a problematic identity (in this case the `appeaser', in favour 
of appeasement), may be via those contributions denying that the 
accusation applies to them. 
8.2. Problematisation and `Buts' 
A variety of disclaimers are utilised to resist accusations of 
`appeasement', and other interventions made aiming to influence its 
definition. For example, Michael Brown, tried to establish a 
distinction between `appeasement' and the `negotiation' involved in 
all diplomacy: 
Above all, negotiation is not appeasement. Appeasement involves a 
sacrifice of a moral principle in order to avert aggression. Negotiation 
requires some change of the status quo in order to make progress without 
giving up a point of basic principle. This is the very stuff of diplomacy 
and, throughout history, negotiation has been the only peaceful way of 
resolving serious differences between nations. 
(The independent, 7/8/02: 13). 
Rather than denying that the accusation applies to him, Brown denies 
that the phenomena called `appeasement' and `negotiation' are 
equivalent in general. He provides definitions emphasising the 
difference, which he takes to be whether or not `principle' is 
compromised. According to such a definition, the UN process should 
be observed as `negotiation' rather than `appeasement', as a long- 
standing routine practice rather than as sinister and illegitimate. 
Clearly if the distinction can be sustained this would be what 
Luhmann, after Bateson (2000: 459), would call `a difference that 
makes a difference'. 
In his examination of the historical significance of the policy of 
appeasement, Robbins (1997) discusses the way in which, during the 
1930s, appeasement was to be understood as distinct from pacifism, 
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and that explicit advocates of either position disliked being associated 
with one another. According to Robbins, appeasement was viewed as 
more overtly political, but as less based upon consistent and sustained 
principle 
- 
it was more a pragmatic response to a specific set of 
circumstances than a theoretically expounded `ideology' (Robbins, 
1997: 26). It may be that some of the antipathy that the alleged 
presence of appeasement attracts is based upon an understanding of 
appeasement that continues to assume this absence of principle. 
Although not made directly in contrast to pacifism, Brown's definition 
of appeasement is certainly consistent with its negative valuation as 
unprincipled. 
Other more straightforward denials state that the accusation of 
appeasement and the analogy with the 1930s is wrong in terms of its 
application rather than its definition. For example: `I am disappointed 
when the spectre of appeasement is raised [... ] The situations of Iraq 
in 2002 and Germany in the 1930s are totally different' (Richard Allan 
[Liberal Democrat], Hansard, 2002b: 134). The differences between 
the contexts, which unlike in Singer's earlier denial are not specified, 
are supposed to render the analogy inoperable. 
Another contribution problematising the applicability of 
appeasement, comes from Lord Morgan: 
As a historian, I worry about the crude use of history, particularly our old 
friend the 1930s. Time and again we hear that this crisis is the 1930s come 
again 
- 
what nonsense. Saddam is not another Hitler. Where is his Mein 
Kampe. Where is his dream of universal conquest? George Bush is 
certainly no Churchill; it would be a calumny on the reputation of that 
great man to suggest it. It is a facile argument, and it disturbs me that 
Downing Street produces it, all the more because I taught one or two of 
them. My efforts were clearly somewhat in vain. 
(Hansard, 2003b: 332). 
Not only is Saddam not another Hitler, but Lord Morgan also denies 
the validity of comparing George W. Bush to Churchill. He asserts his 
authority to speak on this by mentioning that he is a historian, which 
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supposedly qualifies him to adjudicate the validity of the appeasement 
analogy, which he characterises as `crude'. Based upon the 
incompatibilities Lord Morgan mentions we can assume that he 
believes that too many of the important elements from the source 
domain of the metaphor do not connect up with elements in its 
destination 
- 
if Saddam is not Hitler, and Bush is not Churchill, then 
the analogy does not fit successfully. 
Speaking in the final House of Commons debate before the 
British troops were deployed, Peter Kilfoyle [Labour] argued for 
another incompatibility, relating directly to the presence of the 
weapons inspectors: 
[T]he Prime Minister made much of events back in 1938. Of course, he 
said that he was not suggesting that anyone was an appeaser. The only 
person who I have ever appeased in my life is Mrs. Kilfoyle 
- 
not very 
successfully, I hasten to add. The thing that struck me, of course, was that 
I do not recall that the League of Nations had inspectors in Germany 
dismantling the panzers in 1938, as we have inspectors dismantling the 
weapons in Iraq today. 
(Hansard, 2003d: 780). 
Kilfoyle makes a `joke' about his unsuccessful appeasement of his 
wife, ironising the moral seriousness of the concept. He states that the 
presence of the UN weapons inspectors is the key difference, making 
reference to the 1930s and appeasement inappropriate. In a more 
directly dialogic context, Kilfoyle would be likely to face the counter- 
claim that the only reason inspectors were in Iraq, was the credible 
threat of force, but this does not necessarily undermine the status of 
Kilfoyle's argument as another way of problematising the analogy 
with the appeasement. 
Given their composition in terms of age, it was possible for 
many members of the House of Lords to draw upon personal 
experiences of WWII in formulating their arguments. Baroness 
Turner of Camden drew upon her experiences in arguing for the 
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inappropriateness of the 1930s appeasement analogy in successive 
parliamentary debates: 
Those of us who oppose war are often derided as appeasers 
- 
or else are 
told that we are anti-American. I know that there are many Americans 
who share our feelings against war. It takes some time for them to get 
organised and to make their views known. But they will do so and they are 
already being joined by a number of prominent United States citizens. 
As to the charge of appeasement, that makes me very angry. I am old 
enough to remember the Second World War. I know what it is like to 
huddle in an air-raid shelter and hear the scream of the bombs as they 
come down [... ] The generation who challenged Hitler's regime 
- 
and 
Saddam Hussein is no Hitler 
- 
knew very well what had to be faced. 
Today's armchair worriers face no such threat. They will watch the war on 
television while others pay the price. 
(Hansard, 2003b: 347). 
I do not believe that those in this country who are in favour of war fully 
understand the revulsion that many of us feel of the reasons for it. We are 
accused of supporting Saddam Hussein, or else of appeasement, as if a 
minor dictator of a broken, battered country that has been reduced to third- 
world level can somehow be compared with Hitler! Those who make such 
comments are too young to have experienced those days or else know no 
history. 
(Hansard, 2003e: 211). 
In both extracts, she strongly refuses the equation of Hussein with 
Hitler. The first denies outright their equation, and the second 
provides reasons for this 
- 
Saddam Hussein's minor status, and Iraq's 
reduction in terms of economic and technological development, due to 
the UN sanctions, distinguishing it from 1930s Germany. She 
accompanies this with a denial of anti-Americanism and the accusation 
that her position equates with being `pro-Saddam', issues which I have 
already discussed. She accuses those making the appeasement 
accusation of having deficiencies in historical knowledge 
- 
they are 
`too young' or `know no history', and she positions herself in the role 
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of primary source, bearing firsthand witness to assist her claims to 
validity. 
Some other contributions moved beyond denying the 
relevance, or applicability of the invocation of appeasement, and 
imputed illegitimate motives to that invocation 
- 
making sense of why 
the process of accusation occurred. Rowan Williams, now the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, claimed that talk of appeasement was 
`facile point-scoring' (Rowan Williams, The Daily Telegraph, 
5/11/02: 22), and Peter Hennessey wrote: 
[W]hen you want to do something and need instant justification with brand 
recognition, you invoke Munich. Eden also invoked Munich at Suez, he 
said Nasser was Mussolini. It's not good enough; it just doesn't work; it's 
not on. It's lazy thinking. 
(The Guardian, 29/8/02: 3). 
According to this, the metonymic significance of Munich with regard 
to appeasement has `brand recognition'. Interestingly, Hennessey also 
notes the way that it was used previously in the Suez crisis, and 
implies its use is generally illegitimate. Again we have the implication 
that it is based upon misunderstanding, or a `lazy' interpretation of 
history. 
Another contribution diagnosing the reasons for the Hitler 
analogy's application characterises its usage in a manner similar to the 
processes I am describing: 
[There is a] powerful reason why both London and Washington have had 
recourse to parallels between the present conflict and the second world 
war. Doing so has served to delegitimise dissent. Since appeasing Hitler 
in the 1930s proved futile and prolonged his aggression and genocide, the 
clear implication 
- 
which pro-war politicians and pundits have often made 
explicit in fact 
- 
is that now to criticise war against President Saddam, 
another monster, constitutes at best crass naivety, and at worse complicity 
in dictatorship, terror and slaughter. 
(Linda Colley, The Guardian: G2,7/4/03: 5). 
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Here, the delegitimating implications of accusing your opponents of 
`appeasement' are recognised, and the logic behind appeasement's 
negativity described - its `failure' in the past. The question that 
perhaps remains is: is it enough to identify or recognise such a process 
in order to undermine it? Is articulating what your opponent is `doing' 
with their argument - their attempts to position you - sufficient to 
undermine what they are doing? I would suspect not. This specific 
example is actually similar to my approach in that she is not assessing 
the truth or falsity of the analogy. However, since truth/falsity is one 
of the most recurrent ways in which public statements are observed, it 
would seem unlikely that an argument such as Colley's would have 
much persuasive effect upon her opponents because they would be 
likely to assert that the analogy was accurate or true - something 
which is not necessarily the point. If the debate tends to revolve 
around the truth/falsity of a given analogy, then inside the debate, 
recognition of what the analogy does would seem unlikely to result in 
a successful reorientation of the whole debate. 
8.3. Reversing the Accusation 
Another set of practices observable in resistance to accusations of 
appeasement involve going further than disclaiming or trying to 
undermine the analogy with the 1930s as illegitimate. Instead they 
assert the relevance of appeasement but as part of arguments against 
war. 
One example stands on its own by arguing that appeasement 
has actually been successful in the past: 
I am against appeasement in general, but I do not believe that invoking the 
examples of the 1930s is always helpful in the 21s` century. Sometimes, I 
remind noble Lords, appeasement has worked. We appeased the Soviet 
Union, for example, for 40 years between 1945 and 1990 and in the end we 
won the Cold War. 
(Lord Thomas of Swynnerton [Crossbench], Hansard, 2002e: 919). 
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This claims the relevance of appeasement, but attempts to 
problematise its negativity by identifying a significant context in 
which it was pursued successfully. 
This approach would seem a rather unlikely candidate for 
success because of the sense in which it is challenging a whole set of 
widespread associations in which appeasement is negatively valued by 
people on both sides of the debate. In the materials I have analysed I 
have not encountered any similar examples, whatsoever. 
A far more common approach making use of the relevance of 
appeasement was to accept its relevance, but to argue that is was not 
being applied to the correct people - reversing the direction of the 
accusation. It is claimed that that those commonly making the 
accusations are the ones engaged in appeasement. This is pursued in a 
variety of ways, and I discuss several specific examples below. It is 
noticeable that all these examples come from the three daily national 
newspapers consistently against the war. 
Commenting upon George Bush and Tony Blair's positions, 
and the invocation of `appeasement' Robert Fiske wrote that: 
Obsessed with their own demonisation of Saddam Hussein, both are now 
reminding us of the price of appeasement. Bush thinks he is the Churchill 
of America, refusing the appeasement of Saddam [... ] 
One of the principal nations which `did nothing about Hitler' was the US. 
(The Independent, 27/1/03: 5). 
Here the US's late entry into WWII due to its policy of neutrality 
before `Pearl Harbor' is mobilised in order to problematise parallels 
with WWII, and Fiske is arguably also skirting around accusing the 
US of `hypocrisy'. 
Other contributions accused the British government, or Tony 
Blair in particular, of engaging in appeasement with their orientations 
towards US policy: 
The distorting mirror of Munich and appeasement is held up with irritating 
regularity [... ] Jack Straw warns that Washington would abandon the UN 
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and NATO if Europe refuses to fall into line: `What I say to France and 
Germany and all my other EU colleagues is take care, because just as 
America helps to define and influence our politics, so what we do in 
Europe helps to define and influence American politics 
... 
And we will 
reap a whirlwind if we push the Americans into a unilateralist position in 
which they are the centre of this unipolar world. ' If that is not 
appeasement, I'd like to know what you call it. 
(Richard Dawkins, The Guardian, 6/3/03: 27). 
Dawkins notes the metonymic significance of Munich, and its place in 
accusations of appeasement, claiming that they are `irritating' 
distortions. He utilises a statement made by Jack Straw, regarding the 
relationship between Europe and the United States 
- 
that a certain non- 
confrontational approach should be adopted so that the EU does not 
`reap a whirlwind' of US unilateralism 
- 
and argues that this 
constitutes appeasement of the US. 
Another example comes from Seumas Milne: 
The split at the heart of Nato over George Bush's plans to invade Iraq has 
triggered an outpouring of charges of 1930s-style appeasement against 
those resisting the rush to war. [... ] Hitler analogies have long been the 
stock-in-trade of Anglo-American war propaganda 
- 
perhaps not 
surprisingly, since the second world war still retains near-universal 
legitimacy [... ] The parallel between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Nazi 
Germany is transparently ridiculous [... ] The idea that those opposed to 
US aggression against Iraq can be compared to the appeasers of the 1930s 
is simply risible. But if appeasement 
- 
unlike the form it took in the 1930s 
- 
is regarded as an attempt to pacify a powerful and potentially dangerous 
power, it sounds far more like the behaviour of Tony Blair's government 
towards the Bush administration. 
(The Guardian, 13/2/03: 22). 
Milne identifies one of the main issues which underpins talk about 
WWII 
- 
its `near-universal legitimacy' as a justified (`just') war that 
was necessary in order to defeat Nazism. He claims that arguments 
invoking Hitler have been regularly made when the US or Britain have 
been advocating war, but in stark contrast to the contribution from 
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Linda Colley in the previous section, he is clearly operating according 
to the truth/falsity of the analogy with the 1930s - it is `transparently 
ridiculous' and `simply risible'. Having argued that those against war 
are not guilty of appeasing a dictator equivalent to Hitler, he makes a 
contrastive move to define appeasement in such a way that Tony Blair 
is positioned as engaging in it vis-a-vis the Bush administration. Such 
an approach clearly relies upon a definition of appeasement as 
inappropriately compliant behaviour towards a more powerful person 
or institution with negative consequences, albeit used in a different 
direction than is often the case. 
Another contribution turning the notion of appeasement back 
upon Tony Blair comes from one of the war's most vocal critics, John 
Pilger: 
To call Blair a mere `poodle' is to allow him distance from the killing of 
innocent Iraqi men, women and children for which he will share 
responsibility. He is the embodiment of the most dangerous appeasement 
humanity has known since the I930s. 
(Daily Mirror, 29/1/03: 4; also see Pilger, 2004: 26). 
Pilger problematises the common `poodle' accusation 
- 
that Tony 
Blair was acting like George W. Bush's lapdog, with all the 
emasculating implications of the poodle as canine analogy 
- 
by 
claiming that it is too lenient a description, and allows Blair a greater 
degree of `distance' from the situation than he allegedly deserves. 
Pilger prefers to accuse Blair of appeasement, indeed, with 
characteristic shrillness, the `most dangerous appeasement humanity 
has known since the 1930s'. Again the 1930s are invoked, but the 
accusation is directed at those in favour of war on Iraq. 
Similar logic was at work after the Madrid bombings and 
Spanish elections in early 2004 as Matthew Parris objected to the 
accusations of appeasement directed at the Spanish electorate for their 
decision to elect an anti-war government: 
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Appeasement worries me: appeasement in the War on Terror. I am 
worried about political parties becoming associated with appeasement in 
the voters' minds. 
The appeasement I mean is not the cheap accusation with which our Prime 
Minister insults the Spanish electorate. I mean the appeasement of 
Washington. It is not too late for the British Tories, nor for the Right more 
widely across the Western world, to start distancing themselves from a 
doctrine that in Spain has just cost the most successful conservative party 
in Europe a general election. ' 
(The Times, 20/3/04: 26). 
Writing immediately after the publication of Tony Blair's dossier on 
`Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction', another longstanding critic of 
US foreign policy, Tariq Ali, advanced a similar, and yet significantly 
different characterisation of Britain and the US, again using the 
resonance of the Hitler analogy: 
The notion that Iraq represents a threat to Britain, let alone the US is 
reminiscent of German propaganda prior to the Second World War. 
Before he invaded a country, Hitler always insisted it posed a threat to the 
Third Reich. 
(Daily Mirror, 25/9/02: 6). 
Rather than being cast in the role of appeaser, Blair is himself 
associated with Hitler 
- 
engaging in practices `reminiscent of 
`German propaganda'. This arguably goes one step further than the 
others, and does not rely directly upon the appeasement part of the 
analogy with the 1930s. Nevertheless, the significance of using an 
understanding of particular aspects of WWII is clear. 
Most of these examples sustain or reaffirm the negativity of 
appeasement (or other aspects of WWII), by making use of some of its 
connotations in order to reflexively refold or reverse the process of 
accusation. As such, they can be argued to be contributing to the 
relevance of `appeasement' as a technique for understanding 
orientations to war in the future, and therefore arguably assisting those 
likely to make the accusation at them in future contexts. Such 
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reversals do little to undermine the general utility of accusations of 
`appeasement' for marginalising opposition to war (in general), since 
the illegitimacy of appeasement is left intact; indeed reversal is reliant 
upon that illegitimacy for its efficacy. 
The possibility of such reversal lies in the lack of directional 
specificity in terms of appeasement's meaning. If the direct link made 
between appeasement and Hitler can be broken, then anyone can be an 
appeaser or be appeased (including George W. Bush and even Mrs 
Kilfoyle). However, things are not quite this simple. In the section on 
anti-Americanism, which would seem to be more directionally 
specific, I also provided examples of people engaging in reversal. As 
with almost everything about this event, neatness and clarity remain 
rather elusive, and what counts as what and where is contested. 
8.4. The Suez Crisis (1956) 
One historical analogy drawn directly as a distinction from the WWII, 
which was unable to gain WWII's hegemonic status, is the `Suez 
crisis' resulting from Britain's response to Egypt's nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal in July 1956 (see Varble, 2003 for a summary). 
In the Parliamentary debate immediately preceding 
commencement of military action, Peter Pike [Labour] invoked Suez 
to inculcate wariness about the risks of war: `Suez shows that some 
conflicts do not yield the aims that we set out with. That is why I am 
worried about the present situation' (Hansard, 2003d: 890). The Suez 
crisis is held up as an example of war having negative unintended 
consequences, to bring into view the unknown consequences of the 
Iraq conflict to encourage a greater degree of caution. 
During the earlier action against Afghanistan, other aspects of 
Suez were invoked and used to make sense of the events and 
consequences of that situation: `History may not be repetitious, but 
Suez offers some winding parallels [... ] Many applauded the platitude 
that Nasser was Hitler returned from the grave 
- 
and that appeasing 
dictators never worked' (Hywel Williams, The Guardian, 18/10/01: 
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24). Williams went on to claim that the strongest parallels lay in the 
alleged divisions within the cabinet over what should be done and the 
looming possibility of the PM's replacement 
- 
with Gordon Brown 
playing Harold MacMillan (Anthony Eden's replacement as Prime 
Minister) to Blair's Eden. 
Far in advance of the beginning of military action in Iraq, Lord 
Thomson of Monifieth [Liberal Democrat] made the following 
statement: 
There is always a danger that decent men draw the wrong lessons from 
their own historic experiences. In 1956, at the time of Suez, Anthony Eden 
equated Nasser with Hitler. He was rescued from a foolish war only by the 
government of the United States. Today, sadly, the leaders of both 
America and Britain appear to be falling into the same historic fallacy over 
Saddam Hussein. 
Hussein, for all his horrors [... J is no Hitler. 
(Hansard, 2003b: 267). 
The implication is that the Hitler analogy has been applied in the past 
- 
at the time of Suez 
- 
with negative results. Nasser was `equated' 
with Hitler leading to `foolish' consequences. As such, the UK and 
US should be careful about falling into this `historic fallacy' in relation 
to Saddam Hussein. 
This is very similar to Robbins' (1997: 4) understanding of the 
episode 
- 
primarily as one in which the spectre of Hitler was invoked 
leading to much `anti-appeasement rhetoric' in pursuit of justification 
for military action against Nasser (also see Pearson, 2003: 29,57). 
If the Iraq war had been understood more widely as analogous 
to this interpretation of the Suez crisis, emphasis would have been 
placed upon very different elements in the conflict. Instead of Saddam 
being Hitler, Blair would have been Eden, claiming that Saddam 
Hussein (as Nasser) was Hitler for what have been understood to be 
illegal and misguided ends (even William Rees-Mogg, who was at the 
time a junior assistant speechwriter to Anthony Eden, admits that the 
whole policy on Suez was based upon a lie regarding the existence of a 
177 
secret treaty between Britain, France and Israel - see The Times, 
2/2/04: 16), and this would have been expected to result in Blair losing 
office. The different resonance of the Suez crisis as a dominant frame 
would have fostered a different set of expected risks and 
consequences, and required a different balance of forces to justify the 
war. 
Post-conflict, if that can be accepted as an accurate description 
of the situation at the time of writing, Suez has been mobilised to 
retrospectively criticise the action taken. Robin Cook, a prominent 
critic of the war has repeatedly described the Iraq war as proving to be 
the `greatest blunder in British foreign and security policy since Suez' 
(The Independent, 4/2/04: 16; also see The Guardian, 12/11/04: 30). 
A rather vitriolic and more personal connection has been made by 
George Galloway: 
I consider Tony Blair to be a blood-soaked criminal, who at the bar of 
history will be utterly condemned. Few people know what political 
achievements Anthony Eden, prime minister at the time of the invasion of 
Suez, had to his name. That's the point. The only thing Eden is 
remembered for is the criminal blunder of invading Egypt. 
(Galloway, 2004: 102). 
The details of how Tony Blair's role in the justification and 
prosecution of the invasion of Iraq will be understood are yet to be 
established. Nevertheless, the possibility that his legacy will be 
`ruined' by it, also proposed by Short (2004: 211), would probably be 
unappealing to him, although very appealing to Galloway. 
Regardless, the negative connotations of the Suez crisis, 
although in circulation, were unable to achieve the hegemonic place of 
those associated with WWII. Had they done so, things may have 
turned out very differently. 
8.5. The Vietnam War (1961-75) 
A highly resonant historical analogy has been drawn between the 
recent military action and aspects of the Vietnam conflict. The 
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potential relevance of `Vietnam' as a way of understanding war was 
also present in the military action to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan 
late in 2001. In an article negatively portraying the action, Air Vice 
Marshal Tony Mason, who served in the US Air Force during Vietnam 
wrote of `ominous parallels' between the conflicts under the heading 
`Could This Be Another Vietnam? ' (Daily Mail, 20/3/02: 12; also see 
Daily Mirror, 1/11/01: 1). 
Whilst less regularly invoked in advance of the invasion of 
Iraq, it has increased in usage as the violent resistance of the 
coalition's occupation has continued. For example, the venture 
capitalist, George Soros, who unsuccessfully dedicated himself to 
campaigning against George W. Bush's re-election, alleged parallels 
in terms of Iraq being a `quagmire': 
We find ourselves in a quagmire that is in some ways reminiscent of 
Vietnam. Having invaded Iraq, we cannot extricate ourselves. Domestic 
pressure to withdraw is likely to build, as in the Vietnam war, but 
withdrawing would inflict irreparable damage on our standing in the world. 
In this respect, Iraq is worse than Vietnam because of our dependence on 
Middle East oil. 
(The Guardian, 26/1/04: 18). 
Soros claimed that the situation in Iraq was actually worse than 
Vietnam 
- 
and we can assume that that makes it very bad indeed since 
the Vietnam conflict is widely regarded as a generally `bad' war 
(certainly it is viewed as much less legitimate than WWII). The 
resonance of `quagmire' as the most common metaphor through which 
Vietnam is understood and undermined (Kendrick, 1994: 135; Scheer, 
Scheer and Chaudry, 2003: 128; Rowe, 1991: 121), is certainly similar 
to the usage made of analogies with Vietnam in the context of 
Afghanistan in 2001. The resonance of quagmire, with its 
implications relating to inertia and being `stuck' would seem likely to 
gain greater credence the longer the violent resistance to the 
coalition's occupation continues. 
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Daniel Ellsberg, the `whistleblower' who leaked the Pentagon 
Papers during Vietnam, drew parallels between Iraq in early 2004 and 
the unwillingness of Vietnamese civilians to warn American troops 
during the conflict there: 
There could not be a more exact parallel between this situation and Iraq. 
Our troops in Iraq keep walking into attacks in the course of patrols 
apparently designed to provide `security' for civilians who, mysteriously, 
do not appear the slightest bit inclined to warn us of these attacks. This 
situation 
- 
as in Vietnam 
- 
is a harbinger of endless bloodletting. I believe 
American and British soldiers will be dying, and killing, in that country as 
long as they remain there. 
As more and more US and British families lose loved ones in Iraq 
- 
killed 
while ostensibly protecting a population that does not appear to want them 
there 
- 
they will begin to ask: `How did we get into this mess, and why are 
we still in it? ' And the answers they find will be disturbingly similar to 
those the American public found for Vietnam 
I served three US Presidents 
- 
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon 
- 
who lied 
repeatedly and blatantly about our reasons for entering Vietnam, and the 
risks in our staying there. For the past year, I have found myself in the 
horrifying position of watching history repeat itself. 
(The Guardian, 27/1/04: 25). 
Ellsberg claims that the guerrilla form of the continuing violence in 
Iraq, and the reasons for invasion, are similar to Vietnam, although he 
does not state in what ways he believes this to be so. Nevertheless, he 
portrays the Iraq situation as history repeating itself 
- 
stronger than 
Soros's `reminiscence'. A few months later, Edward Kennedy was 
quoted as saying that Iraq was turning into `Bush's Vietnam' (Rupert 
Cornwell, The Independent, 7/4/04: 5), thereby personalising it too. 
I have already mentioned that the Vietnam conflict tends to be 
considered a `bad' war, and this generalisation needs a little 
explanation. It is obviously the case that its resonance is different for 
Britain and the USA, leading to a focus on different aspects of that 
conflict. Had Tony Blair not allowed the use of British troops in Iraq, 
rather than `being' Anthony Eden as in the Suez analogy, would he 
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have been Harold Wilson, denying direct British assistance to Lyndon 
Johnson? 
In American culture Vietnam is not necessarily viewed with 
consensus as a bad war, but it certainly has several dimensions that are 
difficult to reconcile with the nation's narratives of self-understanding. 
As mentioned in my literature review, this problematic status is often 
referred to as `Vietnam syndrome' (Rampton and Stauber, 2003: 182; 
Martin, 1993: 53; Mariscal, 1991: 97) 
-a phenomenon thought to 
have organised many of the cultural representations made of the war 
both in the rhetoric of politicians, and more popular cultural artefacts 
such as books and film. 
In their detailed comparison of the contexts of Vietnam and the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, Record and Terrill conclude that it is in terms 
of the aftermath and possible political consequences 
- 
the difficulty of 
sustaining support `at home' 
- 
that there are the closest parallels. 
Moreover, they identify another way in which WWII provided the 
expectations for how events would progress, claiming that those in 
favour of war preferred the analogy with the replacement of Nazi 
Germany and Imperial Japan with what are now flourishing 
democracies (Record and Terrill, 2004: 1), and that their expectations 
were such that: 
In Iraq, the U. S. leadership did not seem to expect protracted irregular 
warfare beyond the termination of major combat operations. As liberator 
of all Iraqis from a brutal tyranny, U. S. forces, it was widely believed, 
would be as welcomed in Iraq as had been Anglo-American and Free 
French forces in France in 1944. 
(Record and Terrill, 2004: 23). 
As I have already noted, the Vietnam War tends to be acknowledged 
as a traumatic moment for the US, leading to a `national identity crisis' 
(Hackett and Zhao, 1994: 535; Hackett, 1993) threatening America's 
`master narrative of war', and incited the First Gulf War as an act of 
national redemption (Hackett, 1993: 51). 
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In an article also approximating this argument, Kendrick (1994: 
130-1) identifies the public importance of war on Iraq `not being 
another Vietnam', using metaphors such as `haunting' and `phantom' 
to describe the ways in which Vietnam causes difficulties and requires 
continual exorcism `through a ritual of comparison and denial' 
(Kendrick, 1994: 137). Even Record and Terrill's (2004) scholarly 
interrogation of the Vietnam analogy in 2003 is tied up with such a 
discourse of comparison and denial, and indicates the need to 
interrogate and compare events to Vietnam, and the extent to which, 
despite the allegedly successful exorcism in 1991, Vietnam still 
governs aspects of America's discourse of military intervention. A 
single exorcism, it seems, is insufficient. 
8.6. Conclusion 
The issue of exorcism in the context of Vietnam may be directly 
related to the significance of the appeasement analogy in Britain 
- 
the 
apparently shared negative valuation of appeasement representing part 
of a similarly necessary ritual of comparison and denial of failed 
British policy in the 1930s. 
In characteristic sweeping style, Baudrillard (1994: 116) claims 
that: `The metastases of all that resurfaces as history goes back over its 
own tracks in a compulsive desire for rehabilitation. ' Perhaps the 
interrogation and denial of appeasement represents a generalised 
pursuit of such rehabilitation 
-a need for national redemption, a 
`never again' imperative similar to that associated with Vietnam in the 
Us. 
In addition to this possibility, it is important to recognise a 
more strategic dimension to the invocation of history more generally, 
including the fact that: `there is no history that is not motivated by the 
present' (O'Leary, 2002: 82 original emphasis). As Misztal (2003b: 
13) puts it: `By mediating and paring the past and the present, as well 
as providing analogies to events of the present in past events, 
collective memory is strategic in character and capable of influencing 
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the present. ' The apparent need for redemption, the need to never 
appease again, is harnessed to create discursive obstacles for those 
opposed to war. If the need for redemption persists, and if the 
problematisations of the accusation of appeasement largely continue to 
reinforce the importance of not engaging in it or reinvigorating it via 
reversal, it would seem unlikely that appeasement will be reduced in 
its significance as a technique for causing such difficulty for those 
opposed to future potential wars. 
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9. The Ambivalence of Pacifism 
Pacifism [... ] cannot be a majority faith because religion is not 
only an adjustment to the human condition but an expression of 
the political unit. There are certain limiting conditions pertaining 
to the political unit with respect to the use of force which make 
the attitudes of the pacifist sect or the monastic order politically 
impossible. 
(Martin, 1965: 203). 
9.1. Pacifism as Illegitimate 
Another explanation advanced for opposition to military action 
was the influence of pacifism. This was particularly advanced as 
an explanation for the reticence of members of the Labour Party: 
`The Parliamentary Labour Party is composed of its fair share of 
former card-carrying members of CND, and pacifism remains 
fundamental to many of them' (Simon Heffer, Daily Mail, 5/2/03: 
12). 
Here connections are made with the Cold War and its legacy 
via reference to CND. Arguably there is disrespect at work in 
terms of the `card-carrying' nature of their membership, but this is 
rather muted, and does not violate the widely articulated yet 
ambivalent respect that pacifism receives. 
Perhaps the most extreme example of disrespect applied to 
pacifism comes from someone who was actually also against war. 
Lilek (2003: 50) described it `intellectually stupid' for its refusal 
to `stand firm against a threat', and accused it of hypocrisy (Ziiek, 
2003: 27) for ignoring the fact that inspection work was possible 
only because of the threat of force. Nevertheless, such contempt 
was relatively rare, and a particular ambivalence results from the 
fact that `principle', as something supposedly scarce nowadays, 
tends to be positively valued. Whilst the influence of pacifism 
may be something that disqualifies potential contributions to 
debate, in the build-up to war it did not seem to attract such 
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systematic moral contempt as the other identifications discussed 
thus far, since the principle upon which it is based makes a 
generalised negative evaluation itself problematic. 
The following contribution articulates respect for pacifists, 
simultaneously taking a swipe at those who have allegedly less 
respectable reasons for opposing war: 
Where these voices [of dissent] have belonged to pacifists, they have my 
respect, but most often they have belonged to the purely selfish, the 
pathologically timid, or to those who somehow believed that however bad 
things were in country X, the Americans were always worse. 
(David Aaronovitch, The Observer, 2/2/03: 27). 
Timidity, selfishness and anti-Americanism are all portrayed as 
illegitimate when understood in proximity with pacifism, which is 
more legitimate. Aaronovitch is also positioning himself as 
someone who is respectful towards principle by attempting to 
avoid the accusation that he is not. 
A fortnight later on the same page as Aaronovitch's regular 
piece, Andrew Rawnsley attempted to deal with the complexity 
regarding who was on which side in the controversy, including 
reference to the `customary' practice of expressing respect for 
pacifism, a position from which he distanced himself 
Public opinion is fluid and split. Even that slice of the people represented 
by the marchers is confused and divided. Some of those who marched are 
opposed to any war with anyone at anytime. It is customary for a 
columnist to say at this point that naturally one has the most profound 
respect for the principles of pacifists. Actually, I'm not sure that I do 
entirely. War is always a wicked business, but there are occasions where 
it is a less wicked business than the alternative. Had everyone in America 
and Europe in 1945 declared for pacifism, we would now be subsumed 
into the Soviet bloc, which might be welcome to some revolutionary 
communists (Marxist-Leninist) but I am not sure to most of those in Hyde 
Park Some of those who marched are against anything done by the 
United States and/or Britain at any time. Some of the marchers - and for 
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this group I have great respect 
- 
genuinely detest Saddam, but they aren't 
convinced by the balance of risk and life, they aren't persuaded that 
military action is a more effective or civilised option than containment or 
deterrence. 
(The Observer, 16/2/03: 29, emphasis added). 
There is much going on here in terms of the positioning of self and 
others. The fragment contains some very rich discursive work 
related to many of this thesis' other chapters. There is recognition 
of the heterogeneity of those opposing war. Reference is made to 
those who are `unreasonable' in the sense of being closed to the 
possibility of being persuaded to support war. The formulaic 
nature of expressions of respect for pacifism is identified, and 
disclaimed. Rawnsley then engages in a practice similar to those 
advocating war by arguing that war is bad, but is sometimes `less 
wicked' than the alternative, invoking WWII. He then invokes 
1945, associates a minority of the dissenters with revolutionary 
communism, and uses this in a `guilt-by-association' manner with 
regard to the other more `reasonable' people who marched. He 
then goes on to claim that some protesters are against whatever 
America and Britain do, all at the same time expressing respect for 
those who are `genuinely' anti-Saddam but not yet convinced. 
According to some contributions, the conviction that is held by 
pacifists is in one sense okay, but is also something that should 
have been called radically into question by the events of 9-11. For 
example, in his book, written whilst spending thirty days 
shadowing the Prime Minister in the build-up to war, Peter 
Stothard quotes Tony Blair: 
`It's all very well being a pacifist, ' the Prime Minister says suddenly, still 
with his back to his team. `But to be a pacifist after September 11, that's 
something different. It's all new now: terrible threat, terrorist weapons, 
terrorist states. That is what people here have to understand. ' 
(Stothard, 2003: 7). 
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According to this, being a pacifist might have been reasonable in 
the past, but (since 9-11) it is no longer tenable, and reflects a lack 
of understanding, and refusal to be persuaded by evidence, of the 
alleged uniqueness of the circumstances with which the world is 
now faced. The stressing of the specificity of this particular case is 
something also present in some of the arguments of those in favour 
of invasion, which are to be dealt with in the following chapter. 
Despite the `customary' practice of expressing respect for 
pacifism, the arguments of those in favour of war, often 
nevertheless involved locating pacifism outside the legitimate 
parameters of debate in a manner similar to that of Blair. One of 
the most straightforward examples of this comes from the Member 
of the House of Lords and writer for The Times newspaper, 
William Rees-Mogg: `A small minority take the isolationist, or 
pacifist, view: no war in any circumstances. They are outside the 
mainstream of the debate' (The Times, 21/10/02: 18). 
The implication that those who are influenced by pacifism are 
tainted with something not belonging, and are therefore 
disqualified, is also present elsewhere. In the week immediately 
before the coalition's attack was launched, Richard Haas of the US 
State Department was quoted as saying: 
Germany has marginalised itself. It's made itself a less important country. 
It has few relevant capabilities and even less will. If Germany wants to be 
purely pacifist, that is its choice. But then it's not a player. 
(in Stephen Fidler, Financial Times, 10/3/03: 9). 
Here, although Germany's `choice' is portrayed as legitimate 
('that is its choice'), it is also implied that someone making such a 
choice cannot subsequently expect to have a voice in contexts such 
as this. Embracing pacifism is a kind of active self- 
marginalisation that makes the one doing the embracing `less 
important' and `not a player'. As such pacifism's illegitimacy is 
more accurately described as technical rather than as moral 
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(although still portrayed as `unreasonable' in the sense of being 
closed to persuasion). It is both deserving of respect yet also 
illegitimate as a position from which to contribute to debate on this 
matter (a disqualification). 
Having their arguments associated with pacifism, which is 
outside the parameters of legitimate debate, those against war find 
themselves faced with a need to engage in discursive work in order 
to try and distance themselves from it. Indeed, Blix's (2004: 171) 
account contains a denial of pacifism as an explanation for him 
wanting more time for UNMOVIC to carry out its inspections 
regime. 
Below are three examples of other discursive work denying the 
influence of pacifism, one drawn from the editorial of each of the 
British daily newspapers which consistently opposed the military 
action: 
The Mirror is not a pacifist newspaper. We reluctantly support military 
action where there is no alternative 
But we prefer peace to war. And we do not believe this war is justified. 
(Voice of the Daily Mirror, Daily Mirror, 28/1/03: 6, original emphasis). 
War cannot and should not always be avoided. Here is no argument for a 
blanket pacifism; this newspaper supported the Kosovo intervention and 
the 1991 Gulf conflict. But war must be a means of last resort, when all 
else fails. That moment has not yet come. It may never do so 
(Editorial, The Guardian, 30/1/03: 23). 
[W]e remain to be convinced. 
That is not because we are opposed to the use of force to uphold 
international law. We supported the war in Kosovo, conducted by a US- 
led coalition but not endorsed by the UN, because it averted imminent 
genocide and the negative consequences were limited. We supported the 
war against the Taliban in Afghanistan because that regime harboured 
people who posed a pressing threat to citizens of the West. 
(Editorial, The Independent, 7/2/03: 16). 
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In the first of these examples, we are again dealing with a process 
of distancing 
-a type of triangulation. The Mirror distances itself 
both from the case for war, and from what are to be taken as less 
legitimate reasons for opposition to it. It therefore utilises the 
logic of the foil and the hierarchy of dissent, which I have already 
mentioned. It also denies pacifism by emphasising that there are 
circumstances in which it would support military action ('where 
there is no alternative'), but also contrasting such circumstances 
with those facing it at that time. The other two examples both cite 
relatively recent situations 
- 
both referencing Kosovo 
- 
in which 
they have supported military action as evidence to `disprove' any 
accusations of pacifism, with The Independent providing its 





claimed to be significantly different from these other contexts, so 
as to justify the significant difference in terms of their stance: they 
are differences which make a difference. 
Similar discursive work was in evidence in a parliamentary 
context. Speaking on the day of publication of the government's 
infamous `dossier' on Iraq's Weapons of Mass destruction (UK 
Government, 2002) David Heath said: 
[Slome portray those with doubts about military action as either wishing to 
support the Iraqi regime or being involved in a pacifism that does not take 
account of circumstances. I think a great deal of respect is owed to those 
who have deeply held pacifist views, but many, myself included, do not 
have such views, and are quite prepared to see British militaryforces used 
in the right circumstances. We would argue, however, that these are not 
the right circumstances. 
Another caricature is the suggestion that those opposed to military action 
are engaging in a crude anti-Americanism. I reject that caricature, but I 
reject equally the caricature suggesting that the Prime Minister is engaging 
in this process simply because he wishes to curry favour with the 
Administration in the White House. 
(Hansard, 2002b: 106, emphasis added). 
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Heath professes respect for pacifism, while distancing himself 
from it. He claims that he is prepared to support military action in 
some (hypothetical) circumstances, but claims that the context in 
question is different to those circumstances. As such, it is similar 
to the strategy used by the Daily Mirror above. After dealing with 
pacifism he follows with a familiar disclaimer regarding anti- 
Americanism. Interestingly, this does not involve claiming that 
`there are some who are anti-American, but I am not one of them', 
instead amounting to an outright denial of the `caricature' on 
behalf of all opposing war. 
In the corresponding debate in the Lords, the Lord Bishop of 
Oxford, Richard Harries similarly said: 
I hope that your Lordships will forgive me if I stress that not only am I not 
a pacifist but I am a long-standing opponent of the crypto pacifism which 
has infiltrated too many Church statements [... ] I found that with much 
moral fear and spiritual trembling I supported a policy of nuclear 
deterrence in the bad days of the Cold War. I supported military action in 
the Falklands, against Iraq in 1990 and in Afghanistan last year. I believe 
that we should have intervened much earlier than we did in the aftermath 
of the break up of Yugoslavia. I took such positions because I believed 
that the conditions for force to be used in a morally licit way were met. I 
do not believe that on present evidence the criteria are met for military 
action against Iraq. 
(Hansard, 2002c: 898, emphasis added). 
Harries also stresses that he is not a pacifist, supporting this with a 
claim about a `long-standing' opposition to pacifism. He claims a 
history of behaving in a particular way and examination of his 
communicative career would provide evidence that he was not 
opposed to war in the abstract. Since Harries arguably has a 
reputation as someone to whom journalists turn to get a `Bishop 
Supports War' headline, this would be unlikely to be denied by 
others. Harries also gives examples of situations when, despite 
`moral fear and spiritual trembling', he supported war. The 




they are not `met' on the present evidence. This also leaves 
open the possibility that the evidence could change, and that he 
could be persuaded, thereby confirming him as open to persuasion 
and therefore `reasonable'. 
One issue deemed of some importance is the question of 
consistency, and here we are again in the realms of the 
communicative career. Whilst many of those against war were 
denying the influence of pacifism, one of the ways that those in 
favour of war tried to contain the dissent was to claim that only 
pacifists could oppose it. For example: 
You can oppose the ultimate use of force in this very special case if you 
are a true pacifist. But do not call on foreign troops to be used to stop 
genocides in Rwanda, or ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, or to promote 
democracy elsewhere if you are not willing to have them used to deal with 
this genocidal, ethnic-cleansing, power-hungry dictator. Otherwise you are 
a hypocrite. 
(Bill Emmott, The Guardian, 25/11/02: 18). 
Specific objections to this particular war are portrayed as 
hypocritical, and therefore problematic in terms of their 
legitimacy, largely due to a comparative moral evaluation made of 
the situation in Iraq (as genocide). This logic 
-a demand for 
consistency 
-- 
has an institutional corollary in that evidence of a 
systematic pacifistic stance is required for a member of the US 
military to become a conscientiously objector. It is not considered 
sufficient to object to a particular war, more long-standing 
evidence or evidence of a radical conversion is required, 
something which was problematic in the high-profile cases of both 
Mohsin Khan and Vic Williams in the recent conflict (see Natasha 
Walter, The Guardian: Weekend, 12/6/04: 41). 
9.2. A `Tech itical' Disqualification? 
The dynamics around pacifism, whilst in many ways similar to 
other issues such as anti-Americanism in terms of the strategies 
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and evidence used to resist such accusations, are also rather 
different. It is rare for pacifism to attract the same vitriolic level of 
condemnation that some other categorisations attract. For 
example, the previous chapter noted that it tends to be viewed 
positively explicitly in contrast to appeasement. 
In his treatment of pacifism from within the sociology of 
religion, as well as detailing its religious roots, and its relationship 
to the Labour Party, Martin (1965: 133) points out that pacifism is 
`politically impotent'. As the Martin quotation at the start of the 
chapter points out it does not really fit within the general 
boundaries (limits) of the political system 
- 
it is disqualified as 
systematically `unrealistic'. 
Martin (1965: 187-8) also claims that pacifism is rather 
`evanescent', and similar assessments appear to have operated in 
the debate preceding invasion of Iraq, with pacifism viewed as a 
quantitatively and qualitatively marginal orientation (also see 
Narveson, 1999: 120). It is not observed as constituting a `threat' 
as great as anti-Americanism 
- 
it is less virulent; less likely to 
spread widely 
-a perpetual minority. 
Nevertheless, although not condemned as strongly, those 
arguing against war often deny pacifism since its influence would 
compromise the legitimacy of their contribution, amounting to an 
admission that they were incapable of being persuaded that 
violence and war are ever acceptable. As with other strategies of 
resistance, those denying its influence are reaffirming the place of 
pacifism as lying `outside' the boundaries of legitimate debate in 
deliberations over the waging of war, and therefore, in a sense, 
making use of pacifists as a buffer for their own legitimacy. 
Of course, it is important to recognise that part of the reason for 
pacifism being a disqualification is that the whole debate became a 
polarised for/against war discussion rather than a `what should be 
done' one. The discursive context was framed by a discourse of 
military intervention similar to that identified by Richardson 
(2004) in relation to the earlier Operation Desert Fox in 1998, with 
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the military being allocated a position as a privileged solution to 
the problems of the `war on terror(ism)' (Kellner, 2002: 155). 
Complete non-violence was excluded in advance 
- 
pacifists were 
therefore without `category entitlement' (Potter, 1996: 15) in the 
context. 
The significance of the accusation and denial of pacifism is 
therefore directly connected to the extent to which the whole 
situation was taking place in a discursive space organised by the 
central metaphor of `war', indeed the formulaic phrase `war on 
terrorism' with an accompanying for/against distinction with other 
radically different proposals for how to proceed almost completely 
excluded. In connection with this recognition it might be possible 
to suggest that, as a disqualifying attribution, pacifism is more 
contextually specific than `anti-Americanism' and some of the 
others. Anti-Americanism, for example, is less limited in its 
degree of transportability to other contexts, since it could be much 
more easily deemed of relevance in other contexts outside those of 
war or violence. 
So far I have focussed upon problems faced by anti-war 
contributors, but I now turn to one of the major obstacles 
potentially faced by those advocating war 
- 
what could be 
considered the opposite accusation to that of pacifism 
- 
the 




There is not an inexorable decision to go to war. There is an 
inexorable decision to disarm Saddam Hussein. How that 
happens is up to Saddam. 
(Blair, 2003). 
My Lords, I speak not only for myself, as does every noble Lord 
in this Chamber, but on behalf of the Green Movement world- 
wide [... ] 
We believe that the invasion of Iraq is illegal, and we are quite 
sure it is immoral. We believe that going to war is an action of 
last resort, and we were under the impression that that view was 
shared by all men and women of goodwill. 
It is quite clear that the invasion of Iraq is not a last resort, and 
the world as a whole is aware of that. Indeed, for the Americans, 
it was high on the list of resorts. 
(Lord Beaumont of Whitley [Green], Hansard, 2003e: 169). 
As we have seen elsewhere, the logic of the positioning involved on 
the question of war on Iraq was governed by a for/against distinction, a 
distinction which I have been reproducing, albeit in a manner 
acknowledging differences amongst those occupying each position. 
Thus far, I have concentrated upon the problems faced, and 
evasive manoeuvres engaged in, by those speaking against war. 
Although there are obviously asymmetries of power and other 
resources with regard to the two `sides', those in favour of war are also 
involved in denying potentially relevant disqualifying attributions. 
There are also ways in which they were required to avoid a range of 
illegitimate descriptions in attempts to pursue moral force for their 
own arguments. They do not somehow get a free ride. 
The most obviously relevant accusation requiring their evasive 
action is their potential description as `warmongers', since a 
warmonger's positive disposition towards war (if not eagerness for it), 
calls their position on a specific case into disrepute as merely another 
example of that wider pattern. 
As might be expected, there are many examples of people 
disclaiming any identification of them as a `warmonger', and they go 
about this in various ways. For example, by denying it directly, by 
pointing to a dislike of war, or by claiming the existence of a wider 
consensus 
- 
that no-one is in favour of war. Examples of each of these 
are discussed in detail below. First, however, it will be helpful to look 
at a few examples of people engaging in direct and indirect accusation 
about `warmongers'. 
10.1. Examples of Accusation 
Before passage of UNSCR 1441, when the possibility of a return of 
weapons inspectors to Iraq was on the agenda, Tariq Aziz, then Iraq's 
Deputy Prime Minister, spoke about the possibility of opening a 
dialogue: 
We are ready to put all the facts on the table and reach a conclusion 
- 
but if 
the warmongers are using this matter as a pretext in order to attack Iraq, to 
wage an unacceptable war against Iraq, that's something else. 
(in Richard Beeston, The Times, 4/9/02: 4). 
Although he does not specify the ` warmongers' he has in mind, the US 
and UK governments were probably the intended targets of the name- 
calling since they were the states most closely associated with a drive 
towards war. Aziz's contribution also contains one half of a 
distinction that was of some import in the build-up to war. 
This is the distinction between a pretext, which is illegitimate 
(Bamford, 2004), implying that a decision had already been made and 
all that was required was an excuse, and a casus belli 
-a more valid 
reason, something discovered rather than created 
- 
which makes 
military action necessary. This distinction, particularly in terms of the 
difference regarding the order in which a reason and a course of action 
come, goes right to the heart of the question of legitimacy. 
According to Record and Terrill (2004: 52) the distinction 
between a `war of necessity' and a `war of choice', which is obviously 
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closely associated with this reason/excuse distinction is also highly 
consequential for the degree of public tolerance to casualties. 
Assessing the question of whether the action taken was necessary, 
. 
Singer (2004: 167) echoes Lord Beaumont's quotation from the start 
of the chapter by stating emphatically that the invasion was not one of 
necessity: `This was very far from being a war of last resort. ' The 
extent to which this assessment is shared by others may well affect the 
way in which the ongoing violence and coalition casualties are 
perceived, and the war understood in the longer term. 
While there may be a significant degree of moral asymmetry to 
these distinctions, this does not automatically make them line up 
neatly with for/against orientations. For example, Salam Pax, the Iraqi 
citizen achieving a degree of fame by producing the `Baghdad Blog', a 
weblog of his experiences of the invasion. He was in favour of regime 
change, but viewed the build-up as relying upon excuses rather than 
reasons (Pax, 2003: 119). As someone living under Saddam 
Hussein's rule, it is relatively easy to see why he might be nevertheless 
unconcerned with the moral textures of the process of justification. 
Returning to the question of warmongering, the Daily Mirror, 
which was consistent in its opposition to war was particularly vitriolic 
in its portrayal of the Bush administration 
- 
describing it as engaged in 
`insane warmongering' (Voice of the Daily Mirror, Daily Mirror, 
18/12/03: 8). Earlier on in the unfolding process, in coverage of Dick 
Cheney's visit to see Tony Blair in March 2002, it made intertextual 
reference to cult horror film American Werewolf in London (John 
Landis, 1981) in order to produce the headline `American Warwolf in 
London' (Daily Mirror, 12/3/02: 1). Cheney was depicted as a 
werewolf, mobilising the violent associations of `wolves, ' as well as 
the `horror' elements of lycanthropy, with a computer altered image of 
his face with added fur and sharp canine teeth. At the start of the 
accompanying story he was also described as `WARMONGERING' 
(original capitalisation). Incidentally, the caption with the photo 
referred to the film as involving Lon Chaney Junior, a regular star of 
B-movies featuring werewolves, but who died over five years before 
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the film was made. The name Chaney (pronounced in the same way 
as the Vice President's name) has ever since been closely connected 
with werewolves 
- 
this association, unfortunate though it may be for 
the US Vice President, was perhaps the source of the `error'. This was 
not alone as an intertextual reference to the horror genre, since Richard 
Perle, former chair of the US Defense Policy Board is widely labelled 
`the Prince of Darkness' (Shawcross, 2004: 54; Crockatt, 2003: 158). 
Writing from a position opposed to war, Simon Tisdall 
described `second Gulf War syndrome': 
On the absence of a lead from the Blair government the warmongers have 
had an ideal opportunity to make their case [... ] 
When all else fails, warmongers resort, with unconscious irony, to morality 
[... ] Saddam is bad [... ] The president often falls back on this `us' versus 
`them' argument [... ] 
Riding gallantly to Bush's rescue comes Daily Mail columnist Melanie 
Phillips. For her, the reasons for bashing Saddam are obvious. She 
devotes her energies instead to questioning the motives of those who do 
not agree. 
These are the `appeasement factions'. These are the people who are really 
ill, suffering from `a truly pathological anti-Americanism', she writes. The 
intimate bedfellows of those holding such views are `anti-Jewish hatred' 
and `Islamic Fascism' [... ] 
It is when the warrior class reaches this intemperate logic-shredding point 
in its discourse that those opposed to the war know they can win. ' 
(The Guardian, 7/8/02: 16, emphasis added). 
This negative portrayal of `warmongers' (`warrior class') also ironises 
their claims about those against war. The name-calling in which they 
are engaged is portrayed as unreasonable, ` logic-shredding', and 
unfair. Those in favour of war are in violation of a rule requiring that 
they confine themselves to making their own case in a reasonable 
manner. Tisdall is of course also engaged in name-calling about his 
opponents 
- 
and on his own criteria is arguably shredding logic! 
Considering such possibilities is getting a little far away from the 
extract, but the significance of some conception of `reasonable' 
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arguments is observable even if not adhered to by those implying its 
importance. 
Tisdall's `warrior class' loosely corresponds with what Gerard 
Baker called the `war-now brigade': 
The war-now brigade thinks its case is so overwhelming that only an 
apologist for Saddam Hussein could oppose it. The war-never crowd 
thinks the whole thing has been got up by the US in a fit of evil madness. 
[... ] Mr Hussein is an evil man and I have not a shred of doubt that the 
world would be a far safer place without him. But a preventive war is an 
extraordinary step that requires an extraordinary level of confidence that it 
is really the only means to avert a greater tragedy. 
(Financial Times, 27/1/03: 21). 
Not only are people identified as in favour or war, but others 
characterised as wanting war `now' or `never'. Baker positions 
himself as somewhere other than where these two rather 
contemptuously named `crowds' are located. He claims that he is 
currently against war, but not eternally so 
- 
if the `extraordinary level 
of confidence' required for justification can be achieved. Aside from 
positioning himself as open to persuasion, what is most significant 
about Baker's contribution is the importance attributed to the twin 
issues of time and patience. If you want war `now' you are impatient 
for it, whereas if you want it `never' then it does not matter how much 
time and effort go unsuccessfully into achieving a diplomatic solution, 
you are unwilling to countenance war 
- 
your patience is infinite. 
The recurrence of this theme of `warmongering' meant that for 
those speaking out in favour of military action, there was a risk of 
being accused of it 
- 
something requiring their engagement in evasive 
action, several examples of which are discussed below. 
10.2. I am Not a Warmonger, But... 
Some contributions resisting the circulation of such accusations 
directly invoked the term `warmonger' whilst denying its applicability 
to them. For example, journalist Rupert Hamer quoted Captain Tim 
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Fraser, a member of the British military as saying: `We are not 
warmongers. I would much rather that the situation in Iraq is resolved 
through diplomatic means. But we understand the threat and we are 
prepared for it' (Daily Mirror, 22/12/02: 6). 
In this case a desire (or preference) for a diplomatic solution is 
claimed, and used in disclaiming the identity of a warmonger. Captain 
Fraser, and the army are not eager for war, but understand it and are 
prepared to fight it if necessary, though they would prefer it not to be 
required. 
Another example comes from Jason Burke: 
I am not a warmonger. I have seen half a dozen conflicts at close quarters 
and know exactly what shrapnel does to the flesh and bullet does to bone 
[... ] It is a war being fought for the wrong reasons, at the wrong time and 
has been sold in the wrong way. But this war is right. 
(The Observer, 9/3/03: 16). 
Here experience of witnessing the effects of war is used to try and 
defeat any accusation that his position in favour of war is the product 
of his being systematically in favour of it. Burke also uses a 
contrastive logic to add force to his position: given that he has seen 
what shrapnel and bullets do, and is not positively disposed to war, the 
reasons, moral and otherwise, motivating him in this specific case 
must be very powerful in order to have overridden his general aversion 
and led to his thinking that it is `right', even if he also distances 
himself from the official reasons which are `wrong'. 
Finally, here are two contributions from parliamentary context, 
both from Lord Maginnis of Drumglass [Crossbench] in separate 
debates as military action became imminent: 
I am no warmonger, neither do I have to convince anyone that I would 
prefer peace. But I have learnt the hard way to be a realist. We should 
waste very, very little more time. 
(Hansard, 2003b: 329). 
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I am no warmonger. War is and should be the last resort. But I believe in 
moral obligations and that war may be the only way to avert greater wars, 
greater aggression and greater oppression. 
(Hansard, 2003e: 176). 
In the first of these extracts, Lord Maginnis claims that his position is 
not that of a warmonger, but that of a `realist', and that he has learnt 
`the hard way' that this is the best position to occupy. Interestingly, he 
also refers to the amount of time for which the issue has run. In the 
second, he also denies directly that he is a warmonger, and claims that 
war should be a matter of `last resort'. Reference is made to moral 
obligations, and the possibility that a war can be justified if it averts a 
greater and more serious war later. Echoing arguments from previous 
chapters, he implies that a little bit of war now can put off a much 
worse confrontation later. 
10.3.1 Dislike War, But... 
The theme of a dislike for war is also observable in other contributions 
in favour of military action, although not always directly addressing 
the notion of `warmongering'. In such cases it is the contributor's 
general orientation towards war which is invoked. If they are to be 
believed, they are most definitely not in favour of war per se. For 
example, Sir Nicholas Winterton [Conservative]: 
I am not in favour of war. In fact, I am positively opposed to it. War is 
brutal, cruel and indiscriminate. Innocent people will undoubtedly die in 
any conflict that takes place, but there are occasions on which war is 
inevitable if the civilised world is to defend its civilisation against a 
despotic tyrant such as Saddam Hussein. 
(Hansard, 2003d: 800, emphasis added). 
Here several negative adjectives are applied to war 
- 
it is generally 
`brutal, cruel and indiscriminate'. This description is followed by a 
`but' 
- 
that war can be `inevitable' if the `civilised world' needs to 
defend itself, in this case against the specific threat of a `despotic 
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tyrant'. It is not the general moral evaluation of war that is therefore at 
stake 
- 
although portrayed as generally `bad' 
- 
it is its alleged 
necessity in this specific situation that matters. 
A similar example comes from Labour MP, Hugh Bayley: 
I detest the prospect of war every bit as much as the many constituents 
who have written to me opposing it, but I do not believe that we can ignore 
the threat that Iraq poses to neighbouring states, the gross violation of the 
human rights of the Iraqi people or the risk that the Iraqi regime will at 
some point in the future supply chemical or biological agents to terrorists 
who might use them in this country or elsewhere in Europe. 
(Hansard, 2003d: 841, emphasis added). 
Again negative observations about war in general are contrasted with 
the situational specifics of Iraq, including future risks allegedly 
resulting from inaction. Bayley claims to `detest the prospect of war', 
and claims agreement with his constituents on this, but there is 
something more important at stake which overrides his general 
aversion 
- 
the `threat' posed by Iraq. 
The immediacy of threat often depicted in such arguments was 
subsequently disclaimed by proponents of war such as Jack Straw, in 
the face of problems relating to the failure to find WMD in Iraq. This 
was pursued by via a morally asymmetric distinction drawn between 
an `immediate and imminent' and a `current and serious' threat 
(Curtis, 2004: 75). Retrospectively, although not necessarily an 
`immediate' threat, Iraq was portrayed as an `inevitable' threat 
(Shawcross, 2004: 233) and therefore war is claimed as justified. 
10.4. None of Us Wants War, But... 
Another way of disclaiming a generally positive orientation toward 
war, involves people stressing their membership of a wider community 
disliking war. As ever, a declaration of membership of this `we' is 
often followed by a `but' with specific situational reasons for being in 
favour of it in this case. 
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For example, according to the then Conservative Shadow 
Defence Minister, Michael Ancram: `None of us wants war, but to 
secure peace, it is sometimes necessary to prepare for war' (Hansard, 
2002d: 71). Three months later he echoed this, stating: 
None of us wants war [... ] However, sometimes conflict is necessary in the 
short term to achieve peace through the defeat of aggression, and 
sometimes it is the threat of conflict that can establish peace. 
(Hansard, 2003b: 276-7). 
Both of these examples claim unanimity regarding the desire to avoid 
war. In contrast to the immediately preceding subsection, Ancram is 
not only talking about himself but also talking about everyone within a 
wider, albeit unspecified, community. Also, although the general 
orientation to war is contrasted with something, it is not only the 
specific situation of Iraq, it is a broader `sometimes'. 
There is arguably something `Orwellian' about some of this 
logic. Ancram is not quite saying that war is peace, but that peace 
requires a readiness for war. A willingness to go to war has to exist to 
support peace 
- 
something touched upon indirectly in previous 
chapters. 
This pseudo-Orwellian logic is further typified by Donald 
Rumsfeld's speech at the Munich Conference on European Security 
(8/2/03): 
We all hope for a peaceful solution. But the one chance for a peaceful 
solution is to make clear that free nations are prepared to use force if 
necessary 
- 
that the world is united and, while reluctant, is willing to act. 
(Rumsfeld, 2003a). 
Another example of claiming membership of a wider consensus 
generally against war comes from Tony Blair, who in September 2002 
is quoted as saying: `I hate war. Anyone with any sense hates war. 
But there are certain circumstances in which it is the right thing to do' 
(in Andy McSmith, et al., The Daily Telegraph, 4/9/02: 1). 
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Blair's `community' of agreement is more restricted than 
Michael Ancram's, being limited to only those `with any sense', but it 
is similarly a more general `certain circumstances' that can justify, 
again more expansive than only those cases fitting closely with that of 
Iraq. 
It is noteworthy that the article containing this quotation was 
placed next to a widely used picture of Tony Blair, supplied by 
Reuters, with his thumbs in his belt `ready for the draw', asking the 
question `Has Tony Blair been spending too much time down on the 
ranch with Dubya? ' (also see Daily Mail, 4/9/02: 5; Daily Mirror, 
4/9/02: 5; The Sunday Telegraph, 8/9/02: 19). The implication was 
that his bodily movements indicated that he was acquiring from 
George W. Bush some of the characteristics of a `cowboy'. The 
following day, the Mirror (5/9/02: 7) continued with this Cowboy 
theme, depicting Blair as `the Sedgfield Kid'. 
Another interesting contribution comes from an editorial in The 
Sun: 
When U. S. Vice President Dick Cheney says Saddam Hussein must be 
attacked, the world should take heed. 
Cheney is a cautious, level-headed man not given to wild warmongering 
["] 
Saddam is a clear and present danger to the West. 
Of course, no one wants a war. 
Attacking Iraq would carry political and economic perils. 
But the danger of doing nothing is that Saddam will one day blow us 
all up. 
(The Sun Says, The Sun, 28/8/02: 8, original emphasis). 
Here another consensus is invoked 
- 
`no one wants a war' 
- 
juxtaposed with an assertion about the `danger of doing nothing', i. e., 
`that one day Saddam will blow us all up'. This risk requires action 
despite the claimed universal desire to avoid war. 
Within this example, a contrastive logic is deployed regarding 
US Vice President Dick Cheney. He is claimed to be `cautious, level- 
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headed and not given to wild warmongering', and based upon this, if 
he is in favour of military action then everyone else should realise the 
gravity of the situation. The persuasive force of this contrast is of 
course reliant upon acceptance that Cheney is normally `not given to 
wild warmongering', which I imagine might not be easily achieved! A 
starker contrast than that between The Sun's portrayal of Cheney here 
and that made by the Daily Mirror of him as a `Warwolf (see above) 
would be hard to find. 
Finally, another example claiming a consensus against war, 
also allocated the responsibility for any necessary action 
-a practice 
also more widely present in the debates: 
None of us wants to see that; none of us wants to see military conflict. We 
do not want war. It is indeed terrible to contemplate. But the time may 
soon upon us all when Saddam Hussein makes his choice, when he rejects 
the wishes of the international community and instead chooses fear, 
violence, terrorism and dictatorship. 
(Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, Hansard, 2003b: 251). 
Again, this describes what `none of us' wants, and for emphasis `none 
of us' is repeated. War is described as `terrible to contemplate'. By 
now, the significance of the contrastive `but' will be entirely familiar, 
and Baroness Symons follows this with a description of Saddam 
Hussein's likely course of action. The situation described is one in 
which Hussein's decision is determinant 
- 
if there is war it will 
ultimately be his agency that caused it. He has the power to avoid it 
by complying with UNSCR 1441, so any war will be due to his failure 
to act in the available manner to avoid it. 
10.5. Selectivity of Enforcement 
In relation to the issue of the specificity of Iraq as an appropriate 
context for military action, some opponents of war contrastively 
invoked other contexts and questioned why military action was not 
being proposed in them. 
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Various contributions asked why the implementation of UN 
resolutions was not pursued with such conviction when they applied to 
Israel, Cyprus and Turkey, or why the use of military force was not 
being considered against other `rogue states' or `countries of concern' 
such as Iran and North Korea (also see Kampfher, 2004: 228). 
Given the volatile situation prevalent in the Middle East, the 
situation's proximity to Iraq, and the associated allegations that the 
war was intended by the West as an anti-Islamic action, it is 
unsurprising that one of the most problematic such questions related to 
Israel. Those more positively disposed towards the invasion addressed 
such assertions by drawing yet another distinction (identifying another 
a difference that makes a difference) 
- 
that between two `types' of UN 
Security Council Resolutions: 
The UN distinguishes between two sorts of Security Council resolution. 
Those passed under Chapter Six deal with the peaceful resolution of 
disputes and entitle the council to make non-binding recommendations. 
Those under Chapter Seven give the council broad powers to take action, 
including warlike action, to deal with `threats to peace, breaches of the 
peace, or acts of aggression' 
(Leader, The Economist, 12-18/10/02: 23-4). 
Since no Chapter Seven resolutions apply to Israel, and those applying 
to are (non-binding) recommendations which cannot be implemented 
unilaterally, it is claimed that they can be treated differently. 
Whether or not this is enough to convince those who claimed 
that there was unfair selectivity going on would seem unlikely, but it is 
certainly another example of responding to apparent tensions by the 
drawing of ever finer distinctions. 
10.6. No Decision Has Yet Been Made 
A recurrent theme in statements made by the British government in the 
build-up to war concerned the extent to which talk of an invasion was 
premature 
- 
those discussing it were `getting ahead of themselves'. 
For example: `No decision has yet been taken by Her Majesty's 
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Government and I fervently hope none will be necessary. ' (Jack Straw, 
Hansard, 2002d: 55). 
Questioning the truthfulness of such statements was one angle 
adopted by those against war, but my interest in them relates instead to 
understanding why it would have been advantageous if the 
declarations were accepted as true 
- 
the specific difference that makes. 
Such declarations regarding the absence of a decision (yet) 
were observed as repetitive by members of the British press opposed 
to war. This `constant refrain' of `no decisions have yet been made' 
was noted by Rai (2002: 199) in his account in advance of invasion. 
Below are two similar examples of understandings given to the 
declarations, drawn from editorials on the same day: 
For months Tony Blair has repeated a mantra. Military action against Iraq 
is not imminent. We are not yet at the point of decision. We should not 
get ahead of ourselves. 
(Editorial, The Guardian, 28/8/02: 19). 
For the moment, the White House shelters behind its mantra that "no 
decision has been taken" absurdly blaming the media for a `frenzy' of 
speculation for which it alone is responsible. 
(Editorial, The Independent, 28/8/02: 16). 
Although referring to different speakers and different variations of the 
phrase, both examples described it as a `mantra'. In both cases there is 
contempt expressed for the practice of continually making the 
statement, the implication being that it is repeated in a rather formulaic 
manner for sound-bite-related reasons. Although its truthfulness may 
therefore be suspect, it is not addressed directly. 
The primary means adopted to problematise this regularly 
heard call to `hold your horses' was to invoke the futility of `closing 
the stable door after the horse has already bolted'. In coverage of one 
such attempt at problematisation, Donald Maclntyre paraphrased 
Baroness Williams of Crosby [Liberal Democrat], characterising her 
arguments as `entirely reasonable'. The call for a debate now rather 
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than later was: `best expressed by Baroness Williams of Crosby last 
week when she complained with incontestable logic that it was always 
too early to debate a war until it was too late' (The Independent, 
30/7/02: 12). 
Baronness Williams' complaint neatly sums up the significance 
of the deferral of the moment of decision 
- 
the longer that no decision 
is made (officially) the more difficult it becomes to not make the 
decision that has already achieved huge momentum in the prevalent 
definition of the situation. War was on the cards for a very long time 
before any official announcement of the decision was made, and things 
were so close to occurring that preventing British involvement was 
virtually impossible by the time that the House of Commons was 
given its vote on 18 `h March 2003. 
10.7. Huge Diplomatic Efforts and the Credible Threat of 
Force 
Closely associated with the deferral of the moment of decision is 
another type of argument utilised increasingly as war drew near 
- 
claims about the effort that had gone into avoiding war 
- 
stressing the 
amount of diplomatic activity engaged in, as well as arguments that all 
diplomatic activity would have been fruitless without the threat of war 
backing it up. For example: 
[T]his is a moment that we hoped we would not reach; a moment that my 
right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and 
many others, have worked immensely hard to avoid through our huge 
diplomatic efforts. 
(Baroness Symonds of Vernham Dean, Hansard, 2003e: 223). 
The moment of decision is portrayed as unwanted and this is evinced 
by the fact that the government have worked `immensely hard' with 
`huge diplomatic efforts' to avoid it. Also, since `we' have tried so 
hard to avoid war 
- 
responsibility for the present situation is deflected 
onto a non-compliant Saddam Hussein. 
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This logic was still being utilised nearly a year after the war 
had commenced. The week after publication of the Hutton Report 
(Hutton, 2004), Geoff Hoon, being interviewed on BBC Radio 5's 
Breakfast show (5/2/04) stated that: `we went to extraordinary lengths 
to avoid war'. This goes close to claiming that they went `too far' in 
attempting to avoid war. For something to be `extraordinary', it 
requires a point of ordinariness with which it can be contrasted, so the 
implication is that going to war when they did was more than 
reasonable since it was long after a watershed in the process at which 
war would have been justified. 
There are many other contributions claiming that without the 
threat of war the diplomatic manoeuvres would have achieved little. 
For example, an editorial from The Sunday Telegraph shortly before 
George W. Bush's challenge to the UN (12/9/02), and before the UN 
began drafting UNSCR 1441: 
[I]t is scarcely likely that Saddam would be talking to the UN at all about 
the return to Iraq of arms inspectors 
- 
on his terms, of course, if the US 
had not made clear its readiness to take military action against him. 
(Editorial, The Sunday Telegraph, 1/9/02: 18). 
The claim is that without evidence of the US' willingness or 
`readiness' to use force (presumably `as a last resort') even minimal 
Iraqi cooperation over UN weapons inspections would not have 
materialised. Therefore, in order to try and avoid war, it was 
necessary to be observed as prepared for it. Subsequently this type of 
argument was a common means of relating to (and attempting to 
defeat) the arguments of those claiming that diplomatic channels were 
achieving progress. Once the UN inspectors were back in Iraq, any 
mention of their achievements, or any assertion that the inspections 
process was bringing results, was countered with a similar argument 
- 
that without the threat of force, none of its achievements would have 
been at all possible. For example: 
208 
The fact that the UN inspectors have gone back to Iraq, and some progress, 
albeit modest, has been made owes a great deal to the joint military 
pressure mounted by both the United States and the United Kingdom. That 
cannot be denied. 
(Lord Thomson of Monifieth [Liberal Democrat], Hansard, 2003b: 267). 
These types of assertion were even accepted by former head of 
UNMOVIC Hans Blix (2004: 11) 
- 
the possibility of a non-military 
solution was itself only possible against a background in which 
military force loomed. 
Other contributions to debate addressed the issue of credibility, 
and its relationship to time, arguing that the threat of force could only 
remain credible for a limited period. For example: 
Those who say that action is not necessary now must remember that we 
have passed so many deadlines, so many ultimatums, that not to take any 
action now is to reduce the credibility of any action being taken. 
(William Hague, Hansard, 2003d: 793). 
If peaceful means are continually pursued despite an insufficient level 
of cooperation, then the `preparedness' of `the coalition' to utilise 
force be called into question. Therefore the assumed effectiveness or 
`credibility' of the military threat supporting up the diplomacy will be 
reduced, since Saddam Hussein will think that it is mere sabre-rattling. 
Again on the question of effort, but also addressing the 
question of responsibility, Lord Strathclyde made a similar argument: 
War must always be the last resort. But few can say that the Government 
- 
and the US Government 
- 
have not gone the last mile to avoid it. And few 
can claim that Saddam, in the final phase of a vicious and bloodthirsty 
career, has taken any more than token steps to prevent a conflict that he has 





(Hansard, 2003e: 143-4). 
Beginning with a familiar structure of `war must always be the last 
resort' followed by a `but', this contribution engages in a variety of 
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activities. It stresses the process of attempting to avoid war, and 
portrays as a minority view any assertion that considerable efforts 
have not gone into its avoidance (`few can say'). Strathclyde then also 
minimises Iraqi cooperation ('token steps'), and also tries to minoritise 
those claiming that cooperation has been sufficient (`few can claim'). 
He describes Saddam Hussein's `vicious and bloodthirsty career', and 
deflects responsibility for any subsequent military action away from 
the coalition by asserting that Hussein has had the ability to avoid the 
conflict for `months 
- 
indeed, years'. The ball has been in his court, 
and he has been unwilling to return it. 
The issues of time, and speed of the movement towards war, 
were also important themes. This included the way in which long- 
term inaction (for 12 years) was portrayed positively rather than as a 
past failure to act decisively 
- 
allowing those advocating war to claim 
that they were not rushing things. Dossiers published by both the 
White House (2002: 2) and UK Government (2002: 33-4) stressed the 
time elapsed since the issue arose, and the number of resolutions 
violated by Iraq. 
In one of his monthly press conferences Tony Blair claimed 
that: `[T]here is no rush to war. Indeed we have waited 12 years' 
(Blair, 2003). This was claimed as `hardly a sign of impatience' 
(Editorial, The Economist, 19/7/03: 10), thereby assisting the portrayal 
of war as an `absolute last option' (George W. Bush in Woodward, 
2004: 3). 
Associated with this invocation of time was the constant 
iteration of the number of resolutions Iraq was violating 
- 
23 out of 27 
obligations from nine resolutions (Anton La Guardia, The Daily 
Telegraph, 6/9/02: 4), or direct material breach of 16 resolutions 
(Andrew Buncombe and Andrew Grice, The Independent, 28/9/02: 6). 
The importance variously placed upon invocation of the effort 
put into war's avoidance implies that a lack of eagerness is a key 
component in pursuit of demonstrating that you are not systematically 
in favour of war 
-a warmonger 
- 
but also that a simultaneous 
willingness to use force is assumed to be necessary in order to support 
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the associated diplomatic measures, and during 2002-3 the talking up 
of war in pursuit of avoiding it became known as the `Straw Paradox' 
(Kampfner, 2004: 302) because of Jack Straw's engagement in it. 
One possible implication of this is that talk about 
warmongering can actually work to your advantage if you are one of 
those so accused. A shrill and intense caricature of `hawkishness', if it 
fosters extreme expectations of your behaviour, can make it easier to 
provide evidence violating such a portrayal. Based upon such an 
understanding it might be possible to claim that the extreme portrayals 
of the US administration made by those against the war 
- 
as crazed, 
hawkish, warmongers desperate to go to unilateral war as soon as 
possible 
- 
were ultimately self-defeating in the sense that they were 
easily violated: 
There are those in the House and outside who fervently believed that the 
US would act without a UN Security Council resolution. To my relief, it 
went down the Security Council path, compromised and was patient. 
(Bruce George [Labour], Hansard, 2002d: 81). 
If your opponents are vocal about how rushed and unthinking your 
actions will be, it can be relatively easy to evade such characterisations 
by not acting in such a manner; not acting according to the script 
already written. 
10.8. Avian Metaphors 
A common way in which the differences between those eager for war 
and those eager to avoid it are understood is through various avian 
metaphors, and considerable prominence was given to the use of bird 
species to make sense of some of the positions adopted within the 
debate building up to the invasion of Iraq. Of course, the most 
recurrent of these was undoubtedly the invocation of the hawk/dove 
distinction, a hawk being a naturally violent bird of prey, and a dove 
being a widely regarded symbol of peace. This distinction has a long 
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history of use in the context of military and foreign policy, particularly 
in reference to the United States. 
Pollack (2002: 56) claims that neither term is adequate to 
account for the complexities involved, and of particular interest in the 
public debate was the way in which these two birds were 
supplemented with slight variations in the species invoked. For 
example, writing about the American Left's calls to bring back the 
draft so as to undermine the skewed class and ethnic composition of 
the military, Toby Hamden (The Daily Telegraph, 25/1/04: 14) 
invoked the term `chicken hawks' in reference to `hardline civilian 
advisers' without military experience of their own. According to 
Hitchens (2003: 21) this also mobilises a connection with paedophilia 
in the US, but there is a more obvious association with cowardice, via 
the resonance of `chicken'. Those to whom the label refers are a 
curious blend of warmonger and war avoider 
- 
in favour of war 
because they have no personal experience of it, or are hawkish as long 
as they will not be put directly at risk. 
Also unfavourably, Peter Kilfoyle (Hansard, 2002b: 110) 
claimed that US government officials in favour of war were not 
hawks, but pterodactyls 
- 
either implying that they were more violent 
and less thinking than a hawk, or that their policy ideas merited 
description as the product of dinosaurs. 
Similarly, writing even before 9-11, Julian Borger (The 
Guardian, 29/6/01: 4) quotes an even more personalised example of 
this from an unnamed former colleague of Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy 
Secretary of Defense: `Hawk doesn't do him justice [... ] What about 
velociraptor? '. As anyone who has seen Jurassic Park (Steven 
Spielberg, 1993) `knows', the velociraptor is physiologically similar to 
a bird and even more violent. The dinosaur connection was also made 
by former South African President Nelson Mandela in an interview 
with journalist Gary Younge (The Guardian: G2,19/9/02: 2-3) 
specifically in relation to Dick Cheney's advisers. 
The invocation of avian metaphors was not confined to those 
negatively portraying those in favour of war. They also accused their 
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opponents of possessing various bird-like `qualities'. For example, 
Amity Shlaes (Financial Times, 11/6/02: 23) made reference to 
`Europe the Ostrich' implying that France and Germany's opposition 
to war was based upon the fact that they had buried their heads in the 
sand and refused to face facts. This angle was also pursued in 
Parliament, with Lord Weidenfeld [Crossbench] making direct 
reference to bird associations more generally: 
Perhaps we ought to borrow two new symbols from the aviary of political 
stereotypes and replace the hawk and the dove with the eagle and the 
ostrich. It is gratifying to know that the right honourable gentleman the 
Prime Minister belongs to the first species and has refused to stick his head 
into the sand. 
(Hansard, 2002c: 970). 
Blair's alleged refusal to bury his head in the sand is portrayed as a 
virtue, and can obviously be contrasted with those who do so, although 
they are not named here. The specific reason for the Prime Minister 
being an eagle rather than a hawk is however unclear 
- 
what is the 
defining characteristic that makes the distinction necessary? Eagles 
are significant symbols of the United States and are closely associated 
with impressive vision ('eagle eyes') but then so are hawks ('hawk 
eye'). Nevertheless the difference between either of these and an 
ostrich is clear. 
Joseph Nye also wrote of `owls' 
- 
mobilising the association 
between owls and wisdom to argue for the importance of a more 
intelligent version of a hawk. According to Nye, owls: 
would use force to back up the United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions violated by Saddam Hussein but take the time necessary to 
develop a broad, multi-national coalition. Now that the US congress has 
authorised the use of force, the crucial choice is between hawks and owls. 
(Financial Times, 21/10/02: 29). 
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The fact that the crucial choice is claimed to be between two violent 
species means that violence is inevitable 
- 
at this point there were are 
no longer any doves to speak of. Military action was an option 
considered entirely legitimate by almost all those in the US congress. 
One also has to assume that circulating somewhere around this 
highly differentiated aviary, were the media `vultures' eagerly hoping 
to spot some carrion or other. However, at the time of writing, despite 
an attempt led by Plaid Cymru MP Adam Price, at utilising a rarely 
used parliamentary instrument to impeach Tony Blair for gross 
misconduct, there has been a remarkable lack of high-level political 
casualties resulting from the invasion, so the vultures' hunger will 
have gone largely unfed. 
10.9. The Conversion of Colin Powell 
One process observed significantly through avian metaphors, was the 
then US Secretary of State Colin Powell's conversion from dove to 
hawk, including the key event of his presentation to the UN in 
February 2003 (Powell, 2003a). 
Rightly or wrongly through much of the build-up to the 
invasion Powell had been understood, in relative terms, as a dove. He 
was described as having been the US administrations `voice of 
moderation' (Jackie Ashley, The Guardian, 30/1/03: 21) and as the 
`only reasonable link between the White House and the world' (Gary 
Younge, The Guardian, 6/2/03: 1). Such understandings of Powell's 
position were essential in making it possible for him to have 
undergone a conversion, `transforming' into a hawk between late 
January and early February 2003. 
There is another noteworthy dimension to his UN presentation. 
In advance it was largely billed with the assistance of another 
historical analogy 
- 
Adlai Stevenson's dramatic presentation to the 
UN Security Council (25/10/62) utilising 26 black and white aerial 
photographs of Soviet nuclear missiles installed in Cuba, and 
according to Woodward's (2004: 291) account, the US administration 
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had hoped for Powell's `Adlai Stevenson moment' to make a similar 
impact (also see Kampfher, 2004: 269; Bamford, 2004: 367). 
Press responses to the presentation, now understood as 
containing some highly questionable and discredited evidence, varied 
in their portrayal of its significance. Some engaged in an interrogation 
of the validity of the Adlai Stevenson analogy. For example, Julian 
Borger (Guardian, 6/2/03: 6) cited Arthur Schlesinger as stating that 
Powell `did not even come close' to Stevenson's impact. 
More important than this assessment of validity was the way 
that the presentation's impact was connected to Powell's `previous 
identity' as a dove, and constituted a conversion. For instance, 
speaking on BBC's Question Time the following day (6/2/03) Andrew 
Pierce described the presentation as Powell's conversion from dove to 
hawk, by suggesting it represented him `growing talons'. 
Moreover, it was depicted, by those sympathetic, as: 
an extraordinary event [... ] the fact that the case against Saddam Hussein 
was being made by the leading dove in the Bush Administration was a 
powerful reminder that Baghdad has been given ample time to demonstrate 
compliance with the UN. 
(Editorial, The Daily Telegraph, 6/2/03: 25). 
Again we are here in the realms of time and patience as well as the 
imputation of determinate agency to Saddam Hussein (or 
metonymically Baghdad) and the question of his compliance. Since 
Powell had previously been observed as the US administration's 
leading dove, this was all the more `powerful'. 
There was a high degree of consensus amongst those positively 
disposed to invasion regarding the power of Powell's presentation, and 
its source. According to Christopher Hitchens: ` Colin Powell's words 
carry more weight coming as they do from a former sceptic' (Daily 
Mirror, 6/2/03: 7). Charles Moore also claimed that: `Precisely 
because he appears to have the zeal of the convert, Mr Powell was the 
right man for the job' (The Daily Telegraph, 6/2/03: 24), and Tim Reid 
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advanced the more general claim that: `Sometimes it takes a dove to 
make the best case for war' (The Times, 6/2/03: 16). 
The contrastive significance of Powell's recently preceding 
`communicative career' 
- 
that he was understood as a relative dove on 
Iraq 
- 
was absolutely key to the question of his credibility in this 
event, and the `power' of what he said. According to Woodward's 
(2004: 291) insider account this was an explicit part of the thought 
process that went into having him give the presentation: `to have 
maximum credibility, it would be best to go counter to type and 
everyone knew that Powell was soft on Iraq, that he was the one who 
didn't want to go. ' 
It is of course possible to query the authenticity of Powell's 
alleged conversion. We could question the description of Powell as a 
dove in the first instance. Was he some sort of sleeper, acquiring 
credibility throughout the whole process so that he could cash this in 
on the administration's behalf at some later date? Such possibilities 
take us into the realm of conspiracy theories. If we do not wish to 
accept that a radical transformation occurred then it seems more likely 
that he was being a good soldier and simply doing the job asked of 
him, whether he completely believed what he was saying or not. 
Regardless of the answer to such questions, it is the credibility 
pursued and observed by the contrast between his previous 
communicative career (accepted as not a warmonger) and the more 
pro-war aspects of his presentation that are supposed to generate 
persuasive force for what he said: as someone who was previously 
observed as not a warmonger, he must have legitimate and credible 
reasons for his advocacy of war. 
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11. Supporting the Troops Once Battle 
Commences 
[T]he anti-war movement was morally disarmed from the very 
moment our soldiers first went into action. How could anyone 
oppose the war without standing accused of traitorously failing 
to back our soldiers? 
(Correlli Barnett, Daily Mail, 29/5/03: 12). 
As noted in the review of literature, a pressure to state support for the 
troops was evident in the First Gulf War, and a similar phenomenon 
was also present in the more recent `Iraq crisis'. A drive towards 
some form of moral consensus on this issue can be observed as the 
inevitability of war became apparent. By the start of March 2003, as 
the build up to war reached its climax, even those who had 
consistently opposed war started praising the British armed forces, and 
began to engage in discursive work so as to reconcile their previous 
anti-war stance with support for the Armed Forces so as to avoid 
strong moral condemnation. 
11.1. Critique Must Cease 
The explicit call to support was, unsurprisingly, issued most strongly 
by those in favour of military action. A demand for ceasing opposition 
because of the `need' to support the troops was particularly prevalent 
in the pages of The Daily Telegraph: 
[T]he impending hostilities must call an end to the debate about the rights 
and wrongs of war. Now that British forces are going into action, the 
nation must and will unite behind them, just as it has always done, 
irrespective of political allegiance. Nobody is called on to make a greater 
sacrifice than to die for his country, and the only appropriate responses 
from those who do not have risk their lives are gratitude and awe. 
(Editorial, The Daily Telegraph, 20/3/03: 25). 
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The modalities and moralities at work here are quite obvious. The 
passage is concerned with what must be the case, and opposing views 
are portrayed as inappropriate. There must be a moratorium on 
dissent, and unity in `gratitude and awe' is the only legitimate option. 
Another example of this kind of moral and emotional 
shepherding, gives a more practical reason for the need to cease 
criticising the military action 
- 
the troops' morale. An article by 
Martin Bentham cited Lt Colonel Hugh Blackman, commander of the 
Royal Scots Dragoon Guards as saying: `[T]he last thing a soldier 
needs while being sniped at from the front is to be sniped at from 
behind by the armchair lancers [... ]' (The Sunday Telegraph, 16/3/03: 
6). Here it is less directly the morality of critique as such, as much its 
effect upon soldiers that is at stake. Critics are metaphorically 
associated with the `enemy' in that their practice `sniping' is the same 
- 
both are snipers. Even worse, the critics are doing it from behind 
- 
something commonly associated with cowardice. 
11.2. Stressing Support 
The circulation of such accusations and the associated condemnation 
creates a potential problem for critics of the war, apparently inciting 
declarations of support, which can not go unstated. This is not to 
suggest that statements of support are sufficient to avoid 
condemnation, but that if support goes unsaid, then the likelihood of 
condemnation may increase 
- 
since failure to state support leads to the 
presumption of its absence. 
Below is an example articulating this `compulsion' to support 
the troops, describing its influence upon the timing of Tom Utley's 
interventions in the debate: 
Until now, I have avoiding [sic] airing my reservations about the 
threatened war against Iraq for three reasons: my ignorance of Middle 
Eastern politics; my extreme reluctance to side with the sort of people who 
rant against America in the Guardian and, above all, the ever-growing 
evidence that Mr Bush's threats were bringing Saddam to heel. I have not 
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wanted to say anything that might comfort a dictator, or give the slightest 
credence to the thought that Western democracies have no stomach for 
war. 
I air my reservations now because this may be my last chance before the 
troops go in 
- 
and I am not going to say a word against the war once our 
forces start risking their lives. 
(The Daily Telegraph, 18/1/03: 26, emphasis added). 
This again illustrates the contrastive logic of the foil, with Utley 
disclaiming any association with particular people on the same `side' 
of the debate as him 
- 
those who `rant against America in the 
Guardian'. He claims that his airing of reservations is timed to allow 
him to have said it before the troops are in action, at which time he 
will feel the need to stay silent. The fact that the troops were going to 
be `risking their lives' is enough to require his silence. 
Newspapers that had been against the war also contributed to 
the emerging consensus about the need to support the troops, directly 
positioning themselves inside it. As may have been expected, they 
often did so via processes of disclaiming which also advocated and 
identified space for their legitimate dissent. 
In an article exploring how those papers campaigning against 
the war would face a problem once it was underway, Roy Greenslade 
cited Piers Morgan, then editor of the Daily Mirror as saying that: 
`There is no contradiction in being openly supportive of the troops on 
the ground and opposing the fact that they were deployed by this 
government' (The Guardian: Media Supplement, 17/3/03: 2), 
attempting to problematise what are assumed to be contradictions 
between positions taken by his paper. Editorials were a prominent site 
for this sort of (re)positioning, and the Daily Mirror was especially 
noticeable for repetition of such assertions. This is far from surprising 
given the amount of its political capital that was invested in the 
campaign against the war, and also its history. It could not afford to 
change its mind about the conflict, but neither could it afford to be 
portrayed as unsupportive of the troops as it had been during the 
Falklands war. 
219 
Below are three editorial contributions involving various 
accommodations with the notion that the troops must be supported: 
So now we go to war. A war without international support, or the backing 
of the British public. 
A lot of people have pondered on how the Daily Mirror will treat our 
servicemen and women once the first bomb is dropped. 
How can we possibly support them when we are so opposed to the war, 
they ask? 
The answer is a simple one. We are completely behind our British armed 
services, as we always have been. [... ] 
Our forces are well aware of the furore back home, and of the sense of 
disquiet and anger from many British people at this decision to go to war. 
It is unsettling for them, distracting. 
We understand that. And we know that many of them feel equally uneasy 
about why this war is being waged. 
But they need to also understand very clearly that once that first bomb 
is detonated, the Daily Mirror unequivocally supports them. [... ] 
Saddam Hussein is not the target of our sympathy and never would be [... ] 
But the Iraqi people are. 
(Voice of the Daily Mirror, Daily Mirror, 18/3/03: 2, original emphasis). 
Politicians across the political spectrum are united in the conviction that 
the time has come `to support our troops'. This newspaper agrees, and 
fervently hopes for a swift conclusion with as few casualties on both sides 
as is possible in war. But that does not mean we should not debate how the 
fighting is about to be conducted. 
(Editorial, The Independent, 20/3/03: 18). 
British marines and Paras led the attack against Iraqi troops. 
Their courage, spirit and professionalism was praised by Mr Blair and we 
agreed with every word he said about them. 
But it is not in our view acceptable to use the troops as an excuse for the 
country to "unite" behind this war. 
(Voice of the Daily Mirror, Daily Mirror, 21/3/03: 8. original emphasis). 
As in previous chapters, we can see these as interventions in the order 
of discourse, aiming to disrupt assumed relationships, and protecting 
the legitimacy of specific positions, again often pursued by the use of 
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contrastive conjunctions such as `but'. A variety of quite subtle 
distinctions are drawn in pursuit of locations that are not to be subject 
to the moral condemnation implied by a refusal to support the troops. 
The Independent editorial still wants to retain the right to critique the 
conduct of the fighting, and the earlier quotation from Piers Morgan 
distinguishes between `the troops' and `their deployment' as separate 
issues on which one can position oneself differently without 
inconsistency. 
Another means of attempting to gain such protection was the 
identification of the morally coercive form of such a process, and 
therefore a rendering of that process itself as morally problematic 
- 
an 
attempt at reflexively shifting the discursive terrain. For example: 
In recent weeks one of the most hatefully unfair barbs aimed at those who 
urged a policy of delay and containment has been that we are `disloyal' to 
the British servicemen and women on the front line. It is worse than the 
equally ridiculous accusation that we `back Saddam'; it is an echo of the 
infantile way that The Sun accused the Daily Mirror of `treachery' in the 
Falklands conflict. Once troops are being deployed, so that argument runs, 
there can be no more quibbling [... ] 
So my despised and derided fellow-peaceniks, take heart. We didn't want 
this, we didn't vote for it, we dread it, but it is still all right to raise a hand 
in salute and blessing to the poor bloody infantry, and the rest. 
(Libby Purves, The Times, 18/3/03: 20). 
Purves identifies the source of one of the Mirror's problems 
- 
The 
Sun's accusations of treachery in the context of past wars, and also 
describes as unfair the circulation of the `pro-Saddam' accusations 
which I have mentioned elsewhere. She also notes the arguments that 
there should be a moratorium on criticism once the troops are in 
action. Interestingly, her arguments are addressed to those on the 
same side as her, as a type of in-group directed justification for support 
of the armed forces. She is arguing that it is okay for those who were, 
like her, against the war to express such support 
- 
they should not feel 
that they can not. The assumption underpinning this is that they would 
have wanted to do this (express support) but would have felt that they 
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could not, and that they would have felt inconsistent if they had done 
so. Of course, this does not admit the possibility that people might not 
wish to express such support, and therefore leaves unresolved the 
question of how those against war who did not want to express such 
support could position themselves. Such people are not 
acknowledged. 
Another example that implicitly addresses the existence of 
those not wanting to express support, directly invoking the notion of 
positioning, comes from Jonathan Freedland: 
In these days of anxiety and fear, where should those who have opposed 
this war put themselves? [... ] For some, the start of war will mean an end 
to the anti-war campaign. For them, to do anything less would be to 
undermine our arm ed forces just as they place themselves in harm's way. 
But this is one of those cliches of political protocol that makes little logical 
sense [... ] 
Supporting the troops and hoping for victory: many in the anti-war camp 
will fear all this sounds too much like giving up. And the pressure to 
buckle will be immense: the drop in anti-war sentiment recorded in 
yesterday's Guardian poll suggests it's already working its magic [... ] 
[W]e should be prepared now for what the pro-war camp will say [... ] 
[W]e did not question this war because we believed Saddam was a cuddly 
grandpa: we knew the depths of his depravity. Our doubts resided 
elsewhere. 
(The Guardian, 19/3/03: 23, emphasis added). 
Here we have a restatement that dissent was not the product of naivety 
about Saddam Hussein. This follows an identification of the moral 
and emotional pressure brought to bear on dissenters as troops were 
being deployed, including recognition of the concern about 
`undermining' them, and some speculation about how this was likely 
to reduce the quantity of people willing to dissent. Despite claiming 
that it is likely to be successful, Freedland claims that the `cliche' 
about the need to support the troops `makes little logical sense'. 
Although I am not directly assessing the question of success, as a 
strategy of resistance, identification of the process in this way would 
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seem unlikely to be a sufficient condition for robbing it of its apparent 
power. 
Another intervention comes from critic Natasha Walter: 
The sense that it might be traitorous not to support British soldiers who are 
facing death may also bring down the number of people who are prepared 
to protest physically on the streets. 
Even commentators who were once virulently against the war are now 
willing to tell us how much they sympathise with our courageous soldiers. 
Their innocence and vulnerability is constantly emphasised [... ] 
[T]his pragmatic desire for a quick victory rather than a bloody, drawn out 
struggle doesn't mean it is necessary to idealise these men who are fighting 
this unjust war. In fact, it is vital that we do not now start to blur reality by 
idealising them. 
(The Independent, 20/3/03: 19, emphasis added). 
Walter recognises the effectiveness of the moral pressure requiring 
support of the troops, and its influence upon many previously against 
the invasion. She locates this in the stress placed upon both their 
innocence and vulnerability, and the way that this results in their 
elevation and valorisation. 
Many other arguments revolving around these issues attempted 
to problematise the moral pressure by identifying it and making claims 
about its unfairness. Below are two examples that try to do this in 
slightly different ways: 
The standard formula is that, now the fighting has started, we have to 
forget our misgivings and back `our boys'. 
But the argument that critics must now shut up is too easy at a time when 
there are no easy answers. An unwise or unjust war does not become wise 
or just merely because it is underway. 
(Andrew Alexander, Daily Mail, 21/3/03: 28). 
What remains clear is that this war is wrong. The fact that it has started 
and taken on its own unstoppable momentum is not enough to abandon 
principled and reasoned objections to waging it in the first place. It is 
fashionable to accuse those who oppose the war of being unpatriotic, and 
to argue that now the conflict has started we should *rally around `our 
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boys'. But we have never been in dispute with the troops who are 
courageously carrying out orders. Our concerns are with the political 
leaders who have sent them to the Gulf in the first place. 
(Editorial, The Independent on Sunday, 23/3/03: 26). 
The references in both these examples to the soldiers as `our boys', 
even when ironised with quotation marks, clearly relate to the notion 
of `national deixis' (Billig, 1995) which was mentioned in my 
literature review 
- 
the `us' in mind certainly being a national one. 
Alexander's contribution negatively portrays the imperative to support 
the troops as `formulaic' and `too easy' 
- 
it is unsurprising, and its 
widespread availability should undermine its `currency' (it is not 
scarce enough to be valuable). Alexander also tries to retain the 
possibility of a war underway being `wrong' despite the existence of 
the process shepherding people towards it being automatically `right' 
once underway. Resistance to the gravitational pull towards support is 
portrayed as legitimate, via the assertion that whether or not a war is 
underway does not affect its legitimacy. 
Similarly, the editorial from The Independent asserts that the 
war is wrong, despite having begun 
- 
its `momentum' is not a 
sufficient condition to require removal of objections existing 
beforehand. It also describes the emerging consensus of support 
dismissively as `fashionable', and draws a distinction between the 
various `objects' of criticism and respect. The paper claims to have 
`never been in dispute with the troops', but only with the people 
sending them to war. Yet again, the troops are positively valued 
- 
indeed they are doing their job `courageously' 
- 
despite the war being 
valued negatively. 
Some other opponents of the war manifested their concerns for 
the troops in a rather different way, echoing one approach from 1991 
(Kellner, 1992: 252), claiming that their support for the troops 
required a different conclusion: 
It is humbug for Mr [Charles] Kennedy to turn round and pretend and he 
supports it merely because it has started and our troops are involved. If 
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you really want to support our boys, the truly patriotic course is to call for 
them to be removed speedily from the sands of Mesopotamia to the shores 
of Blighty [... ] 
(Alan Watkins, The Independent on Sunday, 16/3/03: 25). 
Stressing that no anger was aimed at troops fighting in Iraq, Mr Murray 
[Andrew 
- 
Chairman of Stop the War Coalition] said: `We want them 
home safe and we want them home now. ' 
(Justine Smith and Stephen Moyes, Daily Mirror, 22/3/03: 14). 
The first of these two examples locates the author in a position of 
contrast with that of the Liberal Democrats, and therefore with many 
others who were previously critical of the build up to war. Watkins 
argues that it is not sufficient to move to a supportive position, and 
that the most supportive response would be to request the troops be 
withdrawn and bring them home. The principle is the same in the 
second example. 
This strategy of claiming that the most supportive position was 
to want the withdrawal of the troops received some particularly violent 
criticism. With characteristic lack of moderation, Julie Burchill, who 
supported invasion, wrote the following: 
One of the creepiest contortions of the anti-war appeasers was how, once 
we were finally out there and even the most anti-war papers suggested that 
it might be best to put our differences aside and support our fighting men, a 
bunch of self-righteous tossers refused even to be this generous, and 
prissed that their way of supporting our soldiers was campaigning for them 
to be `brought home'. 
(The Guardian: Weekend, 19/4/03: 5, original emphasis). 
Obviously creepy contortions, self-righteous tossers and prissing are 
not morally ambiguous! Burchill suggests that calling for withdrawal 
was self-righteous, and therefore an act of positioning deserving 
condemnation. This reflexivity about reflexivity represents a refolding 
of the process of accusation in so far as the technique utilised to avoid 
condemnation can itself be rendered morally dubious (arguably similar 
to the way that saying `I am not a racist but' has become so). 
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11.3. Parliamentary Accusation 
These various phenomena were not only present in the press coverage, 
but were also problematic for various participants in parliamentary 
debates, especially in those immediately preceding war (18/3/03). 
'Pro-war' contributions were often aimed at associating those 
against the war with a lack of support for the troops: 
Whatever one feels 
- 
and many, as I do, will consider that their position on 
tyranny and terrorism has been systematically misrepresented 
- 
one will 
recognise that our first responsibility is to our armed services. Can anyone 
who claims to support our forces leave them to face the enemy while 
casting doubt on what they are being asked to do? 
(Lord Maginnis of Drumglas [Ulster Unionist], Hansard, 2003e: 175, 
emphasis added). 
Here, the difficulty involved in doubting the validity of the war and 
simultaneously claiming to support the troops is identified via a 
`rhetorical question' which associates doubt about the troops' task and 
the absence of support 
- 
if you question their task, then your support is 
questionable. 
Another highly personalised attempt at persuasion came from 
Gary Streeter [Labour]: 
My family is experiencing its first taste of the personal agony of war. Our 
daughter married a fine young trooper in the 2"d Royal Tank Regiment 
only two and a half months ago. She remains by the television, constantly 
awaiting news of the conflict. However, she is surrounded by people in 
her university 
- 
we Streeters marry young 
- 
who demonstrate against what 
her husband is risking his life to do. That does not help. I therefore 
implore those outside who are planning their protests, marches and 
placards to think, once battle is engaged, of the thousands of troops who 
risk their lives and of their families at home. I ask people to show some 
common humanity and postpone their political protests until the conflict is 
over. 
(Hansard, 2003d: 874). 
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The references to `family' and `marriage' appeal to common values 
(indeed, explicitly constituting an appeal to `common humanity'). The 
account is personalised by concerning specific individuals - people 
with social roles with which everyone is supposedly familiar such as 
daughters, husbands etc 
- 
and these are issues which the protesters are 
asked to confront. They are asked to think about and feel empathy for 
the families that they are affecting, and the allegedly negative 
consequences of their protest are supposed to cause them to desist 
whilst war is conducted. Indeed, their willingness to desist (or their 
unwillingness to do so) will be an indication of their `common 
humanity' (or its absence). This is a good example of the sort of 
utterance with which it is difficult to engage without concessions of 
some sort 
- 
the claim that you bear the troops or their families no ill 
will, or a separation of the war and those taking part. To engage with 
it head on, without softening of some sort may put the perception of 
your `common humanity' in jeopardy, or at the very least may see you 
perceived as `cold'. It is possible to see my treatment of Streeter's 
speech in this way 
- 
my focus on its strategic dimensions, may be 
interpreted as unfeeling or as questioning his sincerity. However, as I 
have disclaimed several times previously, analytically, the sincerity of 
the contributions is not paramount. 
Below is another example, calling for careful talk from 
opponents to the war. This example is slightly different from those 
questioning the support of those against war; instead, it questions the 
expressions of support they were giving: 
Perhaps I may express the hope that, now the decision to go to war has 
been taken, everyone will take great care over what they say about the 
morality, legitimacy and wisdom of that decision, whatever strong views 
they may hold. A certain amount of the usual words have been spoken 
how firmly we are behind our Armed Forces, and of course it is customary 
to make those remarks in a debate of this kind. But sometimes I wonder 
how much deep thinking and sincerity lie behind those sentiments [... ] 
I do not necessarily suppose that when those decisions have been taken, 
people will change their minds. But I would hope, at the least, before 
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people express their doubts or demonstrate about the rightness of those 
decisions, that they would try to put themselves into the minds of those 
now waiting in the desert [... ] 
(Lord Chalfont [Conservative], Hansard, 2003e: 197-8, emphasis added). 
Lord Chalfont calls for empathy from opponents of war for the 
soldiers being deployed, and identifies the apparently formulaic nature 
of the expressions of support made by those against war 
- 
`the usual 
words' which are `customary'. He portrays such protestations of 
support for the troops as cynical and disingenuous. Here we have the 
re-entry of themes within themes, and the complex form of the debate 
illustrated. It is almost impossible to decide whether or not this 
observation relates directly to another specific contribution to the 
debate or whether it is more nebulous in reference, but there are 
clearly some examples with which it resonates better than others 
- 
those apparently made in response to the moral pressure to express 
support for the troops once battle commences. Similar to Burchill's 
contribution above, it attempts to contain those who were able to 
sidestep a previous form of containment 
-a new obstacle is erected to 
make difficult the movement of those critics able to negotiate the 
earlier obstacle. 
11.4. Stressing Parliamentary Support 
One of the preconditions of Chalfont's contribution is the presence of 
identifiable expressions of support for the troops from those opposing 
war. Perhaps the most collective of these in the context of the UK 
Parliament occurred in the debate in the House of Commons over 
whether or not British troops should take part. An amendment to the 
motion being debated, proposed by those against the war, actually 
included explicit praise for the armed forces, and in so doing admitted 
the likelihood of its own failure. The amendment, read by Peter 
Kilfoyle, went as follows: 
[... ] the case for war has not yet been established, especially given the 
absence of specific United Nations authorisation; but, in the event that 
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hostilities do commence [this House] pledges its total support for the 
British forces engaged in the Middle East, expresses its admiration for 
their courage, skill and devotion to duty, and hopes that their tasks will be 
swiftly concluded with minimal casualties on all sides. 
(Hansard, 2003d: 779). 
This was widely seen as an attempt at the proponents having their cake 
and eating it 
- 
simultaneously criticising the prospect of war and 
praising those who would conduct it. In comparison with much of the 
other disclaiming and self-positioning going on, it reads rather 
clumsily. It was designed to prevent war occurring, but also detailed 
what the proponents hoped for if war occurred. At that stage it is 
arguable that fatalism was appropriate regarding the possibility of 
preventing military action, but stating your possible future orientation 
to an event occurring as part of the attempt at preventing it seems a 
rather strange approach. The clumsiness of the inclusion of praise and 
support for the troops implies that it was expressed more because it 
was somehow felt to be necessary 
- 
its absence would have been 
problematic 
- 
than because it was an integral element in the motion for 
procedural reasons. It would be possible to view this as rather cynical, 
however, that would require us to ignore the pressure circulating 
which demanded statements of support, and the likely consequences of 
their observed absence. The presence of such words can be explained, 
in part, as necessary in the face of the circulating idea that questioning 
the war meant not supporting the troops, and that this was highly 
morally problematic. 
Other ways of engaging with this pressure were evident. 
Below are two different examples of utterances attempting to do so: 
I am not persuaded for one moment by the ridiculous proposition that, 
because our troops may be employed, it is wrong for us to argue against 
their being deployed. This is the only opportunity that we have to make 
that point. Once the troops are in the field, however, I will give them my 
every support, and I expect every Member so to do. 
(David Heath, Hansard, 2003d: 888). 
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My Lords, we have heard some impassioned speeches this afternoon about 
the villainy and tyranny of Saddam Hussein. The implication has been that 
anybody who is against the ultimatum which has been issued and the war 
against Iraq which is to come must be in favour of this tyrant and 
supportive of him. That is a gross slander on people who take the view 
that I do [... ] 
Those who accuse people like me who are concerned about this war of not 
wanting to support our Armed Forces are again guilty of slander. That is a 
downright lie [... ] 
I, and all those I know who are concerned about the action in Iraq, do 
support our Armed Forces, and will support them. What we do not support 
is that they should have been put in a dangerous situation unnecessarily. I 
wish them well. I wish that they did not have to be there. I hope that they 
will all return safely. 
(Lord Stoddart of Swindon [Independent Labour], Hansard, 2003e: 203-4). 
Heath's contribution describes the view that the temporal proximity of 
war requires an end to criticism as a `ridiculous proposition'. As in 
several other examples, there is an implicit separation of the troops 
themselves and their deployment. Heath also confirms that he will 
support the troops once they are `in the field', and therefore an 
accommodation is reached with the process of accusation. The value 
of supporting the troops goes unquestioned, and is thereby 
(re)confirmed, even in a contribution which describes the pressure 
involved as `ridiculous'. 
Lord Stoddart engages very directly with the accusation, of 
non-support, labelling it `slander', and also `a downright lie'. Like 
earlier contributions he separates the troops from their deployment so 
as to enable the two distinct issues to undergo different valuations. In 
claiming that all opponents of war support the troops, Stoddart also 
(re)confirms the relevance of support, and leaves little space for those 
who may wish not to express such support. Therefore, as has been the 
case with regard to other processes of accusation, his pursuit of 
legitimacy marginalises other conceivable positions, and is therefore 
reliant upon their inferiority. 
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11.5. The Liberal Hermaphrodites? 
Whilst the need to support the troops was problematic for most against 
war, inciting various forms of discursive work, in Britain it was 
intensely problematic for the Liberal Democrats, whose policy was 
consistently anti-war. The party's movement towards expressing 
support for the troops whilst still opposing war was described by 
Conservative MP Boris Johnson as a `curious hermaphroditic policy' 
(Hansard, 2003d: 812), and by `Government insiders' as them `trying 
to ride two horses at once' (in Jean Eaglesham, Financial Times, 
17/2/03: 4). Much discussion occurred regarding the sense in which 
they were trying to be two things at once, trying to have their cake and 
eat it (something of which they are regularly accused). 
For example, the then leader of the Conservative Party, lain 
Duncan Smith said: 
One can argue that further military action by our armed forces would be 
illegal, or that it should be supported. But a political party surely cannot 
simultaneously argue that military action is illegal but should none the less 
be supported somehow. Yet that, we gather, is what the Liberal Democrats 
plan to put as their main case tonight. What is clear is that one cannot 
have it both ways; one has to make a decision and lead. 
(Hansard, 2003d: 774, emphasis added). 
Interestingly, Duncan Smith makes his criticism of the Liberal 
Democrats via use of a `but' and actually seems to acknowledge the 
potential legitimacy of arguing against the war. However, he contrasts 
these straightforward for/against positions with the positions of the Lib 
Democrats who are attempting to `have it both ways'. Here it is the 
fact that they do not fit into one of the legitimate positions 
- 
they 
believe the war is illegal but wish to support it 
- 
which leads to their 
alleged incoherence. 
From the opposite `side' of the debate, George Galloway said: 
We didn't want this war, they said, it is wrong and illegal, but if it has 
begun we must support `our boys'. 
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But why, if something was wrong and illegal before it was done, should it 
be any different once it has started? 
(Galloway, 2004: 68; also see, The Guardian, 2/6/04: 22 ). 
Another contribution questioning the coherence of the Liberal 
Democrats' position comes from Lord Stratchclyde: 
The [... ] thing to set out is the unequivocal support that we offer to our 
Armed Forces and their families at this time. They need to know that we 
endorse the cause in which they are being asked to risk their lives. We 
have been consistent in that position and will remain so. I have enormous 
respect for the wisdom of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, 
and agree with her on many things. But, like many noble Lords, I find it 
hard to fathom the attitude of a party that denounces the legality of a war 
- 
right up to the last minute in the debate launched by the noble Lord, 
Lord Goodhart, last night 
- 
and then says that it supports the war when it 
is fought. With utmost respect, I say to the Liberal Democrats that they 
cannot campaign as an anti-war party on the doorsteps, then proclaim 
support in the television studios for the troops fighting that illegal war. 
(Hansard, 2003e: 144, emphasis added). 
Lord Strathclyde prefaces this with an assertion that there must be no 
equivocation about support for the troops, and the extent to which the 
cause in which they are engaged is endorsed, and contrasts the Liberal 
Democrats' position with the alleged consistency of the Conservative 
party. He then states respect for Baroness Williams before contrasting 
this with the position her party has taken regarding the legality of the 
war, and yet their expression of support for it if it occurs. Again we 
are dealing with observed inconsistencies and incompatibilities. The 
complexity was unwelcome, and the problems arising from being 
observed as trying to be two supposedly contradictory things at once 
was problematic for a considerable period after the war had begun. 
11.6. Conclusion 
It is certainly of great interest that observations made of the discursive 




elements of the debate becoming part of itself. Techniques 
used to negotiate legitimacy can themselves subsequently undergo 
ironisation, and be rendered morally problematic 
-a process of 
reflexive refolding. 
Generally speaking, the incitement of statements of support for 
the troops, combined with the production of such statements of 
support, in pursuit of legitimacy by critics of the war, led to the 
formation of a moral consensus in which anti-war contributions were 
pulled into a discursive location advantageous to their opponents. The 
defensive discursive work required in pursuit of legitimacy operated as 
a distraction from making criticisms of the impending invasion, as 
critics had to devote time and effort trying to avoid their enunciations 
being discounted automatically. 
Nevertheless, critics of the war have also made use of the 
valorisation of the troops, particularly after the end of `major combat 
operations'. For example, in America, Michael Moore (2004) 
published a collection of letters and e-mails sent to him by US soldiers 
and their families, most of which were heavily critical of their task. 
In Britain use was made the troops' valorisation throughout the 
autumn of 2004, especially in relation to the redeployment of the 
Black Watch regiment. Much coverage of their redeployment, 
focalised discussion via their families in a manner supporting Foster's 
(1999: 43-77) discussions of such familial references in relation to war 
more generally. Much was made of the families' `anger' (Shirley 
English, The Times, 19/10/04: 2), `outrage' (Bob Roberts, Daily 
Mirror, 19/10/04: 5) and `immense distress' (Max Hastings, Daily 
Mail, 18/10/04: 11) about what their relatives were being asked to do. 
A degree of prominence was afforded the parents of casualties, 
including Rose Gentle, mother of Gordon, killed in June 2004 (The 
Guardian, 29/9/04: 21), and organisations such as 'UK Veterans and 
Families for Peace' (for example, John Vidal, The Guardian, 
18/10/04: 4). 
In early November 2004, efforts were also made to connect the 
invasion of Iraq to the Remembrance Day commemorations (and 
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therefore WWII again), with families of British soldiers killed in Iraq 
laying a wreath of poppies outside 10 Downing Street and submitting 
an `damning letter' signed by ten such parents on November 10th 
(James Chapman, Daily Mail, 11/11/04: 1). 
Such contributions themselves have constituted considerable 
moral obstacles for those attempting to retrospectively and 
retroactively justify the invasion of Iraq. Bereaved parents can not be 
dismissed as easily as an obviously political opponent. They require 
very sensitive handling, making them potentially useful in attempts at 
retrospectively rendering the military action illegitimate. 
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12. The Infamous `Weapons of Mass Destruction' 
For as long as I can remember, I've had trouble with monsters. 
When I was very small, adults tried to alleviate the terror by 
opening the cupboard and shining torches under the bed to prove 
to me nothing was there. It made things worse, of course, 
because the monster's invisibility gave them absolute power. If 
they couldn't be seen, they were all the more invincible, and 
capable of taking on distorted shapes beyond even the wild 
imagination of a child. Worse than all my fear of seeing them, 
was my fear of never seeing them, of never being able to look at 
them hard enough to make them go away. 
(Dinski, 1998: 3). 
The `Iraq crisis' is likely stimulate scholarly debate across multiple 
disciplines for decades to come, no aspect more so than the meaning of 
`weapons of mass destruction' (henceforth WMD), and this entire 
thesis could easily have been devoted to the significance of this 
phrase, since for those opposed to war, the threat of WMD was the 
`master illusion' (Pilger, 2002: 9) of the pro-war case. 
This chapter departs from those preceding since it is not 
directly concerned with various accusations directed at contributors to 
the debate. Instead, the focus is upon the importance of the phrase 
`weapons of mass destruction'. Nevertheless, the approach utilised is 
very similar, including an examination of the ways in which particular 
discursive connections are made in contributions to the debate 
including the moral asymmetries identified in the discursive work 
undertaken by participants. 
The phrase `weapons of mass destruction' is another example 
of a `formulaic phrase' with respect to issues of recognition, reduction 
and (re)constitution. It seems to have a particular reductive and yet 
constructive capacity to enable people to interact as if talking about the 
same thing even when that is questionable. The phrase also lends 
itself rather easily to parody 
- 
destruction can be variously replaced 
with deception (Rampton and Stauber, 2003), corruption (Editorial, 
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The Daily Telegraph, 7/10/04: 29), or `disappearance' (Robin Cook, 
The Guardian, 3/12/04: 28) often with delegitimating intent. 
12.1. Definition and Vagueness 
From the way it is used, one could be forgiven for thinking that the 
phrase WMD had some clearly understood referent. If much closer 
attention is paid to circulation of the phrase it becomes clear that the 
ways that WMD are envisaged vary considerably 
- 
the phrase is 
polysemic. 
The usual places to look for clarity in definitional matters are 
official documents, and many such definitions are available, although 
most of these were provided after the pre-war process of justification. 
The House of Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) 
Report into the uses of pre-war intelligence defined WMD as follows: 
The term `Weapons of Mass Destruction' is generally used to denote 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Within the context of Iraq, it 
has been used more broadly to cover all weapons programmes proscribed 
under Resolutions 687 of 1991, including ballistic missiles and other 
unmanned delivery systems with a range greater than 150 kilometres. 
(FAC, 2003: 55). 
The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), in its report on the 
handling of intelligence assessments in the production of the UK 
Government's infamous dossier of September 2002 (UK Government, 
2002) defined WMD as follows: 
WMD covers the procurement, development and production of chemical 
and biological munitions and nuclear devices 
- 
together with their delivery 
systems, which include ballistic and cruise missiles [... J 
However, the same term is used to cover battlefield or tactical munitions 
including artillery shells with a chemical payload, such as mustard gas, for 
use against opposing troops. 
(ISC, 2003: 3). 
The ISC also went on to define WMD programmes as meaning that: 
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people and resources are being allocated under a management structure for 
either the research and development of a WMD capability or the 
production of munitions. It does not necessarily mean that WMD 
munitions have been produced, as only when the capability has been 
developed can weapons be produced. 
(ISC, 2003: 10). 
The contrastive importance of the distinction between WMD and 
`programmes' will be explored in more detail below. 
The Butler Report, also investigating the handling of 
intelligence followed the ISC's definition of WMD, but also stated 
that: 
we believe that there are problems with the term `weapons of mass 
destruction' and with the shorthand `chemical and biological weapons' 
(CBW) and `chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear' (CBRN) 
weapons. 
(Butler et al., 2004: 3). 
They also added that the term WMD is: `used so variously as to 
confuse rather than enlighten readers' (Butler et al., 2004: 4). 
Moreover, the committee went on to echo the FAC and the 
eventual Iraq Survey Group's Interim Report (ISG, 2004) by 
explaining that the definition they were using revolved around the 
things UNSCR 687(1991) required Iraq to abandon: nuclear weapons 
and their supporting technologies, stocks of chemical and biological 
weapons and related support facilities and research, as well as ballistic 
missiles with range exceeding 150km and related facilities. 
There is arguably something rather curious and troubling about 
using Iraq to define WMD 
- 
the possibility of a self-fulfilling logic in 
operation raising questions about inevitability or teleology. 
Nevertheless, not everyone was willing to accept the legitimacy of 
those definitions in circulation, especially those opposed to war. 
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During the public debate, various discursive strategies had been 
in evidence involving criticism of the way that WMD were discussed 
by those advocating military action, and negative comments about 
definitional vagueness were one prominent technique used in the 
attempt at undermining the case for war, for example claims that its 
reference is very much observer-dependent: 
WMD [is] empty and dishonest as a concept [... ] The truth is that 
`weapons of mass destruction' is a concept defined by the person using it. 
`I like a drink, you are a drunk, he is an alcoholic, ' runs the old 
conjugation. Now there's another: `We have defence forces, you have 
dangerous arms, he has weapons of mass destruction. ' 
(Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The Guardian, 2/5/03: 28). 
Simon Tisdall noted the vagueness and asserted the significance of this 
relativity of application: 
This is now s universally understood term, or so you might think. WMD is 
proliferating, it's deeply frightening, and it's coming to a cinema or tube 
near you. 
Yet totemic WMD is also a reason why civil liberties are everywhere 
under siege, why military budgets are rising, why your opinion is ignored. 
In fact, WMD is a vague, non-specific term that can be (and is) used to 
cover a multitude of supposed sins. Developed countries have their own 
WMD, of course, but their arsenals are somehow deemed acceptable. 
(The Guardian, 4/11/03: 24). 
Both Britain and the USA have similar weapons, but that is apparently 
acceptable 
- 
something connecting up to a lot of ideas emerging from 
the first Gulf War in 1991 regarding the way in which the morality of 
technologies depends upon who possesses them (Askoy and Robins, 
1992; Hackett and Zhao, 1994). 
Despite controversy regarding what fits into the category, and 
what counts as evidence of their existence in a specific location, there 
is a degree of clarity about the moral evaluation of WMD. Despite the 
lack of agreement on the definition of WMD, in many of the 
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contributions to the public debate, the absence of doubt about their 
presence (or absence) in Iraq was nevertheless prominently on display. 
12.2. Repeating the Absence of Doubt 
I have already discussed some examples of assertions of certainty in 
earlier chapters. Such assertions were also made regarding the 
presence of WMD in Iraq. For example: `[T]here can be no 
controversy about the evidence that Saddam Hussein has developed 
and is continuing to develop apace, weapons of mass destruction' 
(Francis Maude [Conservative], Hansard, 2002b: 52). 
There is perhaps a distinction to be drawn between two 
possibilities 
- 
speaking with certainty and speaking to foster it. Faced 
with a choice between these two possibilities 
- 
that it is possessed and 
expressed, or performed, I think the emphasis should be on the latter. 
This type of enunciation is most usefully understood in terms of its 
interpellatory implications 
- 
the way it values and prefers specific 
subsequent contributions others could make. It is almost like a moral 
challenge to subsequent speakers to disagree, potentially creating a 
problem for them, although this `preference for agreement' is more 
directly strategic in character than that identified by Pomerantz (1984). 
Arguably, the constant performance of certainty raises two 
suspicions. Firstly, that it is the repetitive implementation of a 
strategy that is observed as partially successful, and secondly, that 
each repetition is not a final solution 
- 
it is also partially unsuccessful 
requiring it to be stated again and again. There is always assumed to 
be some `failure' as well as `success' 
- 
an automatic gap between 
partial and total success 
- 
which makes saying it once, twice, three 
times ultimately insufficient in terms of achieving total definitional 
closure. 
Another question we can ask is: to what extent is the process of 
performing certainty self- or other-directed? In a piece discussing 
Tony Blair, Polly Toynbee skirted this type of issue in relation to his 
contributions: 
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As for Tony Blair's veracity, with him there is a wavy line between 
deception and self-deception. He is so easily carried away by the 
persuasiveness of his own words and the force of his own arguments that 
you can hear him mesmerise himself: the truth with him is bound up with 
extraordinary optimism. There is an almost childish blurring between the 
wish and the fact: if he says something strongly enough, his words can 
magic it into truth. 
(The Guardian, 30/5/03: 27). 
It is obvious that Toynbee is partly concerned with `truthfulness' here 
and she perhaps underestimates the extent to which all contributors to 
this debate and others were pursuing the same `magic' she describes 
when they spoke. 
It is important to realise that not all contributions performed 
certainty and much hedging also occurred. For example, in his cabinet 
resignation speech, then outgoing Leader of the House of Commons 
Robin Cook, said: `Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction 
in the commonly understood sense of the term 
- 
namely no credible 
device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target' 
(Hansard, 2003c: 728). 
Cook hedges here whilst claiming that Iraq has no WMD in the 
sense commonly understood. His reference to common understanding 
is also an ironisation of the case for war in that it is implying that such 
understanding is insufficient or misleading 
- 
that an inappropriate 
understanding of the alleged threat had taken hold. It is notable that 
even a strong opponent of war did not claim outright that no WMD 
were there (see Lewis and Brookes, 2004: 135 on the rarity of outright 
denial in the build-up). 
Both hedging and certainty were co-present across the entire 
debate, often from the same source. Despite claims to the contrary 
regarding its `evangelical certainty' (Cook, 20003: 221), and all the 
subsequent controversy over whether it was `sexed up', the UK 
Government's (2002) infamous dossier on Iraq's alleged WMD, also 
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contained much hedging. For example, clear hedging about Iraq's 
capabilities appear on pages 5,22,25,26,27,28,41. 
This surprising amount of hedging in the infamous dossier was 
lost in many appropriations of its contents. The day following its 
publication, perhaps the most simplistic interpretation of the dossier's 
contents came from The Sun (25/9/02: 1) newspaper, which had the 
full page headline: `HE'S GOT `EM.. LET'S GET HIM'. The Sun 
was especially supportive of the Government's line and was arguably 
more positively disposed towards war, leading to almost every piece of 
evidence being interpreted in the most strategically useful way in 
favour of invasion. For example, commenting on the UN inspectors' 
discovery in January 2003 of some Al Samoud warheads which were 
prohibited by the resolutions applying to Iraq, Trevor Kavanagh its 
political editor asserted that this meant that: 
Saddam has been caught red-handed. 
For all his tricks and lies, Butcher of Baghdad can no longer deny he has 
weapons of mass destruction [... ] 
This is bad news for the Labour peaceniks who turned a blind eye to all 
previous evidence that branded Saddam a risk to world security [... ] the 
wobblers will finally have to fall in behind. 
(The Sun, 17/1/03: 2). 
Long after the declared end of major combat operations, talk of 
certainty persisted, although it was still mixed in curious ways with 
hedging techniques. Discussing some of the political problems for 
Tony Blair generated by the invasion's aftermath, Max Hastings wrote 
that: `For Blair to get out of this one unscathed, he needs firm 
evidence about WMD. This may still be forthcoming. In some form, 
they certainly existed' (The Sunday Telegraph, 17/8/03: 18). 
Apparently, WMD `certainly' existed, but only in `some form'. 
Some systematic sociological research has already explored the 
extent to which certainty about the presence of WMD in Iraq was 
transmitted through the mass media, claiming that broadcasters tended 
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to utilise the frameworks provided by the government, and accepting 
its claims regarding the presence of WMD in Iraq: 
[W]e did find some evidence that British broadcasters were sometimes 
tilted in their assumptions towards a framework promoted by government. 
When it came to contentious issues such as WMD or the mood of the Iraqi 
people, we found that, overall, all the main television broadcasters tended 
to favour the pro-war, government version over more sceptical accounts. 
So for example, 9 out of 10 references to WMD tended to assume Iraqi 
capability, while only I in 10 cast doubt on it [... ] Moreover, despite the 
mixed reports coming from reporters on the ground, broadcasters were 
twice as likely to represent the Iraqi people as welcoming the invasion than 
as suspicious, reserved or hostile. 
(Lewis et al., 2004: 25; also see Lewis and Brookes, 2004). 
Edwards and Cromwell (2004: 213) also show that even the websites 
of the two consistently critical UK broadsheets, between 1/1/03 and 
6/6/03, included many times the number of references to the existence 
of WMD than references to former members of the UN inspection 
teams who were critical of the public case advanced, Rolf Ekeus and 
Scott Ritter (961-14 for The Guardian, and 931-28 in The 
Independent). 
The question of whether this (uncritical) circulation of the 
relevance if not presence of WMD had some direct impact upon the 
audience is unresolved, and would require engagement the contentious 
literature on `media effects' and research methodology beyond that of 
this project. What matters here is that very little room was apparently 
left for people to doubt that the issue of WMD was `at stake' in 
relation to Iraq and that this shaped the space into which they would 
have to contribute if they so wished, with assertions that they were not 
at stake significantly `dispreferred', i. e., communications were 
`required' to link to the significance of WMD somehow. 
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12.3. UNSCR 1441 
Following the US government's decision to `go down the UN route', 
and after two months of intensive negotiation, UNSCR 1441 (United 
Nations, 2002: paragraph 2), giving Iraq a `final opportunity to comply 
with its disarmament obligations' was passed unanimously by the UN 
Security Council. 
Even this unanimously passed resolution has been interpreted 
as highly ambiguous. Critics claimed that: `The resolution was a 
masterwork of obfuscation, leaving open the questions of the timetable 
and of how the council would judge Iraqi compliance' (Burrough et 
al., 2004: 176). Particularly controversial was the question of whether 
or not the resolution contained `traps', making it easy for those so 
inclined to `trigger' military action, and disagreement about what 
would count as a `material breach' of the resolution. 
12.3.1. Triggers, Traps and Tripwires 
For those wanting to force Saddam Hussein to comply in disarmament 
of WMD, it became important to deny that the resolution contained 
traps that would make it easy for them to trigger war 
- 
another 
dimension of the denial of warmongering. 
Those less positively disposed to military action voiced 
suspicions that the UN process was something not being pursued with 
commitment, and that the resolution was deliberately designed to fail. 
There were discussions of: 
the well-founded fear that its uncompromising, catch-all terms will be 
manipulated, sooner rather later, into a mandate for war [... ] 
[T]here remains good reason to ask whether the resolution, by setting up 
numerous, over-rigorous and potentially war-triggering tripwires, is not a 
genuine `final opportunity' at all and is designed to fail. 
(Editorial, The Guardian, 7/11/02: 25). 
Earlier in the process, Baroness Turner of Camden had claimed that 
the Bush Administration was: `intent on making it as difficult as 
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possible for Iraq to comply' (Hansard, 2002c: 999-1000), and a month 
before its successful passage, an Editorial in The Guardian (3/10/02: 
21) had claimed that the US' draft amounted to `a blueprint for 
invasion. ' 
In the face of this sort of criticism about the UN process' 
authenticity, denial of the presence of triggers or traps was deemed 
necessary. Jack Straw repeatedly made claims that: `There are no 
tripwires or traps in the resolution; it sets out a very clear procedure' 
(Hansard, 2002d: 49), and Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean 
asserted that: `Resolution 1441 gives the Iraqi regime a final 
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations [... ] I assure 
your Lordships that it is not designed to trick or trap the Iraqi regime' 
(Hansard, 2002e: 861). 
Similar to much of the other disclaiming mentioned thus far, 
such contributions are tied up with questions of legitimacy 
- 
were 
there to be traps and tripwires present then this would be problematic, 
therefore their presence must be denied. 
12.3.2. What Constitutes a Material Breach? 
Related to this disclaiming of tripwires, is the question of what would 
count as evidence of Iraqi violation of the resolution: On what basis 
could it be agreed that a `material breach' had occurred? Realistically 
there was probably very little which would have led to widespread 
international assent to military action 
-a spectacular find of long 
range missiles loaded with chemical weapons perhaps. Given the 
absence of such evidence during the inspections process, things were 
much less clear, leading to many interpretative competitions and 
attempts at controlling how specific activities should be understood. 
Discursive work in pursuit of controlling the parameters of 
compliance or its absence were made necessary because the diplomatic 
process had allowed everyone to think that they had achieved what 
they wanted, leading to the existence of `an aura of ambiguity about 
what will constitute non-compliance' (Lord Weidenfeld [Crossbench] 
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Hansard, 2002e: 927). As Sir George Young [Conservative] put it on 
the eve of the invasion: 
The traditional skills of diplomacy involve getting people to agree to 
something by persuading them that it means what they want it to mean, 
and saying that there is no harm in `signing up' because the eventuality is 
remote. All that has come horribly unstuck. There has been too much 
ambiguity and obfuscation in the process. 
(Hansard, 2003d: 824). 
Throughout the negotiations, preceding the resolution's passage, on of 
the main stumbling blocks had been the choice of the word `and' or 
`or' in paragraph four, which reads: 
Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by 
Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply 
with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall 
constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations [... ] 
(United Nations, 2002; emphasis added). 
The difference `and' makes as distinct from `or' is that it requires two 
things rather than one to occur before a material breach could be 
confirmed 
-a potentially important change in the evidential basis 
required for `serious consequences' to be unleashed. 
However, as I have already noted, there was a high degree of 
controversy over what would count as evidence of compliance (or 
not), and one of the approaches adopted by those opposed to war was 
to constantly interrogate the UK government about what they would 
count as such evidence in advance of its occurrence. 
Unwilling to pin themselves down too much, those responding 
to such questions were rather evasive and vague, even implying that it 
was somehow inappropriate to ask. According to Tony Blair: 
The resolution is certainly predicated on the basis that if there is a breach, 
there is agreement to act [... ] 
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I think there is international consensus that it is not sensible to tie ourselves 
down now to every single set of circumstances, that we want to keep some 
freedom of manoeuvre and that we should keep pressure on Saddam. 
(Hansard, 2002d: 43). 
Similar attempts at allowing `freedom of manoeuvre' (or `wriggle 
room') were evident in the Lords: `[I]t is never possible to give an 
exhaustive list of all the behaviours that would be covered [... ] It 
means something significant [... ] behaviour that is serious; deliberate 
and concerted' (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, Hansard, 2002e: 
862). As Lord Howell of Guildford [Conservative] also put it: 
`Someone suggested to me that it was a little like an elephant 
- 
it is 
difficult to describe in the abstract but easy to recognise when one sees 
it' (Hansard, 2002e: 867). 
For critics, this was problematic because it represented those in 
favour of the course of action trying to have their cake and eat it. Neil 
Gerrard [Labour] gave voice to these anxieties: 
One of the key problems is that we are being asked in the motion to 
support the UN, yet at the same time we are being told that the US 
Government and our Government reserve the right to ignore anything that 
the UN says if they do not like what the UN decides when it looks at the 
weapons inspectors' reports [... j 
We cannot have it both ways. We cannot say `You must support the UN' 
and at the same time say, `We reserve the right to do whatever we want if 
we do not like what the UN decides. ' 
(Hansard, 2002d: 78). 
Concern was also voiced regarding how rigidly the US administration 
would try to enforce their conception of compliance. Lord Rea 
[Labour], for example, claimed that they: `are likely to try to use even 
a minor infringement of UNMOVIC's protocol as a casus belli' 
(Hansard, 2002e: 940). Earlier on in the same debate, Lord King of 
Bridgwater [Conservative] had speculated upon the importance of a 
distinction between `partial success' and `failure': 
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If, as I expect, the inspection regime is able to report only partial success 
in the form of the elimination of some weapons but not others, should this 
automatically be the occasion for war? I say that it should not [... ] I do not 
believe that partial success would constitute failure. 
(Hansard, 2002e: 918). 
He suspected, however, that the US administration would see the 
distinction as invalid, and that partial success, equating with failure, 
would also constitute a material breach. As it turns out, this is 
probably a fairly good summary of what subsequently took place! 
The underlying concern on the part of those averse to military 
action was that, despite the denial of the presence of traps in the 
resolution, it was made almost impossible for Iraq to comply 
- 
not just 
difficult, but that any compliance was dismissed as `a cynical trick and 
playing games' (Tam Dalyell in Andrew Brice, The Independent, 
3/3/03: 1). Whatever Iraq did it was either non-compliance or 
cynicism 
- 
the distinction used to observe things did not really include 
compliance 
- 
there was no room for the possibility of what was 
requested, or no likelihood it would have been acknowledged at all. 
Had the criteria been specified, Iraq could have lived up to them! 
12.4. The Correct Role of the Inspectors 
One issue that became increasingly important as the UN inspections 
progressed was the `correct' role of the inspectors. A key distinction 
was drawn between what they were supposed (and supposed not) to be 
doing 
- 
the inspection process as one of detection or verification. 
Contributions drawing this distinction were spread quite 
liberally throughout the public debate in Britain and elsewhere in the 
months immediately prior to invasion, and were notably prominent 
towards the end of January 2003, including in President Bush's State 
of the Union Address: 
The 108 U. N. inspectors were sent to conduct 
- 
were not sent to conduct a 
scavenger hunt for hidden materials across a country the size of California. 
The job of the inspectors is to verify that Iraq's regime is disarming. It is 
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up to Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay those 
weapons out for the world to see, and destroy them as directed. Nothing 
like this has happened. 
(Bush, 2003a). 
Not all accounts involved this type of double movement, but for those 
involved in making the case for war, the importance of the inspectors 
not being detectives was clear. For example the UK Government 
(2003: 2) asserted that: `Inspectors are not a detective agency', and in 
the parliamentary debate on the eve of war, Dr Julian Lewis 
[Conservative] also stated that: `[I]t is not the inspectors' job to go on 
doing what they have been doing over the last few weeks in acting as 
detectives' (Hansard, 2003d: 834; also see Powell, 2003a). 
In such accounts, the specific thing that the inspectors `are' 
supposed to be is not necessarily mentioned. In trying to establish 
this, it is obviously more useful to look at those contributions stating 
both what is and is not the case more directly. In such contributions, 
the correct role is regularly claimed as one of verification in direct 
contrast to that of detection. For example: `The inspectors' role is not 
one of detectives hunting for clues, but one of verifying Iraqi 
compliance' (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, Hansard, 2003b: 
371). Here we see the familiar use of a contrastive conjunction 
connecting two interrelated movements in some ontological 
gerrymandering 
- 
what is and is not the case. Here the discursive 
work does not directly concern some `identity' that Symons tries to 
avoid, but relates to her characterisation of the understanding that 
should be made of the inspections process. The difference between 
these two roles has important implications for what is expected of the 
inspectors, and the Iraqi regime. 
It was not only those positively disposed towards war drawing 
this distinction. For example, Hans Blix, then head of UNMOVIC, 
drew the distinction in one of his presentations to the UN on the 
progress of the inspections: 
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Resolution 687 (1991), like the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, 
required cooperation by Iraq but such was often withheld or given 
grudgingly. Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its 
nuclear weapons and welcomed inspections as a means of creating 
confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine 
acceptance 
- 
not even today 
- 
of the disarmament, which was demanded of 
it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to 
live in peace. 
As we know, the twin operation `declare and verify', which was prescribed 
in resolution 687 (1991), too often turned into a game of `hide and seek'. 
(Blix, 2003). 
Later he added that: `Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that 
this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. 
Inspection is not a game of `catch as catch can'. Rather [... ] it is a 
process of verification for the purpose of creating confidence' (Blix, 
2003). 
It is possible that some of the resistance to the war resulted in 
part from the UK government failing to successfully establish 
`verification' as the preferred understanding of the inspections process 
in advance of that process beginning. Verification implies a less pro- 
active set of activities on the part of the inspectors 
- 
not `hide and 
seek' or a `scavenger hunt' and fosters different expectations about the 
results of those activities, which can not be conducted unilaterally. In 
contrast, defining the situation as one of `detection' fosters the 
expectation that a search is on, and that something will be found. The 
significance of this differential understanding is, of course, also 
interconnected with differences in the understandings of what WMD 
are, or what would count as evidence of their existence. 
What is important is that much of this discursive work in the 
direction of verification as the inspectors' correct role, was happening 
once inspection was underway. It is possible to conclude that it was to 
some extent in response to the problems resulting from detection 
coming to define the public debate. 
249 
The sense in which the definition of the situation had not been 
closed down in advance is attested to by Lord King of Bridgwater, 
speaking in Parliament in late February: `Only recently have we 
received the obvious and necessary clarification that the inspectors' 
role is as verifiers, not detectives' (Hansard, 2003b: 367). He not only 
draws the distinction between detectives and verifiers, and indicates a 
preference for one, but also claims that the clarity this distinction 
brings is something new. 
This observation about newness does not mean that the 
distinction was not drawn earlier on in the process, or long before 
(Butler, 2000: 19). Indeed, in his statement made shortly after the 
successful passage of UNSCR 1441, and before the inspections 
resumed, Tony Blair implied it: 
The obligation is to co-operate. It is not a game of hide and seek, where 
the inspectors try their best to find the weapons and Saddam does his best 
to conceal them. 
The duty of co-operation means not just access but information. Failure to 
be open and honest in helping the inspectors do their work is every bit as 
much a breach as failure to allow access to sites. 
(Blair, 2002). 
However, despite this early mention, this is perhaps one time that the 
craft of spin was not implemented successfully 
- 
the importance of 
`verification' was not circulated effectively and had not penetrated and 
framed the whole debate in advance. It was this failure that made 
necessary a certain amount of `remedial' and retroactive discursive 
work regarding the role of the inspectors. 
For those expecting verification (or perhaps more accurately, 
seeing the inspectors' role as one of verification, but not necessarily 
expecting it to occur) what was key were the activities of the Iraqi 
regime 
- 
as Blair put it, their `obligation'. Therefore, writing after the 
conclusion of major combat operations, and asserting the war's 
legality despite the absence of WMD findings, it was possible for 
Christopher Greenwood to claim that: 
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the fact that no `smoking gun' has yet been discovered in Iraq does not 
affect the legal basis for the action. The Security Council resolutions make 
it clear that the critical question was not whether Iraq might possess a 
prohibited weapon capable of immediate use. Rather, what the council 
consistently required was that the inspectors it appointed be able to certify 
that all such weapons had gone and that there were no programmes in 
place by which new ones could be created. Iraq was required to take 
positive steps, of disclosure and co-operation, as part of this process. In 
the event, Iraq had still not complied after 12 years. 
(The Times, 22/10/03: 22). 
The significance of the obligations allegedly placed upon Iraq to 
engage in such `disclosure and co-operation' can not be 
underestimated, and the following section looks at some of the ways in 
which Iraqi compliance (or not) was understood. 
12.5. The Onus and the Burden of Proof 
Much discussion of the UN inspections process concerned the 
obligations placed upon Iraq, and those in favour of pursuing military 
action constantly stressed that the combined effects of UNSCR 1441 
and previous resolutions placed the onus upon Iraq to cooperate and 
demonstrate its compliance. 
Over a month before passage of 1441, Jack Straw placed 
emphasis upon this issue: `Above all, the responsibility for ensuring a 
peaceful resolution of the issue of disarming Iraq rests with Saddam 
Hussein alone' (Hansard, 2002b: 27). The significance of such 
utterances for framing notions of responsibility has already been noted 
in the section on `Warmongering', and it is clear that the onus is 
placed upon Hussein to act in particular ways: `Above all, it is not up 
to Dr Blix and Dr El Baradei to find them. It is up to Saddam Hussein 
to give them up. He has not' (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, 
Hansard, 2003b: 246). 
The question of how cooperation was to be judged or assessed 
was obviously an important dimension of the public debate in Britain, 
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and was also an acute concern for the US administration. Stress was 
placed upon the relevance of previous successful disarmament 
processes as a point of comparison with Iraq - non-cooperation being 
defined by its difference from cooperation. 
In January 2003 the White House published a document titled 
What Does Disarmament Look Like? outlining three elements of 
voluntary disarmament: 
The decision to disarm is made at the highest political level; 
The regime puts in place national initiatives to dismantle weapons and 
infrastructure; and 
The regime fully cooperates with international efforts to implement and 
verify disarmament; its behavior is transparent, not secretive. 
(White House, 2003: 1). 
It held up examples 
- 
in South Africa, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
- 
claiming that Iraq was failing to live up to those standards, and that its 
behaviour contrasted sharply with them (White House, 2003: 3). 
Repeating and restating these themes, then US National 
Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice produced a similar statement 
regarding voluntary disarmament: 
There is no mystery to voluntary disarmament. Countries that decide to 
disarm lead inspectors to weapons and production sites, answer questions 
before they are asked, state publicly and often the intention to disarm and 
urge their citizens to cooperate. The world knows from examples set by 
South Africa, Ukraine and Kazakhstan what it looks like when a 
government decides that it will cooperatively give up its weapons of mass 
destruction. The critical common elements of these efforts include a high- 
level political commitment to disarm, national initiatives to dismantle 
weapons programs, and full cooperation and transparency [... j 
Iraq's behaviour could not offer a starker contrast. 
(Rice, 2003). 
Later as the pressure for an invasion intensified, Colin Powell stated 
similar themes in a speech to the Center for Strategic Studies: 
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Has Saddam Hussein made a strategic political decision to comply with the 
United Nations Security Council resolutions [... ] 
[... ] There is no other question. Everything else is secondary or tertiary 
Nothing we have seen since the passage of 1441 indicates that Saddam 
Hussein has taken a strategic and political decision to disarm; moreover, 
nothing indicates that the Iraqi regime has decided to actively, 
unconditionally and immediately cooperate with the inspectors [... ] 
Process is not performance. Concessions are not compliance [... ] 
(Powell, 2003b). 
Later he invoked Ukraine and South Africa again as a point of 
comparison with Iraq: 
What would it look like in Iraq? Instead of letting the inspectors grope for 
answers in the dark, Iraq would bring all of its documents out and all of its 
scientists into the light to answer the outstanding questions. Indeed, Iraq 
would be besieging the inspectors with information. Mobile labs would be 
driven up and parked outside of UNNMOVIC headquarters. All of the 
missiles of the al Samoud variety would be destroyed immediately. They 
wouldn't be hesitating. They would go and find the infrastructure for these 
missiles and what machinery they have hidden to produce more and make 
them available for destruction. 
(Powell, 2003b). 
Again, the centrality of a `strategic decision' to disarm is emphasised, 
as is the requirement of considerable activity on Iraq's part. 
Many contributions implied that if disarmament was underway 
the world would have been able to tell, and such ideas were stressed 
by George W. Bush on 6`h March 2003. First in a press conference he 
stated that: `If the Iraqi regime were disarming, we would know it, 
because we would see it. Iraq's weapons would be presented to 
inspectors, and the world would witness their destruction' (Bush, 
2003b). Later he directly echoed Colin Powell stating that: 
`concessions are not compliance' (Bush, 2003c), implying that this 
was a strategically selected sound-bite. 
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All of these contributions mobilise some version of the 
detection/verification distinction, and are all concerned with trying to 
control what is and is not the case in this context 
- 
limiting what is 
`relevant', and trying to control what counts as evidence with regard to 
those relevancies. 
Within the public debate there was a sharp polarisation on the 
issue of what the absence of hard evidence meant, however it can only 
be explained in part by the centrality of the detection/verification 
distinction, since some of those who shared a stress on verification 
nevertheless did not assume the existence of WMD. Hans Blix, who 
clearly expressed a preference for an approach akin to: `they declare, 
we verify' rather than just `they open doors, we search' (Blix, 2004: 
82), for example, tried to retain an air of legalistic objectivity by 
claiming to have made no assumptions either about existence or 
otherwise of weapons: `We presumed neither guilt nor innocence' 
(Blix, 2004: 132). 
Blix also claimed that the US administration had a different 
understanding of proof, evidence and `objectivity'. He wrote of a 
meeting with John Wolf, an American member of UNMOVIC's 
College of Commissioners: `As I went through his formulations I 
understood them to say, The witches exist; you are appointed to deal 
with these witches; testing whether there are witches is only a dilution 
of the witch hunt' (Blix, 2004: 202; original emphasis). 
The persistent assumption of Iraqi guilt is portrayed as unfair, 
meaning that pursuit of the inspections process seemed disingenuous, 
and pointing to this allegedly unfair, imbalanced, burden of proof was 
one way that those against war tried to undermine the case for it. 
Shortly after UNSCR 1441 was passed, Baroness Williams of Crosby 
utilised a statement made by Donald Rumsfeld in precisely this way: 
In answer to a caller on a recent phone-in programme in the United States, 
who asked what would happen if no weapons of mass destruction were 
found by United Nations inspectors inside Iraq, Mr Rumsfeld said: `What 
it would prove would be that the inspection process had been successfully 
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defeated by the Iraqis'. In other words, in the eyes of the Secretary of 
Defense, it is impossible to prove one's compliance. 
(Hansard, 2002e: 873). 
In his intervention, Michie points to this asymmetry and alleged 
unfairness in relation to the burden of proof. 
Start by assuming that the Iraqis haven't got WMD. Then they are obliged 
to fail the test through non-compliance. From this non-compliance we'll 
then conclude that they have something to hide, i. e., that they have WMD. 
Alternatively start by assuming that they have WMD. Either way they 
stand convicted. 
(Michie, 2003: 12, original emphasis). 
With regard to the retrospective justification of the whole process, it 
can not help those making the case for legitimacy that the Butler 
Report even accused the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of 
operating with an asymmetric burden of proof with regard to Iraq: 
Our impression is that [JIC assessments] were less complete, especially in 
their consideration of alternative hypotheses; used a different `burden of 
proof' n testing Iraqi declarations; and hence inclined towards over- 
cautious or worse case estimates, carrying with them a greater sense of 
suspicion and an accompanying propensity to disbelieve. 
(Butler et al., 2004: 53). 
Claims about such a differential burden of proof and the assumption of 
Iraqi guilt in the assessment of intelligence have subsequently been 
highly problematic for those who advocated war. 
12.6. Legal Justification: WMD, or Morality and Regime 
Change 
I have reiterated that I am not adjudicating the rightness and 
wrongness of the contributions analysed, and I am also only interested 
in the question of the `legality' of the invasion in so far as it was 
something asserted by contributors. For analytic purposes I am neither 
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interested in whether it `really' was legal, nor am I qualified to make 
such a determination. Indeed, there appears to be nothing even 
approximating a partial consensus amongst those who are qualified to 
do so! 
12.6.1. The Relevance of the Weapons (and Their Absence? ) 
One important dimension of debate concerns the question of the 
invasion's legality, something brought into question by many 
opponents at its start due to the failure of the UN Security Council to 
agree upon a second resolution. The legality has subsequently been 
problematised in relation to the absence of any WMD stockpiles 
- 
the 
argument being that if there were no weapons then the justification and 
legality of war collapses: 
It is no exaggeration to say that without any weapons find, the legal 
argument for waging war falls away. We are left with two possibilities: 
either Mr Blair believed what he was telling the Commons and the public, 
in which case he was culpably naive. Or he lied in order to justify a war he 
supported for other reasons. Either way his credibility is on the line. 
(Editorial, The Independent, 29/5/03: 18). 
Since the supposed presence of WMD in Iraq was such a key 
component in the UK government's case for invasion, their absence 
meant that invading was not justified. This contribution identifies two 
possibilities, which both have negative implications for Tony Blair's 
credibility especially 
- 
either Blair was wrong, or he lied about his real 
reasons for advocating war. 
As has already been implied in the contribution of Christopher 
Greenwood already cited (above), in countering such problems 
recourse was made to the weapons being unnecessary to make the war 
legal, with Iraqi non-cooperation being portrayed as the determinant 
factor (see Lord Goldsmith [Attorney General], in BBC, 2004a; 
Shawcross, 2004: 121). 
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12.6.2. Regime Change? 
Although moral evaluations of Saddam Hussein were constantly stated 
in the build-up to war, those advocating military action in Britain were 
careful not to claim that this was sufficient moral and legal 
justification for war. They claimed not to be advocating a policy of 
regime change for regime change's sake. 
Very often, a policy of regime change was denied directly, as 
in Tony Blair's assertion on the eve of war that: `I have never put the 
justification for action as regime change' (Hansard, 2003d: 772). 
Alternatively a denial was packaged in conjunction with an expression 
of distaste for Saddam Hussein's Iraq. As Jack Straw put it: 
I do not like the Saddam Hussein regime 
-I regard it as one of the most 
revolting and terrible regimes in the world 
- 
but the focus of 1441 is not 
regime change per se, but disarmament of Saddam's weapons of mass 
destruction. 
(Hansard, 2003a: 272). 
The moral evaluation is clear, but also recognised as insufficient 
justification. `Regime change' for its own sake is not being advocated, 
and it is arguable that this was articulated against a background 
involving the widespread circulation of hostility to the idea that moral 
evaluation of a government or state alone was justification for the use 
of military force against it. The discourse of military intervention that 
was operating was not without limit, and one was located here 
- 
in the 
need for more than just moral evaluation to justify war. 
In relation to the subsequent failure of the Iraq Survey Group 
(ISG) to find WMD, this is where many of the problems faced by the 
UK government have emanated 
- 
as the absence of WMD became 
accepted, they have been left with a justification that they previously 
portrayed as insufficient for war. 
The following section of this chapter will examine the way in 
which expectations and justifications relating to WMD specifically 
were observed as shifting once it became clearer that none were likely 
to be found. Observations were also made, especially by critics of the 
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war, pertaining to the UK government's shifting justifications 
- 
accusing them of illegitimately trying to shift from the threat of WMD 
to (insufficient) morality as a retrospective justification for the 
invasion due to the absence of stockpiles of WMD. For example: 
That he was an evil man is not in dispute, but that was not why we went to 
war, so the retrospective justification as a crusade against evil with due 
parading of conscience is irrelevant. 
(Roy Albinson, The Times, 4/6/03: 32). 
In a manner similar to that noted in an earlier chapter, whilst the moral 
evaluation of Saddam Hussein is accepted as shared, it is also claimed 
to be irrelevant 
- 
it does not count as a sufficient reason for the 
military action, and therefore will not serve to justify the invasion on 
its own if no WMD are found. 
Another contribution denying the sufficiency of the moral 
arguments made, drawing a distinction between a moral case and a 
moral reason, comes from cultural critic George Monbiot: 
I do believe that there was a moral case for deposing Saddam 
- 
who was 
one of the world's most revolting tyrants 
- 
by violent means. I also 
believe that there was a moral case for not doing so, and that this case was 
the stronger. [... ] 
[A] moral case is not the same as a moral reason [... ] 
[T]hose of us who opposed it find ourselves drawn into this fairytale. We 
are obliged to argue about the relative moral merits of leaving Saddam in 
place or deposing him, while we know, though we are seldom brave 
enough to say it, that the moral issue is a distraction. The genius of the 
hawks has been to oblige us to accept a fiction as the reference point for 
debate [... ] 
Let us argue about the moral case for war by all means; but let us do so in 
the knowledge that it had nothing to do with the invasion of Iraq. 
(The Guardian, 25/11/03: 23). 
Very significantly, Monbiot identifies the sense in which, by being 
drawn into debates about morality of the invasion, critics of the war 
allow themselves to be pulled into a debate (with a fictional reference 
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point) which is disadvantageous to them. According to Monbiot, the 
moral case is irrelevant given the reasons for the legality of war given 
at the time. Monbiot asserts a clear separation between morality and 
legality, leaving open the possibility that something can be observed as 
both moral and illegal in separate observations. 
12.6.3. Statements of Illegality 
During the autumn of 2004, people with current or former institutional 
locations making their contributions highly relevant began to state 
without hedging that the war was `illegal'. There was minor political 
embarrassment for Tony Blair, for example, when his former senior 
adviser on Europe, Sir Stephen Wall, said publicly that the invasion of 
Iraq was illegal (Bob Roberts, Daily Mirror, 9/11/04: 8). 
More significant, however, was UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan's decision to state publicly in an interview with the BBC World 
Service: `it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point 
of view, from the charter point of view it was illegal' (in BBC, 2004b). 
Although Annan is careful not to be speaking only for himself - it is a 
collective perception, grounded in the UN charter - the absence of 
significant hedging was seized upon by critics of the invasion: 
The declaration of the United Nations secretary-general, Kofi Annan, on 
the Iraq war was shocking in its simplicity. He described it for the first 
time as `illegal'. No caveats. No equivocation. None of the ambiguity 
loved by diplomats, especially at the UN headquarters. The shock is in 
part because Annan is an inherently cautious individual [... ] 
While Annan's verdict on the war is welcome, the pity is that he did not 
have the courage to make it last year, before the US and Britain embarked 
on war. 
(Editorial, The Guardian, 17/9/04: 29). 
From the point of view of those opposed to war it was unfortunate that 
he did not make such a clear declaration when it might have been more 
consequential 
- 
in advance of the invasion it might have created 
political problems for the ` coalition'. Nevertheless, despite the claims 
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that the war was in violation of the UN Charter, there appear to be no 
legal consequences for the governments involved. 
12.7. Shifting Expectations 
12.7.1. Second Order Observation of a Shift 
After the invasion, something very interesting started to happen from 
my point of view. There emerged many observations claiming that a 
shift was taking place in the official statements of the UK and US 
Governments 
- 
that they were attempting to reduce public 
expectations that `incontrovertible' evidence of WMD would be 
found. For example, Kampfher (2004: 359) claims that things moved 
from assertions regarding weapons, to programmes, and then 
programme-related activities. 
Allegations of a shift were particularly prominent in press 
coverage of the invasion's aftermath, especially in, although not 
limited to, those sources opposed to the invasion. 
Referring to a weapons `programme' does not imply they exist or are being 
produced. The most it indicates is that production could begin in future 
[. ] 
The distinction between `programmes' for weapons and actual weapons 
gained political significance after the Prime Minister told the 
Parliamentary Liaison Committee, made up of the chairs of the select 
committees, on 8 July that he had `absolutely no doubt that we will find 
evidence of weapons of mass destruction programmes'. 
The change in language, away from earlier claims that weapons would be 
found, was not lost on his critics. 
(Glen Rangwala, The Independent on Sunday, 17/8/03: 13). 
The distinction that Rangwala draws is central in much of this 
`shifting' talk 
- 
that between weapons and programmes 
- 
and was 
observable in many other contributions criticising the war. Moreover, 
it is the specific significance attributed to this distinction, this alleged 
shift, which is rendered a morally dubious matter. The observed shift 
was characterised in various negative ways, ranging from mild 
260 
ironisation and the impugning of self-interested motivations, to 
outright condemnation and sarcasm. For example, statements from US 
and UK principals were understood with a certain degree of suspicion 
as `the abrupt scaling down of expectations' (Julian Borger, The 
Guardian, 29/5/03: 1), `a gradual shift in language' (Andrew Grice, 
The Independent, 17/7/03: 2), and as `a significant softening of 
Downing Street's stance' (Nicholas Watts and Julian Borger, The 
Guardian, 18/7/03: 1), as well as representing an: 
[an] escape route being tunnelled by ministers is to shift the standard of 
evidence required. They no longer promise to uncover actual weapons but 
talk of producing evidence of a potential to make such weapons. 
(Robin Cook, The Independent, 8/7/03: 14). 
In addition, commenting upon the subsequent creation of the phrase 
`weapons of mass destruction-related programme activities', Timothy 
Garton Ash claimed that this was a dishonest twisting of language and 
was: `an early entrant for weasel words of the year' (The Guardian, 
22/1/04: 25). 
Assessing the accusations made about exaggerations regarding 
WMD in the build-up, the late Hugo Young had previously made 
similar criticisms about Tony Blair: 
So strong is his sincerity, however, that he has tried to underpin it by 
bending the language and the truth. The first sign came a few weeks ago, 
when Jack Straw started shifting tenses. Instead of saying that Iraq 
contains weapons of mass destruction, the foreign secretary began to blur 
`has' into `had', to cope with the inconvenient possibility that the weapons 
had been destroyed some time before war began. 
(The Guardian, 3/6/03: 20). 
Writing on both Blair and Bush, other critics observed a similar shift: 
`both men are working to lower the burden of proof 
- 
from finding 
weapons to finding evidence that there were programmes to develop 
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them' (Andrew Buncombe and Raymond Whitaker, The Independent 
on Sunday, 3/8/03: 8). 
Other ironisation involved sarcasm about the `objects' and 
evidence that would qualify under the new regime of expectations 
apparently being fostered. If the burden was successfully shifted in 
the direction desired by the US and UK governments then `nothing 
more lethal than memos' (Editorial, The Independent, 30/9/03: 16) or 
`only guilty paperwork' (Unattributed, The Economist, 19/7/03: 36-7) 
would be sufficient justification for invasion. This was treated in a 
rather derisory way, and it was implied that there was something very 
disturbing, and almost comical about this attempted shift. Like the 
observed shift from WMD to morality, it was argued to: `not [ 
... 
] 
merely move the goalposts, but transports the entire football field, 
stadium and all' (Cook, 2003: 294). When a further shift, from 
programmes to `break-out capability and Saddam Hussein's `strategic 
intent' (Tony Blair, Hansard, 2004: 197-8) to restart such programmes 
once sanctions were lifted, was observed at the time of the ISG's 
interim report (2004), the whole town was perhaps being moved. 
12.7.2. The Dossier's Name Change 
Perhaps the most direct manifestation of the significance of the 
weapons/programmes distinction came during the UK's Hutton 
Inquiry, when it was revealed that the UK Government's dossier had 
undergone a change of title less than a week before its publication 
(Hutton, 2004: 471,525,585). 
The significance was not lost on those who had been critical of 
the invasion: 
Even ministers have given up pretending that they now expect to find 
actual weapons. Instead they have spent the past two months lowering 
expectations by encouraging the public to settle for evidence of 
programmes of weapons of mass destruction as proof that the dossier was 
right all along [... ] 
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The decision to drop `Programmes' from the title was deliberately 
calculated to encourage the belief that Iraq already had weapons and the 
threat therefore was urgent. 
(Robin Cook, The Independent, 4/9/03: 16). 
The change of the title is seen as aiming to make the threat from Iraq's 
alleged WMD seem more immediate, more `real'. If the original title 
and its implications had been left in place it is possible that the 
evidence available after the war would have fitted with the tenor of the 
dossier more generally, but would have made it more difficult to 
justify war in advance. 
The irony of the sense in which the title change had actually 
made evidence that would retrospectively justify invasion more 
difficult to obtain was also noted by critics: 
The 19 September version was entitled Iraq's Programme for Weapons of 
Mass Destruction. Yet the final version was called simply Iraq's Weapons 
of Mass Destruction. This change is rich in irony because since the war 
Mr Blair has subtly but significantly toned down his claims that WMD 
would be found in Iraq to say that `evidence' of weapons `programmes' 
would be uncovered. So the wheel has come full circle. 
(Andrew Grice, The Independent, 19/8/03: 5). 
The wheel may have come `full circle', but it did not do so very 
smoothly, and at times through the whole episode the wheels have 
been quite close to coming off completely! 
12.7.3. Supporters of War Distinguishing Themselves 
The apparent consensus on the shift in the strength of language used 
by the UK government was not limited to critics of the war. Those 
who supported the invasion also made similar observations, often to 
disassociate themselves from the government, a practice similar to the 
types of triangulation and the logic of the foil I have previously 
mentioned. 
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For example, an Editorial in The Daily Telegraph, generally 
supportive of the invasion, but not the Blair government, claimed that 
Blair was facing a `credibility crisis', adding that the statements made 
by cabinet members: 
swing from bullish confidence that WMD are certain to turn up eventually 
to the claim that their existence was never the sole justification for going to 
war [.. ] 
Mr Blair, desperate for the support of his own party, nailed himself firmly 
to the mast of WMD as the casus belli and allowed his spin machine to 
exaggerate the danger to Britain. He may have managed to win a war that 
was morally justified, only to lose an argument that was badly conducted. 
(Editorial, The Daily Telegraph, 30/5/03: 29). 
The paper distances itself from the WMD controversy by claiming the 
war was morally justified but that the official process of justification 
was badly conducted 
- 
something for which the Telegraph cannot be 
blamed. Again in the Telegraph, several months later, a similar logic 
is clearly visible: 
Opponents of the war on Saddam Hussein are cock-a-hoop that, in the 
months since liberation, the inter-allied Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has not 
yet discovered weapons of mass destruction. As far as they are concerned 
this invalidates the main reason for sending troops into harm's way. But 
are the ISG's findings the last word on the matter? After all, the search for 
WMD was very slow off the mark and was not a high military priority in 
the days following liberation [... ] 
The survey confirms that Iraq was in violation of UN resolutions on its 
WMD programmes. Are the opponents of the war seriously suggesting 
that Saddam should have been allowed to fulfil what was, at minimum, a 
desire to acquire such weapons? The answer is obviously not. But what 
can be said is that possession of WMD alone was a dangerously narrow 
basis on which to advocate the case for war. The better argument for 
overthrowing Saddam was that put forward by figures such as Paul 
Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Defence Secretary: that the radical regimes of 
the Middle East that had given a haven to terrorists over the years had to 
be fatally weakened after September 11, so that more pluralistic forces 
could emerge in the region. The weapons that such regimes possessed, 
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and that they might have passed to suicidal sub-state forces, were mere 
symptoms of their totalitarian nature. WMD added much to their 
subversive muscle, but were not the be-all and end-all of the threat posed. 
Had Tony Blair couched the matter in broader terms than those set by the 
UN, he might be in less political difficulty now. 
(Editorial, The Daily Telegraph, 3/10/03: 29, emphasis added). 
Blair is again described as doing the right thing, but using the wrong 
justification, while the Telegraph claims better reasons for its position 
- 
distancing itself from Blair which given its general antipathy 
towards him, is far from surprising. This gets across some of the 
complexity involved in managing one's friends, enemies and context- 
specific allies. 
12.7.4. Weapons are Not Really Necessary... 
There was another dimension to this type of discursive work 
- 
statements claiming that finding weapons was actually unnecessary. 
A statement from Jack Straw was picked up by the British 
press, particularly those who were critical of the invasion, as 
representing this general shift: 
Jack Straw was forced to concede that hard evidence might never be 
uncovered. 
lie said it was `not crucially important' to find [WMD], because the 
evidence of Iraqi wrong-doing was overwhelming [... ] Similar back- 
tracking is apparent in Washington where the national security adviser, 
Condoleeza Rice, said last week that the US was pinning its hope on 
finding incriminating documents rather than actual weapons. 
(Nicholas Watt, The Guardian, 15/5/03: 4; also see Ben Russell, The 
Independent, 15/5/03: 1). 
Again here we in the realm of `back-tracking' from what has been said 
before, and the apparent expansion of the parameters of evidence 
being expanded to include documents, as evidence of `programmes' 
being sufficient. 
Straw made a similar statement a few months later: 
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The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, yesterday insisted the invasion of Iraq 
would still be justifiable even if British and US forces had to admit that no 
weapons of mass destruction could be found in Iraq [... ] 
Mr Straw, addressing the UN general assembly in New York, said that the 
fact that evidence was `difficult to obtain' did not mean it did not exist. 
There had been `overwhelming evidence' of unanswered disarmament 
questions before the war, he said. 
(Patrick Wintour, The Guardian, 26/9/03: 8). 
What is important here is that phrase `unanswered disarmament 
questions' which seems to be held up as sufficient justification for 
invasion is something likely to be viewed with the same suspicion as 
`lethal memos' and `guilty documents'. 
Nevertheless, these sorts of `objects' 
- 
unanswered questions, 
evidence of infrastructures 
- 
have become increasingly prominent in 
the statements of all those with a stake in having the war viewed 
positively. Here is an example from Tony Blair at one of his monthly 
press conferences, focusing explicitly on the war's legality: 
[F]or this war, even in retrospect, to be lawful, it requires breaches of UN 
resolutions. Already what the Iraq Survey Group has uncovered that, so 
even if there were issues to do with the legality of the war, if what David 
Kay is saying is right, if what the Iraq Survey Group is saying is right, and 
there were facilities and laboratories and documents that were not 
disclosed to the UN that should have been, then, that is the clearest 
possible breach, not just of earlier UN resolutions but specifically of UN 
resolution 1441. And that is why I say to you that in the end all these 
things, everything that is happening in this debate is a cover for people 
wanting to have a debate about the rightness or wrongness of the conflict, 
and that is actually the debate we should have and that is a perfectly 
sensible debate. But it is not a debate actually about the law, about 
conspiracies, about security services, it is actually a debate about was it 
right to remove Saddam Hussein in the way you did, or should you have 
waited and given the inspectors more time? That is actually the heart of 
this debate and it would be sensible to have it on that basis. 
(Blair, 2004a). 
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Technically the non-disclosure of facilities, laboratories and the 
unresolved status of disarmament questions might all be considered 
breaches of UNSCR 1441, but the frustration for those critical of the 
action was that they perceived this as not the case made for war - it 
was made on the more extreme grounds that weapons existed which 
could be used and constituted a threat. The problem for someone like 
me trying to make sense of the basis upon which the case was `really' 
made, apart from a degree of epistemological humility, is that there 
was such a proliferation of information, so many relevant speeches, so 
many pertinent statements circulating that the sheer volume prohibits 
clarity. It is possible to find examples of most people saying most 
things, something making it difficult to observe a clear change, and 
leading to a certain amount of information fatigue. However, it is 
possible to observe the emergence of this discourse concerned with a 
shift, and map some of its strategic relevancies, both for those alleged 
to be making it, and those observing its operation. 
12.8. Finding Nothing But Explanations 
As can be seen from the concerns circulating in the previous section 
the absence of tangible WMD in Iraq was attributed moral and 
strategic importance vis-ä-vis the war's justification. For a particular 
constituency: `Anything less than a solid discovery of WMD in Iraq 
undermines the principal argument for the military invasion' (Quentin 
Peel, Financial Times, 8/7/03: 19). 
The alternative interpretation that I have already focused 
heavily upon is that that finding stockpiles of weapons was not 
necessary, programmes and the obstruction of inspections were 
sufficient justification for the action taken. This, however, did not 
operate in isolation 
- 
other explanations and interpretations of the 
absence of such weapons were in circulation, many of which are 
discussed below. 
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12.8.1. Just Because You Cannot Find Something... 
One approach utilised was to assert that just because something cannot 
be found, it does not mean it is not there. As Andrew Murray 
observed: 
It is now semi-acknowledged that the fabled `weapons of mass destruction' 
are not going to be found in Iraq [... ] We are told that Downing Street's 
defence will hinge on the argument that just because IVMD are nowhere to 
be seen, it does not mean they are not there. 
(The Guardian, 27/9/03: 21, emphasis added). 
As chairman of the Stop the War Coalition, he clearly has reasons for 
undermining the case for war, but he does successfully identify the 
logic of many contributions, such as that of Daniel Finkelstein, quite 
neatly: `[T]here is a world of difference between not finding the 
weapons and the weapons not existing' (The Times, 30/5/03: 24). 
This logic is close to that identified by Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1982: 54) in relation to `risk' and specifically tests for carcinogens 
and their `catch-22' quality: you can be sure if you find something, but 
if you do not, you can not assume that it is not there because your 
method may have been flawed. Hence, Tony Blair's constant calls, 
post-war, for everyone to wait until the Iraq Survey Group produced 
its final report before drawing firm conclusions. 
This deferral of the moment of ultimate conclusion was also 
present in the Butler Report, published in July 2004. The authors 
elaborated that: 
Even now it would be premature to reach conclusions about Iraq's 
prohibited weapons. Much potential evidence may have been destroyed in 
the looting and disorder that followed the cessation of hostilities. Other 
material may be hidden in the sand, including stocks of agent or weapons. 
We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at this stage that 
evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical agents, or 
even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found. 
(Butler et al., 2004: 116). 
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Before the report was published, the previous head of the ISG, David 
Kay, had noted several times that they were unlikely to find stockpiles 
of weapons, and his statements were viewed as highly problematic 
because they came from a man who had been consistently hawkish on 
Iraq for a long time (see Julian Borger, The Guardian: G2,3/3/04: 2). 
When he eventually described Tony Blair as `delusional' for 
continuing to insist WMD would be found (Peter Beaumont, The 
Observer, 6/6/04: 24), this obviously created something of a problem 
for Blair 
- 
the man who had been in control of the search, who was 
keen to find stockpiles himself was admitting they were not going to 
be found and that anyone who still expected findings was kidding 
themselves. 
It is probably fair to say that many of those opposed to the war 
were also surprised at the lack of WMD findings, and would have been 
shocked to hear the ISG's (2004) interim findings if they had been 
available before the war. 
For some such people, their surprise was due to their 
expectation that something to be `found' in convenient and sinister 
way. For example, Denis Healy, former Labour Cabinet member, 
stated that he `would not put it past the Americans to plant their own 
weapons of mass destruction there' (The Independent, 5/6/03: 19). 
The fact that this did not occur was praised by philosopher Peter 
Singer. In an interview about his book (Singer, 2004), he said of 
George W. Bush that: `A man of less integrity would have put them 
there' (in Gary Younge, The Guardian: G2,14/4/04: 6)! 
12.8.2. Weapons Could Have Been Destroyed, or Removed 
An alternative set of claims speculated that the reason no stockpiles 
were found was that any weapons that were once there had been 
destroyed. Those accepting this hypothesis can be differentiated into 
two main groups: those opposed to the war who claimed they were 
destroyed long ago, and those in favour, or official sources which did 
not actively disapprove, who claimed that they could have been 
destroyed or removed immediately before the war began. 
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For the first of these two groups, given his previous 
institutional location, Hans Blix was an important contributor, 
advancing the hypothesis that Iraq cultivated the image of retaining 
WMD, despite having destroyed them, as a bluff 
- 
like a beware of the 
dog sign on a house with no dog: 
[T]he former United Nations chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, said that 
Iraq had probably destroyed its most deadly weapons of mass destruction 
more than an decade ago. 
Mr Blix, who retired in June, told the Australian state broadcaster ABC: 
`I'm certainly more and more to the conclusion that Iraq has, as they 
maintained, destroyed all, almost, of what they had in the summer of 
1991. ' [... ] Mr Blix suggested that Saddam's regime chose to keep up 
appearances to deter attack [... ] He said: `Iraq may have tried to fool them 
surreptitiously in believing that there was something. You see, if they 
didn't have anything after 1991, there must be some explanation why they 
behaved as they did. They certainly gave the impression that they were 
denying access and so forth. 
`I mean, you can put up a sign on your door, "Beware of the Dog", without 
having a dog. ' 
(David Usborne and Nigel Morris, The Independent, 18/9/03: 1). 
One of the UK's official inquiries into the pre-war intelligence noted 
the alternative hypothesis that the WMD were destroyed immediately 
before invasion: 
One suggested possibility is that the intelligence from Iraq was correct, but 
that Iraq took a unilateral decision to destroy its WMD capabilities prior to 
the outbreak of conflict in March, perhaps in response to the growing 
international pressure as military action approached [... J 
If Iraq did destroy all proscribed material unilaterally, that would raise 
questions as to why it failed to provide documentary evidence to UN 
weapons inspectors in support of its claims [... ] 
It is also possible that Iraq did destroy its stocks and weapons unilaterally, 
but sought to protect the technical expertise and the capability required to 
reconstitute its WMD capability at relatively short notice once, UN had 
been eased or lifted. 
(FAC, 2002: 75-6). 
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The authors are perhaps justified in asking why, if it had destroyed any 
WMD it possessed, Iraq failed to provide documentary evidence to 
that effect 
-a potentially difficult discursive obstacle for those against 
the war to negotiate. The passage also points to the `programmes' 
issue again, implying that technical expertise' was sufficiently 
illegitimate to warrant military action. The subsequent Butler report 
(2004: 97) also acknowledged the possibility that WMD could have 
been destroyed in the chaos following the main hostilities. 
In his evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, 
in response to a question from Sir George Young, Tony Blair 
conceded for the first time, that WMD might never be found, a 
statement which was widely attributed a great significance: 
I have to accept that we have not found them and that we may not find 
them. What I would say very strongly, however, is that to go to the 
opposite extreme and say, therefore, no threat existed from Saddam 
Hussein would be a mistake. We do not know what has happened to them; 
they could have been removed, they could have been hidden, they could 




Over a month later in his keynote speech at the Labour Party 
Conference (28/9/04), he went further, admitting that the intelligence 
was `wrong' and there were no WMD in Iraq before the war, but 
refusing to apologise for the fact that this led to removing Saddam 
Hussein: 
The evidence about Saddam having actual biological and chemical 
weapons, as opposed to the capability to develop them, has turned out to be 
wrong. 
I acknowledge that and accept it. 
I simply point out, such evidence was agreed by the whole international 
community, not least because Saddam had used such weapons against his 
own people and neighbouring countries. 
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And the problem is I can apologise for the information that turned out to be 
wrong, but I can't sincerely at least, apologise for removing Saddam. The 
world is a better place with Saddam in prison not in power. 
(Blair, 2004d). 
Again the badness of Saddam Hussein is stressed and implicitly 
claimed as sufficient justification for the action taken 
- 
it was 
`enough' to justify the absence of an apology for war, contrasting with 
his earlier distancing of himself from the possibility that regime 
change was the reason for invasion. 
12.8.3. Lies and Propaganda or Mistakes? 
These various justifications and explanations were not the only ones 
articulated for the inability to find WMD in Iraq. It has been posited 
that the accusations that Iraq possessed WMD were lies, rested on 
`speculative exaggeration' (Editorial, The Independent, 2/6/03: 12), or 
that claims about their presence were based upon flawed intelligence 
which was `sexed up'. 
The primary cultural artefact subject to scrutiny in relation to 
these accusations within the UK has been the infamous dossier (UK 
Government, 2002). At the time of its publication, a variety of views 
were expressed regarding its merits or their absence, and even those 
who subsequently criticised intensely the case for war, praised the 
dossier: `It is a great credit to our intelligence services that the dossier 
is so balanced, so objective, so factual and so much eschews rhetorical 
flourishes' (Baroness Williams of Crosby, Hansard, 2002c: 865). 
Other contributors claimed that the dossier constituted 'proof: 
`The dossier proves that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass 
destruction' (The Lord Bishop of London, Hansard, 2002c: 886), 
whereas others took the contrary view 
- 
that it was nothing more than: 
an attempt to put an official seal of approval on speculation [... ] I could 
not disagree more with hon. Members who have said that all the evidence 
is here in the dossier. [... ] It is light on fact, and heavy on conjecture. 
(Alice Mahon [Labour], Hansard, 2002b: 100). 
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After the conflict, and talking more generally of the case for war, Hans 
Blix, former head of UNMOVIC, made a rhetorically effective 
statement regarding this notion of exaggeration: 
I think it was a spin that was not acceptable. They put exclamation marks 
where there had been question marks and I think that is hyping, a spin, that 
leads the public to the wrong conclusions. 
(in BBC, 2004a). 
The difference that makes a difference rhetorically here is between 
question and exclamation marks 
-a nice piece of spin in its own right. 
As ever, the discursive location 
- 
the `communicative career' 
- 
of the 
person making the statement is very important for the amount of 
attention and weight given it. 
More extreme than these claims about speculation and 
exaggeration are the accusations of a greater mendacity 
- 
those 
making the case for war were deliberately lying. In this regard, the 
Stop the War Coalition's `Bliar' campaign, swapping the two letters in 
Blair's name, is a prime example. 
To try and combat this set of claims, those supportive of the 
war's aims seized upon the conclusions of the various investigations 
and inquiries made into the uses of intelligence, and the Butler report 
specifically. On the question of Blair's (and Bush's) honesty, David 
Aaronovitch made use of Butler's lack of ambiguity on the issue of 
honesty: 
Butler does not make an ambiguous judgment on the accusation of 
deliberate deception. He rules against it [... ] 
The `liar' position depends on an assertion that Bush and Blair half- 
expected there to be no WMD. That assertion, as Butler makes clears, is 
not credible. 
(The Observer, 18/7/04: 26). 
A critic might point out that the Butler Report only `found no evidence 
of deliberate distortion or of culpable negligence' (Butler et al., 2004: 
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110; original emphasis), and if we applied the same evidential 
standards to this as those in favour of the invasion utilise on the WMD 
question then just because no evidence can found, it does not mean 
that it is not there! However, that is not really the point. What is 
important is that the document is drawn on selectively, and that the 
assertion that accusation about lying are `not credible' is yet another 
example of a statement `hoping' for a direct performative effect - 
challenging those wishing to claim as much, to deal with the moral 
consequences resulting from such an allegedly `incredible' claim. 
Accusations about lying were actually relatively rare within the 
`mainstream' political system (including those journalists and critics 
associated with it), and people criticising the action often disclaimed 
that they were accusing Tony Blair et al of lying. Below are two 
examples, both drawn from The Independent newspaper: 
I don't myself believe that he was actually mendacious in his presentation 
of the threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. He was 
probably guilty of no more than massaging what he saw to be the truth for 
what he considered to be an end that would justify his means. 
(Deborah Orr, The Independent, 3/6/03: 12). 
Personally I never thought the Prime Minister acted on Iraq in anything 
other than good faith. On the contrary, the problem may have been at the 
other extreme. The burning sincerity with which Tony Blair believed in 
the case for war may have led him into seizing too uncritically on those 
pieces of information that supported the conclusion he had already reached 
that war would be justified. 
(Robin Cook, The Independent, 6/6/03: 16). 
Both these contributions rely upon a distinction between lying 
(illegitimate) and something else (portrayed as less illegitimate). In 
the first example, this is Blair `massaging what he saw to be the truth', 
and in the second, it is `burning sincerity' which affected his 
judgment. 
Since both the writers are generally political `allies' of Blair, 
the positioning involved is similar (and yet opposite) in its logic to that 
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of those contributions of those who were pro-war but anti-Blair in a 
more general sense. It is a matter of managing the enemy/friend 
distinction with the use of some kind of context-specific 
supplementary clarification: pro-Blair but anti-war, pro-war but anti- 
Blair. 
An alternative `not quite lies' argument, of specific theoretical 
interest comes from commentator Timothy Garton Ash: 
[W]e went to war with Saddam Hussein on the basis of Anglo-American 
intelligence reports that were, at best, politically misrepresented, or, at 
worst, falsified [... ] [T]he trend in journalism as in politics, and probably 
now in the political use of intelligence, is away from the facts and towards 
a neo-Orwellian world of manufactured reality. This is something slightly 
different from (though close to) straight lies. 
(The Guardian, 5/6/03: 23). 
Here we are portrayed as moving towards some sort of Baudrillardian 
simulation (Baudrillard, 1983), which is alleged to be highly 
problematic. Faced with this, Garton Ash advances the arguably naive 
solution that if journalists pursue the `facts' than this advancing world 
would be forced into retreat, although he neglects to address how 
pursuit of `the facts' can occur if the nature of factuality is no longer 
agreed upon. 
In this specific case, a number of inquiries have been held in 
the UK and the US, all in search of `the facts'. The Hutton Report 
(2004) was widely dismissed by critics of the invasion as a 
`whitewash', and the more recent Butler Report (2004) was 
sufficiently ambiguous to let everyone find something within them to 
support almost any argument they wanted! 
In the `Letter to the Prime Minister' at the start of the ISC's 
(2003) Report the authors included a disclaimer regarding the report's 
intentions: 
This Report does not judge whether the decision to invade Iraq was 
correct. Its purpose is to examine whether the available intelligence, which 
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informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly reflected 
in Government publications. 
(ISC, 2003: no pagination). 
Variations on this clarification or disclaimer also appeared throughout 
the report (for example on pages 5 and 41). This allows those more in 
favour of the invasion to conclude that the report did not criticise the 
decision to invade, without having to mention that that is because it 
was a question that was not directly asked! 
In the context of hunting, similar use is made of the Bums 
Report (Bums et al., 2000) which constantly stressed that it was not 
passing judgment on whether hunting with dogs was cruel or not 
- 
not 
making an ethical assessment. This constant denial of an engagement 
in moral evaluation on the part of the authors has not stopped both 
sides in that debate spending the last four years constantly claiming 
that that the report directly supported their position on the morality and 
ethics of hunting! 
In the context of Iraq, the ISC displaces the issue of what 
should have happened onto the question of whether the intelligence 
available was used correctly, which also half-sidesteps the question of 
the accuracy of that intelligence, and questions regarding the 
responsibility for it. 
A variety of explanations were generated elsewhere for the 
apparent failure of the intelligence services to `accurately' identify 
Iraq's capabilities, most of which were described tentatively in the 
Butler Report. These tended to locate the `blame' collectively and 
non-specifically in systems, institutions and practices. For example, 
Butler et al. (2004) identified the risks of the development of a kind of 
`group think' and a `prevailing wisdom' about Iraq' (Butler et al., 
2004: 16), which meant that intelligence assessments: 
tended to be over-cautious and in some cases worst case. Where there was 
a balance of inference to be drawn, it tended to go in the direction of 
inferring the existence of banned weapons programmes. 
(Butler et al., 2004: 111). 
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A related but alternative explanation was that the intelligence situation 
was an `echo chamber' in which the same intelligence sources were 
unintentionally used to corroborate themselves (David Rose, The 
Observer, 30/5/04: 23). 
All these attempts at explanation are of course partially related 
to the continued need for legitimation of the invasion, and the need to 
account for how what happened could have been based on a set of 
claims that many people involved now accept was inaccurate. 
12.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped some of discursive contours of 
communications involving the phrase WMD in the public debate 
concerned with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It has explored some of 
the subtle distinctions advanced for strategic and moral reasons in 
pursuit of definitional control in relation to the significance of the 
phrase `weapons of mass destruction'. 
The following chapter will bring together the contents of the 
preceding empirical chapters in order to restate their 
interconnectedness and identify more directly some important 
regularities that should be noted and explored in greater detail by 
future research. 
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13. Discussion and Conclusions 
`Of course, denying it wouldn't have worked. The way things 
were, if somebody came up to you and said, "Hi there, I'm a 
Rosicrucian, " that meant he wasn't. No self-respecting 
Rosicrucian would acknowledge it. On the contrary, he would 
deny it to his last breath. ' 
`But you can't say that anyone who denies being a Rosicrucian is 
a Rosicrucian, because I say I am not, and that doesn't make me 
one. ' 
`But the denial itself is suspicious. ' 
`No, it's not. What would a Rosicrucian do once he realized 
people weren't believing those who said they were, and that 
people suspected only those who said they weren't? He'd say 
that he was, to make them think he wasn't. ' 
(Eco, 1990: 199) 
Having discussed the theoretical background informing this project, 
including the way it is influenced by the work of Foucault and 
Luhmann, this thesis has outlined some pertinent literature concerned 
with the `Iraq Crisis', and explained the methodological approach 
adopted. This included discussion of the discursive difficulty that can 
result from the circulation and application of morally asymmetrical 
distinctions, including the types of statement that accusations 
associated with such distinctions can incite as a form of resistance. 
I then moved on to focus upon various dimensions of the public 
debate preceding and surrounding the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
including some of the regularities observable in relation to the 
difficulty and moral asymmetries mobilised and evaded by 
contributors. 
As will already be clear, the interconnections between the 
various empirical chapters are not particularly `neat'. The best way to 
think of the interconnections between them would be as a set of 
partially overlapping Venn diagrams. This chapter explores some of 
the regularities identified in the empirical chapters in more general 
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terms and discusses some significant and interesting issues which 
deserve to be pursued in greater depth in future. 
I provide a brief overview of some of the most notable things 
addressed in the empirical chapters, and after this summary, the rest of 
the chapter is organised thematically under the following headings: 
  
Moral Asymmetry, Contrast, and Triangulation 
  
Confluent Alliances, Confluent Enmity 
  
The Communicative Career 
  
Phases of Refolding or Reflection 
13.1. Summary of Key Findings 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 5) attended to the significance of 
`the war on terrorism' (WoT) as a frame for the debate, and described 
some of the ways in which Iraq's relationship was envisaged (or not) 
in arguments for and against the invasion in 2003. This demonstrated 
that contributions on the same side of the debate advanced completely 
different conceptions of the relationship between Iraq and WoT. 
Those advocating invasion offered opposite views on Iraq's relation to 
WoT in the face of differing discursive threats from their opponents. 
Advocates of war had to avoid the illegitimacy associated with their 
position being too connected, or not connected enough, with the WoT 
for various reasons. I also speculated on the difference that it might 
have made if the alternative frame `campaign against terrorism' had 
framed the discursive context. 
I moved on to discuss two accusations made against those 
against war 
- 
that they were `anti-American' or `pro-Saddam'. 
Various techniques were observed as regularly employed in countering 
such accusations, including disclaiming and the provision of evidence 
to the contrary. I also noted the stress placed upon particular 
distinctions, such as that between a government and its people, in the 
associated disclaiming. 
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In relation to anti-Americanism in particular I noted the ways in 
which some contributions invoked the existence of other more 
`extreme' elements on the same side of the debate as them in order to 
differentiate themselves as more legitimate 
- 
using them as a 
contrastive foil 
- 
and thereby mobilising a morally asymmetrical 
distinction between `anti-war and anti-American' and `anti-war but not 
anti-American'. 
In relation to the pro-Saddam accusations, I observed the 
drawing of a key distinction between the morality and legality of 
invasion, as those against war often stressed their negative moral 
evaluation of Saddam Hussein whilst stating that the legality of 
removing him (regime change) did not automatically follow from that. 
I also explored the problems faced by two individuals 
- 
George 
Galloway and Scott Ritter, and the way in which their `communicative 
careers' were important for the ways in which their contributions were 
understood. In relation to Ritter, in particular I noted the significance 
attributed to his apparent `conversion' on the issue, and the way in 
which he seemed to adopt the role of the `parrhesiastes' by implying 
that risks and difficulties associated with his position meant it should 
be taken more seriously. 
Next I moved onto the significance of historical analogies, 
particularly those associated with Hitler, and the implication that those 
against war wanted to engage in `appeasement', as well as the way that 
such accusations were problematised. As with anti-Americanism and 
the pro-Saddam accusations, much problematisation proceeded via 
disclaiming, but also evident was a process of reversal, with those 
against war accusing their opponents of engaging in appeasement of 
the United States 
- 
an approach which reaffirms the relevance of 
appeasement as illegitimate, and implies a degree of variability in its 
potential application. 
I also explored the competing but less successful analogies 
drawn with the `Suez Crisis' and the Vietnam War, and based upon the 
`need' for an exorcism or form of redemption evident in many 
discussions of Vietnam, I advanced the possibility that the significance 
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of `appeasement', especially in a British context, is related to a similar 
need not to repeat what are observed as the `errors' of the past. 
Next, I looked at accusations of `pacifism' and of 
`warmongering', advanced at contributors on opposing sides in the 
debate. In relation to pacifism I noted the way in which, although 
observed as illegitimate, it is nevertheless treated with a degree of 
respect suggesting that it is more a technical than moral 
disqualification. The implication is that, although someone affected 
by it is disqualified from legitimately taking part in debate over 
whether a war should be countenanced, they should not be condemned 
in the same way as those identified in other more morally negative 
ways. 
On the opposite side of the debate, some contributors had to 
disclaim that they were warmongers who were irrationally eager for 
war. One technique adopted in such denial was to claim membership 
of a wider (majority) community which dislikes war and sees it as only 
a `last resort'. Another related and recurrent issue was a stress placed 
upon the absence or deferral of a decision to invade 
- 
that none had 
yet been made, and that the best way to avoid having one was to 
demonstrate a credible threat of force to pressurise Iraq into 
compliance. 
I also discussed some of the avian metaphors used to make 
sense of the position of contributors, including various supplements to 
the standard hawk/dove distinction. Based upon this I noted the 
significance of Colin Powell's conversion 
- 
his observed 
transformation from dove to hawk 
- 
and the way in which his 
communicative career, his being understood as not a warmonger, was 
used in pursuit of persuasive force immediately before the invasion. 
I moved on to discuss the significance attributed to `supporting 
the troops', and the way that this imperative produced a moral 
consensus as military action became imminent. Pressure was placed 
upon those opposed to war to cease their criticism in the interests of 
the troops ('our boys'), something which incited critics to stress their 
support for the troops at the same time as advancing criticism. Some 
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even claimed that the best way of demonstrating support would be to 
ask for their withdrawal. 
In a parliamentary context, I noted how the Liberal Democrats, 
in particular, suffered from the apparent inconsistency of advancing 
support for the troops whilst criticising their deployment. 
Nevertheless, I also noted the way in which those against war have 
utilised the valorisation of the troops, and their families, to undermine 
their continued presence in Iraq in the invasion's aftermath. 
The final empirical chapter concerned some of the discursive 
contours of discussion regarding `weapons of mass destruction' 
(WMD). I described the way in which the vagueness of the phrase's 
definition is admitted by some contributors, but has not prevented 
many contributors constantly stating that there was (or could be) `no 
doubt' about their presence or absence in Iraq, albeit often mixing 
such certainty with a degree of hedging. 
I discussed the significance of UNSCR 1441, including the 
denial that it contained a trigger for war, as well as the degree of 
vagueness about what was to count as a material breach of it. I also 
argued that the correct role of the UN weapons inspectors was 
understood via operation of a morally asymmetrical distinction 
between detection and verification, and that some of the problems 
faced by the pro-war case resulted from a failure to ensure that the 
inspectors' role was understood as one of verification at an early stage. 
On a related issue, I noted the way in which the burden of proof 
was envisaged in the debate, with the emphasis strongly upon Iraq 
(Saddam Hussein) to comply. I also identified the widely drawn 
distinction between WMD and morality (regime change) as 
justification for war, particularly the way in which (similar to the 
separation envisaged in denial of being pro-Saddam) the morality and 
legality of invasion were distinguished. It was claimed, by some, that 
there was moral justification for war, but that it was nevertheless 
illegal since more than a moral evaluation was required. I also 
mentioned the apparently increasing willingness, in the aftermath, of 
relevant people to state categorically that the invasion was illegal. 
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I also identified the way in which a shift in the reasons used 
retrospectively to justify war was widely observed, particularly in 
relation to WMD. Many observed a `downward' shift over time from 
WMD to WMD programmes, to WMD programme-related activities, 
and then to Saddam Hussein's intentions, as it became clear that no 
WMD were going to be found. 
In a manner similar to the triangulation and foil logic 
mentioned in other chapters, I observed the way in which the absence 
of WMD was dealt with by some supporters of war, who distinguished 
themselves from the `official' WMD-related justifications 
- 
saying 
that the correct action (invasion) was taken but was justified using the 
wrong reasons, and that their reasons for supporting invasion were 
better in contrast. 
Finally, I noted some of the explanations advanced for the 
coalition's inability to locate WMD in Iraq, ranging from the argument 
that failure to find something does not mean it is not there, to the 
possibility that the weapons could have been destroyed before war, or 
whether this was based upon mistaken intelligence or more 
mendacious propaganda or lies. 
Having summarised the empirical chapters, I will now explore 
what are some of the most interesting themes emergent from them. 
13.2. Moral Asymmetry, Contrast, and Triangulation 
The things that one finds out about something are to a very large 
extent a product of the way that you set out to observe it. It would 
make no sense for me to deny this given that I have utilised the work 
of Niklas Luhmann, which is all about such observer-dependency 
(albeit one in which systems are doing the observing). Nevertheless, 
the particular way in which I have engaged in observation of the 
public debate surrounding the `Iraq Crisis' has generated some 
interesting findings which can be generalised and potentially applied 
to other areas, because the project is not `about' the `Iraq Crisis' in an 
orthodox way. Rather, it is about the discursive difficulties 
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constructed for particular contributors within that context, difficulties 
which have a clearly moral inflection in the sense of being about the 
operation of evaluations according to the distinctions good/bad, 
right/wrong, esteem/contempt in Niklas Luhmann's sense. 
13.2.1. The Ubiquity of Moral Evaluation, and Moral 
Asymmetries 
Much of the content of this thesis provides evidence for the ubiquitous 
potential of moral evaluation. Despite narratives claiming a decline in 
the significance of morality, it is still always possible that 
communication or discourse will be observed morally 
- 
as good/bad, 
appropriate/inappropriate. If moral evaluation is an ever-present 
possibility, then communications are all therefore potentially morally 
accountable. 
I have adopted a position on moral evaluation as a dynamic 
process, not as involving the implementation of a clearly codified, 
rigid set of already made evaluations. Instead valuation is viewed as a 
more open-ended, contingent process, one that is always possible, but 
one whose occurrence can not be entirely predicted. This to some 
extent presupposes that a clearly shared set of universally applicable 
moral principles no longer exists (if it ever did), and that morality is 
more a matter of form than content. 
It is in relation to this nebulousness, this absence of a clearly 
shared, predictable set of valuations, that the discursive moral 
`difficulty' with I have been concerned intensifies. If moral 
evaluations are a constant possibility, but you can not be sure upon 
exactly what basis you might be evaluated, then things are even more 
difficult than they would be if it was clear what you needed to say to 
avoid condemnation or illegitimacy 
- 
there are no guarantees that 
whatever response you formulate will not be evaluated negatively. For 
example, in this context, some of those critics making sure to state 
their `support of the troops' were, nevertheless, implied to be merely 
stating the `usual words' as if the production of such statements was a 
formulaic, and therefore illegitimate response to the `need' to agree. 
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As set out in my theoretical chapter, it is possible for particular 





or according to a moral 
asymmetry, internal to a specific discursive space. In a controversial 
situation, where there is a strong sense of polarisation into for/against 
positions, the possibilities can be condensed in such a way that the 
available likely types of observation and evaluations 
- 
the number of 
distinctions likely to be used 
- 
is reduced. It can become relatively 
clear to potential contributors that particular distinctions, say between 
the anti-American and the more `reasonable' person, are likely to be 
applied if you make particular types of statement. The sense of 
`difficulty' therefore comes from the possibility of negative evaluation 
according to a morally asymmetrical distinction 
- 
the threat of a 
difference that makes a difference morally (and also strategically). 
Awareness of the circulation of specific moral asymmetries can 
lead to specific strategic imperatives, but a more generalised 
imperative results from the threat of illegitimacy, forcing people to 
have particular relations with themselves. The difficulty resulting 
from the circulation of asymmetries requires or incites particular types 
of statement, which are repressively present, and aimed at 
problematising the distinctions in operation, or attempting to secure a 
position on one side rather than the other. People are encouraged to 
relate to and talk about themselves in particular ways, making claims 
about how they can or would prefer to be (or should be) observed, and 
for what reasons, and I have discussed many such examples 
observable in the public debate over the invasion of Iraq. 
There is no good reason to assume that these sorts of processes 
are restricted to this context, although particular accusations are more 
likely to be more transportable than others. That would require 
detailed empirical investigation across several contexts. I would argue 
that thinking about similar issues in virtually any context would be a 
productive starting point for understanding the types of difficulties, 
pressures and limits with which contributors are faced, and therefore 
one dimension that could be probed in order to understand or explain 
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how a debate unfolds in the ways it does. A question such as: `What 
moral asymmetries are in circulation in any given context, and how are 
the engaged with and problematised by those to whom they are 
applied? ' could be used to bring into focus some of the important 
dimensions of a specific discursive context, without unnecessarily 
restricting the types of observation made. 
13.2.2. Clarification Only? 
One objection to the type of understanding that I am advocating, one 
alternative approach to the use of contrastive conjunctions, would be 
to see them as clarification only, as morally `innocent' 
- 
as if 
clarification were not a morally accountable, and potentially 
problematic, matter. However (again I am, ironically, using one such 
conjunction in writing about them), clarification also occurs in relation 
to perceived negative misunderstandings, and therefore is a moral or 
normative matter operating in relation to moral asymmetries. Even 
seemingly ordinary practices are `interested' in the sense of being 
directed towards something. They are strategic, if strategy is 
conceived in a non-cognitive, non-intentional sense (Potter, 1996: 65; 
Dean, 1999: 72) 
- 
directed towards some end, moving along a 
particular trajectory. 
For example, my `clarification' about what I have not been 
doing in this thesis 
- 
providing an authoritative, explanatory account 
of the invasion of Iraq 
- 
is interested, directed to an end. It (hopefully) 
makes a difference regarding the way in the project is to be evaluated. 
If it were evaluated as attempting to produce such an account, I would 
likely be assessed, quite rightly, as having failed rather spectacularly! 
So I attempted to negotiate this `difficulty' by intervening discursively 
in the attempted to preclude a particular type of evaluation. If 
successful, it will not ensure a particular type of evaluation, but may 
prevent an especially unhelpful possibility. Even seemingly `ordinary' 
or `banal' activities have a type of morally significant trajectory that 
merits analytic attention. 
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13.2.3. `But' as Coupling and Decoupling 
Since `but' is a contrastive conjunction it is rather obvious that it, 
along with `nevertheless' and `however' etc, are used in activities 
which contrast and connect things! 
The various interventions we have seen aimed at disrupting 
definitions of the situation 
- 
the ontological gerrymandering aimed at 
altering the discursive space 
- 
are all orientated towards something 
being the case rather than something specific, presupposing a moral or 
strategic asymmetry between the two possibilities. 
If we accept that, based upon the more two-sided version 
conception of communication derived from Niklas Luhmann, both 
sides of a distinction utilised in communication can be observed by a 
second order observer, then we can view contrastive conjunctions as 
crossing points between the two sides of a given distinction, or as 
involved in the coupling and decoupling of distinctions. 
For example, contrastive conjunctions can be used in an 
attempt to ensure that the speaker is observed as legitimate rather than 
illegitimate, by their claiming that they are not pro-, and are, in fact, 
anti-Saddam Hussein. Alternatively, they can facilitate a discursive 
movement from agreement over the negative moral evaluation of 
Saddam Hussein, to disagreement over the legality of invading Iraq, 
and the claim that moral evaluation is not sufficient to justify war. 
Whilst coupling the drawing of the two distinctions, and moving 
between the two, such a process decouples them conceptually 
- 
denying that the two distinctions can be de-differentiated, therefore 
affirming that they are different from one another. 
Whilst the complexity involved and implied by such a process 
is partially resistant to the difficulties resulting from any coercive 
pressure to agree upon moral evaluation 
- 
agreeing with it, but also 
claiming its irrelevance, or at least its insufficiency 
- 
it also plays a 





to affirm a negative moral evaluation of 
Saddam Hussein. Whilst partly resisting it, it can also be argued to 
affirm it, contributing to a sense of consensus, and therefore is 
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complicit in (re)circulating the incitement. Some of the techniques 
available for pursuing legitimacy therefore nevertheless also draw the 
contributors resisting them into what may be a disadvantageous 
discursive position for them 
- 
resulting in their making concessions to 
their opponents and bringing them into partial agreement with them. 
As we saw in several of the chapters, the extent to which they seem to 
share evaluations with their opponents 
- 
on the need to support the 
troops, or on the moral evaluation of Saddam Hussein and yet disagree 
on what should follow, can lead to their being perceived as 
inconsistent, confused, or as trying to have their cake and eat it. 
13.2.4. Triangulation 
In several of the chapters I noted the way in which some contributors 
positioned themselves in relation to more than one thing with their 
statements. They were not simply choosing a side, but also 
positioning themselves in relation to other people on the same side 
- 
clarifying their degree of attachment to the others on that side. 
This double movement is similar in operation to the coupling 
and decoupling significance of contrastive conjunctions, representing 
the pursuit of legitimacy in contrast to less legitimate, less reasonable 
contributors on the same side. The contributor who engages in such 
triangulation pursues legitimacy as anti-war but anti-Saddam, or as 
anti-war but pro-American at the expense of those that they portray as 
anti-war and pro-Saddam or anti-war and anti-American. That is, they 
negatively evaluate what are their context-specific allies, and rely 
upon identifying their difference from such allies who are, in contrast, 
less reasonable, and not theoretically open to persuasion. 
Arguably, therefore, this approach does nothing to significantly 
undermine the illegitimacy of a particular accusation, or the process of 
making accusations more generally, since it is directly reliant upon 
such accusation. Moreover, it raises questions about what it means to 
be positioned on the same side as other groups or individuals 
- 
how 
does the strength of a contributor's attachment to the others with 
whom they broadly position themselves on an issue manifest itself in 
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their contributions more generally? How temporary, and how specific, 
are contemporary political, social and cultural alliances? 
13.3. Confluent Alliances, Confluent Enmity? 
One issue which I have implied but not addressed directly so far 
relates to the significance of having a `coalition' 
- 
having a context- 
specific alliance between people who may strongly disagree with one 
another in other contexts. This is something which was relatively 
prominent in this context, with both sides stressing the breadth and 
diversity of people on their side. 
On both sides of the debate over Iraq, coalitions were 
assembled and prominently displayed. The `coalition of the willing' 
eventually came together to support, and conduct, the invasion of Iraq, 
whilst the Stop the War Coalition campaigned against it. Within the 
controversy preceding war it was clear that the issue was considered 
culturally and politically unusual to the extent that the sides, the 
alignment of those for and against, was observed as impossible to 
understand based upon any simple left/right political distinction. 
The apparent strangeness of the alliances involved was 
identified and mobilised by contributors to debate, and used as a 
resource to generate extra persuasive or moral force for their positions. 
If so many diverse people, many of whom were usually politically 
hostile to one another, could come together under one umbrella, on 
one side, then they should be taken seriously. For example, John 
Gummer [Conservative] noted the apparent strangeness, claiming that 
it deserved careful attention: 
There comes a time in one's life when one finds oneself in peculiar 
company. The feeling is probably mutual, and others will be as 
embarrassed as I, but that should lead people to listen carefully to the 
group that has come together to point out something that should be self- 
evident 
- 
that the case for military action against Iraq is yet unproven 
(Hansard, 2003a: 309, emphasis added). 
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Whilst in one sense such `unexpected' coming together is used 
`positively', used as a resource, there is also a sense in which it can be 
problematic. Gummer implies a degree of embarrassment regarding 
those with whom he has positioned himself, and other contributions 
evince the way in which this serves to require more `negative' or 
defensive discursive work. In a manner similar to the other 
triangulation I have discussed, there is a type of future-orientated 
concern with the threat of guilt-by-association which may need to be 
addressed. 
13.3.1. Differentiating Oneself 
We have already encountered several examples in which people are 
involved in differentiating themselves from others with whom they are 
associated due to their position adopted in relation to invasion of Iraq 
- 
relatively left-wing journalists opposed to invasion differentiating 
themselves from allegedly more extreme opponents of war who were 
supposedly `anti-American' or `pro-Saddam', right-wing journalists 
who supported war differentiating themselves from the official WMD- 
related justification for it. Indeed, such approaches pursue legitimacy 
by contrasting themselves with other less legitimate members of the 
same side. They are agreed with in terms of a for/against orientation, 
but things are more complex and there are further differences that 
make a difference. 
There are many examples of differentiating discourse in this 
context, with contributions directly intervening to `clarify' (in the 
interested sense that I have already mentioned) the extent (or lack 
thereof) of their more general association with some of those on the 
same side of the debate as them. Such contributions provide evidence 
of a concern to control the way in which your relationship to your 
context-specific friends and enemies is understood. 
In other contexts, such as the contemporary debates over the 
banning of hunting (foxes) with dogs, this differentiation can take on a 
wry or ironic tone. For example, intervening whilst Tony Banks 
[Labour], her opponent in almost any other context, was giving a 
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speech, Ann Widdecombe [Conservative] stated her gratitude to her 
`honourable and strictly temporary Friend' (Hansard, 2003e: 46, 
emphasis added). 
A much more venomous example, which personalises the 
animosity he claims to feel, comes from right-wing journalist Peter 
Hitchens who was opposed to invasion of Iraq: 
I loathe being on the same side as all those dim, thoughtless Leftists who 
are always against war [... ] 
If Tony Benn and Archbishop Rowan Williams are both against a cause, 
then there must be something attractive about it 
(Mail on Sunday, 29/12/02: 29). 
Interestingly, this very issue 
- 
the concern with managing one's 
context-specific allies, and its possible negative consequences 
- 
was 
also discussed by his brother in one of his many contributions to the 
debate: 
It is important to beware of arguments that depend upon `the enemy of my 
enemy', and it's likewise important to be immune to the charges of 
keeping bad company [... ] 
If you pay too much attention to the shortcomings of your allies, or if you 
worry about being lumped together with dubious or unpopular types, you 
are in effect having your thinking done for you. 
(Christopher Hitchens, The Observer, 25/8/02: 27). 
Arguably both brothers, from their opposing locations on this issue, 
are, in part, attempting to make a virtue out of not allowing others to 
think for them, something again involved in the generation of moral 
force for their position. The negative associations, whilst they need to 
be disclaimed, can be put to good use and made a virtue by claiming 
that the person differentiating him- or her-self demonstrates a refusal 
to allow others to think for them 
-a claim that they are willing to 
speak what they consider to be right or truthful without being 
influenced by the details of which other people do or do not agree with 
them. As such, this resonates with Foucault's (2001) conception of 
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the parrhesiastes, which I have already discussed in relation to Scott 
Ritter. Speaking from a `difficult' position, and despite that difficulty, 
is portrayed as evidence of the importance and consequentiality of 
what is said 
- 
the difficulty should make sure that it is heard and taken 
seriously. 
These types of differentiations, contrasts, and clarifications, are 
unlikely to be confined to this context, although the invasion of Iraq's 
particularly high degree of complexity may have intensified their 
significance. All such differentiations are strongly directed towards 
other contexts 
- 
the disclaiming of generalised associations with 
others, orientated towards avoiding an unwanted association with their 
position on other issues in other contexts. 
The extent to which such apparently fractured groupings raises 
questions about the wider significance of unexpected alliances and the 
temporary basis of political friendship and enmity. Investigation of 
such questions would require engagement with communications 
produced in multiple contexts, looking for patterns of alignment, as 
well as communications avowing and disavowing of the strength of 
attachment of those so aligned. How far and in what ways can and do 
political and moral modalities undergo transformation and become 
repositioned? 
13.3.2. Confluent Adversaries? 
Thinking about the process of political alignment, the way in which 
people line up on opposing sides, can direct our attention towards the 
work of Chantal Mouffe, and her writing for and against that of Carl 
Schmitt, who I have already mentioned occasionally. 
Mouffe has argued that what is necessary for the realisation of 
a more radical form of liberal democratic politics, which is not 
undermined by the incompatibilities of liberalism and democracy, is a 
conception of `adversaries' understood as enemies who (contrary to 
Schmitt) do not merit destruction, but who are instead viewed as 
legitimate and deserving of toleration (Mouffe, 1993: 4; 2000: 102). 
Such adversaries are paradoxical `friendly enemies' who share a 
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common symbolic space, but want that space to be organised 
differently (Mouffe, 2000: 13). 
Arguably this is similar to Durkheim's (1984: 54) argument 
that, under the division of labour, adversaries may nevertheless 
possess: `some general sympathy which keeps their antagonism within 
bounds, tempering it. However, Mouffe (2000: 102-3) conceives of 
the relation between adversaries as agonistic rather than antagonistic 
(which she claims is struggle between enemies in a more orthodox 
sense). 
Whilst it is very interesting, and potentially useful for 
understanding the way in which there may be a high degree of overlap 
between political opponents, this approach does not explicitly provide 
a way of making sense of the dynamism that is implied by much of the 
differentiating discursive work evident in the context of the `Iraq 
Crisis'. 
An alternative approach is Bauman's (2002: 85) adaptation of 
Giddens (1992: 61-4) notion of `confluent love' to make sense of the 
`confluent enmity' and `confluent alliances' arguably evident in the 
WoT in particular. 
According to Giddens (1992: 61), confluent love is: `contingent 
love, and therefore jars with the "for-ever", "one-and-only" qualities 
of the romantic love complex'. The complexity and flux of some 
aspects of contemporary social and political life can perhaps be 
understood thorough this notion of confluence 
- 
implying the 
existence of relatively temporary and highly contingent relationships 
of convenience 
- 
although this does not have to be restricted to the 
WoT. 
It may be that the development of specific controversies fosters 
a type of gravitational field of moral polarization (Black, 1998: 131) in 
relation to the personnel involved, but they are not fixed for all time 
- 
the field is one that can to some degree be exited when it comes to 
another issue. However, there is not a single field with a single 
alignment but multiple ones, between which movement can occur and 
sides aligned differently. 
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The extent to which any instability resulting from such flux 
might contribute to a rather cynical and self-serving form of 
promiscuous politics is something deserving detailed exploration, 
based upon a much broader set of contexts, with a less restricted 
temporal gaze than that used in this project. 
13.4. The Communicative Career 
13.4.1. Careering About? 
One concept that I floated into several of the chapters is that of the 
`communicative career', something used to make sense of the way in 
which the way in which a person has previously been understood it 
consequential for the way in which they are observed again in this 
context. In several empirical chapters I noted how the communicative 
careers of George Galloway, Scott Ritter and Colin Powell were all 
highly consequential for the ways in which their contributions to the 
debate were understood, as well as other contributors invoked their 
history of positions in an attempt to legitimate their current position 
contrastively. 
I think this notion of the communicative career requires a little 
clarification in order to address some likely misunderstandings. In 
particular, I do not take it to mean something that tells you anything 
about the person named as such. Consistent with my appropriation of 
Luhmann and Foucault we are not here concerned with an individual's 
internal mental states. Rather it is intended to capture a sense of their 
history of public positions, their `track record' (which itself may be a 
matter of controversy, of observed in different ways) as understood in 
the media, and political systems 
- 
the way that they have been 
observed, the way that they have built up a pattern of associations, 
positions, and evaluations over time. 
In this regard, the notion of a `career' seems appropriate since it 
implies both a sense of development over time, but also admits the 
possibility that this development does not have a single trajectory. 
The concept does not preclude a relatively high degree of lateral 
movement 
- 
the possibility of some significant `careering about', 
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including fairly radical transformations. Indeed, if some version of 
confluence in relation to alliances and enmity is increasing in 
importance, then we might expect people to be observed as 
increasingly engaged in much such careering about. 
13.4.2. Conversion 
The possibility of radical change also makes relevant the metaphor of 
conversion as a tool through which significant such changes may be 
understood. I have already noted the way in which alleged converts 
can be used in attempts to bolster the case of the side they join 
- 
`see 
how our arguments have convinced a former opponent' 
- 
as well as 
some of the ambivalence that results from the different way that they 
are likely to be observed by the group left behind (as a traitor). 
We can enquire into the extent to which such positive and 
negative evaluations depend upon the stability of the relationship 
between the groups involved, or ask how large or intense a 
transformation has to be before it is described as a conversion? 
Should we conceive of a conversion as `a true political act' in Zizek's 
(2003: 39) sense of an action that significantly `changes the co- 
ordinates of the situation' 
- 
creating wider irritations or shock waves. 
How does it require realignment of other positions, and what sort of 
defensive discursive work might it incite from the group left behind? 
One possible approach to understanding the issues associated 
with this would be to study some examples where controversial or 
radical changes are observed to have taken place. These could be in a 
religious context, but also in relation to a political organisation's 
observed change of direction in policy, or high-profile political 
defections, or even other less obviously `Political' contexts such as the 
transfer of footballers or football managers between rival clubs (for 
example Sol Campbell's movement between Tottenham and Arsenal, 
or Harry Redknapp moving from Portsmouth to Southampton), and the 
way in which they are criticised and justified. What affects the way in 
which a conversion is observed? 
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13.5. Phases of Refolding or Reflection 
In relation to the developmental logic that we might associate with a 
`career', it might be tempting to consider whether or not various 
accusations and the disclaimers used to resist them themselves go 
through stages or phases of development. Might there be some sort of 
pattern regarding the reflexivity involved? The quotation, drawn from 
a work of fiction, at the start of this chapter implies one possible way 
of conceiving of their development, in that case the denial of being a 
Rosicrucian. 
The initial task in such a project would be to attempt to isolate 
the different discursive techniques or movements which can be 
observed, and based upon the contents of this thesis, and a little 
inference in trying to isolate the different processes, they might look 
something like this: 
" The making of a statement about something 
" Interventions making such a statement problematic and the 
circulation of its morally problematic status 
  




it is the accusers who are morally problematic 
  
The process of accusation is itself illegitimate 
  
Disclaiming an accusation whilst providing evidence 
  
Disclaiming is described as problematic 
-'well you would 
deny it' 
It is clear that deciding upon some sense of order of development, 
even for the purposes of analytical abstraction, is less than clear. 
It might be possible to connect them up with Baudrillard's 
(1983: 11-3) developmental logic relating to simulation, and whilst I 
am not put unduly put off by some of the ethical implications of his 
work, I think it important to retain some of messiness and complexity 
of the situation by refraining from forcing things to be neat. 
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Whilst some of these moments, movements, or techniques 
listed above logically precede others - the rendering of something as 
problematic is obviously a precondition for evasive discursive work 
being `necessary' 
- 
it is probably better to think of them as eventually 
ending up as co-present techniques, which may be incited or drawn 
upon variously by contributors. Nevertheless, it may be possible to 
identify some very general tendencies, and in a contemporary 
discursive context, the disclaiming of racism via the statement `I am 
not a racist but' is clearly at the stage where it is itself automatically 
rendered somewhat suspect (van Dijk, 1991,1992). 
In the Introduction I advanced the hope that some of the 
insights developed from this thesis might assist those marginalised by 
the processes of accusation 
- 
those excluded by it 
- 
and help them to 
develop more effective techniques of engaging with and resisting such 
marginalisation. Whilst I have not been assessing the degree of 
success of particular techniques, other than in a highly speculative or 
hypothetical way, at least one technique can be identified as unlikely 
to be successful in radically altering things in the long-term. Reversal 
- 
claiming that the accusers are the ones afflicted by whatever 
illegitimate influence is allegedly in operation 
- 
in particular would 
seem to be unlikely to be effective in the long term because it does 
nothing to undermine the significance of a given accusation since it is 
reliant upon the negative moral evaluation that is being resisted for its 
efficacy. It therefore reconfirms that evaluation as potentially 
available for future mobilisation. 
This thesis has blended together some aspects of the work of Foucault 
and Luhmann with insights from a variety of discourse analytic 
approaches to make sense of the circulation of and resistance to some 
of the moral asymmetrical distinctions, and the associated illegitimate 
identities they mobilised, which were observable in the context of the 
public debate surrounding the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. 
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It has identified a series of approaches used to problematise 
some of the central accusations of illegitimacy circulated, many of 
which were offshoots of disclaiming or ontological gerrymandering. 
The significance of each such accusation was explored in depth 
through the use of a large number of examples drawn from the public 
debates in the UK parliament, and the British national daily press. 
Amongst other things, the analysis of the examples undertaken 
has hopefully made a minor contribution to showing how even 
approaches emerging from a broadly anti-, or at least non-, humanist 
position can nevertheless be used to make sense of human experience, 
since it arguably provides some tools through which people can make 
sense of the way in which the discursive space into which they make 
contributions is reduced and squeezed around them. 
The high degree of recursivity or reflexivity that has apparently 
been involved in the `Iraq Crisis' makes it tempting to reach for a 
concept such as the ` double hermeneutic', since disclaiming is clearly 
a first-order as well as a second-order issue according to Giddens' 
(1984: 284) understanding 
- 
as many examples included here have 
indicated, actors themselves orientate towards it as a way of making 
sense of contributions to debate. 
If some of the insights generated by this thesis were to be 
appropriated and incorporated into political discourse, there are some 
possibilities that I would think highly unlikely. At least one prediction 
can be advanced with a relatively high degree of certainty. Contrary to 
the implications of the rather humorous quotation at the start of this 
chapter, I think it highly unlikely that avoidance of accusations of anti- 
Americanism, or appeasement, or whatever, will ever be best pursued 
via the curious double bluff of directly embracing the label that is in 
circulation! 
Although such an approach might have an initially rather 
disruptive impact, due to its being highly unexpected, it would soon be 
robbed of any radical potential, and once rendered problematic, if 
utilised, would soon tend to be followed by a `but... ' 
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Chronology of Some Key Events 
1917 
Ottoman Empire relinquishes control of Baghdad to Britain. 
1932 
Iraq granted independence from Britain. 
1968 
July 
A coup sees the Ba'ath party take control of Iraq. Ahmad Hassan at 
Bakr becomes president, with Saddam Hussein his deputy. 
1979 
16`" July 
Saddam Hussein replaces at Bakr as president of Iraq. 
18" July 
Infamous video footage is shot of the public `trial' of members of 
Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council accused of a plot against the 
leadership. Saddam Hussein reads out a list of names, and the accused 
are taken outside and executed. 
1980 
22"a September 
After a border dispute, the Iran-Iraq War starts with Iraqi air strikes 
against Iranian air bases. 
1988 
16 `" March 
Iraq uses chemical weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabjah. 
20`h August 
Iran-Iraq War ceasefire comes into effect. 
1990 
2n° August 
Iraq Invades Kuwait. 
UNSCR 660 condemns the invasion 
323 
7sß` August 
Coalition begins to deploy military forces in the Gulf region. 
25`h August 




authorisation of `all necessary means' to liberate 
Kuwait if Iraq does not withdraw before 15a' January 1991. 
1991 
16`h January 
US-led coalition begins Operation Desert Storm. 
2 7-281h February 
Hostilities end with the coalition having liberated Kuwait. 
3rd March 
Iraq accepts terms of ceasefire 
- 




cease-fire resolution requiring Iraq to destroy WMD 
programmes under the scrutiny of UN and IAEA inspections, as well 
as recognise the Kuwaiti border and return POWs. 
6`h April 
Iraq accepts UNSCR 687. 
17 `h June 
UNSCR 699 
- 
Iraq's liability for UNSCOM costs established. 
15: h August 
UNSCR 707 
- 
condemning Iraq's non-compliance, reasserting the 
need for complete disclosure of all WMD programmes and 




approving UNSCOM/IAEA plans for ongoing 
monitoring arrangements to implement 687 
1993 
July 
Inspection process begins. 
November 






the `Oil-for-food' programme is established, allowing 









condemning Iraq's refusal to grant full access to UN 





condemning the denial of access, and demanding 




condemning Iraqi restrictions of access to inspection 
sights as a `flagrant' violation of all previous resolutions (five Security 




condemning Iraqi non-compliance. 
1998 
February 
Iraq ceases completely cooperation with UN inspections. US and UK 
threaten military action as a response. 
20`h-23'd February 
Kofi Annan visits Iraq leading to an agreement on the procedures for 
the inspection of so-called presidential sites 
- 
what became known as 




endorsing the `Memorandum of Understanding' and 
describing the consequences for Iraq if it is violated. 
5th March 









rejecting Iraqi claims that the conditions of UNSCR 
687 should be modified, and condemning persistent non-cooperation. 
31 S` October 




condemning the end of cooperation, and again 
demanding `immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation'. 
14`x' November 
US and UK governments authorise air strikes against Iraq, but such 
action is averted when Iraq claims willingness to comply with UN 
requirements. 
16`h December 
UNSCOM withdraws from Iraq. 
16-19`h December 
US and UK governments launch ` Operation Desert Fox' 
- 
allied air 
strikes on suspected WMD sites. 
1999 
1 D`" January 
The Iraqi parliament calls for an end to cooperation until the sanctions 
regime is lifted 
171h December 
UNSCR 1284 passed 
- 




George W. Bush is elected 43`d President of the USA amid very 
controversial circumstances relating to the ballot procedures in 
Florida. 
13`ti December 




Inauguration of George W. Bush 
I Ph September 
Attacks on Pentagon and World Trade Centre. 
20`h September 




Reaffirming the UN's condemnation of 9-11, and 
calling for international cooperation in the prevention and suppression 
of terrorism. 
7`h October 
The US and UK begin air strikes against Afghanistan 
13`h November 
The Northern Alliance takes Kabul 
2002 
29`h January 
George W. Bush's State of the Union speech identifies Iraq as a 




reaffirming previous resolutions and adjusting the list 
of items available under UNSCR 986. 
9zh September 
International Institute of Strategic Studies publishes a strategic report 
on Iraq's WMD. 
12`h September 
George W. Bush begins to publicly make the case for war in an 
address at UN General Assembly, challenging the UN to act to 
implement disarmament. 
16`h September 
Iraq claims willingness to accept inspectors' unconditional return. 
24`h September 
UK government publishes its dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction (UK Government, 2002). 
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8h November 
Passage of UNSCR 1441 requiring reintroduction of UN inspectors 









reaffirming UNSCR 986. 
7th December 
Iraq submits a 12,000 page declaration on WMD as required by 
UNSCR 1441. 
19'x` December 
Hans Blix and Mohamed El-Baradei informally brief UN Security 




adjusting the goods available under UNSCR 986. 
2003 
9th January 
Blix and El-Baradei brief the UN Security Council. 
I1 ` h January 
British forces leave for the Gulf, lead by aircraft carrier HMS Ark 
Royal. 
27`h January 
Blix and El-Baradei brief the Council on the inspection process in 
relation to UNSCR 1441. 
3'd February 
Publication of the UK Government's ` dodgy dossier' on Iraq's efforts 
and infrastructure to conceal WMD. 
S`h February 
Colin Powell's presentation to the UN. 
14`h February 
Blix and El-Baradei brief an informal session of the Security Council. 
15: h February 
Massive, co-ordinated anti-war demonstrations occur worldwide. 
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26`h February 
121 Labour MPs rebel in a Commons vote on Iraq. 
1 S` March 
Turkish parliament refuses US permission to use Turkish air space or 
be stationed inside Turkey. 
7`h March 
Blix and El-Baradei brief the Security Council. 
US and UK abandon plans for a second UNSCR. 
16`h March 
The Azores Summit 
- 
Bush, Blair and Spanish Prime Minister Jose 
Maria Aznar meet to discuss their next move. 
17th March 
Diplomatic process at UN abandoned completely. Bush issues an 
ultimatum to Saddam Hussein 
- 
leave Iraq within 48 hours with your 
sons or face invasion. UN evacuates UNMOVIC inspectors from Iraq. 
Robin Cook resigns from the UK government 
18`h March 
Saddam Hussein rejects the ultimatum. 
Key House of Commons vote. Government wins support for invasion 
by a margin of 396-217, with 139 Labour rebels. 
19zß` March 
Hans Blix delivers his final inspection report to the UNSC. 
2dh March 
War/invasion (Operation Iraqi Freedom) begins in the form of a 
bombing campaign 




recognising the `occupying powers' and their 
responsibilities in relation to the people of Iraq and the provision of 
humanitarian aid. 
9`h April 
Toppling of Statue of Saddam Hussein in central square of Baghdad. 
I S` May 
Bush visits the US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and declares 





encouraging the efforts of the Iraqi people to form a 
representative government, and welcoming the humanitarian provision 
and other aid. 
2. Vh May 
Andrew Gilligan's broadcast on Radio Four accusing UK government 
of `sexing up' first dossier. 
Tony Blair visits Iraq 
6`h July 
BBC Governors announce their full backing for Gilligan 
9`h July 
Gilligan's source is revealed to be Dr David Kelly 
151, July 
Dr David Kelly's appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee 
18`h July 
Body of Dr David Kelly found. 
11 `h August 




welcoming the establishment of the Iraqi Governing 
Council, and establishing the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq 
(UNAMI). 
I1 `h September 
Intelligence Committee Report published saying September dossier 




reaffirming 1483 and 1373, stressing the sovereignty 
of the Iraqi people, condemning terrorist bombings and urging the 




noting that the situation in Iraq is a threat to 
international peace and security. 
13`h December 




Hutton Report (Hutton, 2004) clears government of wrongdoing, and 
heavily criticises the BBC, leading to the resignations of Chairman 
Gavin Davies and eventually the removal of Director General Greg 
Dyke. 
At a Senate Committee meeting, David Kay claims everyone was 
almost completely wrong in believing Saddam had stockpiles of 
WMD. 
3rd February 
Butler Inquiry announced. 
21 S` April 
UNSCR 1538 
- 
announcing formation of a high-level inquiry into 





positively anticipating Iraq's transition to democracy. 
28`h June 
Coalition hands over `sovereignty' to Iraqi Governing Council, two 
days earlier than planned. 
14`h July 




extending the mandate of UNAMI for 12 months. 
October 
Publication of ISG interim report into Iraq's WMD. 
8`h November 
Operation Phantom Fury 
- 
US attack on Fallujah. 
21 S` December 
Tony Blair visits Baghdad. 
2005 
12`x` January 
Announcement that the Iraqi Survey Group was leaving Iraq and 
preparing its final report, to be delivered spring 2005. 
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30`h January 
Elections held in Iraq. 
For a more detailed account of the inspections process between 
1993 and early 1999, see Trevan (1999: 393-416). 
Full details of all UN Security Council Resolutions relating to 
Iraq can be accessed from: www. un. orR/docshmsc resolutions. html 
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